Philosophy and the Future of Computers - Essay Example

?Peter Kassa of Philosophy and The Future of Computers From all the topics that I have encountered in philosophy, the most valuable topic for me is our discussion on Alan Turing’s philosophy of mind. His article on Can Computers Think really captured my attention and curiosity. In fact, after learning about Turing, it made me want to learn more about the topic. Thus, I found myself reading some books, even after our discussion in class was over. Here, Turing discusses the possibility of the mind’s identity to be akin to a computer or an intelligent machine. Turing’s article discussed the famous Turing test, i.e. the imitation game. A similar take on Turing’s philosophy is John Searle’s Chinese room argument or thought experiment. In this essay, I would like to share something vital that I learned in our discussions in class, as well as something that I learned beyond our class discussions, since the topic was of great value to me. I shall give an overview of Turing and Searle’s philosophy of mind. Afterwards, I shall show how their philosophy is of much value to me, in this present day. For, I do believe that topics such as these are not only valuable inside classrooms but also in the real world, that is, in my life. To begin with, like Turing, the Chinese room argument or thought-experiment, advanced by John Searle (1980), specifically challenges the view of artificial intelligence or what is more commonly known as the computational theory of mind. It challenges the claim that all there is in having a mind is the implementation of a computer program, and that as a consequence, the mental states of humans are no different in kind from the computational states of a running computer program. The Chinese room argument challenges this claim by showing that, unlike humans, computers do not know what the contents of their computational states (or the symbols they manipulate) are about or represent in the world. What computers only know of these symbols are their shapes and the ways in which they should be combined according to the rules of their programs. The Chinese room argument, in its simple form, goes this way. Imagine a native English speaker who does not understand Chinese is locked in a room with only two outlets. Outside of this room are native Chinese speakers who do not know who or what is inside the room. In one outlet, the Chinese speakers give the person inside the room several manuscripts bearing Chinese symbols and a manual of English instructions for manipulating these Chinese symbols. The person inside the room does not even know that the symbols are Chinese; he only recognizes and individuates the symbols according to their shapes or formal properties. Now imagine that the manual, which the person has immediately mastered, says that if he recognizes certain combinations of symbols in the manuscripts given to him in one outlet, then he should arrange certain combinations of symbols and send them to the persons outside the room through the other outlet. Suppose that what the person inside the room sends to the persons outside the room are correct answers to the questions that the persons outside the room ask him through the manuscripts that they send him. In this case, in so far as the persons outside the room are concerned, the person inside the room understands Chinese. But the fact is the person inside the room does not understand the symbols—he does not even know that they are Chinese; he does not know what they represent; and he simply manipulates them according to the instructions in the manual. Technically speaking, he does not know the semantics of those symbols; he only knows their syntax. So does that count as intelligence? Similarly, an important thought experiment that is used to defend the views of artificial intelligence is the Turing test as discussed in our previous lessons. It will be recalled that according to this test, if after a series of questions and answers, the human interrogator could not tell, on the basis of the respondents’ answers, which is the human and which is the machine, then the machine is said to have passed the test, and consequently, is considered to be intelligent. But Searle’s Chinese room argument has shown that even when a computing machine passes the Turing test, still, intelligence cannot be attributed to it. The reason for such is that attributing intelligence means attributing consciousness, which in turn means attributing intentionality. But a computing machine can never have intrinsic intentionality, for it does its computations in a way that considers only the syntactic features of symbols or representations. Moreover, the machine, unlike the human, has no “capacity to feel” anything related beyond its configured programs. Its as if I were playing a game of chess in my computer. The computer, has in it, all the possible moves one can make. It merely uses these as a basis for its next move. Thus, it seems impossible to beat the computer. But it does not mean that the computer is intelligent. Indeed, when Turing raises his original question, “can machines think?” He goes on to say that this question, “I believe to be too meaningless to deserve a discussion” (Turing 324). However, he still puts forth all his beliefs about the matter, which pointed to the single fact that machines can indeed think. Hereafter, he discusses all the arguments that oppose his beliefs. But nevertheless does not defend himself from these objections. Rather, he tells us that his belief about thinking computers, will eventually transpire towards the end of the century, due to our current problems in computer programming, the current state of engineering, our present mindset and system of education, as well as our lack of experience. As Turing concludes: “We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done” (Turing 330). The Value of The Philosophy of Mind What is the value of Turing and Searle’s thought experiment? Turing’s game paves the way towards a defense of artificial intelligence, which as we all know, is a rising view on discussions regarding the nature and identity of the human mind. We see movies that attempt to portray such artificial intelligence, envisioning the future wherein we could not even tell, which one is the human being, and which one is merely a clone. The future is being portrayed and characterized