The Effects of Guerrilla Warfare on Counter Insurgency Operation - Essay Example

?The Effects of Guerrilla warfare on Counter Insurgency Operation Throughout the history, people with their ‘valid reasons’ have fought against theirrulers or even oppressors for their rights and freedom. This fight can be divided into two categories, in one case, the entire nation and its official armed forces fighting against the imperialists. In another case, groups of people will be up in arms against the oppressors. While the fight by the entire nation or the official armed forces may have legitimacy and viewed as independence struggle, military operations, etc., the fight by certain groups will be viewed as a fight against the State and will be viewed negatively as terrorism, insurgency, rebel attack, etc. As these groups of people will be in minimum numbers when compared to the forces of the State, they might use key strategies to attack and overwhelm their opponents, and one among them is the guerilla warfare. Guerilla warfare is a quick and surprise form of attack carried out by a small group of insurgents against a much larger group of armed forces, causing immediate as well as minimum or maximum causalities and then withdrawing quickly. This form of warfare has been carried out by many groups against established armies achieving both successes and failures. Counter measures To counter this guerilla warfare by the insurgents, government or the official armed forces will indulge in Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations. Nations try to reach the top echelons on the back of its strong armed forces. Nations’ with its army, navy and air force will protect its territorial integrity as well as gain superiority. On those lines, counter-insurgent forces are formed to carry out various military or armed strategies and actions against those insurgent groups, in order to eliminate their challenge against the state and also for the common good of the population including the local populace. Apart from indulging in armed actions, these COIN forces will further isolate and pressurize the insurgent groups and prevent them from guerilla warfare, by striking a good rapport with the local population. Thus, this report will first discuss how guerilla warfare gets formed and evolved, and how it is being used by the insurgent groups to fulfill their various needs. Then in the second part, the report will discuss how these guerilla warfare techniques and actions has made the COIN forces even more aware of any impending attack, thereby helping them to come up with a optimal strategies to counter them, using real-world examples. Guerilla Warfare As pointed out above Guerrilla warfare is surprise-filled irregular form of warfare carried out by a small group of combatants against a much larger regular armed forces in a terrain, which favors them. Apart from attacking the larger army’s convoys or forces, guerrilla army would also target their opponent’s resources including their arms and ammunitions depot, food supplies, etc, which can have a key impact on the way counter-insurgency is carried out. This way, they will try to cut the supply lines of their opponents, thereby weakening them to launch more attacks and finally make them withdraw. That is, as the small groups cannot directly confront the larger, equipped and dominant groups in a single battle, then knock them down and emerge victorious, they indulge in guerilla warfare to weaken them step-by-step. “…they seek through a constant campaign of sneak attacks to inflict continuous casualties upon their superior enemy forces and thereby over time demoralize the occupying forces and erode political support for the occupation in the homeland of the occupying forces.” (Singla). This can be seen in many successful guerilla warfare based attacks, where there is a greater disparity in abilities and resources. So, it can be seen as a “simple strategy of repeated pin-pricks and bleedings that, though small in proportion to the total force strength, sap the will of the occupier to continue the fight.” (Singla). Another aspect of guerilla warfare is that, although it is a teamwork, each individual has to act on his/her own to fulfill their given roles and responsibilities. With guerilla warfare happening mainly in the form of ambushes, each one will not have physical or even other electronic contacts to get instructions from a high command. Thus, “it becomes necessary for the chiefs of groups, chiefs of detachments and squadron leaders to have the ability to carry out, with minimal instructions from the higher levels, psychological action operations with the contacts that are thoroughly aware of the situation,” (fas.org). Groups will mount guerilla warfare with a group of individuals, who will have a common goal and mission, and importantly the patience and intensity to strike secretly, without projecting themselves. This being the case, the rebel and insurgent groups will do a lot of spadework and planning while recruiting their fellow group members. This form of building a guerilla group will also have an effect regarding the way the counter-insurgency operations are conducted. They will look for susceptible individuals, who can be tweaked and tuned to indulge in violent actions, according to their orders. This can be clearly seen in the ‘recruitment drive’ followed by the Jihadi forces or Takfiri terrorists (fanatical Muslims who have no value for human live including fellow Muslim lives) in the terrorism hotspots of Afghanistan, Iraq as well as in Pakistan. This pattern of recruitment was discussed in an in-depth manner by the counter-insurgency expert, military strategist and author, David Kilcullen and that has led to Kilcullen’s theory about accidental guerillas. Accidental guerillas in the sense, they become guerilla insurgents due to basic