Should Animals Have Their Own Rights - Essay Example

Should animals have their own rights? INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Alan Holland’s exploration of animal rights is characteristic with richness and depth, while many times being called in, by disputes or practical problems. Instead of focusing on the emphasis of environmental pragmatism or the significance of harmonizing practice and theory, Holland forces his audiences to serve basic philosophical questions, while at the same time resolving the real problems facing environmental policy (Singer 75). The two central areas of focus in Holland’s work include the relations existing between the normative and the natural, as well as the ways in which the duties of individuals to animals go hand in hand with the human responsibility to respect the natural world (Regan 205-211). This report can be viewed as one side of a discourse with Holland, focusing on the main themes in this area of study. The report will start by characterizing speciesism, including a claim that many individuals are in support of rejecting it, irrespective of the fact that they never fail to sanction what is apparently the obvious effects of rejecting the issue. This paper will relate this failure to the historical views over the interrelations between humans, nature and other animals, which is still depicting wide disparities (Regan 205-211). This report holds that, while a thorough anti-speciesism values the maxim that ‘humans are an aspect of the natural world’, these dodges will not be present. The paper will reach a conclusion, through a discussion of the consistency of anti-speciesist’s resolution of the rewilding nature. The points explained through the paper include that under the issue of predation and eating meat, a guardian farmer of a domesticated animal holds the right to slaughter it for meat or trade it for money and the goodness of humans as compared to the cruelty of the wild, bestows extra rights on the human than the animal. Thirdly, when using the case of rewilding nature, man holds more rights to animals due to the services they offer to the natural world and animals (Signal and Taylor 147-157). Under speciesism and the view on the rights of animals, many people in today’s world will regard that animals hold rights. This is evident from popular parlance, informal polls and recent legislation. In jurisdictions like California, Colorado, Boulder and Berkeley, people are not viewed as the owners of pets, but instead, they are viewed as the guardians to their animal companions (AMVA). During the mid 1990s, the NORC (National Opinion Research Center) at the University of Chicago questioned a sample representing the American population, whether they were in agreement with this statement: “animals should hold the moral rights that humans have”. From the surveys, 35% of the respondent in one survey and 39% in the second were in agreement or strongly in agreement with the statement (Regan 205-211). The results from the survey could understate the universal sentiments held about animals, because not all anti-vivisectionists and vegetarians hold that animals posses rights. Further, it is not that all the people that regard animals have rights, view that they hold as much rights as human beings. For example, it is a fact that humans and all species of animals posses similar moral rights. For instance, humans hold the right to engage in their religious practices, and eagles hold the right to fly in the sky, but humans do not hold the right to flight, and neither do eagles hold rights to religious practices. The comparison shows that in the case that a given entity hold certain rights, the rights are linked to the capacity of the given entity. For example, only the creatures that can engage in religious practices hold the rights to practice religion, and only the creatures that can fly hold the right to flight. However, it is not that all capacities are linked to a given area of rights, for example, considering that humans hold the capacity to murder, but they do not hold the right to do so (Signal and Taylor 147-157). There are different refinements about the area of rights, like it was discussed in the introduction part of this paper. There are also significant shades of the language used in explaining the rights of animals. From one point of view, all the people that believe in the rights of humans also believe in the rights of animals, considering that humans are also animals. It is informative and awkward that humans class mosquitoes and chimpanzees as animals in a similar manner, and then exclude humans from the group. According to Plato, it is the same case, where living things are divided into humans and nonhumans, because it would be the same case as dividing animals as cranes and non-cranes (Signal and Taylor 147-157). It is general knowledge, what people are referring to, when they argue that they are in support of animal rights. They use the expression to imply that there are moral grounds on which animals should be treated in a manner, which is better than humans always do (Signal and Taylor 147-157). To a large extent, changes have been brought about by the search for a philosophical critique of the treatment of non-human animals by humans. Since the publication of Animal