Anthropology and Political and Power - Essay Example

Inserts His/her Inserts Inserts Grade Inserts Here (Day, Month, Year) Anthropology and Political Power Anthropology is the study of humanity. It has its roots in the natural sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences. The discipline is a holistic study, concerned with all humans, at all times, in all humanity's dimensions. Anthropology is traditionally distinguished from other disciplines by its emphasis on cultural relativity, in-depth examination of context, and cross-cultural comparisons. Anthropology's basic concerns are "What defines Homo sapiens?", "Who are the ancestors of modern Homo sapiens?", "What are humans' physical traits?", "How do humans behave?", "Why are there variations and differences among different groups of humans?", "How has the evolutionary past of Homo sapiens influenced its social organization and culture?" so it is the study of how humans live and interact. The anthropologist Eric Wolf once described anthropology as "the most scientific of the humanities, and the most humanistic of the sciences." Politics is a process by which groups of people make collective decisions. The term is generally applied to the art or science of running a government. It also refers to behavior within civil governments. However, politics have been observed in other group interactions, including corporate, academic, and religious institutions. It consists of "social relations involving authority or power” and refers to the regulation of public affairs within a political unit, and to the methods and tactics used to formulate and apply policy. Anthropology and politics have a direct link between them. POWER IS IMMANENT in human affairs; by definition, human beings are political animals. Power in this sense cannot be reduced to a single social or political instance by either external or internal criteria. Whether or not the social grouping under scrutiny is collectively aggregated by conditions of gender, age, kinship, class, or hierarchy, power is present. In the most basic sense, power is what the political scientist Harold Lasswell defined as political: who gets what and how. Or, as the anthropologist Edmund Leach provocatively noted, all social and cultural change is a quest for power. Power is not a domain but one of the essential forms and conditions of human relations. Three phases may be recognized in anthropology’s relationship with politics. In the first formative era (1879–1939) anthropologists studied politics almost incidentally to their other interests, and we can speak only of ‘the anthropology of politics’. In the second phase (1940–66) political anthropology developed a body of systematically-structured knowledge and a self-conscious discourse. The third phase began in the mid-1960s when all such disciplinary specialization came under severe challenge. As new paradigms challenged the earlier dominating, coercive systems of knowledge, political anthropology was first de-centered and then deconstructed. The political turn taken by geography, social history, and literary criticism and, above all, feminism has revitalized anthropology’s concern with power and powerlessness. FEW subjects arouse more passion and debate among Muslims today than the encounter between Islam and modern thought. The subject is of course vast and embraces fields ranging from politics to sacred art, subjects whose debate often causes volcanic eruptions of emotions and passions which hardly lead to an objective scrutiny of causes and a clear vision of the problems involved. Nor is this debate which consumes so much of the energies of Muslims and students of Islam helped by the lack of clear definition of the terms of the debate and an insight into the actual forces involved. The whole discussion is also paralyzed by a psychological sense of inferiority and a sense of enfeeblement before the modern world which prevents most modernized Muslims from making a critical appraisal of the situation and of stating the truth irrespective of the fact whether it is fashionable and acceptable to current opinion or not. The Islamic holy text plays a dynamic role in the formation of extreme political ideas, particularly in the form of strict structuralism, the anthropologist Gellner (1981), for instance, suggested an extremely essentialised view of Islam, seen as a social blueprint. Indeed, Gellner’s central argument concerning Islam argued that Islam cannot change. Far from being the religion of living Muslims with opinions, ideas, feelings and identities, Gellnerian Islam is an essence that remains constant in its model. Gellner has suggested that Islam, being a markedly secularization-resistant religion, is also the most vigorously fundamentalist. According to Gellner, Islam, as a religion, shows some ideological historical elements conducive towards fundamentalism. First, Islam is a scriptural faith that claims to be the perfect and final one. Secondly, there is no room for new prophets, because Muslims consider Muhammad (Peace Be upon Him) the seal of prophecy. Thirdly, Islam has no clergy, and, therefore, no religious differentiation is possible. Finally, Islam does not need to differentiate between church and state because Islam ‘began as a religion of rapidly successful conquerors that soon were state’ (Gellner 1981: 100). Now, these Gellnerian observations may seem to have only a scholarly value and few may grasp the consequences of his scrutiny on how the Middle East has been made sense of. Yet Gellner’s scrutiny has a weighty, and somewhat dramatic, conclusion: he