Criminal Personality: The Defence of the Aggression Genes - Term Paper Example

Criminal Personality: The Defence of the Aggression Genes I. Introduction Following the emergence of the popularity of that branch of biology addressing the laws of heredity and the encompassing development of the applied science of eugenics, the element of heredity in human behaviour and social disorders was granted profound emphasis not merely by scientists but as well as ordinary people. It would perhaps not be pointless to assume that, of all the prominent explanations of social behaviour, personal attributes, and social dilemmas present in contemporary society, the hereditary description is prevalent. One rationale for the appeal of the hereditary account is that it appears brilliantly possible (Kadish 1987). However, there is almost certainly no claim that is more difficult to validate than one that challenges that such and such an attribute or circumstance is inherited. All kinds of arguments have been made as to the link of heredity to criminal behaviour, namely, born criminal personalities, birthright of criminal characters, inheritance of particular criminal patterns, and inheritance of criminal propensity or tendency. For the greater part, the ideal that there are born criminal personalities or that particular criminal trends are inherited has paved the way to the view that a number of individuals become heir to vulnerability to criminality that is not detailed (Morse 2006). Various different forms of studies have been conducted to establish the hereditary aspect in crime. Nevertheless, in abandoning the functioning potency of environmental features, some psychologists established at the viewpoint that crime must be substantiated by the heredity of feeble-mindedness, in addition to the inheritance of an inclination to crime (ibid). Biological assumptions of crime received a poor status in the early part of the twentieth century through the extreme claims and empirical flaws of criminologists. For instance, Lombroso’s (1911) argument that criminals were biologically more primordial than others and his assertion that the orientation of the cranial surface could differentiate criminals and non-criminals fell short to be scientifically validated. Furthermore, the perceived racism of these standpoints establishes biological theories of criminality into ill repute and disregard during most of the twentieth century (as cited in Farahany & Coleman 2006). However, in the similar historical period that Lombroso’s nineteenth century assumptions were suggested, Galton invented strategies for the empirical investigation of genetic effects on human behaviour (Ishaq 1991). They integrated the twin study method of evaluating adoptive members of the family who share identical environmental experiences yet by no means genetic heredity. These processes provided the basis for the contemporary discipline of behavioural genetics, the investigation of the inheritance of behavioural attributes (ibid). In the modern period, work on the inheritance of behaviour has turned out to be more refined, and the combined body of information associated to behavioural personalities and to anti-sociality has developed tremendously (Lykken 1982). II. The Idea of Heritability Human behavioural genetics may improve people’s understanding of human behaviour and thus far have insignificant relevance to allocating responsibility in the criminal law. As a scientific field, behavioural genetics aims to understand the contributing functions of genetics and the environment, or nature and nurture, to observed diversity in human behaviour. Similar to other academic sciences, it accepts as true that all natural occurrences have a scientific contributory justification, but put emphasis primarily on the relationship between genetic deviation and behavioural variation among individuals in a given population. Even though the science remains in its formative years, hindered by conflict over fundamental methodology and the designation and measuring tool for behaviour, behavioural genetics proof has already been opened up in criminal trials for several objectives: as scientific substantiation, to reinforce pre-existing legal arguments and as lessening evidence throughout the process of sentencing (Parens 2004). As the science develops and acquires integrity and credibility, scientific outcomes revealing a genetic involvement to behavioural variations in violence, hostility, rashness, substance abuse, disruptive personality disorder, and other associated attributes will carry on to be introduced into the criminal law (ibid). Various interpretations about the scientific discipline of behavioural genetics put into picture the following arguments. Primarily, behavioural genetics does not back up the viewpoint that human behaviour and conduct are permanent or contributed by genes. In other words, behavioural genetics does not advocate genetic determinism. On the opposite, behavioural genetics explains a complicated interaction of biology and the environment that provides impetus to behavioural disparities between individuals. The intangible disagreement