Elephants, Economics and Ivory - Essay Example

Elephants, Economics and Ivory EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The WWF conservation aims towards the protection of Elephants goes hand in hand with the CITES regulation and international ban on the ivory trade. However, whilst preservation of the species is of paramount concern to the WWF objectives, the ivory trade ban has fuelled debate with certain states where the WWF has concerns. On the one hand, certain states argue that habitat is vital to elephant survival and that profits from an ivory trade goes hand in hand with funding for conservation projects. Conversely, the income from elephant tourism in certain states and the potential risks posed by depletion of the species supports the continuation of the ivory trade. The ivory debate is further compounded by the lack of sufficient data on trade flows and the ramifications of an illegal ivory market due to inefficient enforcement measures in respect of the trade ban. This report sets out a detailed analysis of recommendations through the use of management and people organisation concepts to consider how best to manage the ivory debate going forward. 1) In the external environment of the not for profit industry, identify and critically analyse the dimensions of complexity which impact upon the management of people and organisations using appropriate MPO concepts. What are the implications of these key factors for organisations in the sector? In considering the complex interrelationships of factors impacting the not for profit industry it is important to firstly consider the inherent conflict of conserving natural resources within a trade orientated international environment. It is submitted that this in turn requires a PEST analysis to critically evaluate the key external actors and triggers in people management and not for profit organisations. It is further submitted that the PEST analysis helps best understand the key factors for organisations in the sector. The PEST analysis acronym means the political, economic, social and technological issues that could affect the strategic and operational development of a business, which in turn has a concomitant impact on people management. Moreover, identifying central PEST influences is an extremely useful exercise in summarising the external environment within which a business operates to provide recommendations as to how a business should respond to these influences (Worthington et al, 2005). I shall evaluate the applicability of the four factors as they apply to the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) with particular reference to the ivory trade. 1.1. Political Dimension In general terms, the political dimension will consider the environmental regulation and legal mechanisms in place for enforcement of the not for profit industry’s goals in the relevant sector. Heath et al comment that consideration of communication options that organisations can employ in their stewardship to address crucial public policy options and engage in collaborative decision making is vital (Heath et al, 2008: 412). As such, a relevant factor the voluntary sector will be changing needs, changing attitudes of the public, which in turn may impact funding (Courtney, 2002). Moreover, the public perception of the WWF is vital particularly as a global presence and in 1961 the purpose of the WWF when created in 1961 was to “conserve the natural environment and ecological processes worldwide”. In 1989, the WWF adopted a mission statement that organisation objective was aimed at “building a future in which humans live in harmony with nature”. Accordingly, it is vital that this perception remains consistent regarding the political climate and opinion on the illegal ivory trade. 1.2. Economic Firstly, under the economic aspect of the PEST analysis it is submitted that consideration should be given to the impact of trade on the operation of people management and not for profit organisations. To this end, it is submitted that trade is directly correlated to the protection of natural resources and conservation projects. From an economic perspective, great importance is attached to the role of relative pricing. In terms of the ivory trade, Barbier et al highlight that trade bans are difficult to enforce and profits provide little incentives to invest in “sustainable resource management” (Barbier et al, 2000). These economic issues will clearly impact WWF policy as regards the ivory trade. On the other side of the spectrum is the health of the economy and marketplace in general, which in turn impacts WWF operations management due to the reliance on external funding resources such as government aid and individual subscriptions (Courtney, 2002). Additionally, brand value is vital to fundraising and the WWF brand is trusted. With regard to the ivory trade, the WWF has been instrumental in this area and the WWF undertook a study of the ivory problem in 1988, which resulted in the ivory ban (www.wwf.org.uk). However, trust in branding must be consistent and in 2002, WWF research found that people associated the brand with inconsistent messages and slow procedures and complex agendas. 