The Central Feature of John Rawls - Essay Example

Rawls Theory of Justice The Original Position The central feature of John Rawl’s position on the social contract of justice is the original position. Set forth in his book Theory of Justice is the principle that justice is fairness. This original position is designed in manner to suggest that it is an impartial and fair point of view adopted in the reasoning of a person on the fundamental principles that govern the theory and concept of justice. This paper discuses the concept, content and principles that the original position proposes with a keen interest on the difference principle that Rawls proposes. The foundation of this principle is that everybody is takes up a position in the society as equal and free in relation to other members of the same society. The people therefore agree to jointly commit to the principles of social and political justice. This position, the original position, is distinguished from other social views by what Rawls terms as the “veil of ignorance”; an insurance policy that guarantees impartiality of ones judgment. This is done by depriving every member of the society all the knowledge of his or her unique and individual characteristics relative to the other members of the same society based on the historical and social characteristics of the said individual. They therefore operate from a common point of ignorance as to the circumstances and capacities of every member of that society (Rawls, 1999, p. 15). However, as to their knowledge of specific fundamental interests that they all enjoy, nothing is done. This is in addition to information based on biology, economics, psychology and several other aspects of the social sciences. Under the original position therefore, the parties are then given several alternatives of the major conceptions of what justice is based on the common and customary usage of political and social philosophy and given the option to pick the best alternatives of the concept of justice that would be the best means of advancing their interests. These interests are those aspects that would then enable them to pursue their fundamental interests and final ends in the most effective manner. In the best possible justifiable scenario that while ensuring all their interests are catered for, it does not short change the individual member of the group (Rawls, 1999, p. 17). It is the contention of Rawls that it would be most rational for the parties involved in making these choices to select the two principles of justice. The first principle of justice guarantees individual’s basic rights and freedoms that are needed to ensure the security of the most basic interests of an individual who is free. It also allows citizens to equally pursue a broad range of conceptions that they consider to be good. The second principle of justice is more sociological. It provides equality in employment opportunities and education. In this way, individuals are enabled to compete at an equal level for the prerogatives and powers of any office. It also secures for everybody the minimum of the all-purpose means, this includes wealth and income that one would require in order to pursue their specific interests and to maintain their dignity as equal and free persons of the society in which they are in. The Original Position and Argument for Justice It should be noted that according to Rawls, the original position is not a situation that involves bargaining. This view does not contemplate that the parties will make proposals and counterproposals so as to negotiate the various principles of justice. It is also no a free ranging discussion. The parties do not come up with their own constructions of what justice is. The fundamental basis of this position is that the deliberations that may exist between the members of the society are more constrained. They are actually given a specific list of the conceptions of justice that is based on the social and political philosophy of the West. While the list is not exclusive, its principles are basically the same. These conceptions include a variety of principles on perfectionism, utilitarianism, intuitionism, which represents mostly pluralist views, justice as amounting to being fair, egoism that is rational and a collection of several varied conceptions that are made up of two or more of these conceptions. Rawls also notes that libertarianism could also be added to this list of choices. Consequently, the deliberations or discussions that the parties to these options will have are limited to what each will find to be the most rational choice by presenting their specific interest. It is based on these deliberations that they would ultimately agree. It is this common conceptions that now defines the overall group conception of what justice is. It thus up to the parties to compare their choices and considering all the choices that have made. The conception of justice that remains after the various eliminations becomes the ultimate and agreeable conception of justice for all of them. Therefore, the original position is more or less a process of selection. The background condition of each party constrains their deliberations by imposing their original positions and limiting the choices they have to a defined list of conceptions of justice that is provided to them. It is thus the ultimate agreement that they come up with that forms the design of the basic structure of a society that is self-constrained under specific circumstances of justice. The concept does remain unchanged even at this point (Rawls, 1999, pp. 19-40). It is therefore clear from this concept that in making their decisions, the parties are only influenced by their own rational interests. There are no moral considerations that they make on justice unless such considerations have a bearing on them achieving the interests that they have. Even then, these interests are dependent on the terms that each have on acquiring the rights and freedoms; powers and opportunities; wealth and income; among several other primary social goods. The interests are also defined by the parties achieving the conditions that would enable them to effectively pursue what they consider to be good in an effort to realize their high order of interests within their moral powers. However, because they are all ignorant as to the particular conceptions of the good that each has in addition to other particulars about the society, they are incapable of bargaining on anything. Ultimately it would be true to conclude, using Rawl’s original position that they have in their possession the same information and are also moved by the same interests that other parties have. This position is supported by several other arguments that Rawls presents. In the Theory of Justice, he makes four major arguments. One main argument is the difference principle. A principle that he later amends and clarifies in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. The common principle in the original position is that it is more rational for the parties to choose principles of justice as fairness with the average and classical utilitarianism with brief discussions of intuitionism and perfectionism. It is mostly on these principles that he bases the difference principle. It is an acknowledgement of the fact that factors and resources of production are not evenly distributed among members of the society. The Difference Principle This is Rawl’s second principle of justice. This principle states that social and economic inequalities are both, firstly, to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged person in the society and secondly, attached to the positions and offices that are open to all under the conditions of fairness and equality of opportunity. While appreciating the differences of every individual, Rawls