Climate Change and UK Public Policy - Research Paper Example

CLIMATE CHANGE AND UK PUBLIC POLICY Introduction In line with the adage “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” it is important for mitigation efforts to begin as soon as possible in order to reduce the needed adaptation measures in the future. Studies that start out as scientific analyses eventually end up as recommendation for a set of market-based policies constituting near-term mitigations strategies, that put a price on emissions, at first in modest levels but gradually increasing with the passage of time (Dessler & Parson, 2010, p. 158). Climate-change issues are not new, having arisen in the 1990s, but other than its mention in policy agendas no concrete action has been undertaken in the U.S. until 2008, although in the European Union, leading member states initiated some important first steps. These measures, however, still fell short. In late 2007 to 2008, updated scientific assessments drew public attention (Dessler & Parson, 2010, p. 161). The imperatives that climate change imposes are unquestionable. According to Mabey (2007), greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are at a level higher than at any time else in the past 650,000 years, and there has been an average rise of 0.7 degrees Celsius in average global temperatures since 1900. Global temperatures will continue to rise over the remainder of this century, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and that by 2100 global temperatures will rise by anywhere between 1.1 to 6.4 degrees Celsius (interestingly, this is contrary to the 2008 report by the Committee on Climate Change, which forecast a temperature rise of less than one per cent by 2100). Sea levels will rise by 28 to 43 cm., causing people in low-lying areas to abandon their homes; the number and severity of heatwaves will increase, and tropical storms will intensify. All high-stakes undertaking demand that choices be made, some of which are painful in the near term, and uncertainties are so pronounced that even modest results are never guaranteed. All the same, a balance must be struck between prudent near-term actions, continuing learning and information gathering, and a readiness to adapt existing programs and earlier decisions in response to changes in knowledge and situations. As a theoretical premise, decision-making under conditions of uncertainty are generally understood and widely accepted as a matter of principle, but their application to climate-change and global warming issues have proved to be extremely contentious (Dessler & Parson, 2010, p.158) Economic Policy Sir Nicholas Stern’s review of the economics of climate change asserts that the overall cost of climate change may conceivably result in a permanent reduction of 20 per cent in the annual global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2100 (Stern, 2006), a figure already contended in the preceding section. Assuming this, the alternative to not mitigating or adapting to climate change imperatives, however, is far more costly. Mabey (2007) paints a grim picture of the economic implications. Evidence suggests that water shortages will affect billions of people, major food producing and exporting countries will experience crop losses, and certain irreversible damages will affect whole ecosystems vital to world ecology, like the Amazon rainforests and the coral reefs. The elevated temperatures will spawn the proliferation of diseases, and floods in polluted areas will likely spread water-borne diseases such as cholera (Shepherd, 2006, p. 30). In the 2008 report published by the Committee on Climate Change, it was noted that technological changes and shifts in consumer expenditure will likely result in the demise of some existing economic activities and jobs, and the birth of other activities and jobs. Overall, the net effect on the generation of jobs is expected to be positive, although total effect on income may be slightly negative due to the higher cost of clean power. It is expected, however, that losses in certain sectors will be offset by gains in others. The report further elaborated on three categories of economic effects, namely: 1. Multiple macroeconomic adjustments – The consumption of goods and services inherently carbon intensive will drop, and productive resources will be shifted to the production of goods and services with lower carbon content or which are less carbon-intense. As for job creation, the table following provides the sample estimates of new employment, from low-carbon energy production (Source: Committee on Climate Change, 2008, p. 378). While the report makes the caveat that precise estimates of the effect on employment is impossible to gauge at the sectoral level, the overall macroeconomic effect could be, in the words of the report, “predicted with confidence.” They are, however, contingent upon the adoption of the appropriate macro-economic and labour market policies. Furthermore, if there would happen to be an increase in fiscal revenue arising from climate policies sufficient to offset reduction in tax on employment, the net effect would lean towards increasing the attainable employment rate. 2. Negative effects on GDP – Achieving emissions reduction has the clear possibility of creating a net negative effect on the aggregate productivity of the whole economy, and thereby national income. Abatement actions will necessitate investment either in new energy sources or in energy efficiency improvement, which is expected to have lower rates of return. These are expected to be due to higher energy costs, energy efficiency improvement, lifestyle changes that lead to reduced energy consumption and production, and competitiveness impact should UK reduce emissions more quickly than the rest of the EU (CCC, 2008, p. 384). 