Joint Maritime Operations - Coursework Example

241994 Joint Maritime Operations What is your understanding of the concept of Center of Gravity (COG)? What should the relationship be between one’s chosen objectives, at all levels of war, and the enemy COG? Using examples from either the Leyte Gulf operation or the Falkland conflict, analyze the enemy’s COG to include: a. A consideration of the Critical Factors (both strengths and weaknesses). b. Examples of Critical Capabilities associated with the COG. c. The associated Critical Requirements and Critical Vulnerabilities (if applicable) for one of the Critical Capabilities examples. The following examines my understanding of the concept of COG by considering the critical factors involved in joint maritime operations. This examination of COG will be based around an analysis of the Falklands War fought from April through to June 1982.1 The analysis of the concept of COG in relation to the Falklands War will evaluate the British use of joint maritime operations to regain the Falkland Islands and the smaller island of South Georgia during that conflict. The dispute between Great Britain and Argentina over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia had been running for decades before the Argentine invasion of April 1982.2 The Argentines did not believe that the British would attempt to retake the Falkland Islands as well as of South Georgia, especially considering the distances that they would have to travel to get there. The ruling military Junta of Argentina knew that they had the advantage of only having to send reinforcements a relatively short distance of a few hundred miles. The Argentine military Junta was highly confident of their well-equipped air force, and their navy yet not so sure of the fighting worth of their conscripted soldiers.3 Although the Argentine navy was smaller than the Royal Navy its military Junta believed that it was more than capable of repelling any British efforts to retake the Falkland Islands, especially as it included an aircraft carrier as well as the American built cruiser the General Belgrano. They in affect believed that they would keep the Falkland Islands for good. The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher surprised the Argentine military Junta by ordering the retaking of the Falkland Islands and of South Georgia, staking her political future upon the outcome of the conflict. They would lose, and she undoubtedly won due to the professionalism of the British armed forces.4 The British had definite strengths despite the distance that they had to travel to retake the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. Instead of raw conscripts the British had elite fighting units such as the Parachute Regiment, the Royal Marines, Commandos, and Guards Regiments available to participate in the conflict. There were also specialist-fighting units like the S AS and the SBS to make the joint maritime operations even more effective by weakening the Argentine positions during the subsequent Falklands War. Although the British land and marines forces only numbered around 6,000 men these happened to be some of the most effective fighting units within Britain’s armed forces.5 The task of landing the British forces in the Falkland Islands and of South Georgia fell to the Royal Navy, which would complete this daunting task despite a notable lack of naval resources, and some inadequate equipment. Before the Falklands War began the Royal Navy commanders thought that a lack of airborne early warning systems could hamper their joint maritime operations, a point proved by subsequent events. That capability had ended when the aircraft carrier Ark Royal was decommissioned in 1979.6 Fortunately the Royal Navy did have two aircraft carriers without, which undoubtedly the Falkland Islands and of South Georgia would have probably remained under Argentine control. Perhaps the turning point of the Falklands War was the sinking of the General Belgrano by the nuclear attack submarine HMS Conqueror. For it meant that the Argentine navy took no further part in the conflict, and meant the Argentine air force had the sole task of preventing the British from landing in the Falkland Islands, a task it needed achieved. The Argentine air force had the strengths of being well trained as well as being well equipped.7 There are some examples of Critical Capabilities associated with the COG that were demonstrated during the Falklands War of 1982. The Falklands War once again demonstrated the benefit of effective military planning for joint maritime operations. To begin with the Argentines showed effective military planning as they combined their armed forces to overtake the Falkland Islands and of South Georgia. Indeed the Argentine military Junta actually achieved complete surprise when it invaded the Falkland Islands and of South Georgia, even its poorly trained army conscripts were able to overpower the tiny British garrison at Port Stanley. The Argentine air force and navy were supposed to supply and send reinforcements to the army garrisons on the Falkland Islands and of South Georgia. The Argentine air force was certainly capable of fulfilling its tasks, the navy should have been, and the army would prove incapable of winning the Falklands War.8 Despite Britain’s declining military and naval power its armed forces still had the ability to display cc associated with the COG. Britain’s naval power had declined markedly between the end of the Second World War and 1982. Indeed the planned reduction in the Royal Navy’s strength in the 1981 white paper had convinced the Argentine government to invade the Falkland Islands and of South Georgia in the first place.9 British armed forces still regularly practised joint maritime operations as part of Nato exercises. The Royal Navy had two aircraft carriers that could provide air cover for landing craft, and amphibious assault ships, with its Sea Harriers fighter-bombers being tasked with intercepting Argentine air attacks and bombing Argentine targets.10 Heavier bombing raids against Argentine targets in the Falklands Island were made by the ageing Vulcan bomber force, which could reach the Falkland Islands and of South Georgia from Britain with in-flight refuelling.11 The Royal Navy had high expectations of the Sea Harriers, and the Task Force included RAF Harriers as reinforcements for its numbers. Lynx and Sea King helicopters were also to be used to land the army and the marines on the Falkland Islands and South Georgia.12 The Critical Capabilities associated with the COG was shown by the way the British planned to land their army and marine units on the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. The SAS and SBS were landed first with the objective of reporting on the strengths and location of Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. These units also provided target co-ordinations for RAF and Royal Navy bombers as well as Royal Navy gunners.13 British air strikes and naval bombardments were used to weaken Argentine defensive positions and lessen the opposition to the British forces once they decided to land on the Falkland Islands and South Georgia.14 Not only did the Royal Navy get the Task Force to the Falkland Islands it also ensured that the army and the marine units were able to land in sufficient quantities to defeat the Argentine defenders.15 The associated Critical Requirements and Critical Vulnerabilities of the Critical Capabilities of the Royal Navy to get the Task Force to the Falkland Islands are examined here. The Royal Navy commanders were well aware of the Critical Requirements needed to get the Task Force to its destination, including its own warships, fleet auxiliary ships, and also merchant vessels. The aircraft carriers Hermes and the new Invincible were the most powerful ships in the Task Force with their escorting frigates and destroyers. The Sea Harriers performed defensive and offensive duties, whilst Lynx and Sea King helicopters transported troops and supplies. Royal Navy frigates and destroyers also bombarded Argentine positions with their guns. These vessels also had to protect the Task Force from the Argentine air force and navy, a task made harder by the Exocet missiles used by the Argentines. Fleet auxiliary ships were required as supply vessels as well as landing craft, and troop ships. Without requisitioning merchant ships such as the QE2, the Canberra, and the Atlantic Conveyor it would have been impossible to get the Task Force to the Falkland Islands and South Georgia.16 The Royal Navy was indeed vulnerable to the attacks of the Argentine air force; the majority of British lose resulted from Exocet missile and bomb attacks on ships. Amongst the ships lost were the destroyer’s Coventry and Sheffield as well as the Atlantic Conveyer. The lack of airborne early warning systems left the Royal Navy ships and landing craft highly prone to air strikes from A4 Sky Hawks, and unable to detect Exocet missiles until the last possible moment.17 References: • Gatchel, Theodore L. “Operational Art and Joint Task Force Operations during the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict.” Naval War College, 25 Oct 2001 • Thompson, Julian. The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflicts, Chap. 8 “Amphibious Logistics-Falklands 1982.” • Summers, Jr., Harry G. “Strategic Lessons Learned: The Falkland Islands Campaign.”, The Art of War Quarterly, Vol. II, 1983 pp 91-112 • Command of the Defence Council. "The Falklands War 1982 from the Viewpoint of Doctrine." The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine: BR 1806, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, pp 289-195 Read More