uses this principle to advocate not only for the acceptance of the differences that do exist but the fact that those differences should be eliminated in the best and fairest way possible (Rawls, 1999, p. 65). The first part of this principle addresses the inequalities in the way primary goods and means of production for goods and the creation of income and wealth are distributed; while the second part addresses the inequalities of powers and prerogatives of office and the positions of responsibility that people hold. The difference principle basically promotes the concept that the society has a responsibility to institute an economic system that would address the issues facing the least advantaged class better than any other plausible economic system that is compatible with maintaining the individuals’ basic liberties and rights while ensuring there is a fair equality in the opportunities that come their way. He defines the least advantaged members of the society as that class of people who do have the least share of primary goods. These primary goods include wealth and income; and powers and prerogatives of the offices that they hold. The difference principle is based on the assumption that these classes of people are engaged in an activity of production of one form or the other. Based on this assumption, Rawls regards distributive justice as the benefit that accrues to the persons who are playing their part in this production process of the society in a cooperative way. The best category of workers who could be used as an example in this class is the unskilled workers of any given society. It is this group that mostly receives the minimum income in the society. He does not however classify the welfare payments that are paid to the disabled people in the society. Moreover, given the concept of reciprocity when it comes to the basic structure of institutions of economy, the difference principle by itself eliminates the classification of compensating disabled people in any category in the economy classes of the society (Rawls, 1999, p. 72). He contends that this then becomes an empirical question where the system of the economy satisfies the difference principle. He however observes that the best conditions under which the difference principle can most likely operate is in a market that though liberal, could be controlled by the society’s power or in a property-owning democracy where private interests do not interfere with the private interests of other individuals. It would therefore be hard if not impossible, for this principle to function on a free market economy or a communist economy that is in total command of the powers that control the society. To overrule the effects of the principle of utility, Rawls uses the maximum rule of choice. Given that both the maximum rule of choice and the difference principle require that the individual maximizes the position of the least advantaged member of the society, it would be safe to argue, according to Rawls, that the maximum choice rule will lead directly to the choice of the difference principle that is proposed by the views in the original position. However, maximum rule of choice cannot be used to justify the difference principle because when several conditions and circumstances such as the degree of the fair equality of opportunities, applying the maximum rule of choice becomes impossible. This is because in such a situation, there are mixed conceptions of justice. These mixed conceptions protect basic freedoms and in most cases will provide individuals with the opportunities that they need and guarantee them with the minimum income and wealth. This is based on the fact that presented with two alternatives, of either acquiring the maximum primary goods to improve their status as the least advantaged members of the society, or selecting the minimum primary goods that would improve the same status, most individuals would choose either, but when pushed the would also settle for the minimum. Nozick’s critique of Rawls difference principle the main reason for which Nozick attacks John Rawl’s theory of difference principle is based on the ground that a lack of social cooperation, this is what Rawls deems as one of the common desires of the members of a society, to those who are least advantaged. The same case may based on the assumption that those who are most advantaged would be obliged, as consequence of the inequalities that exist and because of the social cooperation that they require, to help their counterparts who are least advantaged. It is this assumption that forms the basic foundation for Nozick’s question as to why the most advantaged would be thus obliged. He also tries to find out why those that are least advantaged would not accept the fact that those who are most advantaged are just not equal to them (Paul, Miller & Paul, 2005, p.163). Nozick also questions Rawls idea that morality is an arbitrary natural endowment. He argues that the natural advantages that those who are most advantaged have and enjoy do not necessarily violate the rights and freedoms of any other person in the society. They therefore have a right to enjoy them as they wish provided they respect the liberties of their counterparts. In addition, he argues that Rawls proposal that these inequalities be directed towards enabling those who are least advantaged in itself becomes a morally arbitrary proposal. In order to find out whether Nozick’s critics were right, there is a need to understand how self-ownership to the ownership of materials and resources move. In Anarchy, State and Utopia, he tries to present an account that is coherent and explains the principle of acquisition. This is a principle of law that gives the person who owns a property the rights over that property to the exclusion of everybody else. The best example would be the underlying reasons for the Palestinians and Israelis conflict. In part, the conflict arises between two groups of who claim ownership of the same property based on past and present occupancy. While the Israelis, who are now most advantaged because of current occupancy claim sovereignty, Palestinians, who are currently disadvantaged over such rights claim sovereignty based on past occupancy. According to Nozick, Rawl’s difference principle is an attractive concept because it overlooks several facts. One among them is the idea that the income and the wealth that is distributed are not really free or without any cost. They are primary goods that are already owned by several members of the society, and rightfully so. This claim that they have may or may not be legitimate depending on the circumstances (Paul, Miller & Paul, 2005, p.164). This therefore means, like the underlying principles and causes of conflict between Palestine and Israel, these individuals would not readily accept the difference principle as proposed. This is based on the fact that, as it is, this principle may seem unreasonable and unfair to them. In addition to this fact, it fails to respect the individual rights and liberties of the owner of the primary goods and means of production and violates all the principles of transfer that exist. However, this angle of criticism can only be true if Nozick shows that those who have worked on resources which were not previously owned ultimately claim them as their own. Moreover, his theory of justice has an interesting perspective. It more or less rests on intuition. As a result, it would be necessary to defend his argument by showing that the person, who owns rights over anything, legitimately acquired that right. References Paul, F. E., Miller, F.D. & Paul, J. 2005, ‘Natural Liberalism from Locke to Nozick’, Social Philosophy and Policy 2(1), 162-164 Rawls, J. 1999, A Theory of Justice, revised Ed., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Read More