The Threat of Hitler - Essay Example

? How might the threat of Hitler have been better contained? History does not provide humanity a set of alternatives to choose from. But humans always look back on events and wonder what if something else had happened. From one viewpoint, it is a waste of time to enquire what should have been the alternatives, if something might not have happened. But still, we humans have to analyze the past so that errors once made are not repeated. Such a looking back can be of great value in preventing the repetition of mistakes. It is in this context that the question, ‘How might the threat of Hitler have been better contained?’, has to be discussed. And the answers are many, if we logically address the ‘how’s and ‘why’s of the past. It is evident that there were many options available before the peace-loving and freedom-loving nations of the world to contain and minimize the threat of Hitler. This is an attempt to explore them one by one. The first issue at hand is regarding how Germany could rise from its ashes to become a monster even after the injuries and defeat caused in the First World War. Perry et al. has argued that the inability and neglect of countries like US, UK, and Russia to contain Germany’s growth after First World War was what made Hitler formidable in the Second World War (816). If we probe this allegation further, it can be seen that after First World War, The Treaty of Versailles had deprived Germany of its powers considerably but this situation could not be sustained because US, UK and Russia were engaged elsewhere with their differences of opinions and internal problems. Also, the initial attempts of Germany to revitalize its strength, lost in the First World War, were looked upon sympathetically by these countries. The injustices that were inherent in the Versailles Treaty were what made UK and France close their eyes to the initial expansionist policies of Germany. United States had retracted from the treaty and had totally kept out of European politics (Perry et al., 816). The people in America were also in support of the isolationist policy. The American government and the people were thinking that there was no point in risking the lives of Americans to solve the problems of Europe. Russia was busy with rebuilding the nation after the revolution and Britain was facing an economic crisis and also hostile to an alliance with US or with France (Perry et al., 816). In retrospection, it can be reasonably argued that if all these nations had shown sustained interest in curbing the powers of Germany, in view of the bad experience in First World War, then Hitler might have been contained in a better way. The strained relations that existed between Britain and France, Russia and the rest of the world, and also between US and the European countries, prevented them from uniting against Hitler. There was no common agenda that unified the countries of Europe. Every nation was doubtful of the intentions of other nations. The British leadership of that period is guilty of appeasing Hitler with a hope that it would keep him happy and prevent him from entering into a war with Britain (Perry et al., 818). The British also failed in understanding the depth and danger of Hitler’s racism (Perry et al., 818). Even when the news about people being sent to concentration camps for extermination began to ooze in, Britain did not believe that (Perry et al., 818). This delay in getting a real picture of the situation cost millions of lives. An account about the life in a concentration camp says: Some show the bunks were people were crammed together to sleep. One building has long rows of holes in cement, (these were the toilets). Imagine, thousands of people rushing in there. They only had a few minutes, no privacy, no toilet paper. Walk back to the middle and continue down the tracks or path and try to imagine what it was like, as the trains pulled in, and the people like Dr. Josef Mengele pointed to the left or right and sentenced prisoners to work or be gassed at his whim (Terrance, 16). If action was initiated at the first instance of arrogance on the side of Hitler, many feel, things might have been different. But Hitler was also clever enough to make the British believe that he would never attack Britain. Even inside his mind, Hitler had a hope that the British would become comrades in his fight for Aryan supremacy. A preventive war might also have been very crucial, if waged (Record, 43). The British leaders were too much obsessed with averting a war that they did not strike back when it was needed, and took the beating in the most unprepared moment. Until then, the tepid nature of initial British reactions to Hitler, reflected in, Samuel Hoare saying in the House of Commons that “Britain would not protest the seizure of Memel” by Germany, and also Chamberlain claiming that “Rumania had not signed away its economic freedom” (Zalampas, 194). The then British Foreign Under-secretary, Richard Butler said that Britain had no plans to put forth “economic sanctions against Germany” (Zalampas, 194). Even when Hitler announced that Germany was no more bound by the Versailles Treaty and that in contradiction to the treaty, the country was going to increase its naval strength and was going to establish own air force, Britain, France and Russia were least bothered, and they even entered into military treaties with Germany (Perry et al., 818). Japan and Italy were also making advances for expanding their borders but this also went unattended to (Perry et al., 818). Britain and others took a passive stand in the Spanish civil war also with the result of Germany getting an opportunity to rehearse a greater war (Perry et al., 820). The weakness that Britain suffered on military front was a reason why the country could not take a pro-active role when Germany forcefully appended Austria and Czechoslovakia (Perry et al., 822). Critics (Perry et al.) believe, if Britain and France had resisted Germany in the Munich agreement that followed, the Czech might have got a chance to resist Germany with the help of other nations (822). Also, if Britain and France had the military strength to launch a preventive, situation might have turned against Hitler (Recod, 45). There was also another diplomatic mistake made by Poland, which indirectly helped Hitler to pursue his bloody goals. When Hitler threatened to attack Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union was ready to help the Czech (Markowicz, 130). But as Soviet Union had no common border with the Czechoslovakia, they had to cross the Polish territory that lay between the two countries if they wanted to reach Czech territory (Markowicz, 130). But Poland did not give permission for Russian military to pass through their land (Markowicz, 130). There were two reasons behind this decision- Poland was friends with Germany and hated Soviets (Markowicz, 130). By this mistake, Hitler was able to conquer Czechoslovakia and then proceed to win the territories of France and Britain. And finally Poland got divided between Soviet Union and Germany. It was only then that real resistance to Nazi regime emerged in Poland. Though France was the most powerful nation in Europe during that time, the French Prime Minister Leon