European Social Policy - Essay Example

?INTRODUCTION: “If we wish to study welfare s, we must begin with a set of criteria that define their role in society. The role is certainly notto spend or tax; nor is it necessarily that of creating equality” [Ebing-Andersen, 172]. Welfare or social assistance is nothing if it is not regarded as in terms of subsistence as one of its essential functions. At some point, neglect becomes abuse under circumstances where government run subsistence programs are not meeting the minimal requirements. Tort law is full of cases where client and provider conflict over delivery of services is the main issue. When a government takes on the responsibility of assisting a needy citizen, they are entering into an agreement or a covenant with the client. Ebing-Andersen understands the “role in society” of social assistance programs as complicit with the principal of “not to spend or tax”. It is also self-avowedly distancing itself from anything that resembles an institution in the aid of “creating equality”. These are some of the important dimensions of their position as stated in the conclusion from “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. While it should be argued that essential attributes include subsistence, this would entail creating equality and that is unquestionably not one of the concluding marks made by Ebing-Andersen. It remains to be asked, to what extent does the exclusion effect or mediate the interpretation? What is 'neglected' can often and at least, sometimes, be victim of abuse. By systemically neglecting the creation of equality, Ebing-Andersen is a-priori creating a condition under which gender equality becomes likewise an issue that is challenged. Ebing-Andersen: An Overview. Within the domain of the published literature about contemporary, social policy theory, many references can be found to Ebing-Andersen's Welfare Reform Theory. Before getting to the kernel of this idea, some remarks will be made on the broader context or background of the seminal 1990 publication. There is a gravitas about welfare that carries with it a weight that is only comparable to health-care. In an age or era when Western governments routinely preside over conditions of a “welfare deficit”, a consideration of one over-lap with health care is the quantifiable amount of neglect involved that can be attributed to, or said to be caused by poverty? Ebing-Andersen define a welfare-deficit as a system under which: “the essential welfare contribution to the household is no longer available" [Ebing-Andersen, 1990, p. 49]. Written in 1990, the context or background environment was marked by government cutbacks to social assistance in the United States in particular. The rising cost of childcare which by then was 23 percent of the total income for poor people [Ebing-Andersen, 1990, p. 59]. What was then an “emerging deficit” [Ebing-Andersen, 1990, p. 49] was compounded further by the fact that in the majority of the states at the time, the majority of children from identifiably economically deficient backgrounds, had no access to any type or form of childcare [Ebing-Anderse, 1990, p. 64]. As a preliminary consideration, the impact of the cutbacks with respect to who it effected, has to bear in mind that childcare is unquestionably a burden that is being quantifiably shouldered by women. Ebing-Andersen on Decommodification. Ebing-Andersen goes far in explaining who is burdened under these circumstances with his notion of “decommodification” or the “the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation” [Ebing-Andersen, 1990, p. 37]. A commodity in the sense used by Ebing-Andersen is the participation of labor, and thus to decommodify this means to stand outside of the boundaries of “market participation”. Women who stay at home raising children are unfortunately a good proportion of the individuals accepting social assistance, and being beyond market participation, they are in a sense a litmus test for systems. They are entirely dependent on the system for subsistence, and indeed, the subsistence and survival of children. Neglect is considered a form of abuse under some legal circumstances, and the state has to consider the question that asks 'at what point in time is neglect' a form of abuse'? The “essential welfare contribution” [Ebing-Andersen, 1990, p. 49] is essential because of the potentially fatal consequences. When the basic contribution is not sufficient, the notion of sufficiency has to be a primary consideration. At the bottom end of the spectrum of poverty, women and their offspring are unquestionably among the most vulnerable. However, Ebing-Andersen does not quite go this far with his structural approach. He does take into account, in his social democratic model, that the labor participation of women to be