liberation by Peter Singer in 1975, a powerful compulsion for the need to change human behavior towards animals has been developed. The case is very compelling because it has been projected from a wide array of perspectives on morality (Francione 75). In the case of rights theorists – including utilitarians and Kantians – they present the argument that many of the non-human species hold rights and they deserve to be respected as societal ends in their nature; the interests of humans and those of non-humans should be offered equal regard (Singer 75). The common outlook among the different views is that they reject speciesism. The word ‘speciesism’ was coined in 1970, by Richard Ryder and was popularized by Singer, through ‘Animal liberation’. Singer explains speciesism as a biased attitude that favors the interests of the members of the species explaining the case, and serving against the interests of other species and their members (Singer 75). Like racism and sexism, it is prejudicial, because it accords preferential treatment for own kind, due to the fact that they share a moral trait, which – on its own – is not enough grounds for moral significance (AMVA). The arguments against speciesism, as presented through the works of animal liberationists depict two significant characteristics. The first is that, what is viewed as being of primary moral significance are individuals and the characteristics they endorse, and not the consideration that they may be viewed as members of different kinds. Therefore, for the reasons of morality, characteristics like being members of the lions club or being a citizen of the US are not – on their own – of key moral significance (Signal and Taylor 14-157). The second is that the traits that are considered of moral importance should not be classifications like gender, race and species, but deeper ones like self-consciousness, sentience and the capacity to express desire. With that in mind, irrespective of the fact that a human will not share many characteristics with a dog, it is evident that there are many morally important aspects that are shared. In reducing the principle outlook of anti-speciesism, it can be held that biological facts – on themselves – do not dictate the moral status of an entity (AMVA). Supposing otherwise would amount to a fallacy, as much as sexists and racists do, considering that it is wrong to hit an individual, not due to the fact that they are male, white or human, but because it hurts them (Regan 205-211). Like Alan Holland, anti-speciesism should be rejected, and moderate speciesism endorsed in its place, based on the belief that humans are morally, at liberty to give priority to the interests of other humans over those of other animal species (Budiansky 132). One such case is that a rat and a human being may hold equivalent interests in a given area of life, but fulfilling the needs and the interests of the human is a greater priority than satisfying the interests of the rat. For example, rats and humans hold comparable rights to the continuation of life, but in the course of satisfying the interest of the human being, it may be necessary to end the life of the rat. The case shows that the normal life of a human being is more significant than that of a rat, not because the human being is human, but because their quality of life is higher. PREDATION AND EATING OF MEAT A recent book authored by Michael Pollan sheds the necessary light and knowledge on this question by acknowledging the authority of the anti-speciesist views. However, he seeks to avoid the universal outlook that vegetarianism is the moral model (Dunayer 7). In conclusion, he infers that it is allowable to use animals for food, in the case that they are raised in a humane manner and slaughtered painlessly – although he insists that that type of meat is the only one that can be eaten by a conscientious person (Signal and Taylor 147-157). The conclusion is not unreasonable, and it is also not different from that by Singer, because Pollan appears to think that he blunted the compulsion of animal liberationist views. He goes ahead to argue that many of the meat meals eaten in America is justified, although it is not necessarily the case. It is difficult to determine the ratio of the meat eaten in America, which is from animals that have lived happily and slaughtered painlessly. However, it is surprising that the percentage of the meat eaten in America, which fits into Pollan’s description, may be less than one percent, and there is also no reason to believe that the proportion of the meat raised in a humane manner is increasing (AMVA). The situation explained by Pollan and Singer shows that it is right to accord animals the rights they deserve, but these rights should be relative to those of the guardian, which are those of the human being (Singer 75). For example, it would be insensitive and illogical to hold that the cow that has been domesticated by a human being has as much moral rights as they do (Francione 75). This line of reasoning can be advanced on the basis of the fact that the domesticated animals needs the human being for protection from wild animals, considering that it cannot survive in the wild, like other animals including buffalos (Cohen and Regan 117). Secondly, the human being invests their time and