Intent and Judicial Moralism in Murder Cases - Essay Example

? Intent and Judicial Moralism in Murder Cases: Law Studies College: Intent and Judicial Moralism in Murder Cases The issue of criminal law and intention has in over a long time proved to be a headache in the judicial corridors. Many criminal lawyers and jurists have over the time been involved in endless debates concerning the appropriateness of applied intention in arguing out cases. The differentiation of reckless action and direct intention has resulted in acrimonious debates in the corridors of justice and the debate seems not to be ending with or clear and defined boundaries between intention and recklessness. Oblique intention according to Kugler (2002) might be described as a case where the actor did not act to produce the final result. In other words, the end result was not the intended outcome by the actor. Kugler further explained that much debate has been on the issue whether a case might be judged and the accused sentenced using the distinction between intention and recklessness. On the other hand, the intention of the actor has to be established as clearly as possible in passing out murder judgments to the defendant to avoid the temptation of involving judicial moralism in the cases. The problem in this case is extended by the introduction of morality in criminal jurisdictions. The use of a moral formula in defining the offence as kugler (2002) explained has been the cause of much acrimony in courts today. The use of the double effect doctrine inter alia, requires that, oblique intention should not be the same in all cases involving a crime of intention as well as using a moral formula in defining some offences in criminal cases. Ross (1996) in his explanation of morality, justice and judicial morality explained that the issue of introducing morality in corridors of justice has raised much concern and debates in courts. According to Ross (1996), the worth of moral action would be in action and not actually in what has been actually done, morality accounts to acting in good will, but in most cases a good will might not end up producing a right action. Justice on the other hand according to Ross would amounts to what has actually been done, without considering the intention of the action itself. Intention would however be of paramount impotence in gauging the severity of the crime itself such as in cases of murder or manslaughter. In the case of Woollin throwing the child in the room, which led to the child’s death, there lacks a clear defined intent in the action, which would make it possible for the juror to possibly infer on the laws of morality in sentencing the accused. It would therefore be more prudent to have clearly defined laws which would define the aspect of intent to avoid judicial morality in arguing out cases in the courts, which as Willson (2000) explained has been the dilemma in many criminal cases. The case of Regina v Woolin (1Cr. App. R. 8, 1999) involved a heated debate about the intent and the actual action of the accused that led to the death of a child, after Woolin threw the child in the room causing the child to suffer a fractured skull that led to his death. The accused on his defense argued that, the intention was to cause just slight harm to the child and was not to cause the death of the child through the serious harm suffered. From the case, it might be certain that Wollin had prior knowledge of his actions and was aware well in adverse that the action would result into serious harm to the child as could be defined by mens rea. The dilemma of intention was further brought out through the Nedrick case (83, Cr. App. R. 267, 1986) by Lord Lane, C.J. In the ruling the judge ruled that in a case where, the accused has been charged with murder and the jury have to decide whether the accused intended to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm, the jury cannot therefore infer the intention to the accused unless where the serious bodily harm might be of virtual certainty due to the defendants actions. Therefore, as Lacey (1993) explained, although the intent has been known as the most scrutinized mens rea in academic and judicial grounds, a clear defined intention in many cases remains a puzzle to crack. From the Nedrick case above, the judge cushioned against the temptation of the jury to infer the intention of the actions by the defendant, unless by much probability, the action could not have resulted to a different result. To a large extent, the judge reminded the jury to concentrate on the action itself and not get much involved in the intention of the defendant in carrying out the action unless it was natural that such an action would have resulted to the serious harm or death of a second party. Chantly (1991) to this effect argued that, it would be essential for the purpose and intention of the defendant to be established before determining the necessary sentence as required by the law. Judging the case on bases of malice and lack of enough proof on the actual intention of the defendant would therefore amount to use of