Fire and the Built Environment - Assignment Example

FIRE AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT By Name Course Instructor Institution City/State Date Table of Contents FIRE AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 1 Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 Case One - Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire, United States 3 Case Two - Gothenburg Discothèque Fire, Sweden 5 Case Three - Lame Horse Club, Russia 6 Lessons Learned 7 Recommendations 9 Conclusion 10 References 11 Fire and the Built Environment Introduction Generally, the ‘built environment’ is the surroundings constructed by people with the goal of staging human activities. According to Beverly et al. (2010, p.299), built environment is utilised to describe areas with human-made structures and buildings. Fire safety can only be achieved in the built environment through contributions from numerous organisations. Therefore, a fire strategy is developed in the design stage by professional designers like the engineers as well as architects, with the permission of the fire authority with the goal of meeting the fire safety business and regulatory requirements. At the operation stage, the building must be operated and maintained by the owner in line with the fire safety strategy, reviewed and examined by the fire authority. When a fire starts in the building, the building owner or the occupants are required to call the fire and rescue service (FRS) so as to fight the fire. In this report, the objective is to analyse nightclub fires at Lame Horse Club (Russia), Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire (the United States), and Gothenburg Discothèque (Sweden) using the available literature. In view of these case studies, the report will discuss the fire safety engineering issues in connection with varying buildings types as well as levels of occupancy. Case One - Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire, United States On 28th May 1977 a fire broke out at Beverly Hills Supper Club, wherein over 2,400 people were attending various functions. Ultimately, the fire led to the death of 164 people while 200 others were injured. The fire started at a small unoccupied room called the ‘Zebra Room’ before spreading quickly all over the facility and trapping many people prior to their exit. According to Duval (2006, p.9), as a one-story facility, the Beverly Hills Supper Club had a total floor space of over 65,000 square feet and had many meeting and function rooms in addition to the Cabaret Room (a large showroom) that could accommodate more than 1,200 people. Furthermore, the facility was originally built in the 1937 and numerous renovations and additions had been done until in 1970 when the owners undertook a major rebuilding project following a small fire in the complex. Basically, the facility construction had been classified as non-combustible and all through the facility; the engineers had installed suspended mineral tiles ceilings beneath the original fibre and plaster tiles. The interior partitions were done using wood framing while lumber and plywood were used to construct the floor joists above the Zebra Room. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) as cited by Duval (2006, p.10) established that the facility interior had been decorated with combustible finishes such as draperies, wood panelling and carpeting. The facility’s fire protection only entailed portable fire extinguishers and did not have standpipe and automatic sprinklers systems. This is further exacerbated by the fact that the facility did not have devices for detecting smoke/fire and also there was no alarm system. The report by NFPA concerning the nightclub fire outlined numerous factors that could have resulted in the disaster: late discovery of fire, lack of evacuation and emergency plan, overcrowding, and the facility’s means of egress capacity was inadequate, especially in the Cabinet Room. Besides that, the facility did not have automatic sprinkler protection by the fire and building codes. A large facility like the Beverly Hills Supper Club required a fire alarm and sprinkler systems. Therefore, the loss of life at the club can be attributed to inadequate egress capacity, combustible interior finishes, and overcrowding. Case Two - Gothenburg Discothèque Fire, Sweden The Gothenburg Discothèque Fire is considered to be the worst nightclub fire tragedy in Sweden’s history that led to the loss of 60 youths. On 29th October 1998, a fire broke out at a nightclub in Gothenburg’s immigrant cultural centre (Castle, 1998). When the fire started, the two-storey building had approximately 398 people. With the view to the width and position of the emergency exits, the fire inspector had allowed only 150 persons into the building. According to Broberg et al. (2005, p.1280), the nightclub was positioned on the second floor, and behind the emergency exit, it is where the fire started before penetrating the room. The ignition of the smoke fumes made the fire spread swiftly throughout the room. The entrance was very narrow and it made it hard for the people in the room to escape. As a result, close to 100 teenagers were trapped inside the room without the means of escaping except the windows. The happenings both outside and inside the building were exceedingly