resources in taking care of the animal; therefore, at some point in time, they should be in a position to see their rights surpass those of the animal, which will allow the human to benefit from the domestication. Additionally, human beings hold the responsibility of caring for animals, therefore that bestows on them, the rights to enjoy the input of the animal, through having some work done by the animal, or using the animal for their benefit. However, the case is much different in the case that it is one that cannot yield any benefit to the human being. In such a case, such an animal may hold the rights to life, but in the case that its rights to life challenge those of the human being – which are more superior – they may have to lose their rights for those of the human (Francione 75). For example, in the case given earlier, a rat will attack the food and the belongings stored by a human being. In the particular case, the rat is threatening the livelihood and the wellbeing of the human; therefore it loses its rights to continued life (Singer 75). Therefore, in such a case, the human being will have the full rights of compromising the life of the rat, so that they can safeguard their rights to life and property. Another case is that of animals like mosquitoes, which will lead to disease and the death of humans. In such a case, considering the comparative value of the two animals, the human being becomes more valuable than the mosquito, therefore justifying its death, so that the human can remain safe and healthy (Williams and Margo 12). THE GOODNESS OF HUMANS AND THE EVIL OF NATURE It is not questionable, that humans see themselves as being very nice, when compared to the nature of the natural order. Through the essay ‘Nature’, John Stuart Mill, a nineteenth century philosopher explained the odious violence and the tyranny that dominates the animal kingdom, except the part covered by the discipline and the taming of man (Signal and Taylor 147-157). He went ahead to discuss that some animals, go through their lifetime, devouring and tormenting other animals. The goodness of humans is inbuilt in their language and evident from terms like humane and human, which imply what is good, and it’s opposite (Singer 75). The words that describe animals, including beast and brute, suggest the bad nature of these other animal species. In discussing the concept of beastliness, Mary Midgley noted that humans are considered animal-like, in the case that they do not depict the goodness of the human species. However, based on the regard that humans are a component of nature, humans may sometimes take the position of the brutal world, reducing the deer numbers in the wild, replacing the hunting tactics of predators like wolves (Dunayer 7). This outlook offers the human being, the license to manage nature, but not to exhaust the natural world and other animals in the natural world, when it suits their interests. This dualistic outlook depicts an unstable existence between humans and the natural world, which require that humans get singled out of animals, among other species, as the focus of control. The dualistic nature of the relations between nature and humans shows some grounds, based on which humans and other parts of the natural world can co-exist harmoniously. The values that are present in animals and humans alike include self-consciousness, sentience and interests, which form the basis for the rights of animals (AMVA). Taking note of the protective role of the human being, it is clearly noteworthy that humans should not exhaust other animal species for their own gain, but they should engage in a give and take relationship with these other animals. For example, through the protection of certain members of the animal kingdom, the human earns entitlement to benefit from the beauty and the intrinsic value of the natural world and other animals (Francione 75). The relationship between the human being and the natural world, particularly domesticated animals that are protected by the human, should be guided and dictated by the mutuality of interests. For example, taking account of the protective role played by man, where he shields domesticated animals from the harsh existence of the wild, accords them more rights than the animals. However, irrespective of the protective role of the human being, animals posses some rights, which could be explained on the basis of the protective role of the human, and the benefits that yield from the animals (Dunayer 7). For instance, in the case of a domesticated animal living under zero grazing conditions, they hold the rights to feed and to receive medical attention from their guardians (AMVA). Therefore, animals, whether wild or domesticated have rights, but these rights could be determined, relative to the role of the human and the priority to be offered to the animal and the human. Further, a human can be sued at a law court, in the case that they do not play the protective role they are supposed to take, for instance in the case that they abuse domesticated animals or subject them to inhumane conditions (Francione 75). REWILDING NATURE Human beings take a curiously dualistic place in nature. On one side, the behavior of the human is that, where they are warring against the natural world and the other is the role of pining