Supporting Knowledge Management - Essay Example

Page 0 Contents 2.0 Introduction 3 3.0 Key Findings 4 3 Supporting Knowledge Management 4 3.2 Critical Assessment of Knowledge Management 11 4.0 Conclusion 14 5.0 References 15 6.1 Appendix 1. Case Study 1. KM in the PharmaCorp. 18 6.2 Appendix 2. Case Study 2. KM in the Swedish Armed Forces. 23 6.3 Appendix 3. Case Study 3. KM in Global Oilfield Services Provider. 26 2.0 Introduction “The problem in Knowledge Management practice is obviously finding the middle ground between technology and people, between fads and methods, between forced and self-directed participation” (Troxler & Lauche 2006: p.8). Leibold et al. (2002) assert that during last three decades the world has gone through the important turning period in its economic, political and social history, which is related to the increasing appreciation of new values, such as openness, freedom, interdependency, networking and collaboration. It is accompanied by the acceleration of technological changes and impetuous development of computer and electronic communications. In the organisational context these processes entailed significant shifts in strategic management thinking and implementations: from information to knowledge and wisdom; from bureaucracies to networks; from training / development to learning; from local / national to transnational / global and meta-national; from competitive to collaborative thinking; from single and multi-connective relationships to bio-corporate relationships (Leibold et al. 2002: p.14). All these changes clearly reveal that the current era of the global economy is primarily based on knowledge and intellectual assets rather than on material and financial assets. This era is often called New Economy or Knowledge Economy (Drucker 1994; Davenport & Prusak 1998), where knowledge is considered as a key organisational asset, which ensures sustainable competitive advantages for companies (Alavi & Leidner 2001). Companies in its turn also represent a new form of organisations, which exploit specific organisational structures and new information technologies, and base their business upon a development of core competencies through knowledge and expertise sharing and organisational learning. This paper is aimed to discuss modern concepts and approaches related to management of knowledge in organisations, and critically assess the role of Knowledge Management in creation of sustainable competitive advantages of enterprises. 3.0 Key Findings 3.1 Supporting Knowledge Management Understanding Knowledge in Organisations Knowledge in organisations is considered as “any text, fact, example, event, rule, hypothesis, or model that increases understanding or performance in a domain or discipline” (Liebowitz & Beckman 1998: p.49). Another useful definition of knowledge is “a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insights that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. In organisations, it often becomes embedded not only in documents and repositories but also in organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms” (Davenport & Prusak 1998: p.5). Allee (1997: p.62) explains that when information is involved in the larger context of meaning, when it is analysed and linked with other information, when it is referred to existing patterns, social and cultural biases and interpretations – then it becomes knowledge. So, evidently, knowledge can be organised and classified, having the properties of an object. At the same time, “knowledge can be viewed as a process of transformation through creation, adaptation, enhancement and application” (Allee 1997: p. 47). Or, in other words, “knowledge is the process of knowing, a reflexive process that takes data and information, in a social context, mixes the ingredients and factors [experience, judgment, common sense, rules of thumb, values and beliefs, basic truths, context, best practices, emotions, desires] to generate new data, information, and/or knowledge” (Fotache 2005: p.260). Thus, the most distinctive feature of knowledge is that it has dual nature – it can be considered as a static object and as a dynamic process. In addition, De Long & Fahey (2000: p.14) point out that, in dependence on context, knowledge may be viewed either as being located in an individual (or a collective), or as embedded in a process (or a routine). The distinctive feature of knowledge is also that unlike information it can be often in a tacit form, what makes its codification and transfer via formal rules and procedures quite difficult. Such tacit knowledge can be revealed through interactions happening within an organisation and its environment. Ramos and Carvalho (2008: p.79) emphasise that “these interactions are structured around the formal aspects of work and used artifacts, shaped informal roles and communication, and human needs for work satisfaction, constrained by organisational policies, and sustained by organisational culture.” Understanding Knowledge Management The distinctive features of knowledge described above make it clear that knowledge in organisations should be managed differently than information and data, focusing onto issues related to development of human and organisational capabilities, motivation, and creativity. Nowadays Knowledge Management is generally referred to the “identifying and leveraging the collective knowledge in an organisation to help the organisation compete” (Alavi & Leidner 2001: p.113). Wiig (1999) considers that the general goal of KM is “to build and exploit intellectual capital effectively and gainfully” (p.4). Wiig (1999) asserts that this goal is suitable for all enterprises, although it may have specific implications due to the considerable