has stated that Muslims ‘could have democracy, or secularism, but not both’ (1981: 60). In other words, if Muslim societies have democracy they would inevitably see secularism eroded in favor of an increasingly Sharia-based state. Therefore, only a dictatorship can impose a secular model of society, because it can manipulate and control, and so limit, the role and influence of Islam within society. The reason for the support that Middle Eastern autocrats have from the Western leaders is because of their mind set that only manipulated dictatorship can control the secularism that Islam imposes. The observation is that and the west turns out to be tremendously concerned about any independent movement that is not fully controlled or managed as desired by the west, a democracy that can, if needed, turn into forced dictatorship and Muslims should not have a real democracy. As per Bruce Lawrence: the autocrats such as saddam and gaddafi, who have employed an approach that is not in favor of the west, weren’t dangerous fundamentalists(1990). He has discussed Islamic fundamentalism in the wider structure of a assumption of fundamentalism. Hence, from his point of view, Islamic fundamentalism wants to be correctly bordered as a logical class to be helpful within the overall scrutiny of the religious observable fact called fundamentalism. First, Lawrence has recommended that the ruling cream of the crop cannot be considered as fundamentalist, because fundamentalism is a protest and an opposition toward any form of control that is not lead by a divine scripture that is the Quran and the Shariah. Bruce Lawrence has therefore disagreed that ‘being at the middle of power rather than on the boundaries, this eliminates themselves from that vital feature of fundamentalists: to resist the prevailing philosophy rather than to exemplify it; to support change rather than to maintain the status quo’ (1990: 191). As Lawrence considers that the fundamentalism is the competetion with nationalism, Muslim nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, furthermore, are in competition because of ‘the holistic confront of patriotism to the holistic claims of Islam’. Therefore, Lawrence has argued that Islamic fundamentalism, which has its peak in the astonishing Iranian uprising, has its roots in the breakdown of Muslim nationalism, which failed to manage the decolonization procedure in a correct way. Lawrence put forward that if the Muslim changeover has developed next to the Western line of democratic politics, that is if the required change has been successful, then Islamic fundamentalism would never have existed or, in the worst case, it would be unimportant in both its political and social authority. Lawrence suggested that the anti-nationalism of Islamic fundamentalism is not consistent. Although the Sunni fundamentalists totally refuse the thought of nation and nationalism as far-off to Islam, the Shi’a fundamentalists try to alter nationalism so that it can fit their theoratic and ideological notion of the state. Therefore Lawrence does not suggest that the communal political dynamics in which the diverse fundamentalisms develop have no impact on the different forms of fundamentalism in the Islamic world, because, as he has pointed out, there is no ‘single reaction characteristic of all Muslims’. However, he has also argued that in the case of Islamic fundamentalism, the idea that the olden times of Islam, or Islam as a religion, can clarify Islamic fundamentalism Hence, these actions are something which intellectuals have to appreciated by going away from academic labels and the predisposition to over-focus on the ‘social’. These upheavals are expressions of an eccentricity that is entrenched in a social association, which is expressed through global dynamics. Islamism-as it has been called– but also democracy may no longer be the same after the growth of these revolts. Popular expansion in Egypt for coup of its dictator Hosni Mubarak which started on January 25 succeeded on February 11 when he was strained to abscond the country clearing the way for an elected government by September. It has kindled revolt in other Arab countries in Africa and in gulf countries. The situation varies from country to country. The most conspicuous case is that of Libya where the armed forces are trying to crush the revolt against 40 years of autocratic rule of Muammar Gaddafi. More than a thousand people have been killed so far. In a tribal society, Gaddafi commands loyalty of one million strong War fallen tribe. In Bahrain, Kuwait and Yemen, the upsurge may take the form of Shia-Sunni conflict. In many respects Egypt was a unique case. Its importance lies in the fact that with a population of 64 millions, it is the most populous and largest Arab country and lies close to Gaza on the border between Israel and Hamas controlled part of Palestine. Its president Mubarak had set a record of corruption. He is estimated to have amassed a fortune of $70 billion and is believed to be the richest person in the world. His corrupt and autocratic rule as also rule of other dictators in the Middle East was supported by USA as it believed that alternative to dictatorship in the Muslim world, in general, was Islamic fundamentalism. The example of Iran is cited in this context where Mussadaq’s regime was overthrown by Islamic revolution led by religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini. In Pakistan dictators had been best allies of America. But Islamic fundamentalism itself was initially encouraged by American to counter growing Soviet influence. In