1.3. Socio Cultural The relevant socio-cultural factors will be the international brand value of WWF with the inherent tension with local branches and local agendas. This in turn creates issues of brand consistency in objectives. For example, Courtney highlights the point that “by 1986 WWF had come to realise that it name (the World Wildlife Fund) no longer reflected the scope of its activities. The WWF therefore decided to publicize the scope of its activities” (Courtney, 2002: 240) From the information provided it is evident that most of the members of the WWF international board and committees are drawn from the boards and Chief Executive Officers of the national organisations. However, as regards the ivory trade, there are clearly polarised positions with regard to the resuming of ivory trade and it appears that some international offices have mixed feelings about resuming the ivory trade. This clearly hinders consistency in terms of the WWF objectives regarding the ivory trade as the international network consists of 29 national organisations all separate legal entities all operating as a complex franchise network under the umbrella panda trademark from WWF international. Indeed, each national office has its own board with no WWF international representation. Moreover, 25 program offices are owned and managed by WWF international which plan and execute conservation projects in their relevant region. As such, the socio-cultural variances of international offices and approach to the ivory trade clearly create scope for conflict for consistent policy and international enforcement. This is further evidenced by concessions made at CITES conference (www.cites.org). 1.4. Technological The proliferation of the Internet and the digital era has transformed the ability to disseminate information and enables the WWF to access a wider audience, which is important from a funding perspective. The use of the internet enables charitable donations. However, the other side of this is that there is a lot of conflicting information available to the public, which in turn increases competition for funds and volunteers (Courtney, 2002). Alternatively, technology has proved vital in ascertaining empirical data pertaining to the illegal ivory trade in the WWF/Traffic initiatives. For example, the system that monitors elephant poaching such as MIKE (Monitoring, Illegal Killing of Elephants), which compiles data. Secondly, the Elephant Trade Information system, has aided the collection of data regarding the illegal ivory trade. 1.5. International Dimension The WWF has become a global brand with global clout as regards the projects and initiatives it implements in relation to the protection of wildlife. However, the potential for tension at international level has led to concessions having to be made with some criticising the lack of consistency of the WWF at CITES conventions. Additionally, a large part of WWF funding is secured from the US and Western Europe and WWF acknowledges that failure to support elephants is clearly problematic and impacts credibility of the WWF mission statement. However, on the other side of the spectrum Leal et al comment that internationally, the problem is complex as in Africa “the ivory ban stands in the way of progress. It impedes countries from bringing in substantial revenue for further elephant conservation. Kreuter and Simmons (1995: 159) estimate that the ivory trade could bring $100 million per year to Africa” (Leal et al, 2002:112). 1.6 Concluding Observations In addition to the PEST analysis it is also submitted that consideration of external environmental factors to the operation management of not for profit organisations should also consider the PLANET DEFOE mnemonic (Courtney, 2002: 173): 1) Public policy 2) Legislation 3) Attitudes 4) Need 5) Expectations of stakeholders 6) Technology 7) Demography 8) Economy 9) Funding 10) Other organisations 11) Environment (Courtney, 2002). Moreover it is important to consider the other organisations similar to WWF in this sector and how such organisations impact the WWF and Courtney highlights that “for voluntary non-profit organisations it is likely to be important to avoid overlapping services and for each organisation to have its own distinctive contribution to make” (Courtney, 2002: 176). 2. Critically analyse the internal environment of the WWF using appropriate MPO concepts. What are the key implications of your analysis for the management of the ivory trade debate? In considering organisational structure, it is vital to consider organisational theory along with the impact of various internal stakeholders and apply contextually to the WWF global network. The essence of organisational theory is that the success of the organisational framework and future growth directly correlates with the individuals working for it (Robbins et al, 1998). Moreover, The Handy Report “Improving the effectiveness of the voluntary sector” recommended the need for the development of management skills and Handy asserts that “to many in the voluntary non-profit sector, organisation means management, and management reeks of authoritarianism, of capitalism of business and bureaucracy” (Handy, 1988). Lyons further proposes that strategic management of not for profit organisations is inherently dependent on the internal values and relationships in not for profit organisations (Lyons, 1996). If we consider this in context of the organisational structure of the WWF, it was set up as a conservation agency and then primarily focused on the 200 eco regions and ivory trade falls under the umbrella of the six central programmes, namely “species”. Courtney further comments that “By 1986 WWF had come to realise that it name (the World Wildlife Fund) no longer reflected the scope of its activities. The WWF therefore decided to publicize the scope of its activities” (Courtney, 2002: 240). As regards internal structure, most of the members of the WWF international board and committees are drawn from the boards and Chief Executive Officers of the national organisations. WWF also has programme office throughout the world and representatives in many countries (Porter et al, 2000). WWF international is the secretariat for WWF’s global network. The governing body is the international board of trustees. It meets twice a year and holds powers such as the ability to amend the organisation’s statutes (Porter et al, 2000). However, not all members are represented on the Board at any one time as WWF operates a rotational representation (Beaver, 2002). Therefore, as Drucker highlights that in the not for profit sector, “it has to satisfy everyone; certainly it cannot afford to alienate