complexity behind it. De Long & Fahey (2000) view the purpose of KM in organisation more comprehensively, as “to enhance organisational performance by explicitly designing and implementing tools, processes, systems, structures, and cultures to improve creation, sharing, and use of all types of knowledge” (p.15). According to Davenport and Prusak (2001), organisational KM initiatives are commonly aimed onto one of three objectives: “(1) to make knowledge visible and show the role of knowledge in an organization; (2) to develop a knowledge-intensive culture by encouraging and aggregating behaviours such as knowledge sharing (as opposed to hoarding) and proactively seeking and offering knowledge; (3) to build a knowledge infrastructure not only a technical system, but a web of connections among people given space, time, tools, and encouragement to interact and collaborate” (cited in Alavi & Leidner 2001: p.113). Management literature points out two fields that are closest to Knowledge Management (KM) – Organisational Learning and Information Technology. Organisational Learning (OL) is mostly considered in the context of system dynamics (combining system thinking with development of human potential) and organisational culture. Ramos & Carvalho (2008) define OL as “a process by which an organisation constructs the required knowledge to survive and compete in its environment” (p.93). Senge (1994) introduces a model of Learning Organisation, which is based upon five disciplines – systems thinking, personal mastery, mental models, shared vision and team learning. Argyris (1999) also emphasises that Organisational Learning implies close considering of such concepts as “organizational adaptability, flexibility, avoidance of stability traps, propensity to experiment, readiness to rethink means and ends, inquiry orientation, realization of human potential for learning in the service or organizational purposes, and creation of organizational settings as contexts for human development” (p.1). Information Technology (IT) is viewed mostly from the perspective of providing the supportive and encouraging socio-technical environment. Loermans (2002) asserts that KM has originated from many subfields related to IT, such as artificial intelligence and expert systems, business information systems and decision support systems, data mining, information retrieval and others. That’s why many early KM initiatives were aimed at the capture and dissemination of explicit knowledge rather than the mobilising and development of tacit knowledge. Today organisations increasingly realise that although IT and communication tools is a critical component of any KM initiative, the effective KM requires focusing onto building and exchanging of tacit knowledge, as well as onto developing human and organisational capabilities (Wenger & Snyder 2000: p.142). When choosing KM strategy, enterprises often aim at their current business needs, for example, some of them can focus mostly on knowledge sharing and distribution (Wolf & Kazi 2006), while for others, knowledge creation is more important in order to increase operational effectiveness (Sheehan 2002). Analysis of KM practices in companies of both private and public sectors (such as Hoffmann-LaRoche, Hewlett-Packard, Buckman Laboratories, Health Canada, US Navy, World Bank and others) allowed Bouthillier and Shearer (2002) to determine several distinct KM methodologies, which are being most often chosen by organisations: 1. Methodologies focused on communication: Communities of Practice, Question and Answer Forums. 2. Methodologies focused on storage and retrieval: Knowledge Mapping, Expert Databases, and Knowledge Databases. 3. Methodologies focused on selected dissemination: News Information Alerts, Organisational Learning. 4. Methodologies focused on action: Virtual Collaboration. One can argue that this classification is limited; moreover, often these methodologies are used conjointly, for example the Question and Answer Forum can work within Communities of Practice, as well as there also can be organised Virtual Collaboration and Expert and Knowledge Databases. Nevertheless, such classification helps to understand better the particular nature of KM and KM processes related to business processes in organisations. Communities of Practice as one of the most effective KM methodology It is widely acknowledged among KM researchers and practitioners that successful KM is built on a human-centered approach, which involves three core organisational resources – People, Processes and Technologies, and requires coordination between them (Pettersson 2009; Sheehan 2002). In addition, previous researches showed that such factors as Strategic Management, Leadership and Organisational Culture contribute to success in KM implementation. Pettersson (2009) emphasises that “organisational environment must provide acceptance of and the opportunity for exchange, use and reuse of knowledge” (p.1736). In researches and articles in the KM area it is often asserted that integration of people, processes and technologies is more effectively provided within “virtual communities of practice enabled by online interactive technologies” (Ardichvili et al. 2003: p.64). It is believed that Communities of Practice (CoPs) is the most promising KM methodology of choice for an increasing number of enterprises of different sizes (Bouthillier & Shearer 2002). The term “community of practice” was coined by Lave and Wenger in 1991 in order to describe “an activity system that includes individuals who are united in action and in the meaning that action has for them and for the larger collective” (Ardichvili et al. 2003: p.65). CoPs are groups of people “who share similar goals and