Afghanistan the Soviet supported regime was overthrown with the active help of Mujahideen who were armed and trained by America. That dictatorship is no guarantee against Islamic fundamentalism is best illustrated by the example of Saudi Arabia which has an absolute dynastic rule of Shah Abdul Aziz and where people do not have even elementary democratic right to vote. It had supported Hosni Mubarak and given asylum to the deposed Sultan of Tunisia. It is also the source of most fundamentalist form of Islam. Its Wahabi brand of Islam, with American patronage, has undermined its liberal forms elsewhere. “Saudisation” of Pakistan, through network of madrasas financed by Saudi Arabia for instance, has damaged its liberal traditions like Sufi, Barelavi, Deobandi and other forms of Islamic thought. No doubt Muslim Brotherhood was supporting the popular revolt in Egypt. But it clearly said that it had no leadership aspiration. It is too weak to do so and supported the popular movement as it did not want to be completely isolated. Moreover, Christians, with 11% of its population, too, joined the movement in full strength. The demonstrators included all shades of persons, young, old, men, women—including in Western attire. Many persons in the crowds spoke live on TV that they were secular, democrat and wanted freedom. Al-Queda, deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawabri, in his video issue on February 18 said that “demonstrations in Egypt were led by secular liberal activities for greater democracy in sharp contrast to the Islamic state. Democracy replaces God’s laws with men.” Brotherhood is supporting Mohamad El-Bardei, who had emerged as the most known face of the revolt. He is a Noble Laureate and was the former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He began his overt opposition to Hosni Mubarak a year ago and won over a widespread following among the young and middle classes. Egyptian authorities harassed his supporters. Nor is he a favourite of America partly because he is being supported by Muslim Brotherhood and partly because he was not tough enough against Iran as head of the IAFA as USA wanted him to be. However, his own views about Islamic jehadis are known. In a recent newspaper article he writes. “The option in the Arab world is not between authoritarianism and Islamic jehadis.” He described Egypt’s revolt as of a rainbow variety of people “who are secular, liberal, market oriented and if you give them a chance, they will organize themselves to elect a government that is modern and moderate.” He wanted “independent judiciary and free election unlike the last election which was completely rigged and could in fact had a role in provoking widespread revolt of the people.” He criticized the West for having brought the Mubarak’s fiction that a democratic Egypt “will turn into chaos or a religious state without him.” (New York Times, Feb 13, 2011). Moreover, Egyptian nationalism with a civilization of 5000 years old, which Egyptians call “Ummul-duniya (mother of the world) of which sphinxes are eloquent witnesses and Alexandria library, a rich treasure of knowledge in its time is no asset for fundamentalism. What was unique in Egyptian revolt was its non-violent character which in the words of American President Obama was inspired by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King (the latter claimed to be the disciple of Gandhi). The revolt was not organized by any party and led by any leader. Twitters, Face book and other social networking sites coordinated the rebels. What after the transitional role of the army? It had endeared itself to the people by the way it dealt with massive demonstrations. On the first day of the revolt an old man kissed forehead of an officer of the army that had come to Liberty square and told him “you are one of us.” On one occasion, it inadvertently killed some protestors. But soon it offered handsome apologies. Thereafter the army simply helped the people to maintain order and prevent stampede. The onus now is mainly on civil leadership. Its success or failure to evolve a consensus on an alternative system will have impact far beyond the borders of Egypt. India has a special reason to welcome emergence of a democratic Egypt, for this can revive its old friendship when Nehru and Nassar, along with Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia led the non-alignment movement which played a vital role in international politics in fifties and sixties. It has also reason to celebrate success of first Gandhian experiment in non-violence outside India. In fact India needs to relearn use of Gandhian methods from Egypt, in particular by the violent movements currently taking place in some parts of country. Moreover after a few days of evacuation of Indians, 90% of them decided to stay back as they felt quite safe and at home in Egypt, whereas they are leaving Libya in panic. Some Indians who were unable to return to India from Libya tried to cross the border to Egypt to seen safety. Situation in Libya is in contrast with Egypt in many respects. Unlike Hosni Mubarak its dictator Gaddafi, has vowed to “fight to the last drop of his blood.” He no longer enjoyed support of the USA or Israel. Far from non-violent revolt, rebels with hunting guns have occupied eastern part of Libya and central towns like Benghazi, Zawiyat and Misrates but are facing stiff resistance from the army and loyal tribes, supported by tanks and air force bombing. A spokesman of rebels representing all religions, said, “We want a mainly secular constitution.” Libya has 46.4 