The Bhopal Gas Disaster - Assignment Example

The Bhopal Gas Disaster How is it an engineering disaster? Who was at fault? What caused the accident? Union Carbide (UC), a multinational corporation, formed an Indian subsidiary in 1969, which is the Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL), to produce insecticides at Bhopal. UCIL produced competitive advantages due to its lower operating costs, access to a stable and fast expanding market, and low labor expenditures. Furthermore, the Indian subsidiary successfully capitalized on the laidback safety and environmental regulations of the country as India struggled to draw major multinationals for its emerging industrialization agenda. UCIL obtained methyl isocyanate (MIC) until 1979, a major ingredient in the manufacturing of pesticides, from UC, its parent company. UCIL was publicized as being designed and constructed based on two decades of experience with the MIC facility of UC in West Virginia, USA. No incident demonstrates the importance of green engineering ideologies in all designs better than the Bhopal disaster. Among the biggest chemical accidents in history took place in Bhopal, in 1984 when a poisonous fog spread throughout the city from the Union Carbide pesticide facility. This accident resulted in the permanent disability of 120,000 people and the demise of 20,000 individuals. People usually mention a failure or disaster that originates from not using the scientific principles properly, such as an inaccurate interpretation of a physical theory, a mathematical miscalculation, and so on. Another form of failure stems from misinterpretations of human aspects. The Bhopal tragedy had both of these. Maintenance protocols and safety standards at the facility had been worsening and disregarded for months. A record of the flaws of the MIC (methyl isocyanate) units reveals the following. First, gauges specifying pressure and temperature in the different components of the unit, as well as the important MIC storage tanks, were quite particularly undependable that employees paid no attention to early indications of defects or problems. Second, the refrigeration system for sustaining low temperatures at MIC, and thus less prone to go through expansion and excessive heating in case an impurity goes into the tank, had been closed down for a certain duration of time. Third, the gas scrubber, intended to defuse accidentally discharging MIC, had been closed down for maintenance. Supposing it had been operational, post-disaster investigations showed, the highest pressure it could tolerate was merely one-quarter that which was really recorded during the mishap. Fourth, the flare tower, intended to incinerate MIC accidentally discharged from the scrubber, was also closed down, with its rusted part of a pipe scheduled for a replacement. Yet, the tower was insufficiently developed for its function, as it was able to contain merely a quarter of the amount of gas discharged. Fifth, the water curtain, intended to deactivate all residual gas, was quite short to stretch out into the topmost part of the flare tower, wherein the puffing of the MIC takes place. Sixth, the absence of competent warning tools or procedure; the alert system on the storage tank was not able to warn about the rise in temperature on the time of the disaster. Seventh, one storage tank was overflowing; and, lastly, a storage tank which was intended to be kept aside for extra MIC already held the MIC. The creation of a lethal mist of MIC took place due to a cut-rate engineering response to an identified maintenance issue. A ‘jumper line’ linked a pressure vent header to a relief valve header allowing water from a scheduled washing process to flow to MIC storage tank 610. The entrance of water to this MIC storage tank generated an uncontainable escaped exothermic reaction. The outcomes of the reaction moved across “the process vent header to the jumper line, to the relief valve vent header, onto the vent gas scrubber and finally to the atmosphere through the atmospheric vent line”. The poisonous fumes were released for roughly two hours. The discharge of poisonous fumes was backed by several errors and deficiencies in standard operating procedures which could have quickly been prevented in numerous ways. MIC storage tank 610 was overflowing. Functional contents devices must have signaled this and the event stopped until corrected. In addition, a storage tank which was designed to contain additional MIC already held MIC. The reserve storage tank was supposed to be unfilled and any process of production must have been stopped until this condition had been determined. This should have been an official condition ‘hold point’ in the regulatory process before production was permitted to carry on. The MIC 610 tank’s blow-down regulator was identified to be broken; inevitably it was always open. This regulator should have been fixed or the tank should have been taken away until fixed. Moreover, the warning system used for alerting the nearby housing neighborhoods were deactivated after five minutes compliant with modified company safety regulations. This evidently emphasizes the reason the site needed emergency systems to be established and repeatedly evaluated. The plant manager did not inform outside agencies of the mishap and at first refuted the mishap had taken place. This was definite carelessness on the part of the management but characterized the substandard safety and health practices within the facility. The public officials were clueless of what responses to make in view of the fact that there are no emergency systems established and were unaware of the toxic materials kept within the facility. The conditions for effective communications and stable emergency systems with local organizations and emergency services emphasized these deficits. Figure 1. Diagram for the Tank Safety Features (http://www.academia.edu/4242776/Bhopal_disaster_cases_study, p. 14) Devices measuring pressure and temperature in the different sectors of the plant, as well as critical MIC storage tanks were quite disreputably undependable that workers took for granted early indications. The company must have had a strong maintenance personnel or procedure which must have averted this, alongside safety practices which must have investigated any hazardous circumstances. The refrigeration device for sustaining