level motives, particularly their opposition to anything Western and not due to any deep-rooted ideologies. “According to Kilcullen‘s theory, the core takfiri terrorists are implacable fanatics, who exploit local guerrillas and their perception that Western presence is a deadly corrosive to local identity.” (Tiberi and Hamilton 2011). Kilcullen (2009) spells how four stages of cyclical process (bordering on how a bacterial or viral infections affects the human body) through which only these accidental or local guerrillas will emerge, namely infection from a cyclical process that takes place in four stages: infection, contagion, intervention and rejection. According to Kilcullen (2009), in Afghanistan the main jihadi group of Al-Qaeda will start the infection process by establishing a presence in a remote, non-governed or conflict-affected area. Then as part of contagion, they will use these safe havens to spread violence and takfiri ideology to other regions. Following that, as part of intervention, the outside forces in the form of U.S. and other Western forces or heavy-handed government forces will intervene to deal with the AQ threat and disrupt the safe haven. (Tiberi and Hamilton 2011). However this may not work on the expected lines of these Western powers. Because in the final process of rejection, the local population will start to reacts negatively and strongly against the outside intervention, completing rejecting the outside intervention and importantly allying with the takfiri terrorists, becoming a guerilla fighting and indulging in guerilla warfare and other insurgencies. “Discussing the tribal areas of Pakistan, Kilcullen shows how Al Qaeda moved in by taking over communities — establishing bonds by marrying local women, operating businesses, eventually recruiting the villagers as fighters.” (Giovanni 2009). Apart from these men, there are also other group of individuals, who want to become a guerilla fighter just because they love to fight. For them fighting with anyone particularly the Western powers will be a passion, and also the love for fighting will be inoculated in their cultures. This can be particularly seen among the Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan and Pakistan as they are the people who “really love the fight (jang) for its own sake” (Tiberi and Hamilton 2011). Kilcullen (2009) further explains this mentality of the accidental guerillas by stating, “When the battle was right there in front of them, how could they not join in?” Kilcullen writes. “This was the most exciting thing that had happened in their valley in years. It would have shamed them to stand by and wait it out, they said.” The other key component of Guerilla’s function, which will have an impact on the counter-insurgency operations, is how they build their support base. To keep their group running and to further expand their actions, the guerrillas will rely on both internal as well as external support. The internal support for the guerillas could constitute anything from the local populace, including primarily personnel, medical care, food, and intelligence. They will expect and need the support of the local population, otherwise they could be cornered and weakened. So, they will try to get their support by conducting nicely with them or ‘brainwashing’ them with their ideology, or even by providing them with certain needs. If that does not work, they will actualize a reign of terror, creating a fear psychosis and forcing them to support their case. On the other hand, the external support could come from the governments whose views could be parallel to those of the guerrillas. (Gombo 1990). “The external support may be similar to the internal support, but will include weapons, and possibly, a safe haven for the guerillas in times of need”. (Gombo 1990). These are the ways guerilla groups get formed, evolved and operate, understanding of which, can enable the counter-insurgent groups to come up with effective strategies. Counter Insurgency A Counter-Insurgency (COIN) involves series of steps or military actions carried out by a country’s official military forces, under the direction of a recognized government to control as well as quell the insurgency and guerilla warfare of particular groups. As part of controlling and quelling, the COIN will take on the groups through armed actions, destroying their resources, and importantly will also try to erase the political as well as social authorities among the local populace, who are supporting the insurgent groups. “Counter-insurgency may be armed suppression of a rebellion, coupled with tactics such as divide and rule designed to fracture the links between the insurgency and the population in which the insurgents move.” (usma.edu). This way, all the support base for the insurgents could be checked or blocked, thereby making them vulnerable. So, as mentioned above, based on the origination and functioning of the Guerilla war group, counter-insurgency can be aptly strengthened One of the basic needs of a counter-insurgency operation is to increase the number of soldiers in the insurgency area optimally, so that it does not give any chance for the insurgents to indulge in guerilla warfare or even escape quickly. Although, this measure may need high number of manpower, it can be successful because guerilla forces will be effective only if they operate in secret without anyone noticing. However, with this increase in armed forces, they could be vulnerable, may have the fear of getting caught and importantly will eliminate the element of surprise. As part of COIN, the Military can also form local irregular forces, recruiting from local communities and training them to be part of anti-insurgent force. Although, there are risks with this force, as they could act independently and indulge in negative actions, if this force