Contracting Office Representative - Research Paper Example

?Contracting Office Representative Caroline Lynn Timothy Smith February 27, Table of content ………………………………………………………………………………………....3 Chapter 1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….4 Background……………………………………………………………………………………….4 Statement of problem……………………………………………………………………………...5 Research questions and subquestions……………………………………………………………..6 Chapter 2 Literature review…………………………………………………………………………………7 Chapter 3 The roles of a contracting officer representative (COR)/ (COTR)……………………………….8 Chapter 4 The mandate of the Federal agencies…………………………………………………………….9 Chapter 5 Qualification and other requirements for COR………………………………………………….10 Assessing COR…………………………………………………………………………………..10 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….11 Abstract Chapter 1 Introduction There exist several ways in which the contracting office representative in the federal government is effective in terms of roles and responsibilities. This involves having the mandate of monitoring contractual performance based on giving briefs about presentations at the end of every contract. Additionally, the officer serves as the technical liaison whenever there are contracting and procurement challenges. Furthermore, this officer also overlooks at the communication channel by addressing issues of technical contacts and regulations that govern contacts (Bastianelli et al, 2003). Therefore, before this research delves into the effectiveness of contract office, there is the need to explore the background. Background In most nations, the effective management of performance of contracts is paramount to ensure the integrity of contracts and related programs. Therefore, most government offices decided to create the contracting office under the leadership of a contracting officer representative. There was also the need to ensure that procurement and acquisition among employees was upgraded for the benefit of timeliness, completeness and quality. On that account, the government defined contracting as the primary technique that Federal Government agencies utilize in the buying of products or services from other agencies outside the government (Cibinic et al, 2006). Similarly, the government set the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) as the official regulatory body of managing contracts. As a result, the FAR came as a body that offers quality products and services to its clients while preserving the public’s trust and meeting their policy objectives. In addition, because of the creation of the office, the contracting office representative assumed responsibility for contracting for purchase, the acquisition of products and services from the entities of the public sector, federal agencies, and local and state government companies (Kelleher et al, 2010). Statement of the Problem The challenge of whether the contracting officer in the federal representative is effective is determined by several factors. For example, there is a need to consider the stipulated roles and responsibilities of the contracting officer. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the federal office in terms of making purchases of products and services should meet the standards of performance contracts. These performance contracts should be targeted at private sectors, local and state entities that measure their contracts through the parameters of the job description. Similarly, the federal agency should make clear definition of the contractual terms that affect employees working in the private and public sector (Keyes, 2005). This helps the contracting officer in making clear assessments of performance policies and their applicability in the buying of goods and services. Additionally, the effectiveness of the contracting officer is determined by technical liaison officer who ensures that financial experts acquire and process procurement contracts accrued from the sale of goods and services. On that prospect, the (FAR) office needs to widen its mandate of communication channel, technical liaison pertaining to contract security and performance and the role of financial engineers in assessing contracts. However, the challenges that could emerge involve the change of policies governing contracting office and how the contracting officer should overcome them (Cibinic et al, 2006). In addition, various beneficiaries that apply the services of contracting office representatives should be vetted by federal agencies. Research Questions and Sub questions Therefore, this study intends to ask the following questions: what are the fundamental roles and responsibilities of the contracting officer? On that perspective, the research considers the effectiveness of meeting the standards of procured contracts through purchase of goods and services. Similarly, the research needs to know: what is the mandate of the Federal agencies in terms of how they employ contract office representatives (Bastianelli et al, 2003)? Therefore, these two major questions will direct the research to come up with other sub questions. These include: what is the main responsibility of a contracting office representative in any office? Additionally, what are the qualification and other requirement principles that guide contract office representatives when handling contracts of clients? Alternatively, how do the qualifications affect the roles and responsibilities of the contract office in terms of their delivery? On the other hand, what are the penalties put in place by federal and private sectors to ensure contract office representatives meet their goals of assessing contracts (Keyes, 2005)? Furthermore, which laws guide the assessment and performance of contracting office representatives as they offer communication and technical support to clients? How does the federal agency respond to complaints from clients? Chapter 2 Literature review Kulakowski, Chronister and research enterprise define the work of a COR as that of managing contracts. This encompasses enforcing, from inception throughout the project, the specific contents of the accords. The concern of the government and the contractor are quality, time and cost; consequently, this too are the concern of the COR. They opine that most of the contract problems arise prior to the granting of the contract, specifically, during specifications. This