Environmental Policy Making and Pressure Groups - Research Proposal Example

1.0 Proposed “Environmental Policy Making and Pressure Groups: a Constructive Interaction or Just a Surface Approach?” 2.0 Rationale The environmental issues have been extensively been researched over the last decade by well established academics and practitioners. Environmental Policy Makers are often under the influence of high pressure groups that eventually are sought to have a profound impact on Regulation. However, the degree of the impact is not yet thoroughly investigated. Therefore, the rationale behind the choice of the thesis lies in the fact that there is evidence that Environmental interest groups can influence the lobbying of Policy making and not the actual outcome. 2.0 Aims and Objectives The overall aim of the research project is to increase knowledge upon the degree to which the impact of pressure groups can prove effective in measuring actual outputs generated with regards to Policy and Regulation formulation. The objectives, sought to be accomplished are: to investigate whether pressure groups can have a positive effect towards developing sustainable environmental protection policies, rather than regulation that is directed towards single-case environmental damage controls. to explore whether the concentration and intensity (strength) of environmental groups is the main determinant of the subjected positive effect to identify any potential threats (negative relationship) between pressure groups and actual environmental policies formulated. 4.0 Literature Review Growing importance is attributed to the degree in which environmentalists – namely interest and pressure groups – can actually and substantially affect the Regulatory process in Environmental issues. To this extend, much debate is available in literature as to the degree of the positive impact and in some cases the negative influence. Binder and Neumayer (2005) suggest that although there is undeniable empirical research that suggests the effectiveness of pressure groups to policy making, there is also the opposing view, which stresses an adverse impact. Focusing on ENGOs (Environmental Non-Government Organizations), they eventually conclude that these groups can ultimately raise concerns and questions as to the structure and the essence of Regulation, however, they cannot affect the actual output. Porteiro (2001) argues that environmental interest groups can on the one hand be credited with the increase in the sensitivity towards ‘green’ approach, nevertheless can also be attributed the emergence of new generated costs. In more details, the argument lies in the fact that such organizations lack the epistemological infrastructure to disclose information that is scientifically underlined. Thus, when raising an issue with regards to damage to the environment, policy makers cannot simply rely on comments or testimonials of ‘environmentalists’; they need to engage into scientific research that will enable the testing of any claims and suggestions. This research is often associated with large amounts of capital committed; a fact that proves inefficient in most of the cases. For this very reason, the Regulatory process becomes a complex procedure that needs to either be directed towards increasing awareness of environmental issues or towards minimizing the budget construed. (Dal Bo and DiTella, 2003) Roediger-Schluga (2004) claims that pressure groups which are basically the first interest parties, that due to the high involvement in environmental protection, to identify any potential threats and raised concerns, can have a strong positive influence of policy makers. Particularly, he argues that such groups in the onset of new information for environmental hazards or general damage, tend to vigorously demand immediate and active policy regulation. To this end, Dal Bo and DiTella (2003) agree that environmental organizations pressure Regulatory process design by amplifying threats and gradually manage to influence the decision making procedure by posing a dilemma: either to proceed to a highly visible environmental policy intervention or to deal with public awareness and thus, undesirable attitude on the part of the society. Conclusively pressure groups can, due to their nature and the constantly increasing public interest, influence to a great extend the policy formulation with regards to environmental protection. Environmental issues are also highly credited by the media as well, as there is a growing attention of the audiences (Roediger-Schluga, 2004). The media itself, constitute a significant pressure to the development and the implementation of Environmental Regulation; this highlights another source of significant influence on behalf of interest groups. In more details, Boyer and Laffont (1999) critically stress that the importance of environmental subjects attributed by the media, has significantly contributed to the constantly increasing power of non-government environmental organizations. Thus, it becomes evident, that interest and pressure groups can also indirectly pose a vital role in the formulation of regulation. Dal Bo and DiTela (2003) further suggest that excessive media exposure is a one-way approach; policy makers cannot ignore it and thus proceed to actions. Are these actions, however, intended to support sustainable environmental protection or are they more oriented towards filling gaps according to each specific case exposed? Bernauer and Caduff (2004) strongly argue that the incentives of ENGOs are generally driven from the need to increase environmental protection standards. For this reason, targeting the influence on Regulation lobbying becomes essential; however, the competition with industry lobbies increases dramatically as more issues of environmental damage are generated. This subjected competition, poses pressures to the policy makers, who eventually focus on the more concentrated power. This means, that the influence of pressure groups largely depends on the concentration and the intensity of non-government environmental organizations; that is the strength of the groups (Binder and Neumayer, 2005). 5.0 Methodology Due to the nature of the subject and its qualitative approach towards the issue of the degree of effectiveness of environmental pressure groups on policy makers and consequently on Environmental Regulation, the method that the researcher decided to employ is the use of case studies (O’Rourke and Macey, 2003). The current project will rely upon both quantitative and qualitative data to draw conclusions upon the hypothesis and eventually test the overall validity. The case studies will be applied to three states in the European Union (United Kingdom, Austria, and Spain) and will include semi-structured interviews addressed to Non-Government Environmental Organizations (ENGOs) as well as agency officials and Government representatives. In addition, the quantitative data will be obtained from each country’s Official Records with regards to the processes of Environmental Regulation. Finally, the responses that are to be generated by the interviews will be cross-referenced with the public records in order to obtain credible and reliable information (O’Rourke and Macey, 2003). 6.0 Time Schedule December 2008 – January 2009 Collection of Secondary and Quantitative Data on the Regulation and Environmental Policies for the three chosen countries February 2009 – June 2009 Conduction of Semi-Structured Interviews addressed to Environmental Groups (ENGOs) July 2009 – September 2009 Analysis and Statistical Process of data obtained October 2009 – November 2009 Implementation and Completion of the Project. References Bernauer, T., and Caduff, L. (2004). In Whose Interest? Pressure Group Politics, Economic Competition and Environmental Regulation. Journal of Public Policy. Vol. 24, No.1, pp. 99 - 126 Binder, S., and Neumayer, E. (2005). Environmental Pressure Group Strength and Air Pollution: An Empirical Analysis." Ecological Economics. Vol. 55, No. 4, pp. 527 - 538 Boyer, M. and Laffont, J. J. (1999) .Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation. Rand Journal of Economics. Vol. 30, pp. 137 - 157. Dal Bo, E., and DiTella, R. (2003) Capture by Threat. Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 111, No. 5, pp. 1123 - 1154 O’Rourke, D., and Macey, G.P. (2003). Community Environmental Policing: Assessing New Strategies of Public Participation in Environmental Regulation. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 383 – 414 Porteiro, N. (2008). Pressure Groups and Experts in Environmental Regulation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 156 - 175. Roediger-Schluga, T. (2004). The Porter Hypothesis and the Economic Consequences of Environmental Regulation: A Neo-Schumpeterian Approach. UK. Edward Elgar Publishing Unknown, (2007). CIWEM Policy Position Statement No 5: Professional Bodies, Pressure Groups and the Political Process. Water and Environment Journal. Volume 13, Issue 2, pp. 149 - 150 Read More