Policy Diffusion as an Effective Approach Towards Conducting Comparative Public Policy Analysis - Example

Policy Diffusion as an Effective Approach Towards Conducting Comparative Public Policy Analysis Introduction This research work analyses the effectiveness of policy diffusion in conducting comparative public policy analysis. This work argues that policy diffusion does not constitute an effective approach for conducting comparative public policy analysis. The following discussion proves this contention. Policy diffusion can be described as the policy of a particular government being influenced by other governments’ options. This brings to the fore the significance of policy diffusion. As such, there are very few governmental policies that have been selected solely for internal reasons. Thus, policy makers rely upon insights and instances of similar policies of other governments. Due to the contemporary unprecedented interconnectedness of the world, policies tend to be formulated based on the constraints and opportunities envisaged by policy makers at the international, national, state, regional and local levels[Shi121]. Thus, policy diffusion emerges from government policy decisions that have been methodically moulded by the prior policy choices made in other nations. Thus, Gilardi, Füglister and Luyet had discerned that nations had a greater likelihood of adopting reforms to hospital financing when other nations had benefitted from such reforms[Gil121]. Rogers, a pioneer in diffusion research, had defined the process of diffusion as a variety of social change that was based upon communication, ideas, and information. Research in diffusion has been conducted in several professional disciplines, including business, communications, economics, education, geography, sociology and organisational studies[Mos03]. Another definition of policy diffusion is that it is a process, wherein policy choices of a unit are influenced by the policy choices in other units. This definition has been derived from a very general definition provided by Strang, which states that policy diffusion is any process where the previous adoption of a characteristic or practice in a population changes the prospect of implementation for the remaining non-adopters. This definition is applicable to countries, states in a country, cities, firms and other units; institutions; several types of political conduct; and politics. As such, this definition is precise, because it stresses upon the reality that diffusion is distinguished by inter-dependence[Mag16].Convergence and diffusion are clearly distinct, and the former denotes the phenomenon of policies of different units becoming more and more similar with the passage of time[Shi121]. In addition, it becomes possible to arrive at better differentiated predictions, upon undertaking a comparative analysis of various policies, vis-à-vis the reason for some policies exhibiting diffusion. The initial policy diffusion studies had combined several policies. However, they had failed to include the impact of internal determinants. In addition, they had been devoid of the ability to scrutinise them for disparities in the diffusion configurations of these policies[van121]. Nevertheless, several of the newer studies have incorporated various policies in their datasets. All the same, these studies have failed to disclose insight pertaining to the influence of policy specific disparities upon the process of diffusion. Contemporary research has incorporated policy specific differences. In fact, Nicholson-Crotty had analysed 57 policies and concluded that diffusion was greater in policies with high prominence and low intricacy[van121]. Moreover, lawmakers had a greater propensity to reject policy learning and focus upon short-term electoral benefit. Based on Rogers’ work, Makse and Volden had assessed the impact of policy traits upon the likelihood of policy adoption. These characteristics include, comparative benefit, compatibility of previous ideas, intricacy, observability, and the extent to which innovation could be modified. Upon subjecting 27 major criminal justice policies of the US to analysis, it was discerned that learning from other states had been increased with regard to the highly observable policies[van121]. However, this had been reduced when the states could undertake internal trials instead of depending upon external experiments. Moreover, with respect to diffusion possibilities, it has been noticed that an interesting phenomenon is provided by policy specific networks of the regional political bodies. Since the 1980s, local and regional entity networks had burgeoned across Europe in several policy domains. The cardinal objective of these networks is that of sharing policy measures from leaders in the related areas[van121]. This has been cited as the reason behind the establishment of these networks by certain city-regions. Furthermore, these networks endeavour to obtain new information by interacting with other city regions that address the same problems as these networks. Some of the successful networks include, POLIS in the domain of public transport and Les Rencontres in the domain of cultural policy. The diffusion processes in these networks have not been researched to any appreciable extent [van121]. As such, there is an absence of studies that had systematically