Blum kept away from interfering in the Spanish civil war thereby reducing his stand to the level of appeasement towards Nazi Germany (Markowicz, 130). French also made the mistake of being caught unawares in the quagmire of war, once it got started and lost more than half of its territory to Hitler. Another mistake was made by Russia when Stalin-led Russian government entered into a secret non-aggression agreement with Hitler (Perry et al., 824). This destroyed the possibility of Britain, France and Russia forming a strong alliance against Germany (Perry et al., 824). Though Russia was buying time to build its military capacity through this agreement, a strong response to Germany was delayed. Instead, if there might have a British-French-Soviet alliance, Hitler might not have dared to plunge into a war so easily. The unduly fear and hatred of Communism was what led Britain and France to believe that there was no option of joining the Soviets (Markowicz, 130). The Soviets also shared the same hatred. When Chamberlain asked Soviet Union to issue a joint declaration against Hitler, Russia was not ready for that (Zalampas, 194). Instead, Russia wanted an “anti-Hitler conference” to be held involving Britain, France, Poland, Rumania, Turkey and Russia (Zalampas, 194). Chamberlain was of the belief that the notion of such a conference was “premature” (as cited by Zalampas, 194). The war of words continued in this vein but nothing constructive materialized. There also is a very big ‘if’ related to the policy of United States towards the rise of Hitler. It is a known fact that America was following a path of isolationism during that era and they did not bother to understand what was happening in Europe (Margulies, 39). As United States had by then become the biggest industrialized nation in the world, they could have become a formidable foe for Germany (Margulies, 39). Instead of resisting the progress of Hitler, America went on passing Neutrality Acts which restricted the country form taking sides in the European conflict (Margulies, 39). This was a factor, which gave much confidence to Hitler (Margulies, 39). The American isolationist attitude ended too late, only when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor (Margulies, 39). The shadow of First World War still lingering in the minds of the people of Europe was yet another hassle before an effective European offensive against Hitler. If Britain and France had even a fraction of awareness about the power of propaganda as Hitler had, there might not have been the response to and invading Germany, delayed. The fear of war was so strong in the minds of British and French and this was what molded the public opinion of appeasement (Reynoldson, 36). But Hitler had overcome the same mood in the minds of Germans through sheer propaganda (Reynoldson, 49). And at a personal level, if the British Premier Chamberlain was as strong-willed as his predecessor Churchill was, then he might not have conceded to giving away Sudetenland, which was part of Czechoslovakia, to Germany (Reynoldson, 36). Even as early as in 1938, Churchill, who was totally against the ‘appeasement’ policy, said, “We have been defeated. Czechoslovakia will soon be taken over by the Nazi regime” (as cited in Reynoldson, 36). There was an internal clash going on in Britain between those who stood for appeasement and those who opposed it. Churchill was in the camp, which was against appeasement. But it took time for him to throw out Chamberlain and take over the command. It was very clear that British leadership had totally underestimated Hitler. They thought that once German majority lands were attached to Germany, Hitler would stop (Reynoldson, 37). Otherwise, there might have been better plans devised to remove Hitler from power through a coup or even assassination. It was in 1944, i.e; towards the fag end of the war that the British Special Operations Executive prepared a plan to kill Hitler (Hosmer et al., 32). This plan was formulated on the assumption that once Hitler was dead, nothing will be left of Germany (Hosmer et al., 32). This assumption was to an extend, true as Hitler was holding the trust of the people of Germany with his histrionics and a peculiar charm. His strong-willed nature was what really attracted the German people in an era of confusion and social stagnation that came after the First World War. But there was strong opposition among the British officials themselves regarding the claim that destroying Hitler personally would destroy Germany as a threat (Hosmer et al., 32). These people were afraid that an assassination would impart the image of a martyr to Hitler and the grip of his ideology on Germany would get stronger (Hosmer et al., 32). Anyway, if that assassination plan was carried out, that might have been the end of Hitler. But whether such a drastic act would have backlashed and would have become counter-productive is a question that is not easy to answer. Just before the Munich agreement, the situation in Germany was such that there was every chance of an “internal revolt” (Sears, 26). If Britain and France had realized this and had been bold enough to reject supporting Hitler in Munich that might have catalyzed a revolt in Germany (Sears, 26). But it is observed that, “the British and French governments could not be sure that a firm stand at Munich would have brought about a revolt within Germany” (Sears, 26). This uncertainty was what made them passive when there was a need to be active. Last but not least, there were many voices of suppressed dissent existing in Germany but the allied forces were not able to find the proper cords to strike. The propaganda machinery of Hitler also made it impossible to locate the very subdued resistance inside Germany and give support to them. Apart from the discussion above, more questions can be raised regarding the options that were available to contain Hitler and the genocide that he stage-managed- like, what if the powerful lobby in British government that believed that Hitler was preserving European nationalism could have been convinced otherwise? Or, what if the Russians, Americans and the British had launched a joint military attack against Hitler? As the old proverb has always reminded us, prevention might have been far better than the cure that the world saw for the disease called, Hitler. Works Cited Hosmer et al., “Operations Against Enemy Leaders”, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001.Print. Margulies, Philip, “America’s Role in the World”, New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009. Print. Markowicz, Philip, “My Three Lives”, Pennsylvania: Dorrance Publishing, 2009. Print. Perry et al. “Western Civilization: Ideas, Politics and Society- From 1600”, Volume 2, London: Cengage Learning, 2008.Print. Record, Jeffrey, “Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s”, Darby, PA: DIANE Publishing, n.d. Print. Reynoldson, Fiona, “The Twentieth Century World”, Berlin: Heinnemann, 1995. Print. Sears, Kenneth.A.E., “Opposing Hitler”, Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, 2009. Print. Zalampas, Michael, “Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich in American magazines, 1923-1939”, Wisconsin: Popular Press, 1989.Print. Read More