Meaning and Implication in the Constitution - Essay Example

A Matter of Interpretation: Meaning and Implication in the Constitution The Constitution is open to interpretation, after all, it does not wear its meaning on its face, but the Constitution is not subjected to interpretation, it is subjected to interpretation again and again. – Andreas Teuber Primary Source The primary source for this paper, The Trial of Col. Aaron Burr, encompasses the arguments and decisions made during the 1807 treason trial of Aaron Burr, transcribed by T. Carpenter. This work is an exhaustive and comprehensive collection of what stands as an account of a truly high profile case and one of the earliest legal battles over weighty and influential Constitutional issues. It chronicles not only the alleged attempt to suborn the sovereignty of the U.S. government in the western territories, but also a titanic power struggle between the judicial and executive branches of government. On a deeper level, it offers an early example of the predisposition for interpretation inherent in the Constitution – and its potential vulnerability to political conflict. The point upon which the prosecution’s case turned in Aaron Burr’s treason trial, whether or not levying war constituted an overt act, was contested during a period in which the fledgling American Democracy was testing the very nature of the Constitution and how the law of the land Name 2 was to be interpreted. In The Trial of Col. Aaron Burr, Chief Justice John Marshall renders an opinion on a motion to arrest evidence, in which he quotes from a preliminary opinion regarding the meaning of “levying.” The judge here accords with the argument put by George Hay, chief prosecutor in the Burr trial, by stating that “levying war is a fact in the Constitution of which force is an indispensable ingredient” (Carpenter, 444). Yet Justice Marshall’s ultimate opinion was based on a quite literal interpretation of the Constitution, requiring proof of an overt act of war. But the Chief Justice reckons here without the doctrine of intrinsic, or inherent, meaning, without which the Constitution is rendered far less efficacious than intended. In this particular case, the clear implication inherent in “levying” is one of violent activity and should be construed as such. ‘Real life’ interpretation Justice Felix Frankfurter would speak to the issue of interpretation nearly 200 years after the Burr trial: “The words of the Constitution are so unrestricted by their intrinsic meaning or by their history or by tradition or by prior decisions that they leave the individual justice free, if indeed they do not compel him, to gather meaning not from reading the Constitution but from reading life” (Frankfurter, 1941). In the opinion referred to by Justice Marshall (mentioned above), a pragmatic appraisal of the situation is an attempt to apply the precepts of logic and common sense. “To constitute the fact of levying war, it is not necessary that hostilities shall have actually commenced, by engaging the military force of the United States; or that measures of violence against the government shall have been carried into execution” (Carpenter, 444). Name 3 It is perhaps surprising that Chief Justice Marshall should have adhered to such a strict rendering of the Constitution in light of the unstable political climate in 1807. With the new Republic in a fragile and unsettled state, battles over Federalism vs. States Rights, the geographic destiny of the new nation and which foreign powers should be sought as allies (and which to avoid) created a turbulent, even dangerous political situation. As such, one might expect a far more in-depth interpretation of the law, which, after all, must be dynamic enough to address (without being determined by) existing need and current circumstance. As well, one must bear in mind that Constitutional interpretation was as yet a largely unplowed field. Should the document’s language be interpreted according to the framers’ intent? Should the Constitution be regarded as a sort of legal compendium of shared community values? Or should its interpretation be confined to its literal meaning, expressed line by line in plain English? In other words, “taking the plain language of the text and offering an interpretation of what it meant as opposed to inquiring what the framers meant by it” (Teuber, 1988). The Burr trial’s most salient point, the one upon which Justice Marshall based his opinion, led to a literal interpretation. In his refutation of the defense counsel’s argument, Hay attacked from a viewpoint that can be explained as an attempt to factor “real life,” as Justice Frankfurter advised. Hay’s argument takes a more inclusive perspective in terms of meaning, one that adopts a broader, yet still logical interpretation in answering defense’s assertion that there had to be “an open deed of war. But neither the constitution nor the law speak of an overt act of war. They speak of levying war…An open deed of levying war is an assemblage of troops. If you go beyond that line, if these troops employ force or fight a battle, it is folly to call it an overt act of levying war; it is an Name 4 open act of war previously levied” (Carpenter, 479). Hay goes on to ask why counsel should insist on an overt act of war when “the overt act of treason consisted in levying war against the United States, and not in making it” (Carpenter, 479). Hay touches on two important points here: in referring to “an overt act of war,” he attacks the defense on literal ground (i.e. Article III, Section 3 does not mention an overt act of war); and appeals to the inherent meaning of “levying war,” which the Constitution explicitly mentions. In clarifying his position as to the true meaning of levying war, Chief Justice Marshall criticizes Supreme Court decisions on this point in previous cases. “The opinion delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of (Burr accomplices) Bollman and Swartout was declared by (Marshall) to be not correctly understood; and that there must be, before an overt act of treason is completed, either the actual employment of force or a military assemblage of men, who are in a posture of war” (Brady, 81). The prosecution’s response is in the vein of Frankfurter’s “real life” logic, speculating as to how an overt act of war might be made manifest and thus proven by the (mandated) testimony of