examined the success of policy diffusion in these networks. Additionally, policy diffusion has been linked to a shift in incentives by conditionality and policy leadership theories. On the other hand, the hegemonic ideas theory associated diffusion to a shift in ideas. As such, these studies are unified by their emphasis upon the impact of an external source of ideas or pressure. It has been noticed that these mechanisms function in tandem frequently. For example, the US promotes tariffs reduction in bilateral ties, promotes it in NAFTA negotiations, reduces tariffs with the expectation that other nations will adopt the same practice, and facilitates academic research relating to tariff barriers[Dob07]. Thus, the developed nations engage in competition by adopting policies that promote market harmonisation and market conforming policies. As the governments are aware of the identity of their competitors, they can correlate policy options to competitive benefits. The policies that could render one’s jurisdiction beneficial in the long term usually fail to influence short term decisions of investors or traders. Consequently, the theorists of competition concentrate on policies that have short-term outcomes, including capital account liberalisation and tax concessions[Dob07]. Nevertheless, it is the intention of scholars in comparative public policy analysis to undertake systematic depiction and to describe the decisions of governments, their scheduling and gist. In this endeavour, several strategies have come to the fore, with a view to ascertain the conduct of government and decisional output, such as instance legislative acts, administrative circulars or executive decrees[Sch123]. For example, the impact of policies is measured by one group of scholars. This is undertaken by analysing the effects of policies on the regulation target. Another group of researchers concentrates upon policy outcomes or the immediate consequences of a policy decision[Sch123]. In addition, another approach draws upon policy outputs or the content of the decision. For instance, regarding the social policy field, one could possibly consider the policies that provide protection from unemployment[Sch123]. In this regard, the immediate policy output is indicated by the decision to bring in monetary unemployment benefits at specific levels. This could be approximated by making a reference to total government spending on this specific social protection scheme, or in the alternative by measuring, the impact of the policy decision on the regulatory target, including the number or the quality of life of the unemployed individuals[Sch123]. Moreover, regarding the field of environmental policy-making one could consider emission standards for industrial plants. The standard is defined with respect to a maximum value for the emissions of sulphur dioxide. On the other hand, the related policy impact would be determined by the related change in industrial emissions and the quality of the air, regarding that specific substance[Sch123]. These instances demonstrate the substantial risk of incompatibility and incommensurability that emerge from the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the policy decision of the government or the dependent variable. From the point of view of policy cycle, policy output, policy outcome or impact, refer to the various stages of the policy process. All the same a distinction persists between policy outputs and their consequences. Policy output is fundamentally a component of the policy formulation phase; whereas, policy outcome relates to the implementation stage. Nevertheless, a distinction exists between policy outputs and their outcomes and impacts[Sch123]. This is about temporal patterns, as well as the potentially large number of intervening factors that affect the outcome of policy decisions. For instance, around four decades ago, Collier and Messick had assessed whether the adoption of the first national social legislation, in combination with certain domestic factors, could be ascribed to the diffusion of international policy. These scholars had demonstrated that in a sample of 59 nations, the pioneers had introduced their initial programme at a higher level of economic development, in comparison to the stragglers[Obi131]. This was because these laggards could benefit from the experiences of the pioneering countries. Subsequently, Alber investigated as to whether the Bismarckian social legislation of Germany had produced conclusive effects upon other nations, which could have promoted its propagation in the other nations of Western Europe. Alber arrived at the conclusion that German social insurance could not be deemed a successful export product. These findings were reinforced by Kuhnle, with regard to the Nordic nations, as Norway proved to be the sole nation to adopt a few of these social insurance principles. On the other hand, Hennock had determined that some of the Bismarckian social insurance principles had been replicated in the UK, in the aftermath of David Lloyd George’s sojourn through Germany in the year 1908[Obi131]. In addition, the researchers Abbott and DeViney employed sophisticated statistical procedures for analysing sequences in the adaption of some welfare programmes in 18 well to do industrial nations. These scholars discovered that the advent of