interests” (Kirchner & Wopereis 2003: p.111) or “informally bound together by shared expertise and passion for a joint enterprise” (Wenger 2000: p.139). This means that members of CoPs likely “employ common practices, work with the same tools and express themselves in a common language” (Ibid.) That, in its turn, causes strengthening of trust within the community and increases willingness of members to communicate with each other and to share knowledge. McDermott (1999) notes that “knowledge belongs to communities” (p.108), and the real value of knowledge can be measured only in regard to how the knowledge is generated, developed, disseminated and exploited within a context and processes of a particular community. In summary, CoPs can be defined as “groups of people informally linked across traditional [organisational or industry] boundaries by shared expertise, interests and mutual enterprise passions, either physically (e.g. face-to-face meeting) or virtually (e.g. by email networks)” (Leibold et al. 2002: p.243). CoPs are highly efficient in organisational and personal knowledge generation, sharing and exploitation, because they provide tools for revealing and internalising tacit knowledge, allowing employees to discuss their experiences, participate in problem solving and work jointly on specific tasks regardless of geographical or organisational boundaries. At that, tacit knowledge is considered as a key source of competitive advantages of enterprises (Ardichvili et al. 2003), so, creating and supporting CoPs is an essential step toward an improvement of sustainable competitive position of a company. The significant benefit, which companies can get from CoPs, is that, while complementing existing organisational structures, CoPs help to change radically the processes of learning and knowledge sharing within enterprises and their environments. This was well proven by a number of real-life case studies. For example, when an automotive concern DaimlerChrysler merged its two major divisions – in Germany and in America, a new effective mechanism for communication and learning from each others’ experience was extremely needed. Setting up CoPs across the functional units of the merged firm helped to stimulate horizontal interactions and learning on the basis of product model ranges / car platforms (Wolf & Kazi 2006). Such cross-functional interactions and learning, in turn, have contributed in improvement of organisational communications and decision making processes, what was extremely important and useful for the firm. Wolf & Kazi (2006) conclude that “CoPs do not only create value, their implementation can lead to a massive change of the organisational decision structure due to new communication and decision process structures being co-created” (p.56). CoPs unite people within and across enterprises, so the successful functioning of a CoP depends on a proper organisational and technological infrastructure. For example, the success of CoP’s implementation in the World Bank and the American Management Systems was in the most part determined by senior management sponsorship and efforts of support teams (CoP’s facilitators), which not only coordinated a virtual activity of CoP members, but also organised face-to-face events – conferences, knowledge fairs, meetings (Leibold et al. 2002). Technological infrastructure should provide the functionality not only for gathering, organising and distributing of explicit knowledge, but also for enabling CoPs members to contribute in CoPs' activities and collaborate for developing, internalising and exploiting of tacit knowledge (Lissack 2000: p.81). Such approach will ensure an increasing of employees’ willingness to explore and learn – they will likely want and be able to do new things or to do old things by new ways (Fahey & Prusak 1998: p.272), thus, creating a sustainable competitive advantages for their companies. Wenger et al. (2002) emphasise that CoPs are not an universal means of increasing business effectiveness, but if executives and employees understand well the role of CoPs within their companies, CoPs can become one of the key contributors to business success, as they create value in multiple and different ways (Wenger et al. 2002: p.16). For companies: The major short-term value is an improvement of business outcome, this value is based on such benefits as possibility to get quick answers to questions and to solve problem jointly, to improve quality of decisions and to view more perspectives on problems, to reduce time and costs, to coordinate and ensure synergy across units, to take more risks with backing of the community. The major long-term value is a development of organisational capabilities, it is based on increased ability to achieve strategic objectives, on increased authority with clients and retention of talent, on possibility to create knowledge-based alliances and to fulfil knowledge-development projects, to foresee and implement development of new capabilities and technologies, to take advantages of new market opportunities. For CoPs’ members: The major short-term value is an improvement experience of work, which is based upon such benefits as helping with challenges, an access to expertise, a contribution to collective thinking and team work, a fun of interactions with colleagues and a sense of belonging. The major long-term value is a fostering professional development, which includes possibilities to expand skills and personal expertise, to enhanced professional reputation, to increase marketability and employability, and to gain strong sense of professional identity (Wenger et al. 2002: p.16). Taking into consideration all discussed above, one will agree that communities of practices may be viewed as a foundational structure on which an organisation, aiming to manage its knowledge effectively, should be build. Generally speaking, “communities of practice can drive strategy, generate new lines of business, solve problems, promote the spread of best practices, develop people’s professional skills, and help companies recruit and retain talent” (Wenger & Snyder 2000: p.140). 