China and Taiwan in american foreign policy - Essay Example

?China and Taiwan in American Foreign Policy Introduction: From being allies during the Second World War, the United s of America and China drifted apart to confront each other during the period of the Cold War, and even after the Cold War period. This confrontation has seldom taken on a direct form, except for the occasion of the tension across the Straits of Taiwan in 1996. The confrontation remained a proxy war during the Korean War in the 1950s and the Vietnamese conflict in the 1960s and 1970s. The break up of the Soviet Union and the demise of communism, except in China, should have paved the way for more amicable foreign relations between the two countries. This was not to be, as the confrontation across the Straits of Taiwan has demonstrated. Since political ideology of communism and democracy are no longer a major constraint in the development of amicable relations between America and China, analysis of events in the relations between America and China point to Taiwan as being the stumbling block. Overview of Taiwan in American Foreign Policy: Taiwan has been the major irritant between China and the United States of America for decades. American foreign policy in the far-east is the reason for the continued existence of Taiwan as a separate entity to this day. Taiwan became a separate entity from mainland China in 1949, when the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek was defeated by the communist forces and retreated to Taiwan, which was then called Formosa, to set up the government of the Republic of China, independent of mainland China. The communist forces under Mao Zedong attempted to take back Taiwan but were unsuccessful. In the mean time America decided to throw its weight behind the independent existence of Taiwan. This decision was based on the need to contain the growth of communism, and Taiwan provided the means to demonstrate America’s will in this direction. Taiwan was also strategically important, as it provided America with a platform for resisting the growth of communism in the Far East. For China, Taiwan and its independent existence has always been an emotional reminder of the past humiliations China has undergone from the West, which it would like to forget. Besides emotional reasons there are two valid concerns for China. Taiwan is a hindrance for it assuming the role of a major world power it has the potential to be and wants to be, is the first. The second is the security threat that Taiwan poses. The hostile attitude of Taiwan coupled with an American foreign policy unfavorable to China makes Taiwan a security threat due to its proximity to the mainland, as it can be used as a platform for many kinds of attacks. China would like to take control of Taiwan outright, but is gradually veering around to the reality that this would not be possible, and so China would be willing for a reunification with Taiwan, on the lines of its successful reunification with Hong Kong in. Taiwan is not keen on it, and would like to maintain its independence, which it stresses from time to time through its actions. America supports this view of Taiwan, and aims to prevent China pressurizing Taiwan into union with the mainland. From this stems the difficulties witnessed in the relationship between America and China. (Jakobson, 2005). Post Cold War American Foreign Policy in East Asia: The American foreign policy with regard to Taiwan and China has seen periods of wide swings. From the 1970s onwards American foreign policy was tilted towards a sobering influence between China and Taiwan, which went to the extent of reassuring China that America would reduce its military assistance to Taiwan in 1982. A decade later this pacifist trend was to reverse. The Bush administration in 1992 sold 150 F-16 war planes to Taiwan in spite of protests from China. The Clinton administration in 1994 upgraded the protocol rules for Taiwanese diplomats, and the following year provided a visa for senior Taiwanese leader Lee Teng-hui to visit America, disregarding diplomatic precedents. These were acts that were read by the Chinese as clear indications of an upgrade in relations between America and Taiwan (Ross, 2006). This shift in the pacifist trend in the American foreign policy was the consequence of the end of the Cold War and the shift in focus of American strategic interests from Europe to East Asia. There was recognition that the East Asian region was emerging as a region of economic importance and the significance of China in this changing reality. Policy makers in the United States of America were fearful that an emerging economic and military power like China would be tempted to use its military might to end the thorny issue of a separate and independent Taiwan once and for all. Deterrent measures needed to be put on place. The 1996 confrontation between America and China in the Taiwan Strait was a result of this renewed support to Taiwan by America and the expression of the Chinese disapproval of any support that would strengthen Taiwanese claims for sovereignty (Ross, 2002). The Chinese perceived the changed American foreign policy with regard to Taiwan as encouragement for Taiwan declaring itself as a sovereign state, independent of China. The Chinese response was a military build up threatening Taiwan, which brought about an American show of force in support of Taiwan, and the two countries came close to war. The two sides however backed off after America demonstrated it commitment to ensuring that Taiwan would not succumb to coercion from China, China demonstrating its opposition to any moves from Taiwan to severe its connection to mainland China on a permanent basis (Ross, 2006). This confrontation was to even further fuel the belief in America of the need for proper deterrence, as the only means to ensure that the economic and military might of China was not used to force Taiwan into submission and union with the mainland. The consequence has been increased arms sales to Taiwan and the initiation of a defense relationship between America and Taiwan laid on a foundation of wartime cooperation and increasing thrust in a missile defense system to offset the threat of hundreds of Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan. As a result the