lies in the jurisdiction of the COR (Kulakowski, Chronister and Research Enterprise, 2006) and (DTF, 2006). Compton identifies the role of a COR as being a representative of the government in the last phase of contracting, acquisition. Further he argues that the lapse in their responsibilities is due to poor training and unclear roles and responsibilities (Compton, 2009). Kelleher et al. identified problems with the authority conferred to the representative by the contracting officer. They identified several case studies of formal titled representatives of the contracting officer and the problems of changing contract terms. They conclude that a COR only bears the power entrusted to them through formal writing (Kelleher et al, 2010). However, though the government authorizes a contracting officer to delegate responsibilities to another officer as a representative, the authority excludes changes to the scope, price, terms or conditions of the contract (OFR, 2010). In 2009, the treasury inspector general for tax administration reviewed controls over COTR’s workforce. The report revealed that the performance of the officers was affected by their lack of training and delegation, placing the government at risk (TIGTA, 2009). In a report prepared by SRA international for the federal acquisition institute, the research revealed a need for reevaluation of the competencies required from COTRs (SRA, 2003). Tadelis & Levin evaluated the link between efficiency and costs of contract administration. They suggested a significant role of efficiency in government contracting costs. (Tadelis & Levin, 2010). Ya Ni and Bretschneider in their evaluation of government’s rationale in contracting, one of the factors they identified is the professional management of contracts. This is affected by, among others, the COTR performance of their duties (Ya Ni & Bretschneider, 2007). In another review, Prager evaluated several lessons to be learnt from the private sector in contracting. In his discourse, the management of contracts by the COs and their representatives bears significance in the cost effectiveness of government contracts (Prager, 2008). This role is further highlighted in an OMB report on contracting (OMB, 2003), and a report by Fernandez, Sergio, and Hal on government contracting (Fernandez, Sergio & Hal, 2005). However, some analysts deem the specifications of the contract as important as the administration of the contract. Poor specifications are equally to blame as incompetent COs and their representatives (Hefetz, Amir &Mildred 2004) and (Allen, 2002). In healthcare, where contracting continues to increase, a strong case has been made for the effect of proper contract management and oversight by COs and COTR in increasing efficiency and reducing costs of contracting (palmer, 2000) and (Hughes Tuohy,2003). Numerous studies have also expressed the need for proper training for COS and their representatives and the dissemination of delegated duties, in writing, to ensure fewer poor contracts (Macneil, 1978) and (Ruuska & Teigland, 2008). Chapter 3 The roles of a contracting officer representative (COR)/ (COTR) The COR is a non-contracting person with the key role of technical monitoring and administrative aspects of a statement of task or specification of contract; the COR ensures the deliverables meet the required specifications. There are other designated terms that refer to the same position. These include COTR, GTR and GTE. The authority of the COR comes exclusively from the CO assigning him/her to a contract. This authority is stated through specific provisions in the contract specifications or in a letter of designation (Boyd, 2007). Nevertheless, there is a limit on what authority can be delegated by the CO to the COR. This authority is first defined by the authority of the CO, which is provided FAR subparts 1.6 and 2.1 (Acquisition Central, 2012). The statute defines the CO as a person with the mandate to initiate, manage and terminate contracts. These terms encompass approved representatives of the CO. However, such delegation excludes capacities allowing the representatives to alter the terms of the contract. Furthermore, the approval must be in writing, and must indicate the extent the representative may act on behalf of the CO. The entry of the COR into the contract may be before the awarding or after the awarding of the contract. The services of a COR are required when technical guidance and inspection functions are required in the course of a contract. A COR may also be required for testing approval or perpetual monitoring of a contractor’s work. Consequently, one of the basic requirements of the COR is to familiarize with the contract. This is important since most of the COR’s tasks revolve around compliance to the contract specifications. Another task of the COR is to establish amiable communication with the contractor, because the effectiveness of their work depends on this relationship. Most importantly, the COR interprets technical requirements in order to asses performance and recommend changes. The COR is also required to review invoices for payments based on performance. In the pre-award period, the COR may be involved in the translation of technical aspects of a project into contract terms. Chapter 4 The mandate of the Federal agencies The mandate of federal organizations in hiring CORs is provided in the FAR statute. Subsection 414 (4) of Title 41, US code, necessitates departments to initiate procurement career programs. This includes initiating a mechanism for selecting, hiring and terminating procurement officers consistent with OFPP standards. It is on this base that the FAR statute recognizes the importance of CORs. FAR establishes the duties of the COR as emanating from the delegation by the CO (Acquisition Central, 2012). In subpart 2, the stature’s definition of a CO includes authorized personnel acting on behalf of the CO. The statute also provides for the qualification of the personnel qualified for this position. However, their duties are only those established by the CO in writing. Chapter 5 Qualification and other requirements for COR Before a person can qualify as a COR, there are the qualification requirements attached. The first is initial COR training offered at FAI. This includes programs such as FAI Market research and FAI contracting orientation. Another