3.2 Critical Assessment of Knowledge Management In the most cases the results of KM implementation has been reported to be successful from different perspectives. For example, it was estimated that Xerox saved about $100 million from its Eureka database (Chua & Lam 2005), while Hewlett-Packard has benefited in its sales processes standardisation (Wenger & Snyder 2000). At the same time KM experts commonly agree that developing successful KM is very difficult task. Pettersson (2009) asserts that, in spite of the current extensive researches in the KM area, up to 84 percent of KM initiatives generally fail (p.1735). Chua and Lam (2005) have analysed five well-documented cases of KM project failure and developed the model of unsuccessful KM implementation, which consists of four distinct categories of factors (pp.11-13): Technology, which is referred to KM infrastructure and technology, and includes such factors as Connectivity, Usability, Over-reliance and Maintenance Cost. Culture, relates to human and organisational behaviour and includes factors: Politics, Knowledge Sharing, Perceived Image, and Management Commitment. Content, which is referred to properties of the knowledge and includes factors: Coverage, Structure, Relevance and Currency, and Knowledge Distillation. Project Management, which is referred to the management of the KM initiative as a project and includes such factors as User Involvement, Technical and Business Expertise, Con?ict Management, Rollout Strategy, Project Cost, Project Evaluation, and Involvement of External Consultants. At that Chua and Lam (2005) emphasise that in generally KM failure factors are highly context-specific and it is not possible to determine “a singular set of factors solely responsible for KM failure” (p.13). Analysis of case studies related to KM failures Three articles, which describe real-life KM implementation failures, are analysed in this section. Case 1 (App.1) relates to unsuccessful KM Alpha Project in the PharmaCorp, which was aimed “to leverage the aggregate knowledge and experience of staff world-wide” in the company’s order handling business (Braganza & Mollenkramer 2002.: p.25). Case 2 (App.2) presents four cases of KM initiatives undertaken in the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF), three of which were unsuccessful but the last one has managed to succeed. Case 3 (App.3) describes an unsuccessful attempt to build and facilitate Community of Practice in the Global Oilfield Services Provider company. In spite of the Alpha Project in the Case 1 (App.1) had many positive aspects, such as top management support, competent managers, sufficient resources, it has failed due to significant omissions of the KM project manager. On the basis of analysis of major failure factors of Case 1 it is possible to derive five key lessons for managers of future KM projects: (1) knowledge interdependencies should be recognised and managed through CoPs, rather than through the functions how it was intended in the Alpha; (2) knowledge within natural groups of activities should be contextualised by the experts rather than IT-people; (3) over-emphasis on explicit knowledge should be avoided; (4) KM users should determine and develop both tacit and explicit knowledge which they need in practice; (5) inputs from external consultant should be controlled (Braganza & Mollenkramer 2002: p.23). Three of four cases of KM initiatives, described in Case 2 (App.2) have also failed. It seems that all three initiatives had similar weaknesses, and the same mistakes were made, namely there are: “a multitude of actors, weak central management, insufficient KM tools, and no account taken of user needs” (Pettersson 2009: p.1742). The most important failure factor for these cases is that the technical solutions were not focused onto meeting user needs properly. In addition, particular characteristics of organisational culture of the SAF have not been taken into consideration. This caused the situation when individuals did not want to admit their mistakes and to describe them as Lessons Learned. In terms of project management there were also significant omissions, as the KM efforts were ill-documented and not systematised. And finally, top management seemed to be not interested much in the KM projects’ success as it did not take full responsibility for the outcome. However, the successful KM project SWEDEC shows that when all mentioned above issues are taken into account, it's quite possible to implement KM successfully within the SAF units. The Case 3 is an example of KM approach that “lacks consideration of the socio-technical character of a Knowledge Management system both for implementation and use” (Troxler & Lauche 2006). Although the implemented KM System allows sharing knowledge across the CoP, a process of learning in the CoP can be carried out rather slowly, because needed resources had not been allocated. Consequently, CoP’s members were not able to contribute to the Community and to knowledge sharing and development, as it were planned initially. Such approach is considered as technology-driven approach to Knowledge Management, and it was widely used in the early Knowledge Management initiatives. In sum, analysis of mistakes and factors of failures is very helpful in order to understand and to avoid the pitfalls “that are evident in the approaches of many organisations’ attempts to work with knowledge” (Fahey & Prusak 1998: p. 275). 