horrible. The fire led to the death of 63 people mostly between 12 and 19 years and severely injured 213 others. The two-storey building was constructed in the 1930’s and during its lifetime it had different types of occupancy. The second floor of the building was converted into a dancehall in the 1990s. The two exits in the building had signs that were illuminated while the northeast side had eight passable windows which were 10 feet above the floor. The other side had five impassable windows that were secured with bars. Just like the Beverly Hills Supper Club, the building had no fire/smoke detection devices or an alarm system while exhaust fan was the main tool utilised to control the room’s ventilation. The building was constructed mainly of masonry and concrete blocks while the ceiling was made by the suspended acoustic tiles. Furthermore, the plaster utilised for the interior finish was non-combustible, but the wood panelling was combustible. In the main hall, there were some combustible materials such as tables and chairs. On that fateful day, the combustible materials (chairs and tables) had been moved to rear staircase so as to create more space at the main hall for the party. The rear staircase housed the main fire load while the one at the dancehall was comparatively small. Although the number of people that were supposed to attend according to the fire inspector was 150, the number of attendees that day was 398. The party is believed to have taken place illegally because no permit had been obtained. Furthermore, the rear exit had enough fuel, which was used by the arsonists to start the fire. Furthermore, the building has no alarm and detection system, a system for controlling heat and smoke as well as and fire extinguishers. Besides that, overcrowding made it hard for the participants to evacuate safely through the main entrance; instead, they used windows to evacuate. Case Three - Lame Horse Club, Russia On 5th December 2009, while celebrating the 8th anniversary of Lame Horse Club a fire broke out as a result of pyrotechnic display that ignited the ceiling after being lit on stage. As a result, 156 people lost their lives and other 100 got injured. The highly flammable interior decoration was ignited by the fireworks, which made the fire spread rapidly. The mistake of utilising fireworks in a building environment with flammable ceiling and linings resulted in the fire disaster. The Lame Horse Club as mentioned by Strick (2014, p.18) was located in a one storey building with a total floor space of 5380 square feet. Just like the Gothenburg Discothèque, there were only two exits ate the nightclub, a rear exit and the main entrance. At Lame Horse Club, the entrance had two double swing doors each placed behind the other. During the anniversary celebration, only one leaf of the two double swing doors had been opened while the rear exit did not have an illuminated emergency exit sign. At the venue, evidence gathered showed that there were a lot of combustible materials such as chairs and tables. A fire alarm was not set up at the club as evidenced by an armature video shot during the tragedy as cited by Strick (2014, p.18). Furthermore, the building did not have smoke control and automatic suppression systems. Evidently, the interior finishing of the nightclub was very combustible because it was decorated mainly by twigs and wood. The nightclub had a capacity of 450 people. In total 282 people were invited to the party. Furthermore, the pyrotechnical devices that were utilised during the party had been certified for outdoor use, and not indoor use. One year prior to the tragedy, the nightclub had been fined twice for failing fire safety inspections. Individuals staying near the building faulted the fire brigade for taking bribes and approving the venue’s safety standards for many years. Clearly, Lame Horse Club nightclub had not met the safety standards; for that reason, it was operating illegally. The nightclub failed to adhere to the Russian safety standards by using pyrotechnic display indoor, rather than outdoor. Therefore, the materials choice resulted in the ignition of the ceiling as well as the rapid spread of smoke and fire. The existing evidence shows no signs of alarm and detection system, fire extinguishers, or sprinklers. It was hard for the attendees to known about the rear emergency exit because it had no illuminated sign like the one that was at the entrance. Lessons Learned From all the three analysed cases, it is evident that nightclubs did not have sufficient automatic and protective systems. In all the three nightclubs, there was no report of alarm or detection system, smoke systems or automatic sprinklers. The first lesson learned is that lack of proper fire controlling system can result in loss of lives in the built environment. The fires in these nightclubs could have been managed effectively if fire controlling system were properly installed and updated according to the fire standards of their respective countries. The second lesson learned is that the rear emergency exit should have an illuminated sign and should be clear to facilitate effective evacuation. The rear emergency exit at Gothenburg Discothèque was blocked with chairs and tables while that of Lame Horse Club nightclub had no illuminated sign; therefore, there