foreign policy thrust of the George Bush administration has been to strengthen the diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan, even it this means a disruption in the relationship with China and the possibility of regional instability. Hence the focus of American policy in the post cold war period in the issue of China and Taiwan has been to ensure that it acts as a deterrent to any territorial ambitions that China has demonstrated with regard to Taiwan (Ross, 2002). The Chinese Perspective: Unification of Taiwan with the mainland has remained a “sacred goal” for the Chinese leadership starting for 1949. There has been no vacillation on this. The only vacillation has been in the means to this goal. The unification of Taiwan with the mainland is an emotional and psychological necessity for the Chinese leadership. It is only through this unification can the memory of a “century of humiliation” through the exploitation of the weakness of China by foreign powers even to the extent of annexation be wiped out. Imperatives of territorial and national sovereignty demand this. As long as Taiwan maintains a separate identity, this “sacred goal” of China can never be achieved. Being a territorial issue, for China, the problem of Taiwan is an internal one, and the interference of America is unwarranted. The means to imposing this requirement on Taiwan has seen a transition with the passage of time. In the time of Mao Zedong the policy was one of use of force to recover the island territory. Under his successors this has seen a change of a negotiated means to a reunion of one country and two systems. It is highly unlikely that there will be any further watering down of the policy, as acquisition of Taiwan will remain a political necessity for the Chinese leadership (Whiting, 2005). It would be heartening for American foreign policy to see the shift in Chinese policy to Taiwan as solely because of its military might. This would be to ignore the other causes that have been responsible for this shift in policy by Mao Zedong’s successors. The subsequent Chinese leadership of Deng and Jiang appear to have learned from the Japanese experience of the use of soft power to attain influence on affairs around the world. Shattered after the Second World War, Japan rose to become a global power not through any flexing of the muscle of military might, but from the success of its economic model and its non-nuclear armament stand. Such a thread can be seen in the basic foreign policy line of China that has become clearer since 1996. China’s appears to want to erase the concerns that its smaller neighbors, other countries in the region, and the world as a whole have with regard to its expanding military might and economic power. The reason behind this move of China lies in the requirement that it sees in favorable world opinion for its growing trade, which is the driving force behind the rise in its economic fortunes. In this aspect Taiwan remains a hindrance. It cannot afford to give up its stance on the unification issue on one side and on the other it faces the problem of displaying a new face pacifist face to encourage its neighbors and other countries in the world to have confidence in it. Any moves on Taiwan that have a semblance of the use of force will negate all the efforts that it has put into reassuring former adversaries in and around the region and the major powers of the world that China is a responsible and attractive international partner. This is a challenge that the Chinese foreign policy faces and augurs well for the security in the Taiwan Strait. China will be less inclined, and more favorable for a negotiated settlement of the Taiwan issue (Goldstein, 2001). Security Implications in the Taiwan Strait: The current American foreign policy on China and Taiwan is one of deterrence with respect to any attempts by China to coerce Taiwan into unification, and reassurance to China that there will be no attempts to encourage Taiwan to declare total independence from mainland China. The salient point is that would such a foreign policy remove the security threat that the issue of Taiwan poses for the Far-East and South-East regions of Asia. China has demonstrated that it is willing to go to war over Taiwan, but is not keen on it. However this attitude would change the moment there are significant moves on the part of Taiwan to declare itself as a sovereign nation. Unresolved issues have the uncanny knack of developing into knotty problems that can flare up, threatening the security of the region and the world itself (Christensen 2002). There are pointers to reduced tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The policy of deterrence of America, and the current concentration of the Chinese leadership on trade and economic development, which requires a conducive world opinion, and the improving relations between America and China, since the EP-3 spy plane incident of 2003. There are several indications that show that the Bush administration considers China of significance in world affairs and of China reciprocating with a new found responsibility to concerns of the world. This can be seen in the crucial role played by China in the Six-Party Talks with North Korea on the creation of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. America and China are strategic partners in the war on terrorism. Would this improved relationship between America and China lead to addressing of the concerns of security implications in the Taiwan Strait is the moot point. There are distinct possibilities against it. Chinese rise as an economic and military power could well see it use both these to compel Taiwan into submitting to unification on Chinese terms. The American deterrence factor may not be relevant as China grows in economic and military might leading to a shift in balance of power in the Taiwan Strait in favor of China (Bickford 2005). The second factor likely to adversely affect security in the Taiwan Strait is the impact of domestic politics of Taiwan that result in provoking China into action. The political scenario in Taiwan is essentially made up of four parties the Koumintang (KMT), the People’s First Party (PFP), the Shui-bian’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). The KMT and the PFP favor the continuance