4.0 Conclusion The discussion of KM issues and research findings presented in this paper reveal that in order to be successful a KM program should involve both human and technical aspects. One will agree that achieving successful KM is “as much about the willingness of people to use technology as much as the quality of the tool itself” (Sheehan 2002: p.24). It is also useful to note that knowledge management in organisations should be considered mostly as facilitating the internalising, sharing and exploiting of tacit knowledge. Although there are other KM processes, sharing of tacit knowledge is the primary objective of most of successful KM initiatives. Weber (2007: pp.335-336) asserts that on the basis of the analysis of success and failure of previous KM initiatives it is possible to introduce a guideline, according to which a KM approach with a greater potential for success should: 1. Be designed to support communities of practice. 2. Integrate humans, processes, and technology. 3. Be designed in collaboration with different stakeholders. 4. Identify an adequate level of specificity. 5. Adopt representations with set of specific fields. 6. Be integrated into the context of target organisational processes. 7. Demonstrate how contributors can benefit from KM. 8. Allow for the measurement of their effectiveness. 5.0 References Alavi, M. & Leidner, D.E. (2001). Knowledge Management and Knowledge Management Systems: Conceptual Foundations and Research Issues. MIS Quarterly, 25 (1), 107-136. Allee, V. (1997) The Knowledge Evolution: Expanding Organizational Intelligence. Boston, Butterworth-Heinmann. Alrawi, K. 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(2003) Reconsidering the tacit-explicit distinction - A move toward functional (tacit) knowledge management. Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management, 1 (1), 23-32. Kirchner, P. & Wopereis, I.G.J.H. (2003) Mindtools for teacher communities: a European perspective. Technology, Pedagogy and Education, 12 (1), 105-124. Leibold, M., Probst, G.J.B. & Gibbert, M. (2002) Strategic Management in the Knowledge Economy. Erlangen, Publicis KommunikationsAgentur. Liebowitz, J. & Beckman, T. (1998) Knowledge Organizations. What Every Manager Should Know. Boca Raton, St. Lucie Press. Lissack, M.R. (2000) Knowledge Management Redux: Reframing a Consulting Fad Into a Practical Tool. EMERGENCE, 2 (3), 78–89. Loermans, J. (2002) Synergizing the learning organization and knowledge management. Journal of Knowledge Management, 6 (3), 285-294. Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi, H. (1995) The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation. New York, Oxford University Press. 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[Online] Available from: http://www.krii.com/downloads/km_emerg_discipl.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2011]. Wolf, P. & Kazi, A.S. (2006) Communities of Practice – A Case Study from the Automotive Industry. In: Kazi, A.S. & Wolf, P. (eds.) Real-Life Knowledge Management: Lessons from the Field. Knowledge Board, pp.49-61. 6.0 Appendicies 6.1 Appendix 1. Case Study 1. KM in the PharmaCorp. Adapted from Braganza and Mollenkramer (2002), pp. 23–33: Background. In July 1999, Wilco Smith, Head of Pharma Global Order Handling Services, made a decision to stop knowledge management program in the PharmaCorp. Thus came to an end a three-year initiative that at the outset was considered to be “the knowledge management showcase for the firm”. PharmaCorp is one of the top ten players in a pharmaceutical industry and operates in over 70 countries around the world. The organization is an active global player, with products and services being offered to suit local conditions in each country. The management teams have a tradition of operating autonomously although from time to time neighbouring countries and/or regions may collaborate on specific developments. The organization had sales of about US$10 billion and an employee base of about 95,000. In mid-1995, PharmaCorp’s executives realised that the order handling line of business had to be improved — and quickly: “We are unable to deliver much of what our customers want today and we are even less capable of delivering what they will want in the future. They want integrated solutions and a seamless service offering. Our processes and systems are fragmented, redundant, and inconsistent around the globe, contributing in part to our falling revenues and market share while our biggest competitors are growing both in terms of actual revenues and market share.” From the further discussions the Alpha Project was established. Phase 1 of the Alpha Project The major outcome of this phase was establishing of the following vision for the Alpha Project by the executives and senior managers of the PharmaCorp: The organization will build a profitable global business in order handling services. The Alpha Project will deliver: (1) Order handling services (2) Advisory services linked to order handling (3) Integrated information and knowledge of clients, translating data into information and then knowledge. The organization will become one of the top two order handling services firms globally, dominating targeted market segments and benchmarking its services against best-in-class company and non-company competitors. Another major outcome was realising of the need to manage knowledge holistically across the organisation: PharmaCorp’s success in the order handling business will depend ultimately on how well it manages to leverage the aggregate knowledge and experience of staff world-wide. Phase 2 of the Alpha Project