is made up right personnel they can play a key role in counter insurgency operations. This measure worked aptly in Iraq, with the Sunni gunmen recruited by the Iraqi government aptly supporting the American and Iraqi forces. “Irregular forces embedded in local communities, including the 100,000 Sunni gunmen paid by the Iraqi government to form “Awakening Councils”, played a crucial role in America’s success in the counterinsurgency war in Iraq.” (Kristol 2010). With these men, the number of men fighting the guerilla forces in Iraq increased and that give an upper hand to the Coalition forces. However, just having higher number of armed men may not result in completely defeating the guerilla groups, as other factors will continue to supply the much needed support and resources to those group. This fact of how victory over guerrilla groups may require not just numerical military superiority, was clearly stressed by Robert Thompson in the book Defeating Communist Insurgency. On those lines, Thompson (1966) came up with five “Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency”, which are “The government must have a clear political aim; The government must function according with law; The government must have an overall plan; The government must give priority to defeating political subversion; and The government must secure its base areas first.” (Thompson 1966). As discussed above through guerilla warfare, insurgents will mainly try to weaken the larger force step-by-step. One of the ways, they could do that, is by carrying out minimum damaging causing guerilla attack and then eliciting the larger force to return fire maximally. “The more force applied, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal.” (uchicago.edu). Because of this complex situation, the counter-insurgent forces need to use force in a careful, judgmental way. That is, the counterinsurgents should know when to use minimum force or when to use maximum force, and also when more force is needed or when it is needed or may be counterproductive. “This judgment involves constant assessment of the security situation and a sense of timing regarding insurgents’ actions.” (uchicago.edu). One of the key parts of counter-insurgency operations is isolating the insurgents or guerrilla group, by weaving away the local populace away from them. As discussed above, the guerrilla groups will always depend on the local population during the guerilla warfare and also for their food supplies and other resources. So, the counter-insurgent forces, apart from militarily attacking the insurgents, should also come up with strategies that can take them into the good books of the local population. It is up to the counter-insurgent forces in association with other government bodies to carry out constructive and positive activities for the welfare of the local people. Once these steps are carried out, people will start trusting the government and may not heed to the words of the guerilla groups. Even involving them in the welfare activities will give them a vocation and avenue to earn, thereby avoiding any overtures of the insurgent groups to join them. Kilcullen points out how the vulnerable people in Afghanistan’s Kunar Province were involved in the construction of the road in 2007–2008, thereby weaving them away from Jihadis and insurgents. “Similarly, he points out, success in Iraq involved bringing tribes and insurgent groups into sanctioned security arrangements and gave locals alternatives to the extremist option.” (Mathew). If the local people start focusing on constructive works and importantly did not support or show sympathy for the insurgents, then the counter insurgency forces can succeed quickly. As the insurgents will be deprived of their crucial supplies including food, shelter, and, also its moral legitimacy, they struggle to survive and operate. So, instead of just militarily fighting the insurgents, cutting off the supply lines with the help of local people is also a key necessity in counter insurgency operations against the insurgents, whatever the country maybe. References fas.org. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE, viewed on April 9, 2011 http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/guerilla.htm Giovanni, JD 2009, Local Wars, viewed on April 9, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/books/review/DiGiovanni-t.html Gombo, J 1990, Understanding Guerrilla Warfare, viewed on April 9, 2011 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/GJ.htm Kilcullen, D 2009, The Accidental Guerrilla, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Kristol, W 2010, Some Good Advice from the Field for Gen. Petraeus, viewed on April 9, 2011 http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/some-good-advice-field-gen-petraeus Mathew, P, Intelligence in Public Literature, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big, viewed on April 9, 2011 https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no4/intelligence-in-public-literature.html usma.edu, Ontology, viewed on April 9, 2011 http://portal.dean.usma.edu/departments/se/nrcd/Ontology.htm uchicago.edu, Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations, viewed on April 9, 2011 http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/841519.html Singla, Parvesh. The Manual of Life : CounterTerrorism. Parvesh Singla Publications. Thompson, RGK 1966, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (Studies in international security), F. A. Praeger. Tiberi, P and Hamilton, BA 2011, Counterinsurgency Book Review and Summary, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, viewed on April 9, 2011 http://usacac.army.mil/blog/cfs-filesystemfile.ashx/__key/CommunityServer. Blogs.Components.WeblogFiles/coin/COIN-Center-Book-Review_2C00_-Kilcullen_2C00_-The-Accidental-Guerrilla.pdf. Read More