Warsaw Ghetto Uprising - Term Paper Example

?Table of Contents Introduction Historical background Life in the ghetto Illegal organizations Destruction of the residents Relations with Polish organizations The uprising Conclusion Introduction The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was the largest Jewish rebellion against the Nazis during the Second World War. Its suppression took the Nazi troops more time than the conquest of Poland. Many of the liberation wars carried the seeds of inevitable defeat, but none of them had such deep sense of tragedy, as the last fight of the last remaining inhabitants of the Warsaw ghetto, which broke out at the grave of their neighbors, without support, almost without weapons, without even the slightest chance to win. Historical background After the entry of troops of the Third Reich into Poland in October 1939, the occupation authorities issued the order according to which Jews had to pass their money to financial institutions. A person was allowed to keep no more than 2000 zlotys. In public transport, the Nazis placed offensive posters intended to incite ethnic hatred. Speaking about the reasons for creating ghettos in towns of Poland, the Nazis claimed that Jews were carriers of infectious diseases, and that their isolation would help to protect non-Jewish population from the epidemics. In March 1940 a number of urban areas with high concentrations of Jewish population had been declared a quarantine zone. From these areas about 113.000 Poles were expelled, and this place was inhabited by 138.000 Jews from other places. The decision to organize the ghetto was taken on October 16, 1940 by Governor-general Hans Frank. At this point in the ghetto, there were about 440,000 people (37% of the population), while the area of ghetto was 4.5% of the area of Warsaw. Initially leaving the ghetto without permission was liable to imprisonment for a term of 9 months. Since November 1941 the death penalty was applied. On November 16 the ghetto was fenced with a wall. Life in the ghetto Issues within the ghetto were regulated by Judenrat, which was under the control of German authorities. Chairman of the Judenrat was Adam Czerniakow, who “refused to take advantage of opportunities to leave Poland in the early months of the occupation, and he held Jewish leaders who did so in contempt as traitors to their people” (Niewyk & Nicosia 175). Head of the Jewish police in the ghetto was Jozef Sherinsky (Berenbaum & Peck 599). Officially established food standards for the ghetto were specially calculated for the people to starve and die. In the second half of 1941, food standards for the Jews included 184 calories. However, due to illegally supplied food, real consumption averaged 1125 calories a day. Part of the population was engaged in German manufacturing. Thus, in the sewing industry of Walter Tebens 18 thousand Jews were employed. The working day lasted 12 hours with no weekends and holidays. Of the 110 thousand workers of ghetto only 27000 had a permanent job. Inside the ghetto illegal production of various goods was organized, raw materials for which were supplied in secret. Products were also smuggled for sale or exchange for food outside the ghetto. In addition to the legal 70 bakeries in the ghetto there were 800 illegal ones. The cost of illegal export from the ghetto was estimated at 10 million zlotys a month. Among the inhabitants of the ghetto there was a layer of people, whose activities and position provided them with relatively good life (traders, smugglers, members of the Judenrat, the agents of the Gestapo). Most of the residents suffered from malnutrition. There were problems with health: Once the ghettos were sealed, the uncontrollable spread of typhus became a major problem. Some estimate that there was a case of exanthematic typhus in every family in the Warsaw ghetto, affecting from one-quarter to one-third of the population (Soumerai & Schulz 100). The worst situation was with the Jews, displaced from other parts of Poland. Not having connections and acquaintances, they had difficulties in finding and securing income for their families. Demoralization of youth took place in the ghetto, youth gangs were formed, homeless people appeared. Illegal organizations Illegal organizations of various kinds and numbers acted in the ghetto (the Zionists, the Communists). Once in early 1942 several Polish Communists (Jozef Levartovsky, Pinkus Kartin) were sent to the ghetto, members of the groups “Hammer and Sickle” and “Friends of the USSR” joined the Polish Workers Party. Members of the party produced newspapers and magazines. They were sided by left Zionist organizations that supported the ideology of Marxism and the idea of ??the establishment in Palestine of Jewish Soviet Republic. Their heads were Mordechai Anielewicz, Mordechai Tenenbaum, Yitzhak Zuckerman. However, in the summer of 1942, the Gestapo with the help of agent provocateurs identified most of the members of the pro-Communist underground. In March, the Anti-Fascist Bloc was created. The Anti-Fascist Bloc established contacts with other ghettos and established militant organization including about 500 people. Branch of the Bund had about 200 people, but the Bund refused coordination with the Communists. Organization of resistance did not become widespread. Destruction of the residents Rumors about mass extermination of Jews in the provinces of Poland circulated in the ghetto. To confuse and appease the ghetto, the German newspaper Warschauer Zeitung reported that tens of thousands of Jews were engaged in building an industrial complex. In addition, the ghetto was permitted to open new schools and orphanages. On July 19, 1942 in the ghetto