economically affordable [Ebing-Andersen, 1990, pp. 27-8], and at the same time documents the fact that most states were not meeting the subsistence level of women and children in particular [Ebing-Andersen, 1990, p. 64]. WHY SUBSISTENCE IS ESSENTIAL TO WELFARE POLICY AND EQUALITY . The gravitas that this social policy issue carries that parallels or cross-overs into Health-care policy, is the question of fatality. When neglect is so bad that it has to be considered abuse, the state stands as liable for not providing a subsistence level income. Conversely, in situations such as the Liberal state where some amount of subsistence is tolerated, or considered 'systemic'. It is a 'measure' that is important Without which, Ebing-Andersen claims you could not have some working definition of what is “essential”. Subsistence requires essence, so to speak. Ebing-Andersen: Three Tiers/Theories of Welfare. Ebing-Andersen approach to WRT, is one that is premised on three different categories representing types of systems. The most relevent from the present perspective nationally, is the Liberal type. It is the model that represents systems like the United States and Great Britain [Ebing-Andersen, p. 26]. If accept his claim that: "welfare states are key institutions in the structuring of class and social order" [Ebing-Andersen, 1999, p. 55], then an understanding of the social democratic model has to consider the dialectical relationship that has partnered between the nature of the welfare state and the very “structuring of class and social order”. Under circumstances where you are going to evaluate a welfare system, it is argued by Ebing-Andersen that the object of study is also a simulteneous fact of influence: "to move from the black box of expenditures to the content of the welfare states" and to distinguish between "categorically different types of states" [Ebing-Andersen, 1990, p. 20]. It should be mentioned that the other two types of models are the 'corporistist' and the 'social democratic' [Ebing-Andersen, 1999, p. 26-7]. Lewis and the FEMINIST CRITIQUE of WRT. It can be argued that they best typify the distinction between a ‘gender type’ and a ‘gender role’ [Clausen, Ed., 2002, p. 39]. Where the ‘type’ in this instance is ambiguous, the role which is assumed might be definite according to the individual in question. For example, there are cases where scientific determinations have established a ‘type’ for given individuals with physiological tendencies toward hermaphroditism, the individual on their own volition may have an entirely different conception of themselves which is at odds with the scientific ‘label’ or ‘type’. Self perception in this sense raises the central ideas of ‘social construction’ which were raised in the opening of this analysis. The ideas which shape how we perceive ourselves, are arguably more important than the biological determination, if it is the case that we can be entirely at odds with the ‘biological definitions’ provided for us. And, if these ideas again, are an extension of the knowledge systems and processes which any given individual is subjected to, then, it can be said that we are ‘socially constructed’ in two important senses: “In the conservative tradition' of course, women are discouraged from working; in the liberal ideal, concerns of gender matter less than the sanctity of the market.” [Esbin-Andersen 2006, p. 169] We are socially constructed by the values, ideas in the market place, so to speak, but also constructed in any attempt to define ourselves. To some extent, even self definition remains connected to socially defined variables. Biological determinism is the notion or tenet which maintains that who we are, is largely shaped by our genetic makeup, and moreover, and in terms of sex difference, that which shapes our capabilities. Posited in terms of the notion of ‘power’, for example, the studies conducted this century which concluded that women are more right brain oriented, and conversely, men are more left brain oriented, is a theory in science with some important social repercussions. Given that the left brain is generally the seat of ‘analytic’ skills, this scientific theory legitimated the ‘streaming’ of boys into math’s and sciences, and the streaming of girls into a variety of alternatives within the academic curriculum [Clausen, Ed., 2002: 202]. In short, those occupations oriented toward mathematics and sciences are generally better paid, and as such, an already existing power structure is legitimized through a scientific theory. The science of distinguishing the sexes, does have important implications on social policies, and further, important implications on the existing patriarchal structures which are already enshrined in society – in turn, this effects the distribution of power: “decommodification is a