the low temperatures of MIC, and thus preventing it from expanding and overheating in case impurities goes into the tank, had been deactivated for a period of time. This problem could have simply been mitigated by the management having a dedication to procedure and safety guarantees as against profit creation. Which particular aspects of the disaster are the results of a poor engineering choice or practice? The aforementioned shortfalls are primarily because of engineering cutbacks and because UCIL chose to water down its safety protection systems so as to exploit profits, whereas local agency evaluation or checking of designs by local engineers or safety specialists were was absent. The exact observations of Ashraf Labib and Ramesh Champaneri, two maintenance and asset management experts, of the engineering failure involved in the Bhopal disaster are as follows: (1) The gas scrubber, designed to neutralize any escaping MIC, had been shut off for maintenance. Even had it been operative, post-disaster inquiries revealed that the maximum pressure it could handle was only one quarter of that which was actually reached in the accident; (2) The flare tower, designed to burn off MIC escaping from the scrubber, was also turned off, waiting for the replacement of a corroded piece of pipe. The tower, however, was inadequately designed for its task, as it was capable of handling only a quarter of the volume of the gas released; (3) The water curtain, designed to neutralize any remaining gas, was too short to reach the top of the flare tower where the MIC billowed out; and (4) There was a lack of effective warning systems; the alarm on the storage tank failed to signal the increase in temperature on the night of the disaster. Numerous mishaps occurred all through the plant’s operation prior to the disaster. Every one of them exposed or revealed poor safety protection practices, inadequate training, low level maintenance, and incompetent management. UCC keeps on employing the most hazardous or riskiest procedures whereas safer procedure was obtainable. A number of aspects contributed to bring about a massive catastrophe, like: accumulating the MIC in huge tanks greater than the publicized level; incompetent maintenance process after the plant discontinues the generation of MIC in 1984; safety engineering protocols were temporarily closed down to cut down costs (this involves the MIC storage tank refrigeration system which has the ability to deter such disaster); the worsening problem with informal settlers surrounding the facility heighten the impact of gas discharge. Moreover, the weather conditions at the moment of the disaster contributed to the severity of its impact. There was no rain to dilute or water down the gas, no strong wind to scatter the fumes. Lastly, there was no medical treatment available or emergency preparations for evacuation for any disastrous gas discharge. How is it relevant to the study and practice of engineering? The Bhopal disaster is relevant to the study and practice of engineering because it was primarily caused by the absence or failure of safety regulations. From this disaster, engineers can recognize that if the plan had appropriate safety regulation systems the outcomes of the catastrophe would have been substantially diminished. Hence, this disaster shows that chemical engineers have the duty to society to develop and implement adequate safety regulations to chemical practices so as to stop catastrophes like the Bhopal Gas disaster from taking place. Sadly, industrial carelessness and inattention remains a dilemma in numerous third-world nations. The main causes of engineering failures found in the Bhopal disaster are the following: (1) hazardous environments or conditions; (2) materials failures; (3) design errors (numerous of which are also the outcome of unethical actions); (4) human factors; and (5) combinations of these factors. In the Bhopal tragedy, political demands and financial cutbacks by Union Carbide and UCIL led to modifying worker shift replacement rules, downsizing the workforce, postponing maintenance, removing refrigeration, and so on, all of which resulted in the most disastrous industrial catastrophe in history. This incident reveals that deterioration in the safety control system took place over time and with no any specific solution to carry out but merely as a chain of solutions that pushed the plant gradually toward a condition where any minor miscalculation or mistake would result in a catastrophic mishap. Due to the general condition of the Bhopal UC plant and its processes, if the slip disk had not been excluded from the pipe washing procedure in December 1984, another factor would have caused a mishap. In reality, the same leakage had taken place the year prior, but did not bring about the same disastrous outcomes. The field of engineering will benefit from the realization that, as revealed by the Bhopal disaster, to identify a single occurrence, like a maintenance staff omitting the slip disk, or even a number of occurrences as the main source or the beginning of a series of event resulting in this tragedy would be erroneous at best. As explained by Rasmussen: The stage for an accidental course of events very likely is prepared through time by the normal efforts of many actors in their respective daily work context, responding to the standing request to be more productive and less costly. Ultimately, a quite normal variation in somebody’s behavior can then release an accident. Had this ‘root cause’ been avoided by some additional safety measure, the accident would very likely be released by another cause at another point in time. In other words, an explanation of the accident in terms of events, acts, and errors is not very useful for design of improved systems. Therefore, the primary relevance of the Bhopal disaster to the study and practice of engineering is that it revealed that learning can be dealt with in three points of view which are as follows: (1) the adoption of interdisciplinary perspectives and broad, universal knowledge; (2) the use of sophisticated tools or systems in groundbreaking applications; and (3) response from maintenance to design. What future precautions are recommended? Were any new laws, practices, or regulations implemented as a result of the disaster? What was the overall impact on engineering practice? Read More