is no way that the disastrous outcome could have been lower. The third lesson learned is that operating nightclubs illegally as evidenced in Gothenburg Discothèque (lack of a permit) and Lame Horse Club nightclub (using pyrotechnics indoor rather than outdoor) can be disastrous. All nightclubs should have automatic and manual protection systems, but they were non-existent in all the three nightclubs and this was worsened by the insufficiency of the means of egress. The fourth lesson learned is that training the nightclub staff can greatly help improve evacuations and reduce fatalities. However, the level of the tragedy at Lame Horse Club, Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire, and Gothenburg Discothèque proves that the nightclub employees were ill-prepared. There is no evidence of fire drills and employee training as required by the U.S. National Fire Protection Association, Swedish Fire Protection Association and Russian State Fire Service. The last lesson learned is that performance-based design should not just focus on the building’s occupants’ safety, but instead, it should take into account the applications of safety in their entirety, which includes safety of rescue personnel. As opined by Wang et al. (2011, p.590), the built environment fire strategy should include parameters such as visibility and fire so as to facilitate rescue operation. Recommendations Large-fire losses at nigh-clubs can be reduced by installing sprinkler system, which is activated after a fire breaks out in the built environment. Furthermore, the nightclubs management should carry out regular testing and maintenance of sprinkler systems. For the nightclubs without fire alarm or sprinkler system they can prevent fires by ensuring they have sufficient fire extinguishers, which are inspected every twelve months and also make sure their employees have been trained properly on how to utilise the fire extinguishers. More importantly, all nightclubs should have evacuation plans that are properly understood by the staff and customers, and this can be achieved through practice drills. Furthermore, all the flammable liquids should be stored in flammable storage cabinet and regular inspections should be carried out in the facilities to make sure that the exits are marked appropriately and are not blocked. Nightclubs owners and managers should understand that fire prevention has no shortcuts; therefore, they should ensure that their plans for the fire prevention plan are always updated according to the fire standards of their respective countries. The governments should aggressive enforce safety standards for nightclubs and also make sure that all clubs have a safety culture. All nightclubs should also have safety signals and fire hazard warning systems. Conclusion In conclusion, this report has analysed the nightclubs fires at Lame Horse Club (Russia), Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire (the United States), and Gothenburg Discothèque (Sweden). The losses in the abovementioned fires were mainly attributed to overcrowding, illegal operations, utilisation of pyrotechnics, and lack of fire controlling systems. The interior finishing of the nightclubs, specifically Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire and Lame Horse Club were done by combustible materials. Overcrowding is the main factor that made evacuation process very challenging, and all the three nightclubs had not installed an automatic sprinkler system. The existing safety standards require all nightclubs to install an automatic sprinkler system and other fire controlling system. The existing portable fire extinguishers as mentioned in the essay should be maintained regularly while flammable liquids should be stored safely and not at the rear exit as evidenced in the Gothenburg Discothèque. Evidently, practical fire drills and employee training is very important because they can help reduce losses associated with fire and could help the customers understand the existing safety standards at the nightclub. However, all these were non-existent at the three clubs while the means of egress capacity were defectively insufficient. References Beverly, J.L., P. Bothwell, J.C.R.C. & Herd, E.P.K., 2010. Assessing the exposure of the built environment to potential ignition sources generated from vegetative fuel. International Journal ofWildland Fire, vol. 19, pp.299–313. Broberg, A.G., Dyregrov, A. & Lilled, L., 2005. The Go¨ teborg discotheque fire: posttraumatic stress, and school adjustment as reported by the primary victims 18 months later. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, vol. 46, no. 12, pp.1279–86. Castle, S., 1998. Fire in Swedish disco kills 60 Arson fear after 60 die in disco fire. [Online] Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/fire-in-swedish-disco-kills-60-arson-fear-after-60-die-in-disco-fire-1181746.html [Accessed 17 August 2016]. Duval, R.F., 2006. NFPA Case Study: Nightclub Fires Prepared by. Quincy, MA: NFPA Fire Investigations Department. Strick, J., 2014. Development of Safety Measures for Nightclubs. Master Thesis. Lund, Sweden: Department of Fire Safety Engineering Lund University. Wang, Y.C., Marsden, J. & Kelly, M., 2011. Challenges of Fire Fighting in Fire Engineered Built Environment. Physics Engineering, vol, 11, pp.583–92. Read More