In Phase 1, the Alpha Project Team consisted of three external consultants for each PharmaCorp employee. In Phase 2, the total Alpha Project Team grew to approximately 100 members, and the staff - consultant ratio reversed to three PharmaCorp staff for each external consultant. The Project Team’s focus included business strategy, IT, knowledge management and order handling products. The goal of the project team was to make the Alpha vision become a reality. In relation to knowledge management, Alpha’s objectives were to put in place the mechanisms to meet client needs faster and more effectively by: having better and consistent access to and use of PharmaCorp knowledge across the globe; creating support tools to ensure tasks are performed consistently; developing and implementing processes that support knowledge management. A structure chart for the Alpha Project is displayed in Figure 1A. Figure 1A. Structure chart for the Alpha Project A Knowledge Management function became the focal point for managing knowledge in the organization. In addition three sub-streams (known collectively within the organisation as the Kappa Stream) were formed: (1) Business architecture; (2) IT and (3) Knowledge content and design (see Fig. 1A). Even though both the business architecture and IT sub-streams were part of Alpha’s IT function, most people in the Alpha project associated the three sub-streams with the Knowledge Management function. The strategic importance of the overall Alpha Project was clear to PharmaCorp’s board-level executives and senior managers. The board committed a significant amount of investment funding to Alpha - US$300 million over five years. They accepted that this would be a long-term investment and were willing to absorb a reduction in gross profit before tax of US$65 million in the year 1 profit and loss account. As the Alpha Project progressed, the executive went beyond financial commitment. They raised Alpha’s status by making it a formal part of the organization structure rather than a project. Alpha became an official line of business. Its name changed to Global Order Handling Services. After that people were moved to a new purpose-built location. This significantly changed the informal nature of communication and team atmosphere: “A lot of attention was put to communication, the organized communication had not met the standards that you would expect - but communication among people was very open …very informal. That totally changed when the PharmaCorp executive declared us a line of business.” The development of a dynamic IT infrastructure was of central importance to knowledge management. The Alpha Project’s IT solution is known as the ‘Knowledge Enabled Worktable’, it is described as “computer systems that allow users to access, add and use knowledge”. The main Alpha Worktable was designed to integrate ‘seamlessly and through an easy-to-use interface’, with other Worktables, which were designed to support each business function. Underpinning the ‘seamless’ interface was the Alpha ‘Knowledge Base’ — or the ‘Library’, a large data repository of documents, information, and other knowledge from internal and external sources, exemplified by competitor intelligence reports. The first Worktable was expected to be developed for the Sales function to the third quarter of 1997. However, due to bottlenecks attributed to the use of new technology and poor translation of design requirements to system functionality, the Sales Worktable development was dogged by delays and, consequently, timescales began to slip. Concurrently, people working in the knowledge content and design sub-steam focused their activities on identifying content for the Sales Worktable and developing a project management methodology for implementing knowledge management in each country. Because the IT sub-stream delayed the delivery of the Worktable systems, the content and design sub-stream chose to design an Intranet-based tool, Knowledge Across the Net (KAN), to publish the content they were developing. Ultimately, KAN was intended to replace PharmaCorp’s existing Lotus Notes application that served as a repository of valuable and diverse knowledge, ranging from sample sales proposals and product information to country specific data pricing data. However, while piloting KAN, it turned out that many of PharmaCorp’s country locations did not have Internet access and/or the minimum required hardware to do so. Therefore, given that Notes was globally accessible and company-wide, the KAN content had to be transferred into Notes. During PharmaWeb’s development, internal resistance began to surface. Managers in the IT function considered the PharmaWeb development as simply ‘going for the quick win’, while they (in the IT function) were working on the actual Worktable solution. So, an external consulting firm was hired to deliver PharmaWeb, which was launched seven months later. The site contained links to HQ information, PharmaNetwork information, knowledge sharing forums, and a functioning Library. However, the PharmaWeb received a frosty reception from the other functions. According to one senior manager: “IT saw the PharmaWeb launch as a counter move to the Sales and Service Worktables and saw content and design as attempting to position themselves as coming up with a product. Rather than be enthusiastic about it, they (IT and other functions) were not and the PharmaWeb was not embraced by the organization.” In late 1998 the viability of achieving a ‘seamless and easy-to-use’ IT enabled Worktable, in the short term, was in grave doubt. The sense of concern reached the highest levels of PharmaCorp management. It was concluded that given the high-level of dependency on and unsustainable expenditure on external IT resources, Global Order Handling Services’s management was losing control over its IT-related projects. Thus, the year ended with the following top management directive: the Worktable initiative, as originally envisioned in the Alpha business case would be curtailed - and Global Order Handling Services’s IT function would be dissolved. According to one executive, the Head of Knowledge Management, Samuel Parsons, had not linked knowledge management with the actual jobs people carried out in the business. These sentiments, coupled with the absence of any PharmaCorp senior executive coming to Knowledge Management’s defence, led to Smith’s ultimate decision – that he “no longer wants knowledge management.” 