Local government is better set up to take care of disaster relief than central governement - Essay Example

? Local government is better set up to take care of disaster relief than central government Contents Introduction 3 Disaster 4 Stakeholders 5 Understanding Regional Specificity 6 Theory 9 Under Developed Nations and Emergency Relief 11 Conclusion 13 Bibliography 15 Local government is better set up to take care of disaster relief than central government Introduction Local governments should be better equipped to set up for disaster relief than centralized government. One of the best reasons for this is that local situations are going to be specific to a region, the problems, potentials, and weather and earth related issues specific with how they should be addressed. A good example of this can be seen in the problems that occurred in the United States after Hurricane Katrina struck and New Orleans and the surrounding regions were left at the mercy of an unprepared government. The problems during that disaster were specific and were not relatable to any other region in the United States. The tsunami in Sri Lanka in 2004 is another example of how local government was better set up to respond than the centralized government. Because local governments are in a position to be better set up than centralized government it does not mean that they are prepared for what can happen. The suggestion in this paper is that local governments are in a better position to prepare for regional disasters and should become prepared in relationship with the foreseeable problems that might affect their local areas. Even though the exact timing of a disaster is not usually predictable, most disasters can be predicted as a probability. This was the case in New Orleans as well as in Turkey where the earthquake that struck recently was predicted long before it actually took place. Still, the city and the government were unprepared for the event. The following paper will explore the theoretical concepts in regard to disaster relief in relationship to local governments while examining the some of the events of the last decade that have brought disaster relief to the forefront of concern for both central and regional governments. Disaster The UN defines a disaster as “a serious disruption of the functioning of society causing widespread human, material, or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected society to cope using only its own resources” (Jha 2010: 4). The way in which disasters are measured is through losses, most often first in lives, then in property. A disaster is a tragedy of such proportion that the community is affected is usually close to non-functioning after a disaster and commerce stops in order to focus on creating a unified effort towards saving lives that are still in jeopardy and finding a way to restore the way of life that was disrupted during and after the event. What is often overlooked is that the aftermath of many disasters goes on for years. Long after the attention of the media has stopped focusing on the areas that have been affected, the rebuilding efforts that coincide with the human struggles continue to evolve, the relief an ongoing process that sometimes can take decades to be fulfilled. Disasters that are made by man such as the core melt-down at Chernobyl in the then U.S.S.R are just as devastating as natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. The disaster at Chernobyl, in fact, has left the area uninhabitable for generations to come (Kapucu, Naim, and Alpaslan O?zerdem 2012).A disaster is not defined by its origin, but through its impact on an area and its population. Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) is the theoretical framework for the cooperative efforts of local and central government as they create an approach to effective disaster relief through both sets of entities. The key concepts for cross-organisational functions are flexibility, coordination and leadership (National or local disaster? 2011). Disasters on a small scale happen on a daily basis, utilizing the skills of the police departments, fire and rescue departments, and various other services that are available to the public when times of crisis occur. When wide scale disaster hits, these services become overburdened unless they have been a part of the development of IEM in such a way as to have some sense of preparedness established (Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola. 2011) Stakeholders In the event of a disaster there are stakeholders who have vested interests in the outcomes of prevention and relief. Stakeholders are a wide group of individual people and entities who will be affected by the way in which an event has impact from its initial disaster to the way in which relief is handled. The primary stakeholder is the Emergency Manager, but entities such as insurance handlers, volunteer organisations, and political entities will have a stake in how and to what effect relief is effected in the areas that are under disaster status (Kapucu and Ozerdem 2012). In examining stakeholders from a local versus central government perspective, the local stakeholders will have an outward set of goals while the central government will have an inwardly directed set of goals. The stakeholders at the local level will be interested in preserving their people, businesses, and their way of life. The interest at this level is in trying to re-establish life at the level it was before losses occurred. The interests here are based upon needs. At the central government level, the interests are less about people and more about the appearance of effectiveness. The interest where people are concerned is the appearance of charity, while the stake that they hold is based upon the effect of their actions on the perception of the greater world in relationship to the aide that is given to the people. Stakeholders will have an outward look where the effect of relief has a personal importance, while those who have an inward look are interested through the perceptions of their aide gives to those whose influence is important in relationship to their power. Understanding Regional Specificity Taking London as an example, the potential risks that the city faces can be assessed and evaluated in relationship to local responses to disaster situations. The city is not typically vulnerable to events like volcanic activity, earthquakes, or to volatile weather issues. Hurricanes, tornadoes, or tsunamis are not likely to affect the city. The one natural disaster that the city is vulnerable to is that of flooding from the River Thames. The