key concept in comparative welfare research that explains variations in welfare state regimes” [Andersen, 1999, p. 172]. Lewis “reacted” to the “decommodification” concept set out by Esping-Andersen [Standing, 2005 , p. 392] to The following will examine the ‘reliability’ of science, and with particular attention paid to what is ‘socially determined’ and what is ‘biologically determined’ in terms of human attributes, and further, the very relationship between the social and the biological within this framework. Biological determinism, has to be alongside what is being said about “essential”. If the deficit is one that defines the line between subsitence or not, who is on that line should be paid equal consideration. That is what extends from Lewis' criticism of the limitations of the “decommodification” definition. As is stressed by Taylor-Gooby (2008), Europe can learn much from Esbing-Andersen and WRT. In particular, European models which are largely 'social democratic', with an exception of a corporatist model in Italy, can make sure that the notion of an “investment” continues to be a driving one [Taylor-Gooby, 2008, p. 10]. In North America, or more liberalized models, individuals on social assistance are not viewed as investment. Rather, they are viewed as a liability. When the overwhelming concern is debt and deficit, the short term solution is to focus on that which contributes to the current government debt. Individuals on social assistance, under the social democratic model, should be understood as investment in the future. For individuals on social assistance or welfare in Europe, there is a good deal of emphasis on education. Likewise, with health-care. These are part of the social support systems that are available to individuals on social assistance through Europe. In Denmark and in the Netherlands, the emphasis on investment as a long-term dividend: “relaxation of employment security combined with activation and training produced a positive outcome” [Taylor-Gooby, 2008, p. 8]. What Europe can learn from a feminist critique of the of Esbing-Andersen is both positive, but with some important additional considerations. On the one hand, Esbing-Andersen does view subsistence as a dividing line, and on the other, assistance is not just a liability but instead, an investment, on the hand, they also do not go far enough with the idea that 'gender' is essential to reform ideas – at least as much in relation to the other primary considerations. Europe has progressive social assistance infrastructure, and this inlcludes the level of funding that is actually provided [Taylor-Gooby, 2008, p. 8]. However, Europe is continuing to fail “high risk groups” [Taylor-Gooby, 2008, p. 16]. The rates paid out to families with children, is a rate that has been falling in recent years and most notably within the nation of Germany [Taylor-Gooby, 2008, p. 17]. As mentioned earlier, single-mothers are disproportionately represented on social assistance client numbers, and thus, a failure of provision or subsistence among this class of category, entails a more closer attention paid to the very nature of the group itself. Where WRT has failed in Europe, a feminist critique offers much to point out the nature of the limitations in question. It can be argued that they best typify the distinction between a ‘gender type’ and a ‘gender role’ [Clausen, Ed., 2002, p. 39]. Where the ‘type’ in this instance is ambiguous, the role which is assumed might be definite according to the individual in question. For example, there are cases where scientific determinations have established a ‘type’ for given individuals with physiological tendencies toward hermaphroditism, the individual on their own volition may have an entirely different conception of themselves which is at odds with the scientific ‘label’ or ‘type’. Self perception in this sense raises the central ideas of ‘social construction’ which were raised in the opening of this analysis. The ideas which shape how we perceive ourselves, are arguably more important than the biological determination, if it is the case that we can be entirely at odds with the ‘biological definitions’ provided for us. And, if these ideas again, are an extension of the knowledge systems and processes which any given individual is subjected to, then, it can be said that we are ‘socially constructed’ in two important senses: “In the conservative tradition' of course, women are discouraged from working; in the liberal ideal, concerns of gender matter less than the sanctity of the market.” [Esbin-Andersen 2006, p. 169] We are socially constructed by the “social superstructure” [McNair, 2003, p. 145.] representative of its values, ideas in the market place, so to speak, but also constructed in any attempt to define ourselves. To some extent, even self definition