anyone” (Drucker, 1990). This is rooted in the argument that whilst a private sector organisation’s overriding objective will be to address customer needs, a voluntary not for profit organisation has to satisfy numerous “funders, individual, corporate and statutory, as well as regulatory bodies, customers, trustees, volunteers, staff, the media, the local community etc” (Courtney, 2002). Indeed, WWF’s multi-tiered global structure has distinct parallels with a franchise paradigm structure and the political and corporate structure of its international contingencies clearly limits consistency in executive control. Accordingly, Anheier (2000) argues that the inherently disparate needs of internal and external stakeholders and income sources highlights the complexity of managing a voluntary not for profit organisation such as the WWF. As such it is imperative for the WWF to bring together the “organisation’s internal state” with its “external expectations” (Courtney, 2002). Therefore successful internal management is vital in WWF operations management and directly appurtenant to this is effective management culture. Indeed Grugulis and Wilkinson argue that “the notion of cultural change within organisations continues to excite attention. This continuing attraction is readily understood, since cultural interventions offer practitioners the hope of a universal panacea to organisational ills and academics an explanatory framework that enjoys the virtues of being both partially true and gloriously simple (Grugulis & Wilkinson, 2001). From the perspective of organisational theory, it is posited that management, internal stakeholder motivation and employee relation is imperative to organisational success. Moreover, supporters of the organisational theory argue that the concept of “stress” is central to the individual’s performance within an organisation: “Stress is a person’s adaptive response to a stimulus that places excessive psychological or physical demands on that person” (Moorhead/Griffin, 1998, p.226). To this end the organisational theory focuses on the impact of stressors on the psyche, which is argued to undermine work efficiency and relationships at work. Firstly, from a psychological perspective, the organisational theory focuses on the impact of stress on the “internal organisation of the mind” and it is argued that causality is vital in order to manage the consequences of such stress (Moorhead & Griffin, 1998). Furthermore, it is submitted that the interrelationship between stressors, causation and consequence is key to organisational consequence, which impacts innovation and growth. As such, the organisational theory places the organisational framework at the centre of individual efficiency within the workplace. The learning organisation theory develops this further and is an evolving notion which has become increasingly incorporated into the modern company and multinational philosophy. In its simplest form, Richard Karash propounds the ideology underlying the learning organisation: “A learning organisation is one which people at all levels, individuals and collectively are continually increasing their capacity to produce results they really care about” (Karash, R. 1995). The ideological underlying principle behind the learning organisation is that it produces a flexible workforce with a shared vision, which in turn ensures internal stability within an organisation. Mike Wills defines the learning organisation as a “group of people who work together” (Wills, M. 1998). He further defines it as a “company, corporation, firm, enterprise or institution, or part thereof, whether incorporated or not, public or private, that has its own functions and administration. For organisations with more than one operating unit, a single operating unity may be defined as an organisation” (1998). Pedler, Burgoyne and Boydell define the learning organisation as “an organisation that facilitates the learning of all its members and continuously transforms itself to achieve superior competitive performance” (1991). Indeed, Beaver argues that “the re-positioning of the World Wildlife Fund as a fund raising business, rather than a conservation organisation, is a good example of such strategic opportunity” (Beaver 2000: 95). Within the contemporary not for profit framework, personnel management theory highlights the importance of efficient employee relations and collective employee morale in achieving specific goals (Argyris, C 1999). As such, Pedler argues that the learning organisation theory is central to this (Pedler, M & Aspinwall, K., 1998). Garvin further asserts that organisational learning involves three stages. Firstly is the notion of “cognition”, which is the learning of new concepts, development of skills, which relates to employee performance (Garvin, D. 2000). This is further demonstrated in Figure 1 below, which illustrates Garvin’s model of the learning organisation: Figure 1 GARVIN’S MODEL OF THE LEARNING ORGANISATION (David A. Garvin 2000), “Learning in Action” Harvard Business Press). With regard to the skills stage of Garvin’s learning organisation model, it is imperative for individuals at all levels within the organisation’s hierarchy to have problem solving capabilities, thereby highlighting the interdependency of internal stakeholder performance and optimum organisational performance (Garvin, D.A. 2000). Furthermore, Parker comments that “because of the large global nature of the World Wildlife Fund, as well as the large amount of money flowing through it, the organisation has had to find ways to manage corruption risk” (Parker, 2002). Therefore, the WWF should form strategic alliances to address corruption issues by implementing a check system with the states and governments that WWF align themselves with (Parker, 2002). Question 3: Critically analyse micro level issues with respect to the ivory trade. What are the key implications of your analysis for