threat is increasing as the city is beginning to settle into and sink slowly into the clay based earth that lies under the city. Surge tides are a serious threat when low pressure comes across the Atlantic towards the UK and sea levels rise under the depression. The Storm Tide Warning Service is responsible for warning when the right circumstances occur for surge tides to be a direct threat (Amendola, Horlick-Jones, and Casale 1995). Before 1980, the Greater London Council was responsible for coordinating the disaster services for the city. Since the council was abolished, the thirty three local boroughs were left with trying to find a way to manage disaster relief so that they were prepared for eventual problems of large scale effect. Amendola, Horlick-Jones, and Casale (1995: 497) have presented the result by saying that “in the vacuum that the absence of a strategic authority or hierarchy of responsibility causes, we have evolved an elaborate series of liaison arrangements, operating on several levels, some spanning London, others focused on particular areas”. The individual departments have been assigned roles in the event of a disaster, operating autonomously and in unison in order to create a focused effort towards relief. As an example, the fire departments know they are responsible for rescue, which is not the responsibility of the police department who is responsible for managing and controlling the chaos of aftermath into a sense of order. Amendola, Horlick-Jones, and Casale (1995) discuss that the value of the local entities self-managing is evident in the way in which they operate. The local commanders are in charge of their units and they affect the scenes they are in charge of through a unified effort. The teams are well known to everyone, the members having had a great deal of practice working with one another. They have trained in smaller events as well as together for the eventuality of a larger event. They know how to anticipate each other as they are already a team, not needing to be assembled from a wide-spread gathering of people from outside the community, but from groups of people who are a part of the community. The folly that can be observed where local versus central governmental control is concerned can be seen in the hurricane disaster that affected New Orleans in the United States in 2005. While the category five hurricanes was bad enough as a disaster hitting the region, it was the inadequacies of the levies that caused the greatest amount of flooding. New Orleans is situated beneath the water level of the Mississippi River, the water held back by levies that were built to contain what might overflow. The problem with the levies is that they were built to withstand only a category three hurricane, even though the possibility of a category five was more than possible. As the levies broke, the flood waters filled the city creating a much worse scenario than was necessary (Daniels, Kettl, and Kunreuther 2006). Beyond the problem of inadequate preparations for a local disaster, the region also was heavily dependent upon national response to the events of the disaster. Because control was not central to the region, many people suffered after the event that did not need to be in such distress had local authorities been better prepared for the aftermath of the disaster. Both the prevention and the aftercare was held in the hands of federal authorities rather than local and regional entities, thus the response was not tailored to the specific needs of that region. This is a classic example of how local authorities must have responsibility for the events of a disaster so that the preventions and the responses are under the authority of those who can focus on the potential problems to which the region is specifically vulnerable. Theory In 1991 and then again in a revision in 2003 the UK released a theory on how to combat disaster issues. The theory upon which the government approaches the potential for disaster is through what they refer to as resilience. Resilience is based upon the idea that rather than anticipating a disaster through risk reduction which assumes the ability to predict disaster or through redundancy which can be costly where the risks are low for an event to occur, the potential for disaster is approached through decentralization so that specialized attention is created and through flexibility which allows for quick and efficient reorganization of resources in order to use them over a variety of events (National or local disaster? 2011). The most important element during the event of a disaster is the disaster manager. This individual or entity is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the various departments that are important during a disaster rescue and recover. The manager must be sure to not direct the various departments on what to do. This should not be necessary as they should be trained to effectively manage the situation and act on their responsibilities autonomously. The importance of the disaster manager is to make sure that all avenues of resource management are being utilized and that those actors with responsibilities are using them effectively. The theory of creating decentralized efforts for disaster relief is based upon the conclusions of a variety of theorists, including McLuckie (Drabek1986) and Alexander (2000) theorized that centralized control of a disaster results in a disruption of the free-flow of information and that the decisions that need to be made become stalled as those who are needed to take responsibility are out of touch with the events as they are taking place since it is likely that they are not in the area that is affected by the event. When local authorities have developed a system of ways in which to handle a disaster, the interruption by centralized authorities can often mean that a time period of playing ‘catch up’ will occur in which the coordination between authorities breaks down the system rather than further supporting it. The example of New Orleans in Hurricane Katrina shows that the federal authorities that were responsible for much of the relief were out of touch with the needs of the local population, where as the local authorities waited instead of moving forward with the aspects of the work that they knew to be a factual ;part of the process. Because the federal authority was given lead on the disaster, people waited as much as five days for clean water, were not provided with adequate evacuation, and the area was not properly put back under control in a timely fashion. It is probable that had local authorities taken the lead and had