between behavioural genetics study and genetic determinism is manifested both from the characteristics of the researches and from the empirical outcomes (Rothenberg & Wang 2006). Secondarily, researches in behavioural genetics are planned and conducted to produce a population figures about the connection between behavioural differences and genetic deviations in a population, conceptualized an approximated of heritability. Heritability “provides a statistical approximation of the relative contribution of genetic difference versus environmental differences to observed behavioural differences among individuals in a population” (Farahany & Coleman 2006, 1). On the contrary, it does not give details on the correlation between the genetic outline of an individual and his behaviour, nor does it give explanation of the origins of any specific action done by an individual. As a population statistical figures, heritability may differ by the age, societal context, and environment of the sample population under observation. Furthermore, the traditional saying in statistics proves applicable as well, which says “correlation does not imply causation” (ibid). A correlation as revealed by statistics between genetic variations and behavioural differences in a population does not interpret into a contributory explanation about the behaviour of motives. In a nutshell, heritability does not give explanation on the roots of an individual’s conduct, or the roots of any particular action committed by an individual (ibid). Thirdly, behavioural genetics researches unveil that even if genetic variations give ideas into the reason individuals conduct themselves as they do, genetic variations serve merely a single portion to the overall account. In researches of rebellious or criminal behaviour, behavioural geneticists reveal heritability approximates between 0.12 and a high of 0.62, which imply that genetic variations in the sample population related to twelve to sixty two per cent of the disparities in experimental antisocial or criminal behaviour in that population. Hence, genetic variations fall short to account for thirty eight to eighty eight per cent of the experimental behavioural difference in the population (Farahany & Coleman 2006, 115). These observations, which behaviour fails to be deterministic, that heritability approximates refer to population more than individual differences and that genetic variations singularly do not account behavioural disparities between individuals, would alone validate restricting the introduction of behavioural genetics proofs in criminal instances. Nevertheless, practitioners keep on introducing behavioural genetics evidence in criminal cases. Therefore, rather than emphasizing on the dynamic scientific boundaries of behavioural genetics, the aforementioned arguments demonstrate the reason, with regard to criminal law theory, for behavioural genetics to not purposefully inform the evaluation of criminal responsibility (Wasserman 2004). III. The Effects of Genetics in Criminal Law Since free will is frequently a foundation of contemporary criminal justice theory, an adjustment of this notion could have significant consequences. Current findings that individuals with particular genetic codes may be more probable to perpetrate violent crime become exceptionally significant. To be certain, they address the concern the contribution that free, individual preference plays in the carrying out of crime. It is imperative to understand the outcomes of these researches and their correlation to explanations and assumptions of free will and determinism (Rutter & Silberg 2003). In the latter part of the 1960s, scientific research started to transpire that portrayed a likely linkage between different genetic factors and tendency for aggressive behaviour in individuals. Findings discovered that, even manipulating for other factors, an uneven population of males having an XYY chromosome was being detained in maximum security prisons, facility set aside for the extremely aggressive and brutal criminals. Even though a general relationship was found, irregularity in future researches, accompanied with a common hesitation to approve of these genetic excuses implied that courts rebuffed the XYY chromosome justification in criminal trials. However, the study creates essential questions on the function of genetic in criminal behaviour (Denno 2002). Another major genetic research with repercussions for criminal law was the study conducted by Professor Han G. Brunner of supposed “aggression genes” (Jones 2003: 1031). Professor Brunner studied a big Dutch family that had a substantial number of male members who were unusually sadistic in behaviour. The family was selected since it showed signs of a sharp, extraordinary behavioural distinction between abnormal and normal males. After manipulating for an array of various variables, Professor Brunner found out that the males who showed aggressive, violent behaviour such as sexual harassment, arson, and physical attack also had an alteration in one of their genes. Consequently, they had problem dealing with nerve-racking situations. Many scientists