accident insurance, family benefits and unemployment compensation adhered to a specific sequential pattern that was independent of specific correlations between countries[Obi131]. Moreover, the literature relating to international relations does not include any presumption that the import of foreign models can improve the efficiency or effectiveness of the importing nation. The scholars, whose work is based upon these perspectives, usually overlook the issue of effectiveness. All the same, such literature bestows less attention upon learning as a system of diffusion. On the other hand, it suggests that importing external models, due to competition, coercing or imitation, generally culminates in policy ineffectiveness and dysfunction[Mar092]. In addition, the point of view that governments imitate others with a view to conform with the overriding templates of suitable conduct and behaviour is diametrically opposed to the view that policy diffusion is a logical process that entails the substitution of ignorance with knowledge, to improve functional results. This contention has derived support from empirical studies that have demonstrated that the policies nations should adopt for resolving a specific issue are not the policies that they actually adopt for legitimacy or prestige purposes[Mar092]. Furthermore, if nations have been obliged to adopt specific policies by powerful external entities, then the policies themselves could be intrinsically inappropriate for the local conditions, or could be compromised by the resentful national entities during their execution. Even if one were to presume that learning had a function, entities could have limited logicality. Therefore, they could arrive at inappropriate generalisations because of a small number of proximate instances [Mar092]. In addition, this could make them firm believers in their initial conclusions despite the presence of repeated refutations. Thus, the body of literature on policy diffusion endeavours to elucidate the propagation of certain policies among units at the local, state and national levels. It does this by isolating causes and factors that support policy diffusion. With a view to diminishing the intricacy involved in comparing public policy making over cases or units, the scholars of policy diffusion subject policy innovations or single policies to analysis by describing the causative adoption patterns over time and units[Sch123]. As such, policy diffusion scholars attempt to explain the dissemination of policies by presuming that policy options are interrelated. In this manner, diffusion scholars endeavour to assess international influence upon the policy decisions at the national level. Policy diffusion research emerged in the 1970s, and it has achieved considerable sophistication, notably regarding the development of impressive research methods to uncover diffusion channels[Sch123]. In this regard, Rogers has defined diffusion as the process that is involved in the communication of an innovation via specific channels over time among the members of a social system. The American states can be regarded as a social system, and this has been the perspective of the students of state policy innovation. These scholars claim that the state policy adoption pattern emerges from states that mimic the behaviour of other states. As such, several disparate diffusion models have been developed[Sab09]. The basic difference between these models is the channels of communication and influence that is presumed to exist. Thus, it has been claimed that states emulate each other for the following fundamental reasons: first, states learn from one another, since they share innovations that they regard as having achieved success in other places. In this regard, Walker had resorted to the classic model of incremental decision making to conjecture that state policy makers envisaging intricate issues fall back upon decision making shortcuts[Sab09]. Furthermore, Lindblom had contended that a crucial simplification process was to limit consideration to alternatives that were marginally at variance from the status quo. Moreover, Walker had claimed that another simplification method was to select alternatives that had been adopted and had proved successful in other states. Thus, by illustrating the manner in which the adoption of other states’ innovations can promote simplification of complex decisions, the theorists of policy diffusion have shown how the implementation of non-incremental policies can be consistent with the logic upon which incrementalism is based[Sab09]. Second, the states are in competition with each other and imitate the policies adopted by other states. This is done for gaining an economic advantage over other states or to circumvent some disadvantage. Thus, states may reduce welfare benefits to the levels of the other states to avoid the migration of the poor to their state from the other states. Moreover, a state could provide games of chance in its jurisdiction, with a view to prevent its residents from visiting another state that allows gambling. Furthermore, a state could adopt the economic development incentive programmes of another state to preclude business concerns from shifting their operations to a state with such incentives[Sab09]. Third, Walker had claimed that regardless of the autonomy of states in a federal