of the current status quo with a possibility of integration with the Chinese mainland on a democratic basis sometime in the future. The DPP and the TSU call for a separate identity for Taiwan that will finally lead to independence from the mainland. China believes that America secretly supports this initiative of the DPP and TSU. Currently Taiwan is ruled by the President Chen Shui of the DPP. This has exacerbated the fears of China that Taiwan would attempt to break free. In recent times President Chen Shiu has been less vocal in his articulation for a separate identity for Taiwan, but this has in no way reduced the suspicion of China with regard to the possibility of Taiwan attempting to break free under his leadership. The Chinese suspect that President Chen Shui, who has been elected for a second term would rewrite the Constitution of Taiwan that calls for independence from China. Such a move could well see a second Taiwan Strait crisis occur, and may be this time with even greater repercussions (Glosny, 2004). Need the security implications in the Taiwan Strait be such that they threaten the security of the world? The answer to that is no. China would not indulge in violent measures unless pushed to by Taiwan. This means that America needs to maintain its influence over Taiwan in such a way as to ensure that it makes no rash moves towards a total break from China. China’s foreign policy has in the recent past demonstrated greater flexibility and sophistication. It has shown a drive towards improving its relations with friends and foes, rich and poor countries around the world. It has also shown a willingness to be a part of discussions on security issues that are of concern in the Asian region. It has also shown a more responsible trend in nuclear non-proliferation and global arms control. The American foreign policy needs to take note of these trends and engage China and Taiwan in discussions to remove the unresolved issues between them to reduce the security concerns that they pose (Medieros & Fravel, 2003). Leaders of the opposition parties, the KMT and PFP have visited mainland China. This creates an avenue for China to initiate discussions with mainstream political parties in Taiwan on the ways and means to remove the thorny issue of the separation of Taiwan from mainland China. America could help in this, by encouraging such interaction between Chinese and Taiwanese leaders. This would in addition dispel the Chinese suspicion of American motives in its assistance to Taiwan. Linda Jacobsen, 2005, has put forward a thought provoking suggestion of Greater Chinese Union as a means to remove the security concerns that arise from the Taiwan issue. In the Greater Chinese Union put forward by her a means to move beyond the current status quo situation, which can be quickly upset by deliberate moves by any of the concerned nations, or just by actions by one that raise the suspicions of the adversary, is provided. The Greater Chinese Union is proposed to be a loose form of political integration, which would be a form of federacy. The features of the Greater Chinese Union would be such that it addresses the main concerns of both China and Taiwan. It would be consistent with the One China policy requirement of China. Taiwan would be demilitarized removing the security fears of China. Safety concerns of Taiwan would be met through international guarantees, and may be even the presence of the United Nations. Taiwan within the Greater Chinese Union would have greater scope and space for international interaction, which meets the major demand of Taiwan. The Greater Chinese Union calls for concessions from both China and Taiwan, but could lead to a win-win situation for both through the addressing of their major concerns (Jacobsen, 2005). This is not to say that the Greater Chinese Union is the only solution for the vexing issue of Taiwan for China and America. It at the least provides a road map for forward movement to remove the Taiwan issue as a security threat to the region and the world. Conclusion: Taiwan has and continues to remain a thorny issue for both America and China in their relationship. The deterrent policy of adopted by America has prevented the military might of China from overrunning Taiwan and annexing it to mainland China. This deterrence has made China unwilling to risk a war, but it would in the event Taiwan chose to make a move for total independence. Such a move would depend on the political climate in Taiwan, and whether it believes there would be support for such a move for total independence from America. Thus the current status is dependant more on the actions of Taiwan. This could change in the future, as China’s economy and military strength develop, such that the American deterrence is no longer considered a major issue by China. China would then risk a war with America for China. Literary References Bickford, T.J. (2005). Opportunities, Risks, and the Issue of Taiwan. Retrieved April 14, 2011, from, FPIF Policy Brief Web Site: http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/285 Christensen, J. T. (2002). The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict. The Washington Quarterly, 25(4), 7-21. Glosny, M.A. (2004). Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan. International Security, 28(4), 125-160. . Goldstein, A. (2001). The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice. The China Quarterly, 168, 835-864. Jakobson, L.. (2005). A Greater Chinese Union. The Washington Quarterly, 28(3), 27-39. Medieros, S. E. & Fravel, M. T. (2003). China’s New Diplomacy. Retrieved April 14, 2011, from, Foreign Affairs Web Site: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20031101faessay82604-p0/evan-s-medeiros-m-taylor-fravel/china-s-new-diplomacy.html. Ross, S.R. (2002). Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation, Dominance, and US-China Relations. International Security, 25(2), 48-84. Ross, S. R. (2006). The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force. International Security, 29(2), 87-123. Whiting, A.S. (2005). China versus Taiwan: Balance of Power or of Will? Retrieved April 14, 2011, from, UCLA INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE Website: http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=6671 . Read More