Technology and Human Error in Aviation - Term Paper Example

?Running Head: TECHNOLOGY AND ERROR IN AVIATION Technology and Human Error in Aviation Introduction Technology is the product of human intelligence. In fact, man is so smart that he created technology to be smarter than him, so it seems. The computer is the basic technology used in aviation systems. Computers do extraordinary jobs beyond human capabilities. It is thus no wonder that computers are resorted to when things do not go effciently or effectively, hoping that a simple “delete” or “backspace” key will undo the errors. One tends to forget that technology has limitations since it only works according to how people design, manage, set up, and program its software and hardware components. Thus, every sector in the aviation system must find all facets where computers may be leveraged on to their advantage. Use of Computers in Aviation Systems To most, computers are for games, research, online business, sending e-mails, or downloading and uploading files. But in the aviation system, computers hold the life of the crews and passengers. A small hitch on the computer’s program might result to an aerial accident. Computers have various uses in modern aviation. These may be used to design aircrafts with better capacity, performance, and state of the art equipments. It can spot the parts of the aircraft that need maintenance, repairs, and modifications. Computers can read the codes of the system that has malfunctioned. Moreover, it may identify the geographic location of the aircraft and monitors its flight, and process data and communication transmission between ATC (air traffic controller) and pilot, among air traffic controllers, and among flight crews. It may ensure airport and aircraft safety against accidents, unpleasant incidents, and delays; and give automatic weather reports so as to warn pilots of the coming weather conditions. Technology allows for accurate calculations and computations useful in designing aircraft and saves important data on maintenance and inspection history and some other specifications related to the plane. These data are used to check if the plane is still fit to fly or not (Dhillion, 2007). Analysis of Human Error How tragic is the effect of human error in aviation? About 70 – 75% of aviation accidents are attributed to human-related errors (Hall, 2003). When one diverts from what is accurate, then that may possibly constitute human error (Dhillion, 2007). It is considered human error when one fails to do what is expected from him or her. Structures of error are developed to identify its origin and reasons according to these different perspectives by Weigman and Shappel (2003). The cognitive perspective targets the pilot’s skill on decision-making and choosing strategies, ability to solve problems during flight, and capability to comprehend and respond to stimulus and commands on hand. To reduce the mental workload of the pilot and to avoid accidents, a checklist is advised. This is also a ground for skill-based and decision errors (Weigman and Shappel, 2003). The ergonomic perspective suggests that even if all the reports would identify human-related error as the primary root of accidents, in this systems perspective, it hardly or rarely points to human as the cause. At the start of developing and designing the system and equipment, human factors are already considered. Accidents occur when a mismatch transpires between man, machine, and the environmental components. Problems arise when there are stressors in the part of human like anxiety and hazardous attitudes (Weigman and Shappel, 2003).. Moreover, the behavioral perspective states that rewards, motivations to work safely, the threat of punishment for failures, and past experiences can greatly influence the performance of an individual. According to Reason (1997, 2000), people who violate rules are motivation-driven people. They need to be rewarded when they follow safety rule and the lack of tangible reward for this individual will tend him to twist or break rules. Although this is unacceptable logically, knowing the threat to safety this poses, still one cannot ignore this perception in human error during accident investigations (Reason & Hobbs, 2003). This is why some airlines have different incentives for every good job done. The aeromedical oerspective represents the viewpoint of medicine. When accidents happen, the physiological (e.g., sickness and diseases) and mental condition (e.g. spatial disorientation) of the individual, such as the pilot, should be considered and analyzed. These conditions usually arise or are triggered by environment conditions. Fatigue due to jetlag and circadian rhythms concerns are the primary factors that influence the performance of an individual. Hunger is also one factor. To augment this, the aeromedical community requires airline companies to have optimal work schedules, shifting, breaks, and rest days (Weigman and Shappel, 2003). The psychosocial perspective is an outlook in human error is often neglected to notice since this focus on human interpersonal relationship. There are still doubts whether social factors can affect the performance or decision of an individual. However, there are a considerable number of accidental reports tracing the cause on human conflicts to factors such as: division of tasks; communication problems among the aircrew; pilot or captain’s attitude towards aircrew, pilots insulting ATC and vice versa, disrespect of co-pilot to first officer, among others (Weigman and Shappel, 2003). The organizational perspective suggests that Airline companies assign people who will manage certain areas. These individuals are required to distribute equitable workload among the crews, set standards, check quality of work, and make sure that each job is done effectually. Problems arise when the manager fails to meet these