two witnesses. The prosecution goes to great lengths to theorize as to how this might happen, and to illustrate the absurdity of a treasonable plot being carried out through the deployment and marching about of large bodies of men, which would satisfy the constitutional standards for proof. “The case stated is that of distinct bodies of men, assembling at different places; and marching from these places of partial to a place of rendezvous. When this has been done, an assemblage is produced, which would in itself be unequivocal. But when is it done?...If different bodies of men, in pursuance of a treasonable design, plainly proved, should assemble in warlike Name 5 appearance, at places of partial rendezvous, and should march from those places to a place of general rendezvous, it is difficult to conceive how such a transaction could take place without exhibiting the appearance of war” (Carpenter, 442). In other words, assumedly the only reliable way to prove an overt act is through the witnessing of massed troop movements, aimed at achieving the goals of a covert plot. But can it be reasonable, not to mention logical, to presume that a conspiracy would play out in clear view of the people who it is intended to subvert? Additionally, is it unreasonable to assume that the carrying out of a treasonable, covert plot, playing out as it does away from the glare of public view, would involve provocateurs not necessarily present on occasions when and where other agents gathered? The dictionary definition of covert is “concealed; secret; disguised.” Thus, mindful of Justice Frankfurter’s “real life” criterion, and assessing the situation in the light of common sense and worldly experience, there would seem to be a flaw in the logic that says guilt could not be assigned in the Burr case because he was not physically present on Blennerhassett Island. Maintaining the integrity of a conspiracy is dependent on secrecy and concealment and, as such, a mass assemblage would seem to run counter to common sense. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion makes the very point that logic, based on a general understanding of the meaning of “covert,” would appear to refute. In admitting that Burr was “at a great distance and in a different state,” Marshall asserts that “conformably to the Constitution of the United States, no man can be convicted of treason who was not present when the war was levied” (Carpenter, 426). Available evidence (for instance, Burr’s cipher letter) may Name 6 be corroborative, but does possess a cumulative logical force. (Indeed, the substance of the written communication presented as evidence would seem to be entirely within the nature of conspiratorial and subversive activity.) Confrontation It is impossible to separate the Burr trial from the legal and political backdrop against which it played out. This case was the first in American history to bring the power relationship between the nation’s executive and judicial branches into question. Marshall and Thomas Jefferson, steadfast foes over the question of Constitutional privilege, were combatants over the Burr letters, which Marshall subpoenaed as evidence. Thus, the account of the Burr trial, as presented in this paper’s primary source, presents the views of a chief justice who was not only concerned with settling an important constitutional point, but also in establishing and aggrandizing his constitutionally appointed “turf” vis a vis the office of the president. This is not to suggest that Marshall would have slanted a decision in a given direction in order to gain leverage on a political opponent (difficult to imagine in one of the country’s greatest jurists), but it may be well within the realm of possibility that the chief justice was particularly suspicious given the administration’s posture concerning Burr, and the possibility that documents important to Burr’s defense may have been withheld. “If the prosecution should end, ‘as is expected,’ by the Government, those who withheld from Burr any paper necessary to his defense would, of course, bitterly regret their conduct” (Beveridge, 447). Marshall added that while such conduct might not in the end blacken the image of the administration, but would Name 7 certainly diminish the prestige of the high court if it were allowed to take place. In any event, Marshall and Jefferson became involved in a landmark confrontation over the evidence. Marshall issued a subpoena, which Jefferson challenged. “Jefferson knew that under the Constitution, the President had no superior right to those of any other citizen, and, while directing substantially all papers required duces tecum to be furnished, he refused to appear in person in court. He openly defied the process of the court” (Brady, 56). Hay was later enthusiastic in pointing out that the chief justice’s comments were impolitic, inflammatory and offensive to the prosecution team in particular and to the Jefferson administration in general. Marshall did apologize to Hay for his remarks (especially the “as is expected” interjection), telling the prosecutor that he “regretted the remark” (Beveridge, 449). Such was the highly sensitive nature of the relationship between Marshall and Jefferson. The Burr case appears to have simply aggravated an already prickly relationship between two of America’s most influential legal and political theorists. Jefferson maintained that the Constitution guaranteed the executive branch privilege in such a scenario, though Marshall’s persistence helped maintain the integrity of the notion of accountability at the highest levels of government. The Burr trial exists squarely within the context of historical constitutional interpretation. Marshall’s narrow reading of the nation’s governing document set the stage for an illustrious tradition of American interpretive jurisprudence, rooted in the Constitution’s remarkable flexibility. Name 8 Works Cited Beveridge, Albert J. The Life of John Marshall. Washington, D.C.: Beard Books. 1919. Brady, Joseph P. The Trial of Aaron Burr. New York: Neale Publishing Co. 1913. Carpenter, T. The Trial of Col. Aaron Burr on an Indictment for Treason. Washington, D.C.: Westcott and Co. 1807 Frankfurter, Felix. “The Supreme Court.” Parliamentary Affairs. 3.1. London: 1941. Teuber, Andreas. “Original Intent, or How Does the Constitution Work?” The London Review of Books. 7. 10. March 1988. Read More