judicial moralism it the courts of justice. The danger of introduction of judicial moralism as Ross (1996) explained , could be that through referring to the intention prematurely, the jury would be tempted to conclude that, the defendant acted immorally and in malice hence the end result could be intended or foreseen my the defendant. This way a sentence of murder could be handled in cases where the act was not intended. The situation in the Woolin case was aggravated by the refusal by the jury to the defendant’s assertion that, the act was out of provocation and hence not intended. The jury by rejecting the defense statement could have been guided by the act of judicial moralism where the intent of throwing the child could be considered both immoral and an act of malice and hence the result was actually foreseen. Comparing this to the R v Matthews (2 Crim App R 461, 2003 ) case, the probability of the results occurring might be considered somehow different. In Matthew’s case, it was evident hat the boy could die since he was not a swimmer, and hence the action was actually intended. In Woollin case however, the magnitude of the action seemed insignificant to the defendant to cause the serious harm to the child. Wilson (1999) to a much detailed extent explained the consideration of foresight and intention in the determination of such cases involving murder. It has been an on going tradition that judges has avoided the description of intent and foresight in many cases and according to Wilson, they have left much of the determination and elaboration to the jury as per the presented evidence. Woollin by throwing the child across the room could have realized that it would cause serious injury and this fact left it open for the jury to conclude that, the action was not probable to that extent but certain to cause serious harm. Therefore according to the jury, the consequence could not have been inevitable in any other terms, and the intent was therefore considered as foreseen. The jury by sentencing Woollin on this fact erred in that they concluded beyond doubt that the objective certainty of the consequence was intended and Woollin must have appreciated it. This conclusion could not have been enough to infer a murder sentence to the defendant. Revisiting the case of Hancock & Shankland (1 All ER 641, HL, 1986), the act although the intention was not to kill was dangerous enough to result to serious bodily harm to a third party. Although the intent was not to kill, the jury agreed that the defendant was involved in a dangerous action that could have resulted to such an intended consequence. In the Woollin case, the jury erred by not broadly examining the action, since by throwing the child across the room, it was probable that the child could have suffered minor injury in some cases. The action and gravity of the action in Moloney ( 1 All ER 1025, 1985) could be considered as a consequence having been inline with the intent, since it was the only probability that could have resulted, after pushing one form such a high storey. Serious harm was therefore inevitable. The intent in such a case was therefore properly established compared to the Woollin case, where the jury could be thought to have applied judicial moralism in giving out the sentence. Norrie (1989) explained that for intent to be properly described, desire has to be included in the definition. Duff (1986) further argued that an intended act has to include the aspect and notion of desire, which brings about the act. To intend an action would therefore amount to see the action as having some desirable characteristics. In order to understand if an agent actually intended to bring about X, it would be much more important to prove deductively as Duff (1986) explained the patterns of the agent’s actions. From the Woolin case, it could be difficult to determine the actual intention of the action, although the defendant denied that it was actually to cause the bodily harm. It was not also known whether the defendant could have desired to kill his son, but as Norrie (1999) argued the foresight of a serious risk or death could actually account to intention as was in Woollin’s case. The argument could be judged to be more a moral than a factual approach, where a judge may apply a moral interpretation of malice to conclude on the intent of the defendant. Though Woollin might not have intended to kill, the action was more a malice action and the foresight was clear to him as per the jury’s ruling. The idea of logic and culpability as explained by Horder (1990) may apply to the Woolin case. Through logic, by throwing the child across the room while, the defendant knew well that it might have caused serious bodily harm or, there was a high likelihood for it to occur, then there was no reason for Woollin to believe that the harm could not have occurred. However, it was also probable that, the serious harm could not have occurred serious unlike in the Moloney case, the distance was not significant. Therefore, the serious harm could have been unforeseen probability. The jury could have offered