there were rumors of imminent eviction due to the fact that the owners of the firm of Kohn and Heller evacuated their families to the suburbs of Warsaw. Commissioner of the ghetto informed the chairman of the Judenrat Czerniakow that the rumors were false, and Czerniakow made ??a statement. On July 22, 1942 the Judenrat was informed that all Jews except for working at German enterprises, employees of hospitals, members of the Judenrat and their families, members of the Jewish ghetto police and their families will be deported to the east. Jewish police were ordered to meet the daily dispatch of 6000 people at the railway station. In case of non-fulfillment of orders the Nazis threatened to shoot the hostages, among whom was Czerniakow’s wife. On July 23, the head of the Judenrat Czerniakow committed suicide after he had learned that preparations had been made to send children from orphanages. He was replaced by by Marek Lichtenbaum, engaged in speculation. Lichtenbaum’s sons collaborated with the Gestapo. Judenrat urged the population to assist the police in sending off residents. On the same day a meeting of members of an underground Jewish network was held, where it was decided that sending off residents will be made for resettlement in the labor camps. It was decided not to resist. Every day people were driven from the hospital—the designated gathering point—to the loading dock. Physically strong men were separated and sent to labor camps. In addition, those engaged at German companies were released (after the intervention of the directorate). Others (not less than 90%) were driven to cattle cars, 100 people each. Judenrat made statements, refuting rumors that the cars follow to the death camps. Gestapo distributed letters to residents on behalf of those who had left telling about the jobs at new locations. In the first days the police seized the poor, the disabled, and orphans. In addition, it was announced that those who voluntarily appeared at gathering points would be awarded three kilograms of bread and a kilo of marmalade. Since July 29 surrounding of houses started with checking of documents; those who had no reference to the work of German companies were sent to the loading dock. Those who tried to escape were shot. These checks were carried out by Lithuanian and Ukrainian collaborators. By July 30, 60 000 people had been sent off. “When the Aktion was over, the population of the Warsaw ghetto had been reduced from 380,000 to 70,000” (Fischel 94). On August 6, about 200 children from the orphanage headed by teacher Janusz Korczak were sent off to Treblinka. Judenrat obtained the release for Korczak, but he refused, and followed his pupils. In August, for the first time employees of institutions of Judenrat were sent off (700-800 people). On September 21, houses of the Jewish police were surrounded, most police officers, together with their wives and children were sent to extermination camps. Within 52 days (until September 21, 1942), about 300 thousand people were deported to Treblinka. During July, the Jewish police provided sending of 64606 people. In August they transported 135 thousand persons, on September 2-11, 35 886 people. After that, the ghetto included 55 to 60 thousand people (Krakowski). In subsequent months, the Jewish Fighting Organization took shape with approximately 220-500 people, headed by Mordechai Anielewicz, and the Jewish Fighting Union numbering 250-450 people. The Jewish Fighting Organization wanted to stay in the ghetto and resist, whereas the Jewish Fighting Union planned to leave the ghetto and continue action in the woods. Members of the organization were armed mostly with pistols, homemade bombs and Molotov cocktails. Relations with Polish organizations The Polish government in exile (Delegatura) established a special agency (Zegota, Rada Pomocy Zydom), designed to help the Jews in Poland. The organization saved 75000 Jews, issued 60000 false documents, allowed the Jews to live at the Aryan side. Only in Warsaw Zegota helped to save more than 10 thousand Jews. Warsaw Zegota saved 2500 children taken out of the flaming Warsaw ghetto. Zegota acted illegally, and if caught its members faced the death penalty. The attitude of Delegatura and the Polish Armia Krajowa to the revolt was contradictory. On the one hand, the Jewish sector of the AK helped hide Jews, the AK during the uprising provided a limited amount of weapons and attempted to blow up the walls of the ghetto to save part of the insurgents; on the other hand, assistance was insufficient and often late. For example, after the leaders of the uprising had contacted Armia Krajowa to help to resist the Germans they received the following number of weapons: 70 pistols, 1 light machine gun, and 1 submachine gun. It was all given by the army, which declared in 1941 that it had 566 light machine guns, 1097 submachine guns, 31391 rifles and 5 million rounds of ammunition (Krakowski). AK primarily helped the organization of Zionists revisionists ZZW (Zydowski Zwiazek Wojskowy – the Jewish Military Organization) under the command of Polish officer Paul Frankel; ZOB (Fighting Jewish Organization, Zydowska Organizacja Bojowa), consisting of the Socialist Bund, the Communists and the Left Zionists were suspected of sympathizing with the Soviet Union. Only a communist organization, Armia Ludowa unconditionally helped the Jewish underground movement of ZOB, but it began to actively operate only at the end of 1943. The uprising As directed by Himmler, the evacuation of the ghetto was to begin immediately, so that by mid-February about 25 000 people would have been removed. Colonel Ferdinand von Zammern, the commandant of the SS and police in Warsaw, with the strictest secrecy appointed the “Aktion” on January 18. Even the German guards and the leadership of factories in the ghetto were not warned. Headquarters of ZOB published a leaflet with a short appeal to resist: “Jews! Occupants began the second act of destruction. Do not go to death without fight! Resist! Take axes, crowbars, knives, lock your houses! In the fight you still have the chance to survive. Fight!” (Berenbaum & Peck 615). 