3. Emergence of new high-value sectors – Opportunities abound for the UK to gain competitive advantage from attaining a position of innovative leadership. This implies that the UK must provide support for ambitious emissions reduction targets at the European level, because the change will tend to drive productivity growth Union-wide, which redounds to the benefit of the UK. Higher European productivity and subsequently incomes will provide a stimulus for demand for goods or services wherein UK wields competitive advantage. Foreign Policy As noted by Sinha (2009), the UK is one of the signatories to the Kyoto Protocol and thus is bound to comply with its mandatory provisions particularly for the reduction of CO2 emissions. The UK had promptly reoriented its energy policies, in compliance with measures to realized the emissions reduction target of 12.5 per cent reduction below 1990 levels, from the year 2008 to 2012. What makes the UK effort particularly remarkable, however, is the fact that it has imposed upon itself the more stringent goal of cutting carbon dioxide emission by 20 per cent in 2012 – 7.5 percentage points higher than the Kyoto requirement. The European Union had likewise ambitious goals in emission reduction, adopting the catch phrase “2020 by 2020” which implied a 20 per cent reduction in CO2 emissions, together with an increase in renewable energy by 20 per cent by the year 2020. Far from being divergent from the EU approach, the UK initiative may be said to have influenced this inspiration to “act beyond the defined” framework. Such an approach leading to a low carbon economy “outlines a broad outlook towards the EU and inclines towards the ‘practical’ rather than ‘integrationist’” (Sinha, 2009). Thus by opting out from the EU climate change integration, the UK nevertheless had outdone the same targets, differentiating itself while attaining the same objectives. Harris (2007) recounts that in the 1970s and 1980s, European states and NGOs decried the UK’s lack of participation in the adoption of climate change measures and denounced it as the “Dirty Man” of Europe. The UK dragged its feet in international negotiations and in efforts at the formulation of a common European environmental policy. As a nation, however, the UK had more than fulfilled the same commitments contained in the agreements, and by the 1990s altered its strategic approach and took the lead in the concerted European environmental law efforts. The British and Germans led the overall CO2 emissions reductions in the EU, substantially enabling the EU to take an aggressive position in international CO2 reduction commitments. The UK also figured significantly as a go-between in the EU-US dialogue, during the negotiations leading to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and the Hague/Bonn agreements to implement the Kyoto Protocol (p. 63-64). There were three notable period in the evolution of British policy on climate change. The first and most important phase occurred in 1988-1992, characterized by hostility between UK and the European Commission over environmental policy. The governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major sought to restrict the role of the EC in determining the UK government’s ability to pursue British preferences. The second period was from 1995-1997 characterized by intense negotiations leading to the Kyoto protocol. During this period, the UK and EC aligned more closely, with the UK electing to extend its cooperation with its European partners in international GCC policy. However, it withheld commitment to common European policy initiatives towards the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, because it was seen to threaten British economic interests. Finally the third period was post 1997 to present, and focused on failure of the Hague negotiations to create. For the greater part of the time, the British position aligned closely with the EU. However, the two clashed over issues of American participation in the climate agreement, but its efforts to bridge the gap between the EU and US failed. British environmental policy had been largely influenced by domestic political norms that usually ran against continental norms. Viewed as legitimate by domestic political actors, the norms limited the range of internationally policy outcomes acceptable domestically. This creates pressure for the government to internationalize domestic policy norms in an attempt to limit adjustment costs locally. This resulted in three levels of normative debate surround political response to GCC: the domestic, the EU and the international level, all of which are interlinked with one another (Harris, 2007, p.65). Implications of climate change considerations for future directions in foreign policy are expressed by Mabey (2007), stressing that at the heart of UK foreign policy should be UK’s aggressive approach to environmental and resource issues, together with concerns of security and prosperity. In this, there are three priorities: (1) action to improve UK’s own performance on environmental issues, such as reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and enhancement of coordination and coherence of UK environmental policy: (2) promotion of a bigger role for Europe in addressing climate change; and (3) measures to strengthen global environmental governance and enhance international cooperation in this area. These efforts should be both at governmental and at private sector level. Mabey further observes that UK foreign policy should also take into consideration the risks that the worsening climate conditions would disproportionately affect the world’s poorest people. Three out of four natural disasters are weather related, such as droughts, floods and cyclones. Furthermore, there is heightened risk of instability and violent conflict, as natural resources wealth has been observed to be at the crux of poverty and unrest. Politicized allocation of water and land and the revenues therefrom, along ethnic, religious or regional lines, could potentially drive low-level conflict that may erupt into major violence. UK foreign policy should be prepared to address these distinct possibilities. Energy Policy In 2003, the energy policy perspective favored the installation of wind and gas-powered generation facilities. Today UK wind power generation receives one of the most substantial renewal energy subsidies in Europe, and has further committed to pursue a fast-track program intended to boost its current 5% share of electricity output to 32% by 2020. However, such overly optimistic goals have proven to be too costly. It was noted that, when wind level drops, back-up capacity is required in the form of carbon-emitting fossil fuel generation – in short, resorting to additional “dirty” capacity to support the shortfall in “clean” wind power. Another alternative targetted by UK’s energy policy is the carbon capture and storage (CCS). Otherwise known as“clean coal,” CCS is now being given the support necessary to develop it to commercial-scale deployment. According to the