Miranda Warning, How it changed Police Interrogation - Term Paper Example

?Running Head: MIRANDA WARNING Miranda Warning: How it Changed Police Interrogation Miranda Warnings: How it Changed Police Interrogation Introduction United States Constitution guarantees every individual the right to avoid self-incrimination and have legal counsel when interrogated by law enforcement. The landmark Supreme Court case, Miranda v. Arizona (1966), established that police are obligated to provide certain warnings prior to questioning a suspect brought into custody to obtain a confession. To be admissible as evidence at trial, a defendant's statement must have been made with the knowledge of certain rights. Miranda Warning: How it Changed Police Interrogation Prior to the establishment of the Miranda rights in 1966, numerous courts had raised doubts regarding the validity of some confessions. In 1886, the Alabama Supreme court suppressed the confession of a woman "of weak mental capacity" who had been locked in a smoke house until she confessed and had been led to believe by the prosecutor that she could go free after confessing (Hoober v. State, 1886, as cited in Bishop, 1989, p. 27). In another case, the Mississippi State Supreme Court refused to allow the entry of confession of a "not bright" suspect into evidence. The suspect's employer testified, "He is going to give you the answer you desire. If you want a 'yes,' he will give that to you; and if you want a 'no' he will give you that" (Ford v. State, 1897, as cited in Fulero & Everington, 1995, p. 534). The 1936 case of Brown v. Mississippi (279 U.S. 278) began the movement toward an increased concern for individual constitutional rights. In Brown, confessions were acquired from three defendants through physical methods including hanging, torture and severe beating (Fulero & Everington, 1995). The convictions were overturned on the constitutional basis of the Fourteenth Amendment: citizens cannot be deprived of liberty without due process of the law. This introduced the totality of circumstances standard to the concept of waiver and confession, requiring that a variety of factors be considered in determining the voluntary nature of a confession. Brown was followed in 1964 with an increasing concern for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The question that arose was whether or not this right was violated by a failure to provide counsel. The first major change in police interrogation - that is, from following the voluntariness test - occurred in state law. In 1966 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Miranda. The Miranda decision has been the mirror for modern application of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in both federal and state criminal cases. Ernesto Miranda was convicted on charges of rape and kidnapping after providing police with a signed confession. Miranda's questioning by police lasted 2 hours and was conducted in an interrogation room without the aid of a lawyer. The three other defendants charged with the crimes experienced similar interrogation situations (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966; see Vignera v. New York; California v. Stewart; and Westover v. U.S., as cited in Oberlander & Goldstein, 2001). The Miranda Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, believed a suspect automatically confronted a "compulsory" situation ("inherent pressure") when placed in a police interrogation environment. The Supreme Court believed there had been widespread abuse throughout the nation by law enforcement personnel, and thereby, … concluded that without proper safeguards for the process of in-­custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime … [the] inherently compelling pressures will work to undermine the individual's will to resist and [will] compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely (Dunham , 2008: p. 540). Essentially, the Miranda decision established a new approach to the admissibility of suspects' confessions by rejecting a judicial case-by-case determination of whether a confession was voluntarily given. The Court ruled that any statement resulting from the interrogation of a suspect would be presumed involuntary and thus, inadmissible unless the police first provided the suspect with four warnings. Widely known as the Miranda warnings, these standards first state that the suspect has the right to remain silent. Second, any statements made by the suspect can be used as evidence against him or her. Third, the suspect has the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning. Finally, an attorney will be appointed if the suspect cannot afford counsel. In addition, the court determined that an individual may waive these Miranda rights if the waiver is "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." Soon after the Miranda decision, police departments developed and instituted Miranda warning statements, the majority of which were patterned after the Court's suggested warnings provided in an appendix to the Miranda decision (Grisso, 1998). These warnings were added to enhance the existing test for admissibility of a confession - the due process voluntariness test. The Court's purpose in mandating that the police communicate these specific warnings [warnings which the Warren Court did not believe the Constitution required] was to transform what the Court believed to be a naturally compelling environment to one where the suspect had confidence and control. Some scholars contend the Court's rationale was that it was not proper for law enforcement personnel to elicit free-will statements from suspects unless initially the personnel exhausted almost all efforts to prevent the statement from ever being made (Dunham , 2008). Miranda implied no interrogation was permissible if the suspect indicates "in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney" (Dunham , 2008: p. 538). Most pro-Miranda supporters and certain current Supreme Court justices contend this should be interpreted as guaranteeing the suspect the end of interrogation along with the right to counsel, no matter how muddled and incomprehensible his statement concerning legal counsel. Miranda is an example of this new radical legal philosophy. Miranda represents an aberration from the American jurisprudential landscape, insufficiently conforming with either Biblical or historical criminal confession standards, not so much because of its results, but because of its rationale and the disrespect exemplified by the Court's majority (John & Otis, 2007). The NeoNormalists claim they are contending for the dignity of mankind, but, as Justice Byron White in his Miranda dissent stated, "In some unknown number of cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist, or other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him. As a consequence, there will not be a gain, but a loss, in human dignity" (John & Otis, 2007: p. 356). This should be compared with what a prior Supreme Court had said: "The Constitution is not at all offended when a guilty man stubs his toe. On the contrary, it is decent to hope that he will." (Richard & George, 1998: p. 101). Even though the original holding of Miranda has been substantially diluted, the influence of this monumental case continues to have a significant impact upon the admissibility of criminal interrogations in state cases. State cases have not been the only jurisdiction to incur major changes in this area of law (Fulero & Everington, 1995). Conclusion The act of police interrogation is a complex yet powerful tool for law enforcement. During the early sixties and seventies police professionals shifted attention from deterrence-oriented functions to criminal investigation. A Supreme Court case that changed the nature of police investigations, and specifically suspect interrogations was Miranda v. Arizona, (1966). Prior to Miranda, the legal rule for assessing the validity of suspect confessions was voluntariness. However, the Miranda Court rejected the old standard and implemented new rules governing suspect interrogations. With the development of professional policing, law enforcement agencies began to devote more attention to criminal investigation practices to improve services to citizens. References Bishop, A. W. (1989). Comprehension of Miranda rights: Effects of intelligence, adaptive behavior, and age (Doctoral dissertation, The University of Alabama, 1989). Dissertation Abstracts International, 50, 3546-3547. Dunham B. (2008). Introduction to Law. Delmar Cengage Learning; 005 edition. Fulero, S. M., & Everington, C. (1995). Assessing competency to waive Miranda rights in defendants with mental retardation. Law and Human Behavior, 19, 533-543. Grisso, T. (1998). Forensic evaluation of juveniles. Sarasota, FL: Guilford. John M. Scheb, & Otis H. Stephens, (2007). American Constitutional Law: Civil Rights and Liberties: Wadsworth Publishing; 004 Edition. Richard A. Leo, George Conner Thomas. (1998). The Miranda debate: law, justice, and policing. Northeastern Publishing. Read More