Global Combat Support System Marine Corps - Research Paper Example

Global Combat Support System -Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) During combat, marines primarily need flexible and rapid logistics with the capacity to deal with the peculiar issues presented by the battlefield in the 21st century. The marine produced its Global Combat Support System- Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) in order to deal with these concerns effectively. The system’s acquisition centered on the premise that it would enhance the overall effectiveness of the marine’s combat system. The marine sought a cutting edge technology with the capacity to offer a deployable and single entry point for all marine logistics and GCSS-MC proved to be the answer. GCSS-MC aims at providing technological support with regard to logistics operations while simultaneously enabling the modernization of ancient logistics procedures, as well as processes. Some of the fundamental objectives of the technological system include reduced customer wait time and logistical response, as well as reducing dependence on forward-positioned stocks (Department of Defense, U.S. Military & U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), 2011). However, despite the apparent objectives, as well as proper acquisition practices, the marine combat system continues to face immense weaknesses with regard to its implementation. The purpose of this investigation is to assess the Department of the Navy’s implementation of IT management controls relevant to GCSS-MC. This paper discusses the inherent weaknesses of GCSS-MC implementation by the marine. The examination of the effectiveness of GCSS-MC’s implementation focuses primarily on the system’s effectiveness in terms of economic justification, risk management, management of system quality, architectural alignment, earned value management and requirements management. In order to ascertain the system’s alignment with the DOD business enterprise architecture (BEA), researchers analyzed a variety of program documentation, for instance, acquisition program baseline, and program management plan and acquisition strategy. This assessment also involved the examination of GCSS-MC’s BEA compliance, as well as its system architecture products comparing them with BEA compliance requirements. Notably, the DOD has failed to implement vital IT management controls required by DOD-related acquisition guidance with regard to the GCSS-MC. Effective implementation of the system, as well as other IT management disciplines, enhance the likelihood of a certain system producing the appropriate solution to attain a mission need (U.S. Military & Department of Defense, 2011). Stakeholders should also acquire such a system solution and deploy it in a way that make the most of opportunities for offering promised system abilities and benefits within budget and on time. However, perhaps the most prominent weakness of GCSS -MC is the fact that the system fails meet any of these desired outcomes. This is evidenced by the three-year delay experienced in the implementation of the initial increment. In addition, the system is also expected to cost $193 million more than the originally anticipated cost. Such cost overruns, as well as slippages, are attributable in part to weaknesses in the system’s management control. Furthermore, additional cost overruns and slippages are likely if the organization fails to address these and other IT management weaknesses inherent in the GCSS -MC. Another notable weakness that adversely affects the implementation of GCSS -MC is the poor economic justification inherent in the system. The system failed to provide sufficient economic justification to warrant investment, particularly in consideration of the system’s costs and benefits (U.S. Military & Department of Defense, 2011). Notably, although anticipated benefits were adjusted to expected risks to compensate for questionable assumptions and limited data, the element of cost is not adequately reliable since it was not derived according to fundamental cost estimation practices. Moreover, the system did not center on historical data from comparable programs and did not take into account schedule risks. Both of these elements are vital for the consideration of an estimate as credible and accurate. Another significant weakness inherent in the system is its failed earned value management. Notably, earned value management, which GCSS -MC uses to determine its progress, is inadequately implemented. For instance, the schedule baseline against which GCSS -MC measures progress does not center on key estimating practices required by federal guidance, for instance, determining schedule risks, as well as providing schedule reserves to speak to such risks. As a consequence, it is relatively difficult to access the progress of GCSS-MC. This makes it rather difficult to project program completion dates based on the work performed. Moreover, relevant stakeholders failed to manage the system’s risks. Although the marine established a well-defined risk management plan, as well as supporting procedure, these processes are not always followed to the letter. Notably, the system’s implementation is impeded by the inadequate mitigation steps taken to counteract significant risks, which ultimately resulted in these risks becoming real problems (U.S. Military & Department of Defense, 2011). The implementation process is also marred by problems of data collection. It is quite apparent that data required in developing indicators of system quality, for instance, tendencies in the volume of substantive and unsolved problems, as well as requests for change, are not being effectively collected. In the absence of this data, it is not clear whether or not GSCC-MC is becoming more or less stable and mature. It is clear that the core reasons for the aforementioned weaknesses typically vary from inadequate collection of relevant data to limitations of DOD tools and guidance. It is only until the DOD addresses these problems that it will effectively deal with the concern of delivering a solution, which does not support mission operations cost effectively and falls short with regard to costs and ability expectations (U.S. Military & Department of Defense, 2011). In order to guarantee that GCSS-MC increment processes are economically viable in terms of a reliable appreciation of benefits, risks, costs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to guarantee that investments made to the next phase of acquisition is based on disclosing fully to program oversight (Jones, 2008). The Secretary of the Navy should also disclose fully upon approval entities the phases in progress to address all plausible risks inherent in the system. This includes risks such as failure to be architecturally compliant, failure to produce anticipated mission benefits equal to the anticipated costs, being excessively duplicative of similar programs or failure to mitigate known systematic risks. In addition, so as to enhance the accuracy of GCSS-MC’s cost anticipation, as well as estimates for the department’s programs, it is critical that the Secretary of Defense directs the proper organization with DOD to work in partnership with pertinent organizations. This cooperation should focus primarily on the standardization of the cost element structure for the programs and use such standard structures to sustain cost data for ERP programs such as GCSS-MC. In addition, the department should also use the present cost information to create and implement future cost estimates. Furthermore, in order to enhance the system’s cost estimate credibility, the Secretary of Defense should give instructions to the Secretary of the Navy, via stipulated command chains, to guarantee that the program’s present economic analysis is routinely adjusted to reflect the inherent risks associated with the program, as well as future updates to the GCSS-MC economic analysis (Friedman, 2009). Conversely, the navy department can also enhance the system’s use of EVM by ensuring that the office responsible for the program monitors the program’s start, allocates sufficient resources such as material and labor hours to enable the system’s effective operation and establishes a plan risk analysis to ascertain the level of confidence with regard to meeting the system’s completion date and activities. In addition, the program office should pinpoint and allocate sufficient amount of float time necessary for vital activities to account for potential problems, which take place along the schedule’s critical path. In essence, effective implementation of the framework encompassed in GCSS-MC can reduce risks associated with the program and effectively ensure that the system investments are properly defined. This definition entails asserting the proper way to support mission performance and operations optimally and deliver promised program capabilities and benefits within budget. References Department of Defense, U.S. Military, & U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) (2011).  2011 U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) concepts and programs: Comprehensive guide to weapons, aviation, command and control, ground and combat vehicles, expeditionary and maritime support, installations. New York: Progressive Management. Friedman, N. (2009). Network-centric warfare: How navies learned to fight smarter through three world wars. Maryland: Naval Institute Press. Jones, M. W. (2008). Implementation challenges for DoD logistics enterprise resource planning IT systems. Washington: Amazon Media. U.S. Military, & Department of Defense. (2011). 2011 Complete guide to the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), comprehensive coverage of America’s marines - past, present, future. New York: Progressive Management. Read More