for a lost world, where the ultimate goal is to reconstitute the natural world. The second role is evident from the creation of centers like Disney land-model parks, where they introduce different species to areas similar to those they have been captured from. These are distinguishable trials to reconstitute the look of nature, through the manipulation of animals, both for the interest of the animals and that of the animals as well. Some of these programs – whether of an introduction or re-introduction outlook – depict the fact that these wild animals posses rights, in the eyes of humans (Budiansky 132). These rights include that they are taken from, otherwise threatened or unfavorable natural conditions and taken to areas where they are offered food among other benefits, both for their interest and that of humans. For example, since 1999, there was the initiation of a program for the taming of the wild lynx of Canada, and then taking them to South Colorado, which is an attempt towards the creation of sustainable animal populations (Francione 75). This particular case depicts the protective and the meditative role of human, as they play the role of ensuring that the populations of the animals targeted by the program are not pushed out of existence. The different cases where animals are protected depicts that animals have inherent rights, which can be traced to their self-consciousness, sentience and their ability to express interests. However, like it can be noted from these same programs, the rights of human beings are given priority, above those of the animals (AMVA). Following the discussion of the different cases demonstrating the protective role of the human being, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the rights of animals are defined in relation to those of humans. The relationship between the rights of humans and those of animals shows that the rights of human beings are more superior, when compared to one another, mainly because the human being plays the protective role in nature, while these animals enjoy the safety offered. Further, due to the duty held by man, where they safeguard, protect and direct the wellbeing of animals, the human earns the right to use the animals, so that they can benefit from the services offered (Francione 75). For example, from the case of the creation of the Disney land-model of parks, the developers of the parks will use them for profit making, which repays their investment and the services offered to the animals. Further, in a non-controlled environment, the rights of the human being are viewed to be more precedent to those of the animal, mainly because the self-consciousness, sentience and the interests of the human are deeper (Singer 75). However, the dominant place of the human being, the precedence of their rights or their protective role does entitle them to the exploitation of animals, irrespective of the services offered before (AMVA). For example, in the case that a farmer started abusing their domesticated animals, or treating them in ways that are inhumane, it will not be the rights of the human that will be given priority, but those of the animal (Regan 205-211). Conclusion Alan Holland’s review of animal rights depicts depth and richness, making it a helpful tool in solving disputes and practical problems. The central areas in his review of animal rights include the relations between the natural and the normative and the ways in which the responsibility of humans to animals is in line with the respect for the natural world. Under the view of speciesism, animals can be considered to hold some rights on their own, but these rights should be translated on the basis of the relationships existing between humans and animals. For example, under the issue of predation and eating meat, a farmer that takes care of a domesticated animal holds the right to slaughter it for meat or sell it for money. Secondly, the goodness of humans, which is a contrast to the cruelty of the wild, bestows more rights on the human, when compared to the animal. Third, with reference to the rewilding of nature, man holds more rights to animals, including the rights to profit to them, due to the services they offer – while playing the protective role. Works Cited Budiansky, Stephen. The Covenant of the Wild. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. AMVA. US Pet Ownership 2007. American Medical Veterinary Association, 2007. Web. 6 Aug. 2013. Cohen, Carl, and Tom Regan. The Animal Rights Debate. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. Print. Dunayer, Joan. Animal Equality: Language and Liberation. Derwood, MD: Ryce Publishing, 2001: Print. Francione, Gary. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or your Dog? Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000. Print. Regan, Tom. “The Case for Animal Rights” in Lafollette, Hugh (Ed.) Ethics in Practice, 3rd Ed. Maldon MA: Blackwell, 2007: 205-211. Print. Signal, Tania, and Nicola Taylor. “Attitudes to Animals: Demographics within a Community Sample” Society & Animals, 14.2(2006): 147–157. Print. Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics, 2nd Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Print. Williams, Erin, and DeMello, Margo. Why Animals Matter. New York: Prometheus Books, 2007. Print. Read More