Navigation Incident NO.2 - Essay Example

This factor can be noticed after knowing about the collision of Argyle Express and ro-ro passenger Cargo ferry Plymouth Venturer on 31st April 2004 at 10:22. The collision was there because of reduced visibility; however, there was less damage as both the vessels were turning away from each other at the impact moment. The vessel type of Argyle Express was Passenger/ ro-ro cargo ferry, twin hull while Plymouth Venturer was Passenger/ ro-ro cargo ferry and both the vessels had experiences of daily travelling.

LOA of Plymouth Venturer was 150m, gross tonnage was 16010, service speed was 23 knots while the engine power was 1992 KW, 2 x diesels. LOA of Argyle Express was 80m, gross tonnage was 4246, service speed was 40 knots while the engine power was 22000 KW, 4 x diesels. Discussion Argyle Express and ro-ro passenger Cargo ferry Plymouth Venturer had adopted proper watchful strategies as both had master, mate and rating lookout on the bridge. Two radars were also there to report about any incoming vessel but their distance was only six miles.

According to the rule 7b, “Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational, including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of detected objects” (COLREG 1972). . According to the rule 19b given in COLREG (1972), “Every vessel shall proceed at a safe speed adapted to the prevailing circumstances and conditions of restricted visibility. A power-driven vessel shall have her engines ready for immediate manoeuvre.

” and according to rule 6 and 6i in COLREG (1972), “Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions. In determining a safe speed the following factors shall be among those taken into account: (a) By all vessels: (i) the state of visibility”. Therefore, both the vessels surpassed the speed limit without paying any heed to the poor visibility conditions and without considering the rules designed for such conditions.

Both the vessels were aware of each other’s entering and departure from supervising VTS communications; however, there was no communication between the two vessels due to which, there was a collision. Both were knowledgeable about the movement of other vessel but no one felt the need to communicate with other. After gaining knowledge about Argyle Express movement from bridge team and approaching collision conditions, Plymouth Venturer changed its course only 7 degrees to starboard. This much alteration of path was not sufficient as stated in rule 8b, “Any alteration of course and/or speed to avoid collision shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, be large enough to be readily apparent to another vessel observing visually or by radar; a succession of small alterations of course and/or speed should