system, there is a compulsion to conform to the standards that have become entrenched at the regional or national level. This pressure compels states to adopt programmes that have been adopted by the other states. Moreover, federal mandates coerce the states to accept certain standards. At the same time, there is normative pressure upon a state to adopt the best practices prevailing in the other states[Sab09]. As such, diffusion studies concentrate upon the policy of a specific government and its correlation with such policies in other governments. This poses the danger of neglecting the fact that these policies are selected by persons with individual preferences, capabilities and objectives. As such, several quantitative studies on policy diffusion have concentrated exclusively upon government policies and the manner in which they cluster territorially[Gra132]. However, these studies have failed to take into consideration the entities that facilitate the adoption of these policies. Internal Actors In the context of potentially adopting polities, the entities that discharge a major function in policy adoption tend to be well known to the political scientists, including the electorate, interest groups, policy advocates, elected politicians, and appointed bureaucrats. In conjunction with their preferences, objectives, capabilities and the environment in which they function, these policy makers are critically important for comprehending diffusion[Gra132]. Moreover, it is feasible for the preferences of policy makers to be dependent upon individual opinions and experiences, or they could be derived from the preferences of interest groups or the electorate. These predilections frequently influence the range of policy options that policy makers contemplate. Consequently, preferences affect the possibility of a specific policy being disseminated from one state to another. A visible and tangible point of commencement is provided by preferences. Subsequently, it becomes indispensable to consider the capabilities and goals, and to determine the manner in which these capabilities can limit the achievement of goals. It has been conceded that the goals of the policy makers can be categorised as political goals, such as maintenance of power, appearance of legitimacy, re-election and re-appointment; and policy goals, including the adoption of beneficial policies and luring large tax bases[Gra132]. As such, policy makers who are in search of best policies tend to gather information regarding policies adopted in other states. Among these policy makers, those with wider economic and budgetary issues to contend with, could consider themselves to be in competition with other states and could therefore adopt policies that would be to their benefit. Moreover, policy makers working at the behest of powerful leaders who require to appear legitimate could adopt policies that have been declared appropriate by such leaders[Gra132]. Furthermore, the prior adopters conduct themselves proactively and strategically and do not prefer to rest on their laurels. For instance, they could review and modify their taxation policies, to benefit businesses, in the wake of greater tax incentives from their competing states[Gra132]. Furthermore, their regulatory norms could become more effective upon being adopted by other states. Under these circumstances, the entities of a particular polity could desire to coerce, educate, pre-empt or otherwise influence the entities of other polities. At the same time, there are a third group of pertinent stakeholders who do not belong to the state that is envisaging adoption of a policy or to a state that has already adopted the policy[Gra132]. These actors function as mediators. Moreover, in the hierarchical systems, top-down pressures provide a vertical feature to the customary horizontal policy diffusion. External Actors In addition, the entities in external governments who have already adopted a policy constitutes the second group of pertinent actors. In most the diffusion studies, such external actors are not taken into consideration. However, this neglect of the previous decision makers could result in misunderstanding policy diffusion politics. Thus, while unearthing evidence regarding the influence exerted by pervious adopting governments upon the subsequent decisions of governments, it is usually essential to determine the reason behind the innovative measures adopted by the previous adopters[Gra132]. As such, every novel policy idea emerges from some source or the other. Therefore, to the extent that the first adopters had acted without information or coercion from external entities, researchers can discern the reasons behind the adoption of the policy that persist in the absence of diffusion[Gra132].This has the effect of reducing to a minimum, the possibility of arriving at a false finding of diffusion. Furthermore, certain aspects of such governments could affect the possibility of other states imitating them. For instance, the states with greater expertise could be regarded as leaders. Such states could have greater likelihood of furnishing the future adopters with information. The potential adopters could be more likely to imitate wealthy or large states. Moreover, the larger and wealthier states could enjoy greater success in generating standards, in comparison to the