Ecocentric Ethics: The Land Ethics by Leopold - Essay Example

 Ecocentric Ethics: The Land Ethics by Leopold Leopold’s contribution in the essay, “Ecocentric Ethics: The Land Ethics” was an intellectual foundation to environmental ethics. The land ethic plays the role of establishing the correlation between the land and biotic community attached to it. Indeed, Leopold (1949/2012) asserts, “an individual is a member of community of interdependent parts and the land ethic enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, water, plants, animals, collectively the land.” The land ethic has changed humans to members of the biotic community with an aim of protecting the land. However, Callicott criticizes Leopold's view by contending that the "professional neglect, confusion, and (in some cases) contempt" for Leopold's writing on the land ethic may be attributed to three things. The three things referred to by Callicott include Leopold’s reference to the writings of Hume, Smith, and Darwin (Callicott, 2012). Notably, Hume and Smith argued that ethics depends on feelings and not reason. Leopold relies on Darwin's theory of evolution of ethics where human beings are members of the "biotic community” which is the land. According to Callicott (1987/2012), Leopold argues, “the development of morality is grounded in evolutionary ideas and the development of moral sentiments predates the development of rational capacities.” Callicott dismisses the interpretation that land ethic requires sacrifice of humans that interfere with the biotic community as inconsistent with the entirety of Leopold’s land ethic (Callicott, 2012). Callicott argues that Leopold’s land ethic is holistic and not dependent on previous accretions in the evolutionary layers that established the biotic community and pyramid (Callicott, 2012). We have examples with Leopold's writing that support or refute each of Callicott's arguments. In agreeing with Callicott, that Leopold’s land ethic is holistic and animal liberation is not a criterion to measure the extent to which it is or is not of the environmental sort because animal liberation and conventional anthropocentric ethics are almost identical and have less similarities with environmental or land ethics (Jamieson, 1997). For example, “some bacteria and other inanimate entities such as oceans and lakes, mountains, forests, and wetlands have a greater value than individual animals” (Jamieson, 1997). I refute Callicott’s assumption that humans are natural. For example, unlike other inanimate entities such as oceans and lakes, and mountains that Leopold include in the "biotic community,” humans relate to radical discontinuities between nature and culture that do not apply in other inanimate entities (Orr, 2002). As such, humans are not natural as Callicott argues and animal liberation “is not a criterion to measure the extent to which it is or is not of the environmental sort” as Leopold argues. Various studies have been addressing the loss of biodiversity in the recent past. For instance, Meadows (1990/2012) argues in favor of preserving biodiversity from a practical interest in our own survival. Humans need to be part of a functioning, interdependent community and develop control over humanity, population, and greed for survival. However, Meadows argues for the disregard of biodiversity and favors the separation between humans from nature. We can also establish other users from this week or the previous weeks who also argue for a separation between humans from nature. Such authors include Russow, Schweizer, and Stone. According to Stone (1996/2012) natural objects should have legal rights and we should appoint legal guardians for natural objects. On the other hand, Schweizer (1923/2012) argues that humans need to develop a reverence for life in order to coexist with all living creatures. Russow (1981/2012) argues that we value individuals with certain characteristics, and the rarer the species, the more value we place on them. I think that we should consider humans apart from nature in order to develop an environmental ethic. Indeed, the separation will enhance bio diversity that derives instrumental value for humans and fosters environmental or ecosystem services that are priceless in a market. Through the separation, we will be able to value individuals and establish a criterion to measure the details of the environmental ethic. Ultimately, the separation establishes the "biotic community” that defines an environmental ethic with relation to humans and nature. As such, I establish that considering humans apart from nature is significant in developing an environmental ethic. The reverence for life is a fundamental topic that has attracted various views from different scholars. Indeed, humans must establish a reverence for life in order to enhance humane coexistence between humans and all living creatures (Schweizer, 2012). As such, humans must appreciate the valuable will to live for all living things by valuing, maintaining life, and avoiding destruction of life (Schweizer, 2012). However, Schweizer (2012) notes that it is impossible for humans to exist without restricting the will to live of other living things. As such, it is necessary for humans to adopt measures that will minimize the human impacts that may jeopardize the will to live for other living things. Indeed, Schweitzer (2012) notes, “all destruction or injury to life is evil, and there is no social or ethical rule that absolves that evil or wrong or guilt, but each person must solemnly evaluate how much wrong he must do to survive him or herself.” Notably, other authors acknowledge this inherent conflict between human survival and other species as part of an environmental ethic. Such authors include Richard Dawkins' who recognizes the pervasive struggle for survival between humans and lower organisms as they compete for scarce resources. We also have Grier Miller, Theodosius Dobzhansky, and Herbert Spencer who popularized Darwin’s work and derived the term ‘the survival of the fittest.’ We can resolve this conflict in a practical manner by respecting the rights of other living creatures. By respecting their rights, we will strive to establish a sustainable environment that will guarantee efficient coexistence between human beings and other living creatures. This will involve environmental conservation, effective use of available resources, and minimizing human acts that jeopardize the survival of other living creatures. Moreover, by changing the structure of human beings, we will be able to survive in a competing environment without limiting the lives of other species. Indeed, this will involve adopting environmental ethics for purposes of humane coexistence. As such, it is clear that reverence for life, which enhances humane coexistence between humans and all living creatures, is a fundamental aspect in environmental ethic. Despite the inherent conflict between human survival and other species, we can develop practical solutions to avert the conflict that defines environmental ethic. The issue of legal rights is fundamental in addressing environmental ethic. Indeed, while addressing humans, nature, all living creatures and their coexistence and value, the aspect of legal rights defines the basis for environmental ethic. Ideally, human beings have specific and diverse legal rights to their survival in the environment. In most cases, human beings seem to derive more legal rights compared to other living creatures. However, there have been issues and studies regarding the extension of legal rights to other living things like trees, animals, and other natural objects. Stone (1996/2012) supports the extension of legal rights to natural objects and appointing legal guardians for a river, lake, or forest. I also believe that trees and other natural objects have legal rights. This will enable human beings to have a basis to value the trees and other natural objects’ will to live for all living things by valuing, maintaining life, and avoiding destruction of life. Indeed, this will also help in averting the inherent conflict between human survival and other species as part of an environmental ethic. Notably, Stone has an underlying rationale for granting legal rights to trees and other natural objects. He refers to the rationale that it is logical to extend legal rights to trees and other natural objects since we are already making legal decisions on behalf of, and in the purported interests of others every day (Stone, 2012). He asserts that this legal backing has been fundamental for protecting the environment for a long time since it mandates humans and the government to protect trees and other natural objects thus limiting the inherent conflict between human survival and other species as part of an environmental ethic (Stone, 2012). As such, it is quite clear that granting legal rights to trees and other natural objects would be fundamental in enhancing humane coexistence between humans and all living creatures. References Callicott, J. B. (2012). The conceptual foundations of the land ethic. In L.P. Pojman & P. Pojman (Eds.), Environmental ethics: Readings in theory and application (6th ed., pp. 232-245). Boston, MA: Wadsworth, Inc. (Reprinted from Companion to a Sand County Almanac, (1987)). Jamieson, D. (1997). Animal Liberation Is An Environmental Ethic. Retrieved from: http://www.acad.carleton.edu/curricular/ENTS/faculty/dale/dale_animal.html Leopold, A. (2012). Ecocentric ethics: The land ethic. In L.P. Pojman & P. Pojman (Eds.), Environmental ethics: readings in theory and application (6th ed., pp. 222-232). Boston, MA: Wadsworth, Inc. (Original work published 1949). Orr, D. (2002). The Nature of Design : Ecology, Culture, and Human Intention: Ecology, Culture, and Human Intention. Great Clarendon Street, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Russow, L. (2012). Why do species matter? In L. P. Pojman & P. Pojman (Eds.), Environmental ethics: Readings in theory and application (6th ed., pp. 190-197). Boston, MA: Wadsworth, Inc. (Reprinted from Environmental Ethics, 3(1981)). Schweitzer, A. (2012). Reverence for life. In L.P. Pojman & P. Pojman (Eds.), Environmental ethics: Readings in theory and application (6th ed., pp. 198-205). Boston, MA: Wadsworth, Inc. (Reprinted from Civilization and Ethics, trans. A. Naish (1923)). Stone, C. (2012). Should trees have standing? Toward legal rights for natural objects. In L.P. Pojman & P. Pojman (Eds.), Environmental ethics: Readings in theory and application (6th ed., pp. 246-257). Boston, MA: Wadsworth, Inc. (Reprinted from Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects (1996)). Read More