6.2 Appendix 2. Case Study 2. KM in the Swedish Armed Forces. Adapted from Pettersson (2009), pp. 1735-1743: Background The SwAF are today developing a mission based force, able to deal with a spectrum of peacekeeping operations on the international stage as well as national civil and military tasks. Innumerable Lessons have been generated from individuals and groups in various missions in different countries, during this time. Those experiences would naturally be a huge advantage for SwAF, and should therefore been consequently and carefully considered. New threats demand rapid and iterative needs for Lessons to achieve Lessons Learned. This is unfortunately not the case today. During the last decade the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) has tried to implement KM in different parts of the organisation, but remarkably none of attempts (excepting SWEDEC) has reached a level efficient enough. Successful and Non-successful Solutions for Lesson Learned Heimdall Until 2000, the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT) and the Joint Forces Command (OPIL), now Operational HQ (OPE), used a database named Heimdall. This database was designed to contain a significant number of lessons from completed international missions. The main purpose was to keep one centralised database that allowed personnel throughout SwAF to access it. The database was developed using Microsoft Access, which - unfortunately - later turned out to be software not approved for use within the SwAF. Regrettably, personnel in ongoing missions could not access Heimdall because of security restrictions. One major dilemma in the project was the lack of acceptance for the entering of data into the database, as a natural sub-task for users. Users did indeed enter data, although with great resistance and only in exceptional cases. Users were able to enter data into the database, but they did not experience any connection between the data-entering process and the benefit of the system to their daily work. This situation was the primary reason for Heimdall eventually being closed down. Furthermore, there were obvious problems with the user interface and the general usability of the system. Different aspects of the data entered into Heimdall were categorised to make it easier to search for relevant information. Supplementary data could be added voluntarily under sub-headings. HTML Help Workshop In 1999, the Swedish Navy started to distribute the LLDB99 database. It was primarily a collection of experiences written down from military exercises carried out in 1996/1997. A few years later, it was expanded to include lesson-learned reports from additional exercises and was renamed LLDB 2000 version 1.0. The software was already in use by some units in NATO and the US Navy and, furthermore, it was free to download. There were significant problems of motivating the users to deliver reports, enter data and search for data in the database. They could not perceive the connection between input (data entry) and output (searches). This was the main reason why the system was finally closed down. In addition, an extensive reorganization, which resulted in the loss of a lot of knowledge and technical know-how about HTML Help Workshop, contributed to the decommissioning of the system. OPIL also used an earlier variant of HTML Help Workshop named Win HLP; this was closed down for the same reasons. Technical System Support FMTM is a joint unit located in several places in Sweden. The unit is responsible for SwAF stationary Command, Control and Communications (C3) systems, which are supervised from the C3 Operations Centre. Operational readiness tasks are given by the Joint Forces Command in the SwAF alert order, where the actual operational readiness levels are settled in different areas, such as different networks, radios, sensors and SATCOM. Some units in FMTM have extensive service-desk activity and maintain large systems for the logging of not only incidents but also solutions. Unfortunately, there are no overarching directives for what sort of system the divisions should procure and maintain. Therefore, there is no general overview or coordination of the systems and it is difficult to exchange information. There is also lack of acceptance among some users, to enter and search for data in the database. These databases are mostly designed for technical incidents, but they have the capacity to store different kinds of incidents and solutions such as administration and management concerns. Unluckily, they are not used for a KM purpose and Lessons are never actually developed into Lessons Learned. Within these systems SwAF’s security classifications cause limitations for users. Lessons Learned Information Management System SWEDEC is a centre of excellence in the field of ordnance disposal and mine clearing, which cooperates with the Swedish Police, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, and international organizations such as the International Test