the management of the ivory trade debate? In considering the micro level issues with respect to the ivory trade, it is evident that the CITES fuelled main policy objective of the WWF has been to implement a trade ban and phasing out of the ivory trade. However, both the Barbier et al highlight he problem of enforcement of the 1989 CITES ban on the ivory trade. Barbier et al further comment that “although before the ban Africa’s population of elephants had declined by half, numbers had actually increased in mainly southern African countries” on the basis that that they had used the profits to invest in sustainable elephant conservation schemes (Barbier et al, 2000 p. 187). Additionally, the imposition of the ivory ban appears to have provided the wrong incentives by driving the problem underground difficult to enforce. For example, “southern African countries who found themselves with drastically reduced funds to invest in their elephant conservation programmes have continually threatened to defy the ban, whereas other African countries that had previously under-invested in their elephants found themselves unjustifiably rewarded” (Barbier et al, 2000 p.187). Accordingly, whilst a trade ban stance from the WWF undoubtedly provides credibility needed for funding initiatives, the micro level issues may suggest that a lateral approach is required to address the problem. Indeed, Cites recently agreed to a package of measures to enable Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe to resume controlled trade in ivory (Barbier et al, 2000). As such, it is submitted that consideration needs to be given to the trade measures in evaluating micro level issues pertaining to the ivory trade. In terms of trade bans, this is a central policy tool of CITES and the preferred option of the WWF position statement on ivory. A central issue however is the inherent problem of enforcement notwithstanding the trade ban. Indeed, the demand in both the tourist and international market and lack of cross border controls continues to undermine the international enforcement regime. Moreover, with regard to the ivory trade, Barbier et al argue that trade bans combined with the impact of illegal demand can undo the intentions of the trade ban as stricter enforcement mechanisms can create price hikes through supply restrictions, which in turn increases the likelihood of black market poaching (Barbier et al, 2000). Indeed, Barbier et al argue that the result of this can increase poaching (Barbier et al, 2005). Additionally, from a micro level perspective, it is further submitted that enforcement measures should not be considered in a vacuum and that consideration of the trade perspectives should be evaluated to consider whether the current trade ban is in fact fuelling an underground ivory trade market, which in turn negates the WWF mission to protect Elephants as a species. Van Kooten et al further comment that South African states have relatively large elephant stocks and lobbied to down-list the species and re-open limited trade and “their main argument against the endangered species listing is that in a number of areas there are too many elephants and not too few and that numbers need to be controlled to keep elephants from damaging agricultural lands and wildlife habitat. In addition, trade would create revenues that could potentially be invested in the conservation of elephants” (Van Kooten et al, 2000, p.326). As such, it is arguable that a trade ban may not actually be in the best interests of conservation. Indeed Van Kooten et al argue that the “whether a trade ban is effective in achieving its goal of species preservation depends crucially on the discount rate which is an object of a country’s macro-economic policies, as much as it is on the intervention by the international community to protect wildlife species” (Van Cooten et al, 2000). To this end, clearly a balance needs to be achieved as in contrast to the arguments against trade bans for Southern African countries, in some African countries empirical data suggests that trade bans actually result in dividends. For example, Roth et al point to the fact that Kenya’s national parks are estimated to be worth approximately $25million from a tourism perspective. Moreover, “Almost 50% of questioned tourists considered Kenya to be no longer worth visiting if elephants reduce in numbers. It was shown that elephants earn about 10 times more foreign exchange through tourism than through the value of their ivory” (Roth et al, 1997 at p.403). Therefore alternative measures of elephant species protection and cost-effectiveness should be considered as a part of policy objectives. Additionally, consideration needs to be given to the international variances in considering localised policies, which best meet conservation objectives. To this end, particular attention should be given to the ivory trade flows. For example, Barbier et al argue that there “are no consistent statistics on worked ivory exports from Africa (Barbier et al, 2000). Accordingly, it is submitted that increased trade levels in ivory will not necessarily result in reduction of elephant populations. Moreover, elephants are dependant on their habitat and therefore low returns clearly impact potential conservation initiatives, which can in turn create a negative effect. Additionally, the impact of the ivory trade on elephant populations inherently varies from state to state and therefore “the policies currently in place are not adequately channelling the valuation of elephants into investment in elephants” (Barbier et al, 2000). Indeed, Barbier highlights the point that the “the ultimate capacity to implement many reforms resides solely within various domestic regimes” (Barbier et al, 2000). It is further submitted that one central reason for this is the lack of consistency in domestic management schemes in addressing the demand for ivory as a valuable factor in continued