billion oil reserves and 5.5 trillion natural gas reserves, largest in Africa. The west has a more stake against its blockade by Libyan dictator. There are therefore moves by the Western powers to encourage Egyptian armed support to rebels. Gaddafi reportedly called Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh seeking his support because his action in Libya was akin to Indian action in Kashmir. Not long ago, he had said in the UNO that Kashmir should be independent. Pakistan, in acknowledgment of Gaddafi support, has named a stadium after him. In 2003, even the Western leaders had arrived at an understanding with Gaddafi according to which “Libya’s oilfields would be fully opened up to the West and the US and their banks and corporations will be tapping the country’s revenue stream. Bush administration claimed that its efforts were bearing fruit. The understanding did not last long mainly due to suspected links of Gaddafi with the Islamic extremists. Now the West and the US have frozen all international reserves. But according to IMF estimates central Bank of Libya has about $110 billion international reserves, enough to cover three years of Libya’s imports. While Arab League supported the Security Council resolution for “no fly” zone over Libya, many Arab countries did not support the massive US led military offensive against Gaddafi regime Arab League Secretary General Amr Mousa voiced concerned over air strikes against civilians. Abu Khali who publishes popular website, “the angry world” also warned that the Western military intervention in Libya was intended to “legitimize the return of colonial powers to our region.” Some neutral or passive people are reported to have taken to streets chanting anti-America slogans.” At the movement, the situation has become more complicated. The upsurge for democracy has affected other Arab countries in varying degrees and indifferent ways. In Yemen, with 40%, Shia population, an unprecedented demonstration at its capital Senna demanded ouster of autocratic rule of Ali Abdullah Salah since 1978. His armed supporters, mostly Sunnis, took over the Al-Tehrir square of Senna. He, however, sought to buy peace by declaring that neither he nor his son would run for presiding in 2013. The protesters, in Sanna, interestingly carried protests with images of late Che Guevera leader of the communist revolution in Cuba. Other Arab countries with sizable Shia population which have been touched by his upsurge for democracy include Bahrain and Kuwait. Bahrain is a strong ally of Saudi Arabia and an oil rich emirate. Its Muslim population (82%) is evenly divided between Shias and Sunnis (41% each). There are strong demonstrations against US embassy and for an end of gulf state’s monarchy and for political reforms. As protest gathered strength, Saudi Arabia sent 1000 armed forces to help Bahamian government. In Kuwait another oil rich emirate out of 85% Muslim population 45% are Sunni and 30% are Shias. The target of protest is its Prime Minister. Demonstrations are going on for his ouster. In Iraq Sunni leader Saddam Hussain’s regime was thrown by the Western powers to build a model of democracy for the Arab world. The Sunni minority 34% population and Kurd ethnic population are far from reconciled with the regime of Nuri al Maliki, the Prime Minister. Apart from sectarian factor, his regime is accused of large scale corruption. There was a demonstration against him, in Falluja, a Sunni town west of Baghdad, in which a dozen protesters were killed. The ripples of democratic upsurge were felt even in Saudi Arabia. It is also the richest and most influential country of them with $440 billion in foreign revenues. Its population of 25 millions has rarely witnessed a protest. It is the closest ally of the US which deals with the Muslim world through it. As the democratic wave sweeping across the Arab World reached the Saudi soil, its Shia minority (10%) and some Sunni intellectuals gave a call for reforms and demanded a constitutional king face book is another instrument used by the dissenters. Though some shias have been arrested its 87 year old monarch, in an effort to pacify dissent, doled a grant of $36 billion for welfare of the people. A brief survey of a specimen of the Arab countries would indicate that there is hardly any country that is wholly unaffected by the winds of change. Whatever be the final shape the Arab world takes, it would never be the same again. Democratic countries, including India can play an important role in giving a positive turn to forces of change in building a democratic order in a vital part of the world. The ground for which seems to be prepared as the turmoil so far has given sufficient indications that people in the Arab World, are seeking alternative other than autocracy and religious fundamentalism. The above discussions are some examples of how the Islamic Anthropology is affected by democracy. And visibly highlights the affects that politics have on the anthropology and vice versa. References Rebel, H. Eric Wolf's Approaches to the Hegemonic in Historical Anthropology, University of Arizona, 1998. Roseberry, W. Political Economy, Annual Review of Anthropology, 1988. Friedman, Jonathan. An Interview with Eric Wolf. Current anthropology, 1987. Lim, S. Kyung. Eric Wolf, 1998. Johler, R. Landsteiner, E. An interview with Eric Wolf, 1989. El-Bardei, New York Times, 2011. Bailey, Frederick G. Strategems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics, 1969. Wright, S. Anthropology of Policy: Critical Perspectives on Governance and Power, 1997. Read More