by the rise of technology and innovation. And we see its progress today, just by looking at our current state of technology. In fact, it made me think of some possibilities regarding my future self. That by the end of this century, when I’m long gone from this world, a possible clone that is exactly the same as me may come to rise. But would that be me? That is to say, would that be the same Peter Kassa? He looks exactly like me, but if you open him up, you’ll see nothing but electronic mechanisms that make him function like a human being, but not quite. Technically, he is a computer. And I am not a computer. I am fully human. Indeed, the significance of such a topic has made me think of my own nature and existence, with regards to having a mind. If philosophy, in its loose sense, reflects on the meaning of life, then I would definitely say that this topic made me reflect on the meaning of my life, of being human, and of having a unique identity. For, we have always assumed that we have this thing we call a mind, yet we never really tried to find out what this mind is. The fact that the activities that we normally categorize as mental, such as thinking, making decisions, wishing, imagining, and experiencing pains and pleasures, are activities that we directly engage in as we go about our everyday lives should make the nature of the mind obvious to us. Yet, when asked about what we know about the mind, either we do not have the slightest idea or our idea of it is too general to mean anything. Perhaps, the most practical thing to say about the mind and its states is that they are in the head, but the moment we try to be more specific about what we mean by it, we find ourselves caught in a muddle. By being “in the head”, do we mean, for instance, that what we call the “mind” is actually just the brain and consequently that what we call “mental states” are nothing but the physical states of the brain? If this is the case, we should then in principle be able to tell a person’s thoughts simply by examining the physical states of his or her brain, but this is, if not utterly improbable, a possibility that in the immediate future is least likely to materialize. Or perhaps we mean that the mind is something other than the brain but in some special way is related to the brain, like that it is through the brain that the mind affects our behaviors. But what kind of entity is the mind, if at all it is an entity, if it is not the brain? And if it is something different from the brain, presumably not as physical as the brain, then how can it interact or be in causal relation with something physical such as the brain? In addition to these ways of understanding what the nature of the mind and its states are, there are of course others, which likewise raise more questions than it does provide answers. But then again, isn’t that what philosophy is all about? Indeed, not only is this specific topic valuable to me, it also made me come to realize the real value of philosophy. Philosophy, beneath all the complex words and theories, beneath all the obscure philosophers, and paradoxical questions, is characterized primarily by our wonder and curiosity about life and its true meaning. Our relation to our minds then strikes us as a paradox. Another way of putting this is as follows. Among the things that we have access to, it is our access to our own mental states that is regarded to be the most immediate and direct. For who can have access to our pains, beliefs, and desires more directly and immediately than we do? Other people can only infer that we have these mental states as manifested in our behaviors. The directedness and immediacy of our knowledge of our own mental states have in fact led some philosophers to believe that there is no way that we can be wrong with regards to our knowledge of our own mental states. Our knowledge of our own mental states is, as it were, infallible, such that, for instance, we believe that we are in pain then it must be true that we are in pain. This contrasts with other peoples’ knowledge of our own mental states, which, because it is merely inferential, can be wrong. That being the case, what the nature of our mental states are should have been clear to us. But this is not the case, the nature of our mental states are, or more specifically, how our mental states come into existence and how they work always appear to us as something mysterious. Nonetheless, there is no denying the fact that the mind forms an essential part of what defines our humanity and identity, or of what makes me a unique as specie and as an individual person. As a species, we are often distinguished from other species in terms of our general mental capacities, foremost of which are our capacities for rational thinking and voluntary choices; while as individuals, we are often distinguished from one another in terms of our specific mental states, such as our memories, beliefs, attitudes, and desires, mental or psychological habits, and ways of thinking. Furthermore, the moral dimension of our existence, that is, that we are moral agents, that we are morally accountable and responsible for some of our actions, and that some of our actions have moral value or can be said to be morally good or bad, derives from the nature of our minds. Given all these, it can be said that it is in virtue of our possession of a mind that we are able to speak of our existence as having dignity and value. As you can see by now, our discussion on the relation between minds and machines enabled me to think of issues that are of value outside the confines of the classroom, to this present day and reality. Technology is part of our lives whether we like it or not, and so we have to learn how to live with it. It is not far that in the near future, machines will be made in the likeness of a human being, with cognitive functions that work like the human brain. Yet can this be considered as a mind? Can machines have minds? If machines and computers can have minds, what then distinguishes myself, as a human being, to that of intelligent robots or clones? Does this view lead to the possibility that someday, the human race will come to an end? Will computers replace human beings in inhabiting this world? Regardless of the absurdity, this is nonetheless, a possibility. For, it is in this manner that discussions in the philosophy of mind come to rise. The philosophy of Turing is in some way, philosophy’s response to the task of clarifying the concepts embedded in and eventually evaluating the foundations of newly emerging sciences, which concern the mind itself. This task is not new. It will be recalled that during the Modern Period, the philosophers were also into the evaluation of the foundations of the then emerging natural sciences. Today’s emerging sciences of the mind include Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence. Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary science committed to a scientific study of the mind. It draws from the findings of psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence or computer science, philosophy, anthropology, neuroscience, and biology, its foundation is a theory of mind that develops side by side with the development of computer technology. Artificial intelligence, on the other hand, is a branch of computer science whose research is devoted to the construction of intelligent machines. What cognitive science and artificial intelligence shares is a model of the human mind that is based on computer technology. This model is known as the computational theory of mind or computationalism for short, which basically regards human cognition as a species of computation or that the human mind is a computer program and that the appropriately programmed computer has a mind. The use of the latest most sophisticated technology available in our present time by philosophers and scientists in understanding how the human mind works is something not new. As Searle (1985) writes: Because we do not understand the brain very well we are constantly tempted to use the latest technology as a model for trying to understand it. In my childhood we always assumed that the brain was a telephone switchboard…Sherrington, the great British neuroscientist, thought that the brain worked like a telegraph system. Freud often compared the brain to hydraulic and electro-magnetic systems. Leibniz often compared it to a mill, and I am told that some of the ancient Greeks thought the brain functions like a catapult. At present, obviously, the metaphor is the digital computer (44). What Searle seems to be actually emphasizing in these passages is that the digital computer is no different from the other previous technologies in terms of serving as metaphors for the understanding the nature of the human mind; and as these previous metaphors eventually proved to be wrong or inadequate, the computer metaphor too will be proven wrong and inadequate. And the point here is that the use of the latest technology to understand the nature of the human mind is not a good strategy, that what the human mind is will not be decided by the latest technology. But some believe that there is a qualitative difference between the computer metaphor and the previous metaphors. What basically makes the computer a very powerful tool for understanding the workings of the human mind is its enormous capacity to simulate human thinking behaviors, or perform tasks which humans do with their minds. Be it as it may, the extent to which the analogy between the human mind and the computer can be used to shed light on the mystery of human consciousness is still a matter of dispute. There is no denying, however, that the emergence and further progress of computer technology has revolutionized theorizing, may it be philosophical or scientific, about the nature of the human mind. And the popularity of the computer metaphor extends beyond the confines of academic circles. In fact, certain views that result from such theorizing, particularly the view that machines can be constructed that can be as intelligent as or even more intelligent than humans, have also permeated the entertainment with the proliferation of sci-fi movies whose themes revolve around machines run by computer programs, such as robots and androids, that eventually evolve into conscious beings, thereby acquiring the capacities for making autonomous decisions and experiencing complex existential emotions like love or the desire to love and be loved, anguish, despair, abandonment, and the fear of death. Some popular examples of these movies, to name a few, are “The Blade Runner,” “The Bicentennial Man,” “A. I.,” “I, Robot,” “The Matrix,” “The Terminator,” “Wall-E,” “Tron,” and “Star Trek.” Conclusion Given the aforementioned reflection on the significance of Turing’s philosophy, we come to see that progress in this field is of much value, not only to me but also to everyone. We rely on machines so much that we sometimes forget what this could entail in the future. We do acknowledge the advantage of having such machines to work for us. But what if there comes a time when human beings are the ones that will work for machines? To think of such a scenario, for now, is indeed meaningless for some, for these are mere conjectures and possibilities that may or may not happen, but nevertheless is still possible. I myself do rely on machines, whether it be computers or calculators, cellphones, and the like. In fact, most of the time when I’m using them, I don’t even think twice, as to whether the answer or output that the machine gives me is correct, for I do know that it can’t go wrong. But how come humans fall into error? Are machines more intelligent than humans? Are the “minds” of machines, so to speak, the evolved model of the human mind? Turing’s imitation game showed me a perspective of artificial intelligence that may come to dominate the scene in the near future. While Searle gave me assurance that regardless of the progress that will transpire with computers, it will never surpass the intelligence of a human mind. Indeed, isn’t it the case that without human beings, and their intelligence, the computer would not have been invented in the first place. We take control of what ought to happen in the future, just like how I take in charge of the extent of my dependence on these machines. It is in this regard that this topic taught me more than its scope in our lessons in class. This topic is of much value to me since it taught me a lesson on what makes me human. And it is through my mind that human intelligence thus takes its course. Works Cited Cameron, James, dir. The Terminator. Hemdale Film, Cinema 84, Euro Film Funding, and Pacific Western, 1984. Film. Chris, Columbus, dir. 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