required training is the procurement ethics training course, also offered by FAI. Other requirements for such individuals include certification maintenance. This refers to continued attendance in skills currency training in one’s filed. This is meant to keep the person at par with developments in their field. An individual is required to maintain 40 CLPs on his/her FAC-COTR certificate every two years. The CO, however, is the one who assesses the need for COR is projects; consequently, the CO determines the qualification of CORs and their appropriateness to the project tasks. Assessing COR If a COTR is found serving in his duties with lapses in training requirements, the officer is discontinued from duty until he/she meets the qualification requirements. However, the law requires the duties of the COTR to be documented before assignment to a task. When COTRs deviate from their duties, agencies and contractors may initiate legal proceedings against the individuals. A delegation letter is one efficient tool to gauge the performance of CORT. This letter states the terms of the delegation and the extent of responsibilities conferred upon the individual. However, numerous COs fail to delegate the duties formally. According to the US Merit System Protection Board, the management of COTRs is the key to the regulation of the performance of COTR for the sakes of both the government and the contractor. Management includes appropriate training and formally delegating tasks to them. This also involves monitoring their performance and rating them according to their effectiveness (us Merit System Protection Board, 2005). Conclusion The performance of the COTR is dependent on several factors, including the contract specifications, the clarity of responsibilities and the presence or absence of formal delegation. In the advent of growing government expenditure in contracting, it is imperative that government contracts be effectively managed to ensure optimum utilization of tax money. This is achievable through the designing of precise contract terms and specifications. To achieve this, there is a need to involve COTRs in the initiation of contracts. However, the role of COTR has been subject to scrutiny, and sometimes, resulting in law suits. There is, therefore, need to evaluate the performance of COTRs, since it is closely linked to the success of government projects. This evaluation would include the reassessment of training requirements. Training for COTR has been revealed to be a major source of inefficiency in the duties of COTR. Appropriate training should be emphasized; additionally, it is imperative for the government to keep records of all the CORTs, their qualifications and performance. Further, COs should ensure that the duties of all CORT are documented, to insure the government and contractors of potential ill faith actions of the COTR. In summary, the effectiveness of contracting office representative in any federal office should be guided by factors of contract performance. Similarly, various agencies such as NGOs, private sectors, state corporations and other business premises should validate the roles and responsibilities of a contracting office representative (Kelleher et al, 2010). Alternatively, the purchase and acquisition of contracts dealing with products and services should be verified by FAR which is the monitoring body of contract performance. References Acquisition Central. (2012). FAR. Retrieved from: https://www.acquisition.gov/far/loadmainre.html Allen, P. (2002). A socio-legal and economic analysis of contracting in the NHS internal market using a case study of contracting district nursing. Social Science and Medicine, 54(2), 255–266. Bastianelli, A. et al. (2003). Federal government construction contracts. New Jersey, NJ: American Bar Association. Boyd, B. (2007). the COR/COTR answer book. Vienna, VA: Management Concepts. Cibinic, J. et al. (2006). Administration of Government Contracts. New York, NY: CCH Incorporated. Compton, P. B. (2009). Federal acquisition: key issues and guidance. Virginia, VA: Management Concepts. Department of Treasury and Finance Victoria. (2006). Project alliancing practitioners’ guide, Victoria. Retrieved from: http://www.lowitja.org.au/crcah/list-crcah-publications Fernandez, Sergio, & Hal G. Rainey. (2005). Local Government contract management and performance survey: The Municipal Yearbook 2005. Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association. Hefetz, A., & Mildred W. (2004). Privatization and its reverse: explaining the dynamics of the government contracting process. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 14(2), 171–90. Hughes, T. C. (2003). Agency, contract and governance: shifting shapes of accountability in the health care arena. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 28(2–3), 195–215. Kelleher, T. et al. (2010). Smith, Currie & Hancock's federal government construction contracts: a practical guide for the industry professional. 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Parker, A., Harding, A., & Travis, P. (2000). ‘“Make or Buy” decisions in the production of health care goods and services: new insight from institutional economics and organizational theory. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 78(6), 770–790. Prager, J. (1994). Contracting out government services: lessons from the private sector. Public Administration Review, 54(9), 176–84. Prager, J. (2008). Contract city redux: Weston, Florida, as the ultimate new public management model city. Public Administration Review, 68 (1), 167–180. Ruuska, I. & Teigland, R. (2008). Ensuring project success through collective competence and creative conflict in public–private partnership – a case study of Bygga villa, Swedish triple helix e-government initiatives. International Journal of Project Management, 27(4), 323–334. SRA International, Inc. (2003). Report on competencies for the contracting officer’s technical representative (COTR) job function. 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Retrieved from: http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=224103&version=224322&application=ACROBAT Ya Ni, A., & Bretschneider, S. (2007). The decision to contract out: a study of contracting for e-government services in state governments. Public Administration Review, 67 (3), 531–544. Read More