a benefit of doubt on this argument to the accused. The consideration of a broader view of law by the jurists as Goff (1988) explained could have enabled them to consider a diffused general view of the case rather than a particular instance. The woollin case proves to a large extend the glaring strengths and weaknesses that a jurists might have in arguing out cases, since they shared the fragmented approach that is more characteristic of judges. It also provides a blurred boundary on what may constitute of a murder or a manslaughter charge as Ashworth (1990) argued out. Willison (2007) further argued that the thin line between murder and manslaughter has resulted into confusion in the corridors of justice. In one description of murder, Willison explained hat if one intentionally, inflicted serious harm on another such that it leads to death, such person is guilty of murder. The proper definition of the levels of wrongdoing in such cases therefore becomes important and as Tadros (2006) argued out, the remorsefulness of the defendant would be important for the jurists, since as was in the Woollin case, he was traumatized buys the death of the child which was unintended. The key argument between manslaughter and murder would therefore be the intention. Duff (1998) further argued that there is a direct and retributive theory that ties together the law and morality together. It therefore follows, that in such a judgment, the morality of the action as well as the action itself have to be under investigation in sentencing the accused. The Woollin case through the lack of clear definition of the intent, and the logical interpretation of the facts could have been more driven by the moral responsibility of the defendant. On a lighter note as Barthes explained, the psychological impact of the action and the agile ability of the jurists in interpreting the texts through several cases might be a blow to delivering justice. The Woollin case, the Moloney and Shankland cases to large extent had nothing in common as Norrie (1989) explained, since the intents of the actions were very diverse as well as the actual actions. It could not have been very applicable to use the two in passing judgment in the Woolin case. Although ass Levitt (1917) explained, the presence of mens rea could not be enough to have led to the conclusion that the foresight was well clear to the defendant and thus could have intended the outcome of the action. As the case of R v Walker and Hayles (90 Cr App R 226, 1990) portrayed, the jurists have to critically show the intention to kill using the circumstances that led to the death of the second party. The intention however was not clear and the jurists much relied on mens rea of the case to convict Woollin to murder. As Smith (1974) explained, fro any proper sentencing to be handed over in criminal offences, the intention of carrying out the action has to be considered ante jurists have to figure out as broadly as possible to give the defendant a benefit of doubt. Contrary, there has to be clear and well outlined laws that would lead the jurists in such cases to avoid cases of judicial moralism in the corridors of justice. References Ashworth, A (1990) "Reforming the Law of Murder". Criminology Law Review, pp 75 Ashworth, A & Mitchell, B. (ed) (2000) Rethinking English Homicide NY: Oxford University Press Barthes, R "Dominici, or the Triumph of literature" in Barthes, R Mythologies, 43(6). Duff, A. (1998) Philosophy and criminal law: principal and critique. NY: Cambridge University Press. Duff, R.A. (1986) “The obscure intentions of the House of Lords", Criminology Law Review 771-781. Horder, J (1990) "Cognition, Emotion, and Criminal Culpability" Law Quarterly Review. 469-578 Hancock & Shankland [1986] 1 All ER 641, HL Goff, Lord (1988) "The Mental Element in Murder" Law Quarterly Review. 104, pp30 Lacey, N (1993) A clear Concept of intention: Elusive or Illusory. Modern Law Review 56(5) Levitt, (1917) “Extent and Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea” Illinois Law. Review. 17 Moloney [1985] 1 All ER 1025 Matthews [2003] 2 Crim App R 461 Nedrick [1986] 3 All ER 1 Woollin [1998] 3 WLR 382, [1999] AC 82 Norrie, A. (1999) ‘After Woolin’ Criminology Law Review 532-544 Norrie, A (1989) "Oblique Intention and Legal Politics”. Criminology Law Review 793ff Ross, R. K. (1996). Morality, Justice and Judicial Moralism. Retrieved 10th January, 2011 http://www.friesian.com/moral-2.htm. Smith, J C (1974) "Intention in Criminal Law" 27 Current Legal Problems, 93-121 Tadross, V. (2006) The Homicide Ladder. Modern Law Review 69(4) 601-608 Walker & Hayles [1990] Crim.L.R 44 Williams, G (1987) "Oblique Intention" Cambridge Law Journal, 46(3) pp.417-438 Wilson, W (1990) "A Plea for Rationality in the Law of Murder" Legal Studies 10(3), 307 Wilson, W (2000) ‘Murder and the Structure of Homicide’ in Ashworth, A & Mitchell, B. (ed) (2000) Rethinking English Homicide NY: Oxford University Press Wilson, W (1990) "A Plea for Rationality in the Law of Murder" Legal Studies 10(3) pp. 307 Woollin [1998] 3 WLR 382, [1999] AC 82. Read More