preservation of elephant populations, which is further compounded by state sovereignty (Barbier et al, 2000). Therefore, it is recommended the pre-existing management scheme be re-evaluated through internal reforms. Directly correlated to this is to ensure cohesion with the remedies on an international scale. To this end, it is recommended that consideration be given to the efficacy of the trade ban in terms of enforcement. Whilst primary consumer states have agreed to the ban, there is no effective framework for enforcement and there appears to be a lack of incentive on such states to adhere to the ban. Question 4: Given the analysis above (and again using appropriate MPO concepts), what recommendations would you make for the successful management of the ivory debate and why? In light of the above analysis and Dr Lieberman’s concerns it is evident that there are clearly polarised opinions on the ivory trade and certain WWF territories are not wholly supportive of a complete trade ban. Additionally, from an economic aspect, in certain territories an outright ban may actually prove detrimental to conservation objectives. However, the current management and organisational structure of the WWF clearly provides scope for disparity and inconsistency in the policy objectives of the WWF. This in turn risks undermining of the global brand value upon which funding is dependent. Accordingly, at the outset before considering various solutions to address the ivory trade debate, it is submitted that WWF should consider improvements to its organisational structures at the outset to try and create some consistency at international level. This would enable information to be available to internal stakeholders to increase internal accountability and furthermore, WWF should implement complaints procedures policies vis-à-vis external stakeholders to increase accountability. In addition to addressing the management structure and organisation culture, it is imperative to address concerns raised by Barbier et al in respect of the potentially detrimental impact of the ivory trade and utilise the ETIS system to undertake similar research in other territories to try and ascertain further information about the illegal ivory trade markets. This in turn will aid WWF in addressing policy moves towards enforcement at international level. Directly correlated to this, is the need to consider the data of such reports within the trade related measures paradigm. It is further submitted that only when this is undertaken can the management of the ivory debate be considered in a meaningful manner. For example, the result may lead to a reconsideration of the efficacy of the trade ban as an appropriate measure to protect elephants. Additionally, Swanson et al argued that the efficacy of a trade ban on deterring illegal poaching is reliant on the manner in which illegal traders react to competition in the illegal market (Swanson et al, 1992). They further highlight the problem of the fear in certain southern African countries in managing the elephant populations through sustainable means. Accordingly, it is submitted that in managing the ivory trade debate, the key issue is to comprehend the interrelationship between economic, ecological and institutional contexts of resource and policies, which can backfire (Barbier et al, 2000). To this end, Swanson et al reiterate Bell’s argument that “the whole approach of community wildlife development should be to reconcile conservation goals of species and natural system preservation with the individual aspirations of the people concerned by integration, negotiation and participation” (Swanson et al, 1992 at p.132). Therefore in summary, I would recommend that moves are made towards addressing the management culture and organisational structure to ensure consistency across the international global brand. Additionally, further research must be undertaken into the extent of the illegal ivory market and such research should contextually consider the efficacy of the trade ban and possible alternative measures to ensure protection of elephants as a species. For example, Duffy highlights that in the pre-ban period “Japan and Hong Kong accounted for 75 per cent of the world imports of ivory” (p.158) and that perhaps a form of regulated and legitimised sales are needed to prevent the ivory market going further underground. It is submitted that such an approach is firstly lateral in considering the efficacy of the current measures in place to address the ivory trade. It further considers the possibility that current trade bans may not be operating efficiently due to lack of enforcement and trade measures fuelling an illegal market, which could potentially served by other measures. This in turn would address the concerns of some localised organisational umbrellas representing WWF abroad, whilst preserving consistency in WWF’s objective of preserving and protecting wildlife. From an external perspective and to ensure that such an approach to the ivory debate addresses the concerns of the external stakeholders in terms of WWF credibility, it is recommended that WWF implement a complaints policy procedure and train employees on how to address public information requests and public policy complaints. This would promote transparency in the debate and go further to addressing concerns regarding the consistency of the WWF’s policies vis-à-vis the ivory trade. BIBLIOGRAPHY G. Adelson., J. Engell, B. Ranalli & K.P. Van Anglen (2008). Environment: An Interdisciplinary Anthology. Yale University Press. HK Anheir (2000). Managing nonprofit organisations: Towards a new approach, Civil Society Working Paper, Centre for Civil Society, London School of Economics. Argyris, C. (1999) On Organisational Learning. Blackwell Publishing. E. Barbier (1990). Elephants, Economics and Ivory. James Currey Publishers. E. Barbier & D. Pearce (2000). 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