UK Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC), “the rationale for government intervention relates to the need to overcome innovation market failures, which will result in suboptimal levels of investment” (Datamonitor, 2010, p. 161). The new Energy Bill has thus provided for a levy on energy bills that will fund up to four CCS projects at a cost of £7.2-9.5 billion. Another alternative was revisited in 2006, when in a sudden change of policy, the government declared that it was supporting nuclear power generation, despite earlier ruling it out. Then at the beginning of 2010, the government acknowledge the increasing important role that nuclear energy will be playing in bridging the growing power generation gap; it has began to expedite the planning process and to set out sites considered for new nuclear power stations. Imperatives for climate change notwithstanding, the UK’s energy policy has fallen short of providing the necessary regulatory frameworks to significantly and sustainably reduce global carbon emissions according to Datamonitor, January 2010. The UK’s Renewables Obligation, which may be regarded as the most expensive renewable support schemes in the developed world, has failed to encourage the investments that are needed to yield the scale of renewable power supply originally projected, ending up producing very little “green” power. This is directly attributable to the lack of a responsive regulatory environment. It is therefore highly doubted that renewable power generation and energy efficiency alone will not be able to sustain future energy needs and demand for power and gas in the UK, much less address the long-term need for global carbon abatement. It is thus no surprise that nuclear energy has become an attractive alternative, since it is the only carbon-free technology that may be assured of supply while at the same time ensuring salient levels of baseload power (Datamonitor, 2010, p. 159). Upon announcement of further green measures to be adopted by the government, Energy secretary Ed Miliband further unfolded a plan for seven million homes to benefit by a pay-as-you-can energy makeover, consisting of grants which would pay back through savings in energy bills. Miliband admits that low-carbon energy will be more expensive for customers, although he emphasized the fact that even prices for conventional high-carbon fuels such as gas and coal may be expected to rise due to stronger demand from China and India (Telegraph.uk, 2009). In sum, the present energy policy to cut carbon emissions through reduction in energy demand provides a welcome respite from the impending power generation shortfall in nuclear and coal generation capacity. Government will have to fast-track supply development in the form of renewable, clean energy sources, in order to bridge the shortfall and meet the projected demand of a developing nation. Future prospects for the UK Directions for progressive UK action: Mabey, p. 105 1. Pursue deeper reductions in UK greenhouse gas emissions. By all indications, the UK will only achieve a 16.2 per cent reduction in CO2 emission below 1990 levels by 2010, which falls short of its targeted 20 per cent reduction. This would include road, rail and air traffic policy, energy policy, and lifestyle alteration on the part of individuals and companies. Failing these targets at home, UK would not be able to command credibility in the international sphere. 2. Increase its funding for global environmental initiatives. The UK currently spends £130 million per year on international environmental programs; however, this sum pales beside the contributions of other European countries, with several initiatives such as the low-carbon technology cooperation grossly limited by lack of financing. 3. Enhance assistance to developing countries in coping with environmental challenges. There is a critical need to employ development cooperation policies to benefit the poorer countries and equip them with the capability to better manage their environmental capital and services and engage in natural wealth accounting. Intergovernmental cooperation could also create bilateral instruments to prevent trade in illegally harvested resources. The UK should also support efforts at land reform, reforms to tenure systems, new approaches to water allocation systems and forestry-use rights, the cornerstone of which is the right to environmental justice, consultation and redress. 4. Improve internal coordination and quality of decision making on environmental issues. Risk management of environment and resource issues should be made a core competence at the centre of government, based on a joint international strategy that ensures environmental and resource issues are mainstreamed into the appropriate government units. 5. Strengthening mechanism for greater democratic accountability and oversight of the UK’s international policy on environmental issues, beginning with a clear UK international environmental strategy including, but going beyond, climate change. REFERENCES Climate Change Act 2008 The Stationery Office Ltd. (STO) Committee on Climate Change 2008 Building a low-carbon economy – the UK’s contribution to tackling climate change. London: The Stationery Office (TSO) Datamonitor 2010 Copenhagen is the ideal pretext to address the failing state of UK energy policy. MarketWatch: Energy. January 2010. Retrieved 18 March 2010 from http://www.datamonitor.com Dessler, A & Parson, E A 2010 The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: A Guide to the Debate, 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Harris, P G 2007 Europe and global climate change: politics, foreign policy and regional cooperation. Cheltenham Glos, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Mabey, N 2007 Sustainability and Foreign Policy, in Held, D & Mepham, D eds. Progressive foreign policy: new directions for the UK 2007 Cambridge, UK: Polity Press Shepherd, W 2006 England’s Climate & Energy Politics. Rye, Sussex: Cliff Edge Signalling Company (CESC) Sinha, U K 2009 Climate Change and Foreign Policy: The UK Approach. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Stern, N et al. 2006 Stern Review: the economics of climate change, London: HMSO. Telegraph.co.uk 2009 Society must change to tackle global warming, says Ed Miliband. 15 July 2009. Retrieved 17 March 2010 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/5834236/Society-must-change-to-tackle-global-warming-says-Ed-Miliband.html Read More