and Evaluation Program and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. FOI has developed the Lessons Learned Information Management System (LLIMS) for managing codified knowledge, ordered by SWEDEC. The lessons-learned process and the analysis function are high priority activities at SWEDEC. The aim of the lessons-learned process is to disseminate new knowledge to the organisation. This can be achieved through transformation of observations made by individuals or groups, into reports in the system. After completed missions the Lessons are analysed and entered into the LLIMS system, where they are accessible to, for example, future mission planners. LLIMS is searchable in several dimensions such as mission, unit identity, report authors, creation date, and document identity. To acquire knowledge proactively, SWEDEC arranges seminars that focus on mission experiences, and also participates in seminars at the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) and other organizations in the field of ordnance disposal and mine clearing. 6.3 Appendix 3. Case Study 3. KM in Global Oilfield Services Provider. Adapted from Troxler and Lauche (2006), pp. 5-22: Background A global oilfield services provider has the headquarters in Houston, Texas. It employs about 25,000 people in over 90 countries. The actual case study was located in one of their divisions, which is highly specialised in one crucial step of upstream oil production and has its global operations base in Aberdeen, Scotland. This specialist field was not only relatively new but it also involved a wide set of skills from mechanical engineering, geology, physics, and other disciplines. Therefore, the community of skilled engineers was small. The company was operating worldwide. Its engineers were allocated, on a flexible basis and as business demanded it, to either of the two major sections responsible for the western and eastern hemisphere respectively. These engineers shared all the characteristics of a work-related Community of Practice. Development of KM an CoP To streamline operations, to share past experience and to avoid running into similar problems twice, the company developed a Knowledge Management approach that was heavily reliant on database technology. The Knowledge Management system was composed of a rule-based expert system and three knowledge bases that were linked together – a set of performance guidelines, an online training system, and a repository of lessons learnt (see Figure 1C). Triggered by working constellations and early success with an expert system a technology heavy approach was pursued with little user involvement and little consideration for adequate employee training. The repository had been built using a knowledge engineering approach that included semantic modelling of the knowledge domain. Then, intensive knowledge acquisition campaigns were conducted with a small number of expert engineers. Fugure 1C. The Development of KM and CoP. The knowledge acquired from each campaign was formalised in the semantic model, but also written up in a natural language knowledge book that was used to validate the accuracy of the knowledge captured and then to distribute the knowledge throughout the company. Later, the repository was ported to the company’s database driven intranet and extended with the performance guidelines and the online training system. A central support team maintained the whole Knowledge Management system. The three knowledge bases were operated as knowledge storage and retrieval systems. They were regularly updated with lessons learnt from project reviews, with general reviews of the project planning and execution process (primary process). Occasionally the Knowledge Management support team carried out knowledge acquisition campaigns to gather in depth knowledge e.g. from strategically important projects or across all projects for a certain client. The knowledge bases themselves did not have the capability of making suggestions based on stored knowledge. Actions were entirely left to the engineers. Still, they were designed to provide all engineers with easy access to the most valuable knowledge. Particularly they allowed easy linking between engineering related and other knowledge from the projects. The rule based expert system was excluded from that study since it was only used by a couple of engineers at their central office. The study investigated frequency and ease of use of the knowledge based systems and general user satisfaction. It showed that the systems were not being used to their full potential. Survey among engineers and managers showed that the performance guidelines were the part of the Knowledge Management System used most. 90 % of users reported to be confident using that part of the system. Particularly more experienced users felt the guidelines were useful to their job. The repository of lessons learnt was used at a similar level as the guidelines. About half of the users felt the lessons learnt were reasonably useful, and they reported a good, very good or excellent satisfaction with the system. However, the introductory training did not enable users to report new cases without central support. This central support was not always available due to lacking resources. The online training system was the least used of the three systems. Additionally user satisfaction was lower: the training system relied heavily on the involvement of tutors. Users complained that tutors were slow to respond, if at all, to the learners’ coursework. They also reported having not enough time to complete the coursework. Overall, the users reported easy access to and successful reuse of lessons learnt across geographical areas and across clients. Read More