standards. Often, accidents happen because management failed to supervise; allowed an unsafe standard or acts; failed to convey important instruction to the crews; or have not provided proper working conditions. There should be no room for slack and overconfidence on the skills and abilities of the people one manages. Ergo, management should be aware of the rules, regulations, and codes that govern safety among the crews and passengers. It is also management’s responsibility to relay and enlighten staff on safety procedures (Weigman and Shappel, 2003). Most Common Causes of Aviation Accidents There is no such thing as perfect technology since the maker of technology himself is human himself, and is thus prone to mistakes. When there are errors, there follow repercussions which may end tragically. Unfortunately, some of these slip-ups are just minor details which could be avoided. Stern and Walker (www.trial-law.com) identified that the most frequent lapses that usually cause aviation accidents are the following. Pilot Error. No matter how efficiently engineers designed an aircraft, its fate lies in the hands of the pilot. So far, there is no technology yet that will replace pilots. They are in-charge of decision-making in flight situations. Poor judgment during critical situations will evidently result to an aircraft crash. Stewart (1989) grouped these errors into three types. Commission. This is when a knowledgeable pilot does something unintelligent during the course of his flight. He or she neglected to perform an important step and may be too early or too late in executing a command (Dhillion, 2007). This error is particularly risky because it is attributed to the pilot’s faulty attitude. Some of these hazardous attitudes a pilot may have and make damage and death more likely are: disobedience to authorities, spontaneity, overconfidence, pride, and resignation (Aviation Instructor’s Handbook, 2009). Omission. These are “accidental or unintentional” errors. Pilots who forget, experience miscommunication or omit important instruction from the ATC, belong to this category. This is also related to physical factors such as stress. These can be avoided through proper and rigorous training (Love, 1999). Ignorance. This is the mother of all aviation catastrophes. What one does not know may very well lead to the grave. In 2008, the pilot of Span Air Flight 5022 failed to use the flaps and stacks needed for take-off resulting to a deadly crash (Saeed, 2010). Maintenance- Related Errors. Stephen (2010) defined maintenance as essential actions one should do to make a certain structure or product operational, and failure as any deviation and modification from those necessary actions expected, including giving poor work quality. While many think that pilot error is the top reason for aviation accidents, Reason (1997) suggested that the biggest error lies in the lapses of the maintenance crew to resolve underlying mechanical problems with urgency. The Royal Aeronautical Society in London, which has been maintaining planes, inspecting errors, and looking for ways on how to improve aviation safety for 100 years, believes that 70% of the maintenance errors are actually due to the failure and deficiency of the maintenance system, especially in the human factor, to complete the task expected from them (Hall, 2003). Maintenance work into these types (Kinnison, 2004). Preventive Maintenance. One should correct the system back to its precision and is done regularly to keep the aircraft functional and operational. This takes conscious effort to check the aircraft before failures occur. This requires regular inspections and cleaning that may be planned every month, hours, every landing and take-off, or beginning of flight; this time table can be adjusted according to the demands of the system. Corrective Maintenance. This is the repair done after the aircraft or equipment fails. If this does not cause great damage, it often causes delays and shutdowns. It would be very unfortunate if this happens in a situation when the needed maintainers or equipments are not available. This type of maintenance could be avoided if regular check-ups are done. Predictive Maintenance. The data gathered may give a clue for maintenance crews on which possible failures may occur. They then modify and repair the aircraft to make it more efficient. Reports on maintenance- related aviation accidents by the NSTB (National Transportation Safety Board)  from 1988 – 1997 and in US Civil Aviation stated that the reasons for these catastrophes are the failure in air frame, props, control, gear, and power plant, like fuel, ignition, oil, and mechanics which includes installation errors. Great damage and loss are directed primarily to reversed and wrong installations (Dhillion, 2007). In a 3-year period study on a major airline in the UK, error of omissions accounted to 56% in maintenance errors and only 30% are due to incorrect installation. An interview conducted by Reason & Hobbs (2003) on experienced maintainers revealed that the usual errors of omission are the following: failure to check the locks of the aircraft system before they proceed to work; inability to install the equipments needed and if there are installations made, they are incomplete; warnings, may it be verbal, sign, or tags, are neglected or not provided; materials and tools such as pins, ties, and fastenings, are left in the aircraft or engine; failure to activate or deactivate the aircraft system; incomplete testing; failure to do the necessary servicing; and overlooking the closure of the access panel. Failure to follow Rules and Regulations Manufacturers, pilots, and airline management are expected to know and follow these set of rules (Dhillion, 2007). Unfortunately, some pilots tend to bend or break some and engineers design planes below the specified standard for budget constraints. Part 23 