50 combat groups of ZOB were scattered in different areas of the ghetto, away from each other, without an overall plan of action. In addition, they were poorly armed. For example, three battle groups in the streets of Leszno and Novolipe had only two pistols and one hand grenade. There were not enough bullets. Nevertheless, the Nazis immediately met resistance. On the third day of the “Aktion” the Germans did not take the risks to enter the houses and cellars, and send forth the Jewish police. If on the first day the Nazis managed to capture 3000 people, on the second day it was half the size, and on the third it was only a few hundred. For three days the Germans lost 60 killed and wounded people. Ghetto resembled a real battlefield: tanks and field artillery travelled along the streets, steaming kitchens appeared, soldiers were building firing points. The resistance in the ghetto came as a surprise to the Germans. The raid turned into a major combat operation, to which Zammern and his people were not ready. By the evening of January 21, he interrupted the “action” and, having announced his victory, withdrew from the ghetto. Nazis noted that the Warsaw ghetto turned into the place of corruption and rebellion. In February, Himmler gave orders to proceed to the complete elimination of the Warsaw ghetto and the transfer of its inhabitants to concentration camps in the Lublin district. For the liquidation of the ghetto the Germans had provided more than 3000 people, armed for the front: 2000 SS soldiers, 234 German policeman, 367 Polish officers and 337 so-called askars, who arrived from the camp in Trawniki, 35 Gestapo officers, and in addition more engineers and gunners from the garrison stationed in Warsaw. At the Polish side of Warsaw, just in case about 7000 more police and SS officers were ready, and in the Warsaw District 15000 people were prepared for combat. The ghetto was expecting an attack and prepared for it. Command of ZZW and ZOB became aware of the impending German action on the eve of the evening. At 2.30 a.m. the scouts reported the approach of large enemy forces to the ghetto. The battle groups were sent the battle alarm signal “Jan-Warsaw.” The militants got ammunition, food, and potassium cyanide – to commit suicide if necessary. Molotov cocktails were carried out on blankets. At four o’clock all the fighting groups were in their positions. The rebels mined 15 places, the streets and doorways were closed by barricades of overturned carts and furniture, pillows and sandbags could be seen in the windows. In some houses stairs and ladders have been destroyed in advance, in a number of buildings entrances were bricked up. Patrols of combat organizations continuously monitored the movement of the enemy. The streets were deserted: people were hiding away in secluded areas. Appeals on the walls of houses called “To arms!”, “Die with honor!” At the very prominent place—on the building of the church—the rebels put a red-white Polish national flag. In addition to members of militant organizations in the ghetto there were a lot of those (believed to be about 6000), who took weapons at their own risk, and, not wishing to obey the discipline of ZZW and ZOB, organized the defense directly at the place of residence or work. These “wild” men were often armed better than the members of militant organizations. Germans were cautiously making their way along the walls under cover of heavy machine-gun fire, tanks, artillery and flame throwers, setting up roadblocks and trying to circumvent the rebels from the flanks, to strike them from the rear. But even attacked from two sides, the rebels repeatedly forced the enemy to retreat. For a long time the fire of rebels did not allow the Nazis to re-enter central streets. However, the rebels lacked ammunition and material superiority of the Nazis. Militants of ZOB passed through attics and roofs to new positions, but as the enemy pressed forward, they were forced to leave the top floor and go underground. Governor-general Ludwig Frank reported at this time in the office of Hitler that had to deal with the Warsaw uprising, well organized in the ghetto, which had to be repressed with the help of guns. Rebels had been sent an ultimatum to surrender, which they have not answered. Germans began to burn the ghetto. Conditions of fighting worsened dramatically for the rebels. Earlier they endured murderous attacks, let the enemy come a bit closer and opened fire from rooftops, attics and from upper floor windows. Often, the Germans were forced to spend hours chasing the rebels in the maze of rooms and corridors, large buildings, without being ever confident that the area which seemed to be secured was again taken by rebels. Now the Germans, keeping more or less safe distance, just burned out block by block, ready to shoot anyone who tried to escape from the burning house. By April 22, the Germans were in control, the ghetto was burning, and Jews were being killed in increasing numbers. On May 8, Mordechai Anielewicz, the Jewish commander of the resistance, was slain (Fischel 95). The rebels were forced to abandon the defense of the buildings and took refuge underground. Only at night they could appear on the streets. Communication of the command with combat groups on the ground