other states. Thus, it is incumbent upon the scholars to focus upon the aspects of external states that diminish or enhance the possibility of diffusion[Gra132]. In addition, it has been demonstrated by empirical research that policy diffusion has influenced a vast array of areas, including environmental policy instruments, codes of good governance, lotteries, privatisations, bilateral treaties, merit-based grants, autonomous regulatory agencies, income taxes, regulatory impact evaluation, antismoking policies, tax policies, state bureaucracies, and social security reforms[Mag16]. Thus, the related literature has successfully documented and explained the individual diffusion processes. All the same, these studies have demonstrated considerable variation in their conceptualisation and measurement of diffusion systems, and this has diluted the cumulativeness of the findings. Despite the awareness of the fact that the operationalisation of diffusion mechanisms is heterogenous, the precise character and depth of the issue has not been subjected to methodical documentation[Mag16]. Policy diffusion’s perspective involves the object of determining the pertinent structures that promote policy diffusion. There have been quite a few studies that have exhibited a cross-national character. Most of the research on policy diffusion tends to concentrate upon policy making in the component states of the US. The number of studies that focus upon Brazil, Japan, Switzerland or other sub-national settings have been few[Str12]. As such, the contemporary studies had substantiated processes with tangible underlying systems, including coercion, competition, emulation and learning, and these have been accorded considerable attention. As such, the novel methodological approaches, such as the dyadic-year event history analysis permit analysis of diffusion processes that is more refined[Str12]. Conclusion Policy diffusion, per se, entails the dissemination of policy ideas across political jurisdictions. It can transpire across national borders or within a specific nation. According to Rogers, a pioneer in diffusion research, diffusion can be described as the process whereby an innovation is disseminated via specific channels to a social system’s members over time. In addition, it has been generally accepted that diffusion emerges from interdependence. All the same, the term interdependence assumes various forms, which the literature tends to term as mechanisms. Despite variation in the precise nomenclature, the general practice is to group diffusion mechanisms as: competition, emulation and learning. It has been suggested by some scholars that coercion should be added to these categories. However, coercion denotes the practice of a specific unit adopting a policy due to pressure from powerful international organisations or nations. Instances of such coercing agencies are the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. Even though coercion has the potential to impact policy adoption, diffusion implies that there are no central entities engaged in coordinating the dissemination of a policy. In an ideal situation, policy and political success would be clearly discernible to researchers, as well as decision makers. Difficulty in measuring success leads to the adoption of shortcuts that are consistent with learning. Thus, policymakers could interpret policy adoption without subsequent abandonment over time as the success of the policy. Furthermore, researchers could examine the influence of the opportunity to learn on policy choice as an alternative for direct evidence of learning. As such, policy makers can only learn about policies that have been tried. Strictly speaking, reliance of researchers upon opportunity to learn is justified for policies that are successful, politically and on grounds of policy, eventually. As such, diffusion studies mainly focus up on a specific government policy and its correlation with similar policies of other governments. This could have the drawback of ignoring the fact that policies are sculpted by people with individual choices and capabilities, and that they neglect to address the difficulties faced by the entities that facilitate the adoption of these policies. Thus, it can be surmised that; this research work substantiates the claim that policy diffusion is an ineffective strategy in conducting comparative public policy analysis. References Shi121: , (Shipan & Volden, 2012, p. 788), Gil121: , (Gilardi, 2012), Mos03: , (Mossberger, 2003, p. 922), Mag16: , (Maggetti & Gilardi, 2016, p. 89), Shi121: , (Shipan & Volden, 2012, p. 90), van121: , (van der Heiden & Strebel, 2012, p. 347), van121: , (van der Heiden & Strebel, 2012, p. 353), Dob07: , (Dobbin, et al., 2007, p. 457), Dob07: , (Dobbin, et al., 2007, p. 458), Sch123: , (Schmitt, 2012, p. 30), Sch123: , (Schmitt, 2012, p. 31), Obi131: , (Obinger, et al., 2013, p. 118), Obi131: , (Obinger, et al., 2013, p. 119), Mar092: , (Marsh & Sharman, 2009, p. 282), Sch123: , (Schmitt, 2012, p. 34), Sab09: , (Sabatier, 2009, p. 225), Sab09: , (Sabatier, 2009, p. 226), Gra132: , (Graham, et al., 2013, p. 684), Gra132: , (Graham, et al., 2013, p. 685), Gra132: , (Graham, et al., 2013, p. 686), Gra132: , (Graham, et al., 2013, p. 687), Mag16: , (Maggetti & Gilardi, 2016, p. 88), Str12: , (Strebel & Widmer, 2012, p. 386), Read More