called Brunner’s study as exceptionally significant, perhaps establishing the foundation for the unearthing of the gene for aggression. Even though the long-term repercussions of this research are uncertain, Professor Bruner’s study is relevant since it maintains that, not merely is there a related effect between particular genes and criminal behaviour, but that this effect is contributory as well (ibid). In spite of this brilliant research, it is improbable that the seclusion of any particular gene as the origin of criminal behaviour will ever transpire. David Cummings, a geneticist remarked that “my feeling is there is certainly no “gene” for criminal behaviour. There are only genes which predispose people to an increased frequency of impulsive-compulsive behaviours and that put them at greater risk of being involved in criminal behaviour” (Angier 1995: C1). However, several scientists concur that criminal behaviour can be traced in some fraction to the genetic constitution of the individual. For instance, countless plausible researches conducted on mice, in addition to other studies of the brain, have recognized particular hormonal levels, especially nitric oxide, existent in substantial quantities whereas the animal was endeavouring in violent behaviour. Mice with a reduced level of nitric oxide synthase don’t appear to identify social prompts which would naturally dispel reckless, aggressive or criminal behaviour (Baker 2006). These researches suggest that aggressive behaviour may have at least some origin in genetic make up. IV. Impact of Genetics on Criminal Justice The status quo demands that manifold brief conclusions be extracted regarding free will, yet the genetics research summons at least a number of those conclusions into difficulty. Society is beset with three alternatives, namely, it can carry on in its present framework which would be intellectually deceitful; it can modify the system significantly; it can change its understanding of the reason for the punishment to have room for genetics research. It has been assumed that the number one alternative is unfavourable for the reason that the criminal justice system will not be revolutionized or radically reconfigured. This then put forth the idea that society will realign its basis for sanctions, returning to utilitarian justifications, so as to take in hand the introduction of contemporary genetic research. This concern then turns out to be on how to abide by to what genetics research instructs while still establishing it likely to find guilty and punish those that create a threat to the rest of society (Bullock et al 2007). In simple terms, provided that courts and legislatures will be unable to depend of free will suppositions to the similar degree as they did in the previous years, where then can they rely on to give good reason for implementing punishment and still maintain intellectual truthfulness or integrity? Utilitarian-founded justifications give a response. Based on the opinion of the utilitarian, the criminal law is a mechanism of social education and motivation. Utilitarians chastise individuals not severely since their own blameworthiness, but because they anticipate to prevent the behaviour that results in to societal destruction. The objective is to postpone future behaviour not merely by the individual herself, but through society as entirety. Individuals are components of a greater collective and must compromise their personal liberty for the public welfare or good. Hence, under utilitarian perspectives of punishment, individual guilt is not a precondition to punishment (Clark & Grunstein 2000). Their simple existence in society provides the essential rationale. To sum up, to be philosophically well-founded, the fundamental concern in determining punishment will no longer be the criminal negligence of the individual committing violation of the law, but rather, the impact that the carrying out of the crime has on the larger society. Judge Richard Posner disputes that as empirical research promotes and gains more knowledge on the sources of individual behaviour, criminal culpability becomes progressively external. Society will be troubled less on the motive of the individual committing the crime and more on the action that has been commenced (Andrews 2001). It is clear with the current progress in the discipline of genetics that the free will basis upon which the criminal justice system is founded is in grave peril. Justifications of punishment that depend on the individual responsibility of the doer become problematic to defend when contributing factors affect their behaviour. However, the preservation of social stability remains to be an essential objective for every society and culture. Contemporary legal research acknowledges this, but proposes that the criminal justice system is probably to implode because of the destruction of its pillars in free will (Jang 2005). For these intellectuals, the outcome is a deterministic system, intended to be not viable and intolerable to most society. Works Cited Andrews, Lori B. Future Perfect: Confronting Decisions about Genetics. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. Angier, Natalie. "Disputed Meeting to Ask if Crime Has Genetic Roots." N.Y. Times (1995): C1. Baker, Laura A. et al. "Behavioral Genetics: The Science of Antisocial Behavior." Law and Contemporary Problems (2006): 7+. Bullock, Bernadette Marie et al. "Devian Peer Afifiliation and Problem Behavior: A Test of Genetic and Environmental Influences." Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology (2007): 29+. Clark, William & Grunstein,Michael. Are We Hardwired? The Role of Genes in Human Behavior. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Denno, Deborah W. "Gender, Crime and the Criminal Law Defenses." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (2002): 80-180. Farahany, Nita A. & Coleman, James. "Genetics and Responsibility: To Know the Criminal from the Crime." Law and Contemporary Problems (2006): 115+. Ishaq, Waris. Human Behavior in Todays World. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991. Jang, Keey L. The Behavioral Genetics of Psychopathology: A Clinical Guide. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005. Jones, Mathew. "Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The True Impact of the Genetic Revolution." Duke Law Journal (2003): 1031+. Kadish, Sanford H. "Excusing Crime." CAL. L. REV (1987): 257-58. Lykken, D.T. "Fearlessness." Psychology Today (1982): 20-28. Morse, Stephen J. "Addiction, Genetics and Criminal Responsibility." Law and Contemporary Problems (2006): 165+. Parens, Erik. "Genetic Differences and Human Identities: On Why Talking About Behavioral Genetics is Important and Difficult." The Hastings Center Report (2004): 1+. Rothenberg, Karen & Wang, Alice. "The Scarlet Gene: Behavioral Genetics, Criminal Law, and Racial and Ethnic Stigma." Law and Contemporary Problems (2006): 343+. Rutter, Michael & Silberg, Judy. "Gene-Environment Interplay in Relation to Emotional and Behavioral Distrubance." Annual Review of Psychology (2003): 463+. Wasserman, David. "Is there Value in Identifying Individual Genetic Predispositions to Violence?" Journal Law, Medicine & Ethics (2004): 24+. References Auerbach, Charlotte. The Science of Genetics. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. Bandura, A. Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977. —. "Social Learning Theory of Aggression." Journal of Communication (1978): 12-29. Beecher-Monas, Erica & Garcia-Rill, Edgar. "Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is there a Blueprint for Violence?" Law and Contemporary Problems (2006): 301+. Cohn, Ellen G. Evaluating Criminology and Criminal Justice. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. Coll, Cynthia Garcia et al. Nature and Nurture: The Complex Interplay of Genetic and Environmental Influences on Human Behavior and Development. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004. Denno, Deborah. "Revisiting the Legal Link between Genetics and Crime." Law and Contemporary Problems (2006): 209+. Ellis, Lee & Hoffman, Harry. Crime in Biological, Social and Moral Contexts. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990. Evansburg, Amanda R. "But Your Honor, Its in His Genes" the Case for Genetic Impairments as Grounds for a Downward Departure under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines." American Criminal Law Review (2002): 1565+. Farrington, D.P. & Wright, Richard. "Biological Findings and Crime Research." Mednick, S. The Causes of Crime: New Biological Approaches . London: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 48-58. Fuller, John L. & Simmel, Edward. Behavior Genetics: Principles and Applications. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1983. Goldschmidt, Richard B. Understanding Heredity: An Introduction to Genetics. New York: Wiley, 1952. Holmes, S.J. Human Genetics and Its Social Import. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936. Kaye, D.H. "Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal DNA Databases." Law and Contemporary Problems (2006): 259+. Litton, Paul. "The "Abuse Excuse" in Capital Sentencing Trials: Is it Relevant to Responsibility, Punishment, or Neither?" American Criminal Law Review (2005): 1027+. Luna, Erik. "System Failure." American Criminal Law Review (2006): 1201+. Parens, Erik. "Taking Behavioral Genetics Seriously." The Hastings Center Report (2004): 13+. Pelfrey, W.V. "Mainstream Criminology: More New than Old." Criminology (1979): 323-328. Plomin, Robert. Development, Genetics and Psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986. Shelden, Randall G. "Gene Warfare." Journal of Social Justice (2002): 162. Siegel, Andrew M. "Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposal for a Third Generation of Wrongful Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy." American Criminal Law Review (2006): 1219+. Thompson, W. Robert. Behavior Genetics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960. Walters, Glenn D. Foundations of Criminal Science. New York: Praeger, 1992. Weinreb, Lloyd L. "Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility." LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS (1986): 50-51. Read More