was broken. By April 26, fights in a ghetto reached their highest tension. On this day the command of Armia Ludowa received the last message from ZOB. It said of huge losses; that the defenders of the ghetto met their last days. The main forces of ZZW were broken the end of April, but ZOB continued resistance. On May, 13 governor of Warsaw Ludwig Fischer notified citizens of the destruction of the ghetto – the “nest of Bolshevism and banditry.” He urged people to fulfill their “duty” and deliver “Jews and communist agents” to the authorities. On May 15, the Germans destroyed the last house in the ghetto, with the exception of eight buildings – the German barracks, hospitals and prisons. On May 16, Germans officially announced the end of the “Aktion” and began to withdraw forces. Though in his report Stroop wrote that “the Jewish quarter of Warsaw no longer exists,” the rebels “continued to hide in bunkers and engage in armed clashes” (Fischel 96). According to estimates of German commander Jurgen Stroop, during fighting in the Warsaw ghetto on April 19 - May 16, about 7000 Jews were killed; in addition, about 5000-6000 died inside buildings and bunkers from fire and explosions. 56065 people, according to Stroop’s report, were captured and taken away from Warsaw. German troops during the operation destroyed 631 bunkers. According to later estimates, about 3000 people escaped from the Warsaw ghetto during and after the uprising (Fischel 96). German losses in the Warsaw ghetto are assessed differently. The underground press in Warsaw wrote about 120, 300, 400, and even 1000 deaths. Stroop mentions other numbers – 16 killed and 90 wounded. Later, while in the Polish prison, he said during questioning that the walking wounded who remained in the ranks were not added to the lists, as well as losses of the Polish police (which could not be, in his opinion, particularly large, since this police did not participate in operations inside the ghetto). The very fact of weeks of fighting in the ghetto, the use of artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, heavy machine guns, flamethrowers and gas, the glow of fire and the roar of explosions, repeated unsuccessful attacks of Hitler’s troops – all this suggests the enormous losses that they would incur. However, the appalling inequality of forces should be taken into account. Armed to the teeth Nazis were opposed by almost unarmed rebels with no conditions for any effective guerrilla warfare. Conclusion History teaches that guerrilla warfare can be conducted successfully in the rear of the enemy, whose forces are engaged in the struggle at the front, with favorable conditions of the terrain where it is possible to avoid fights with the main forces of the enemy, to destroy enemy’s communications, to attack by surprise, to attack the rear parts and disparate groups. Jewish rebels had to fight in a constant battle for territory, limited by several streets where the maneuver was limited to the movement of a hundred or so meters. In such circumstances, the defenders could not avoid large losses; it was extremely difficult, almost impossible for them to break away from the enemy during the withdrawal, to avoid encirclement, and even a complete destruction of their forces: “…the conditions of the Warsaw Ghetto made it impossible to consider systematic development of the struggle against the enemy, gradual intensification of the armed resistance, or preparation for the revolt which might break out upon the collapse of the Third Reich” (Krakowski 163). Among the rebel commanders there were no regular officers or people with military education. They could benefit from the experience of only a few ex-soldiers and noncommissioned officers who had served previously in the Polish Army and participated in the September campaign of 1939. The vast majority of the fighters were young boys and girls 18-25 years old, who never took up arms before joining the militant organization. Protracted fighting in the ghetto weakened the prestige of German arms in the eyes of the Polish population of Warsaw, which started talking of “German-Jewish war,” “the third front,” etc. Omniscient Gestapo was caught off guard, and the Wehrmacht and the SS for a long time could not break the resistance of the Jews. By the words of General Jerzy Kirchmayer: The defense of the Warsaw Ghetto ended, but the idea of an armed struggle, in whose name this battle was held, broke through the walls of the ghetto, continued to exist, and remained so until the victory. It was brought to the forests by those who escaped from the ghetto and joined various partisan units. Since the April revolt, we have met Jews in almost all of the units in the forest, and they are very daring and ready for an armed battle. On the other hand, the idea of an armed struggle penetrated the hearts of many Poles who witnessed it in the in the area of Zamosc or in the Warsaw Ghetto. The military significance of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising lies first of all in the response it received from the Polish public (quoted in Krakowski 214). Works Cited Berenbaum, M. & Peck, A. The Holocaust and History: the Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Re-examined. Indiana University Press, 2002 Fischel, J. The Holocaust. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. Krakowski, S. The War of the Doomed: Jewish Armed Resistance in Poland, 1942-1944. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1984. Niewyk, D., Nicosia, F. The Columbia Guide to the Holocaust. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Soumerai, E., Schulz, C. Daily Life during the Holocaust. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. Read More