of Federal Aviation Regulation. This part discussed the aircrafts air worthiness of an aircraft in terms of performance, power, safety instruments present, oxygen and air pressure system, fire prevention readiness, emergency landing procedures, how efficient can the plane be controlled, and the aircraft’s performance standard like maximum take-off weight, rate of climb, and take off speed must all comply with the industry standards. Visual Flight Rules. These pertain to a set of regulations that allow pilots to operate the plane under certain weather condition, especially in thick clouds or fog. To avoid collisions on other aircrafts, pilots are expected to have transponder, a device that respond when it receives radio-frequencies, to identify other aircraft. FARS requires this to insure the visibility of the aircraft, thus ensuring safety. But the best way to avoid this accident is to never risk flying on such circumstances when unpleasant weather is already brewing. Low Flying Rules. For these to be complied with, the aircraft must not fly near 500ft above a person, building, vehicle, and any moving object on the ground. If the aircraft flies over a crowded area, it should not fly below 1,000 feet to give allowance to land clearance in case the engine breaks down. Defective Design and Manufacturing Defect. Designing an aircraft requires careful planning. Voluminous computations are necessary. Design methods are constantly changed to meet the plane’s requirements, including the materials to be used; calculations on the aerodynamics of the plane; the type of engine to be installed, among others. Field performance trials are done to check design errors and evaluate if modifications are to be made and set a limitation for aircraft’s ability. Moreover, they estimate the loading capacity; balance the wing span with that of its weight; and identify the amount of fuel it can consume. These are some of the details engineers focus on to guarantee that the aircraft is fit for flying. This is why engineers are relying on computers to construct complex aircrafts. When do plane designs become defective? An aircraft may look all right on the outside, but it is only when under certain conditions that the defects emerge. Such incidents are manifested in the difficulty to control the plane; the vulnerability to stress especially during flight operations; the plane running off by itself without the pilot touching anything; the inability of the plane to take off even after all the procedures taken; and other technical shortcomings (www.trial-law.com). Manufacturing defects, on the other hand, are the plane’s shortcomings due to substandard materials used during its construction or defects due to wrong assembly. Plane manufacturers should provide clear forewarning and instruction regarding the use of their product to make the pilots aware of the limitations of the plane (www.trial-law.com). Communication Errors between Air Traffic Controller and Pilot Miscommunication between ATC and pilot will have a drastic result if overlooked and not corrected immediately. The role of the pilot is to follow and carry out the ATC’s instruction, while the ATC provides advisories and assists the landing and take-off of the aircraft. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) grouped these controller-pilot communication errors into three types: Readback/Hearback errors (the pilot did not read the clearance right and the ATC failed to check this mistake), Hearback errors type II (the pilot read the clearance right but the ATC didn’t notice his or her error), pilot was not able to read back (Cardosi, 1998, 2005). Language barrier can also be a significant cause although it is not observed often. Few of the consequences of these errors are pilots having a wrong landing, moving away from a suitable altitude, and runway problems. This type of error can be resolved or lessened easily with these following recommendations suggested by Dhillon (2007): 1) ATC should avoid sets or stings of instructions to every aircraft; 2) ATC should keep the instructions short, with a maximum of four instructions per transmission to avoid confusion; 3) Pilots are to respond to the ATC with full readback of the essential details. 4) During similar call signs frequencies, controllers should continue repeating this fact and the pilots are to state again their call sign before and after each readback; and 5) Controllers are to consider every readback as an important piece of information. Steps Taken to Solve the Problem on Human Errors in Aviation Although human errors are inevitable, the aviation industry is spending money to avoid these. There might be computers someday that can predict future accidents. It is possible after many years that a robot can take-over the place of pilots in desperation to eliminate errors. Movies are depicting computer-controlled aircraft and machines so this is a probability, although current regulations still prohibit the idea of computer-controlled passenger aircrafts. While these prospects in technology are still unavailable, the aviation industry cannot sit idle and watch how accidents due to human errors happen. Every now and then, new methods and techniques are being developed to scrutinize human factors that caused accidents. The data gathered from these reports and studies are used as reference to develop new safety procedures and technology that will somehow cover up human’s limitation. But no matter how industrial and modernized computers get, the problem lies deep that no technology can fathom. The aviation industry should focus on changing the mind-sets, attitudes, practices, and personal habits that can be grounds for accidents. These steps, techniques, methods, and concepts are believed to be ways to correct human error issues. Intensify safety procedure compliance, not only for pilots but also the maintenance’s. The mechanics should be enlightened that policies and regulations are not just there to help avoid problems or act as buffer when trouble arises (www.aviationtoday.com, 2006). Following them should be internalized until it is adapted as a behavior, so there’s a negligible chance of breaking the rules. Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction or THERP (Stolzer et al, 2008). A famous method that calculates the outcome of human performance and the probability of error based on the event tree model. The event tree contains human action on each of its “nodes.” Each action has a corresponding success or failure outcome or result on its “branches”, depending on the action the operator performed. Although the results presented are just probabilities, it could help make better judgments in certain situations Intelligent Interface Concept (Garlan et al, 1999). These are smart automated functions developed to help pilots fly the plane. Unlike traditional automation which helps pilots by minimizing his tasks, the intelligent interface, on the other hand, allows pilots to have full control by performing anything the pilot asks it to do. The pilot will just have to monitor the intelligent interface if his instructions are carried out. Some of the advantage of this concept is that it can automatically set the plane to an accurate speed to avoid going too fast into the turbulence during unfavorable weather conditions, checks the speed of the plane for any potential hazards, and execute commands fast. It has also built-in models of crew information and intentions and known aircraft dangers. Through this, pilots can avoid most common human-related errors. CRM or Cockpit/Crew Resource Management. CRM is a crew training intended to improve the crew’s performance to attain safe and well-organized flight operations. It utilizes well-tested tools and methods such as mechanism information, equipments, videos, simulator, and lectures to correct and improve performance, behavior, and skills (Lauber, 1984; Prince & Salas, 1999). Topics usually discussed in CRM are correct communication (e.g, supervisors should not sound threatening and subordinates should learn to question orders nicely), awareness on situations like emergencies, ways on how to solve problems that may arise during flight, executing logical decisions, and teamwork (www.squidoo.com/aviationhumanfactors) This method received remarks from other authors and pilots because the concepts are vague in giving proper behavior in the cockpit and the ideas are not put into effect in the real environment. Although this method takes time to implement because one cannot change overnight, nevertheless, this may be a beneficial method if constantly applied in the actual flight operation. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (Wells & Rodrigues, 2004). This comes in three types: 1) Mandatory Incident Reporting System – There are some incidents that require recording for future use. This record may someday be useful especially in identifying new or uncommon human-related errors. 2) Voluntary Incident Reporting System – In this reporting system, pilots, controllers, maintainers, and other flight crews are encouraged to report accidents, incidents, discrepancies, and other aviation-related issues that they have seen or experienced. The reports gathered are analyzed to give insights on how to prevent future human-related errors. 3) Automatic Recording System or Flight Data Recorder (FDR) – This is a fixed recorder found in modern aircrafts, Sounds and voices from the plane are recorded to help in investigation in case accidents happen and may also be used to correct faulty operations. 4) Human Reliability Assessment – This provides method in calculating human errors. It used technical, engineering, and psychological concepts in evaluating the picture which portrays risks and which areas pose more risks. Is it technical or human-related factors? Conclusion Although one cannot completely eliminate human errors and mistakes, these can be prevented. Engineers are making aircrafts more resistant to damage and software engineers are designing “smarter” computer systems. However, all of these may largely be in vain if human factor issues are not resolved. Research and training would not help if the crew or personnel chooses not to follow rules and regulations. Educating aviation personnel ought to be a priority. The origin of the error must be assessed to give full assistance to pilots, controllers, and those tasked to maintain aircrafts. One effective means to reduce these errors is to learn from every mistake or accident and make sure not that the root causes of such mistakes are not repeated. This may be quite difficult since technology is changing, so new sets of human-related errors may arise. Would it be better if robots take the place of humans then? Lives are too precious to risk, even if learning were a benefit. “Nobody’s perfect” is the common adage, but human errors may be rectified and reduced if not totally eliminated. The methods presented to help reduce errors have both advantages and disadvantages. It is with prudence for airline management to choose which ones are apt for their specific scenario. References Aviationtoday.com. (2006). Human errors in aviation maintenance. Retrieved on March 10, 2011 from www.aviationtoday.com Cardosi, K. M. (2005). Runway safety. Ashgate Publishing Company Cardosi, K.M. (1998). Pilot-controller communication errors: An Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Reports, Cambridge, MA Dhillion, B.S. (2007).Human reliability and error in transportation system. Springer-Verlag London Limited. Federal Aviation Administration (2009). Aviation instructor’s handbook. Skyhorse Publishing Inc. Hall, D. (2003). Mitigating human errors in aviation. London: Royal Aeronautical Society. 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