federal authorities assist in fulfilling the needs of the victims, the process would have been more successful (Daniels, Kettl, and Kunreuther 2006). The national disaster system for the United States is FEMA which is the Federal Emergency Management Agency. This agency developed the theory of comprehensive emergency management (CEM) in which a four pronged approach is established: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. What emerged from this plan was the use of IEM in which localized agencies were established from which the development of regional specific plans could be put into place with training that is specific to the potential vulnerabilities of each region. Even though this agency believed it had prepared for emergency situations, the events of the last twenty years have proven that even though the local agencies have been empowered, the local governments still look to the federal government to address the large scale problems that emerge in local communities (Gallant 2008). Under Developed Nations and Emergency Relief One of the most difficult circumstances is the occasion of a natural disaster in an underdeveloped nation. An example of this event was the tsunami in December of 2003 in which the ocean swept in and carried out a large number of people, including a large body of tourists, from which the event became a global crisis. Because of the lack of sufficient infrastructure to deal with the aftermath of the crisis, the nation brought their need to the public within hours and the EU responded. The consequence of creating an alliance with such a large government power is that sudden interest in the politics of the region can create a conflict between powers. When Sri Lanka’s 2005 presidential elections were held the EU monitored the event. The EU suddenly was taking an interest in the political structure of the nation and even went so far as to begin to make ‘suggestions’ about policy and law. The internal conflict that has been an ongoing issue in Sri Lanka with the LTTE became an active issue for the EU. In other words, in asking for help, Sri-Lanka brought attention from a larger governing body that took an interest in issues that extended beyond the aid that was required after the tragic event. As the Earthquake disaster in Haiti continues to be an issue that is of international interest as the nation tries to dig out from under the issues that were exacerbated by the event of the Earthquake, the world is suddenly focused on Haiti and the problems that occur in this small nation. According to Farmer (2011:34) “the country’s refractory poverty, worsened each year by political instability, unfair trade policies, and environmental disasters” create a system in which the health of the members of the nation is deteriorating rapidly with illnesses becoming a more and more difficult problem to overcome where basic services are difficult to obtain. The problem with both scenarios is that the nations are not equipping themselves in such a way as to create preventative measures towards the need for larger entities coming into the nation and provoking changes that may not be tailored to the cultural backdrop of the nation. Where the local authorities do not have resources with which to create positive changes towards resilience, developing nations are at the mercy of exterior help which may or may not have the best interests of the nation in mind as they offer aide. It means that help can abruptly stop, that political decisions can be influenced, and that the help that is truly needed may be overlooked because of the best intentions of those offering help who do not see the importance of one problem or another within the indigenous population. This means that not only are these nations in need of help from exterior resources, they are at the mercy of those resources. Using local means of survival is a better alternative, although it is not always a possibility. Through local resources of help during a crisis, local cultural integrity is more likely to be held intact rather than to be framed for change through the influences of exterior resources that might change something that is locally understood. Conclusion The importance of local authorities having a prioritised place in the management of a crisis of disaster allows for a more locally relevant agency to create effective resources management for the needs created by the event. Local authorities are more aware of the specific needs of their people, the types of disasters linked to relevant regional potential threats. With central authorities offering aid, but allowing the local authorities to take the lead and manage the crises is the way in which to create effective IEM. If the federal authorities take the lead, as evident in the Hurricane Katrina crisis, it is likely that the confusion and distance between the event and the authorities will cause a breakdown in communication, which results in a lack of resources being received by those that are most in need. While central governments are crucial during disaster events, the more likely resource for managing the crisis effectively is within the local agencies where the regional specificity is more familiar and the training can be localized so that the community is serving its own needs rather than being inadequately serviced by outside agencies. Bibliography Alexander, C. 2000. Confronting disaster. Harpenden: Terra Publishing. Amendola, Anielo, Tom Horlick-Jones, and Riccardo Casale.1995. Natural risk and civil protection. East Sussex: Taylor and Francis, Inc. Daniels, Ronald J., Donald F. Kettl, and Howard Kunreuther. 2006. On risk and disaster: lessons from Hurricane Katrina. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Drabek, T. E. 1986. Human systems responses to disaster: An inventor of sociological findings. New York: Springer-Verlag. Farmer, Paul, and Joia Mukherjee. 2011. Haiti after the earthquake. New York: PublicAffairs. Gallant, Brian. 2008. Essentials in emergency management: including the all- hazards approach. Lanham, Md: Government Institutes. Haddow, George D., Jane A. Bullock, and Damon P. Coppola. 2011. Introduction to emergency management. Burlington, MA: Butterworth Heinemann. Jha, Madan Kumar. 2010. Natural and anthropogenic disasters: vulnerability, preparedness and mitigation. Dordrecht: Springer. Kapucu, Naim, and Alpaslan O?zerdem. 2012. Managing emergencies and crises. Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning. National or local disaster? 2011. [online] accessed 17 January 2012 from http://www.mkweb.co.uk/emergencyplanning/documents/NationalOrLocalv 1_1.pdf Read More