remains connected to socially defined variables. Self-definition is problematic because of reporting situations where people are not representing themselves honestly to the system. CONCLUSION: What doesn't lie are the numbers. Ebing-Andersen's work makes the inference without fully deliverying it. The point to the statistical fact concerning the numbers of single mother's on social assistance across systems, but avoids bringing gender completely to bear on the reform theory in question. It cannot at the same time, be denied that whether they make the leap to a feminist position, they provide the inferences that go into the: “the essential welfare contribution” [Ebing-Andersen, 1990, p. 49]. The use of “essential” in Ebing-Andersen entails a reference to the subsistence that is required so that a consensus of neglect does not cross the line into a neglect that is viewed as a sense of abuse. Part of the essential according to their own data, is the prevalance of single mothers on social assistance which is compounded by a complete lack of education as a potential avenue for buffering the overall impact. However, it has been argued also that part of the essential attributes is 'subsistence'. Ebing-Andersen go far into outlining who it is on the margins of society by establishing what it is to subsist outside of the subsistence, but does not include 'women' as a variable that is as 'essential' as any other contribution. The essence of women is biological. That is variables and attributes that without which, women would not subsist as a particular kind of phenomena, is what essential about the notion of 'essential' in Ebing-Andersen. It is not an easy question to reply with. When one considers hermaphrodites, and how they pose as a challenges to finding something 'essential' to say about gender, so too is Ebing-Andersen's notion lack a certain 'grey area' or complexity. Biological essencial attributes are ascertained through binary notions which go into defining those biological differences between the sexes. If there is a dialectical relationship between how we think, and what kind of welfare system we share [Ebing-Andersen's position], there is going to necessarily be a qualitative aspect to that. There is a subjective component precisely because we are being shaped by that which we are also attempting to determine. Ebing-Andersen's contributions to Welfare Theory are the three categories that clearly define the superstructures that exist in the world market place. That is the value to European Social policy concerns. They are not committed to “creating equality”, and no where in his writings is there a commitment to welfare's fundamental function of 'subsistence'. What is essential to him, are by contrast, is not raising taxes and not “creating equality”. When a state is not committed to subsistence, they are culpable of genocide under circumstances where neglect crosses over the line into abuse. Making a decision not to help a person is the cause as much as making a decision to terminate someone might or probably results in death. Ebing-Andersen does not concern themselves with the essential function of subsistence at his peril. Andersen, Jorgon, (Ed.), 1999, The changing face of welfare: consequences and outcomes from a citizenship, The Polity Press, London. Claussen, Diane.(Ed.), 2002, Sex, Religion, Media, Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford. Ely, Robin J. and Gabrielle Foldy, Erica Foldy, Maureen A. Scully, 2002, Reader in Gender, Work, and Organization, Blackwell, Oxford. Epstein, Steven. 2007,Inclusion: The Politics of Difference in Medical Research, Chicago University Press, Chicago. Esbin-Andersen, Gosta, 2006, The three worlds of welfare capitalism, (Note: provided with the course readings, this is only a 'chapter length' study) Esbin-Andersen, Gosta, 1990, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Green-Pedersen, C., and Haveland, M., 2002, ‘Review essay: the new politics and scholarship of the welfare state’, JESP 12(1) . Lewis, J., 'Gender and Welfare Regimes: Further Thoughts', Social Politics, 4:2 (1997), 160-77 Lorber, J., 1998, Gender Inequality: Feminist Theories and Politics, Roxbury, Los Angeles. Rothstein, Bo, and Sven Steinmo. 2002, Restructuring the Welfare State. Political Institutions and Policy Change, Macmillan, New York. Sainsbury, 1999, Gender and Welfare State Regimes, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Schwalbe, 1996, Unlocking the iron cage: the men's movement, gender politics, and American culture, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Standing, Guy, 2005, Promoting Income Security as a Right. Europe and North America, International Labour Organization, London. Taylor-Gooby, Peter, 2008, “The New Welfare State Settlment in Europe, Routledge”, London. Read More