What is Meant by Natural Justice - Research Paper Example

Law Natural Justice in the arena of sports laws What is natural justice? Natural justice could be defined as a process by which individuals and /or institutions “acting in a judicial capacity” need to observe the least standards of fair and equitable decision making while reaching critical decisions. “Where the relevant person or body is required to determine questions of law or fact in circumstances where its decision making will have a direct impact on the rights or legitimate expectations of he individual concerned, an implied obligation to observe the principles of natural justice arises.” (The answer lies somewhere between conversation and chocolate, 2005). There are two aspects of the principles of natural justice, the first one being that the defendant being given a fair hearing and the second being that the proceedings and decision should be free of any kind of bias or pre-conceived notions against him/her. Natural justice in the field of sports: Coming to the arena of sports, natural justice could be seen in terms of the fact that natural justice are truly speaking minimum standards of fair decision-making that need to be taken by powerful monopolistic administrative sports bodies, who could even bend the rules to suit their vested interests in more ways than one. Thus being so, sports governing bodies are expected to be fair, reasonable and impartial in the ways in which they conduct their disciplinary proceedings. There are two main Latin principles, inter alia, that of nemo judex causa sua and another of audi alteram partem, which govern sports justice. The first nemo judex causa sua, meaning, no person can be his own judge. In real terms, this expression nemo judex causa sua means that no one could be a judge in a matter in which he or she is a party or has some kind of interest. (Duhaime n.d.) Secondly, audi alteram partem, that is, a person is entitled to a fair hearing in matter of adjudication. Both these underlying doctrines would be presently considered in further details. Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath 1926: This principle was first enunciated in the English case of Frome United Breweries Co. v Bath 1926 AC 586 in which the Lord Chancellor was the judge. Although the LC had an interest in the setting up of the canal this fact transpired only after the case was adjudicated by the LC. The later Court set aside this judgement on the grounds that nemo judex causa sua or interest in the case was present in the adjudicating process. “It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.” (Summary, 2010). Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1975): Again, in the case of sports laws, it is quite possible that adjudicators or the legal body conducting the inquiry may have some kind of pre-established bias, or discrimination in favour, or against parties. If this is so, either such interests need to be disclosed, so as not vitiate the course of proceedings, or such decisions could be waived or set aside by the parties. This was put to test in the case of Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1975). in which the aspects of whether the directors of league had the necessary discretionary powers to set out the teams to admitted to the tournament and reject teams outright. In other words, whether it had real powers to select or reject teams, who were members. Apparently, the exclusion of Wests (one of the member teams) triggered widespread protests and these members claimed that the Board’s decision “not to invite it to participate in the competition constituted oppression, unfair prejudice or unfair discrimination” and sought a stay order on this decision. (Fridman n.d.). However, in this case, the verdict went in favour of the Club since the court verdicted that apprehension of discrimination, or bias does not naturally become so unless there is substantial evidence to prove that such bias did occur and caused detriment in the case of Wests exclusion. Bias, as such, cannot be judged by a court of law, only the effects of bias could. Moreover, according to the courts, the directors had acted well within their powers and there was nothing to suggest that these acts could be construed to be ultra vires or against the governing rules of the body. The raisone de etre of audi alteram partem is that this principle of natural justice prohibits a judicial decision which influences private privileges “without giving all parties in the dispute a right to be heard.” (Duhaime n.d, Audi alteram partem). Thus it is important that the aggrieved persons be given full powers and privileges to speak on his/her own behalf in the event of sporting decision that affects his rights or career. While in earlier cases, the elements of natural justice was seen only in jurisprudential or adjudicative matters, later on this was also applied with equal force in administrative aspects of sports governance. Ridge vs. Baldwin (1963): In the leading case of Ridge vs. Baldwin (1963) 2 AER 66. HL it was observed that C, a police personnel was dismissed from the force for alleged treachery. “The decision to dismiss C was void because the watch committee had not observed the principles of natural justice.” Further, “C had not been charged nor informed of the grounds on which they proposed to proceed and had not been given a proper opportunity to present his defence.” (Cases – law and justice, 2008). This case brought out the major elements of the principles of natural. Here Lord Hudson observed: “No one, I think, disputes that three features of natural justice stand out.  (i) The right to be heard by an unbiased Tribunal,  (ii) The right to have notice of charges of misconduct,  (iii) The right to be heard in answer to that charge.” (Manohar 2009). Russell v. Duke of Norfork: The limits of natural justice was tested in the case of “Russell v. Duke of Norfork 65 T.L.R. 225, 231; [1949] 1 All E.R. 109, C.A..)” (Ridge V. Baldwin, n.d.). This is a classically illustrative example of the principles of natural justice. In this case, a jockey’s riding license was revoked and he was barred from ever riding again. The dispute arouse when one of the horses used by the jockey was drugged, which was in direct violations of the regulations of the Club. The Courts held that while revoking a license could be a natural outcome, the decision to debar the defendant for life was against the tenets of natural justice and against public policy. Lord Dennings opined that it was necessary that fundamental justice demands that any person found wanting in an offence needs to be given every possible opportunity of being heard before disciplinary action is taken against him. Perhaps in this case the punishment was stronger than the nature of the offence. Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football Association Ltd: The question of natural justice in the area of sports was once again the focus of attention in the case of “Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football Association Ltd., (1971) Ch D 591 (606) : (1971) 1 All ER 215.” (Thakker 2005). In this case a club was fined and reproached by a county association. The club, Enderby Town was constrained to seek the assistance of Football Association (FA) to resolve the imbroglio. They requested legal aid but this was rejected by the FA according to their rules, which stated that unless the chairman or secretary of the club was an advocate, this could not be granted. Upon appeal, the courts did not approve of legal assistance to the club. According to the learned judge, the Courts were the best place to accept and implement the law and not football clubs. This case proves that the fact that Courts wish to seek a balance between the demand of justice and the governing bodies be given enough autonomy to carry out their tasks efficiently. Again subjecting decisions to the principles of natural justice would also need to be supported with monopolistic inclinations by the parties and also the courts would not like to alter the governing rules of sports bodies too much that would create problems and issues in its internal administration. All along the case laws relating to natural justice in the field of sports laws dealt with aggrieved individuals who file lawsuits against the highhandedness and erratic decision of sports bodies, with the courts seeking to bring the erring bodies in line with the course of natural justice. McInnes v.Onslow-Fane: However, in the McInnes v.Onslow-Fane (1978) 1 WLR 1520 case, the applicant sought a license as trainer from the British Board of Boxing Control (BBBC) along with an request that he may be given an opportunity to state his case in the event his application was rejected. Not only did the BBBC reject his application but they also did not feel it necessary to accede to his secondary wishes. He filed a lawsuit on the grounds that by not granting him an opportunity to state his deposition, he was being deprived of natural justice for which he sought judicial remedies. In this case, the Courts found it untenable and unnecessary that the BBBC provide him with an opportunity to testify before it, and also rejected his dual claims. The Courts in this case held that “that there is no general obligation to give reasons for a decision” not to provide the applicant with a license and since it did not depend upon any criteria, the question of offering or rejecting any oral hearing to the applicant did not arise. (McInnes v. Onslow-Fane and another, n.d.). Mark Jones v Welsh Rugby Football Union Jones v Pugh: Again in the case of, Mark Jones v Welsh Rugby Football Union Jones v Pugh (CA (Civ Div)) Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (1997), the Court had to intervene in the case of alleged unruly and undisciplined conduct between members of opposing teams during a rugby match. The Union, after considering all facts and video clippings felt it fit to impose a 30 day suspension on the player, Jones for misconduct. He however, appealed against the imposition citing that he was not allowed to be legally represented during the suspension proceedings and the video clipping were viewed in private. Thus, in his case, the course of natural justice was not followed. Upon appeal, the COA held that “1.The suspension from play of the first plaintiff is not to be enforced until trial or further Order. 2. The costs of and occasioned by this application be the plaintiffs costs in the cause 3. Leave to appeal is refused.” (Mark Jones v welsh rugby football union Jones v pugh, n.d.). The main aspect that went in favour of the applicant in this case was that justice was not provided to him during the initial hearing in terms of legal representation, right to be heard and video clippings to be viewed in public with his counsel in a position to question the suspension proceedings. Moreover, there were no attempts by the parties to resolve the controversy among themselves, much less find an amicable solution for the issue. Jones v. Welsh Rugby Federation Union (WRFU): However the COA in the Jones v. WRFU (CA (Civ Div)) Court of Appeal (Civil Division) case felt it necessary to involve a higher court in the proceedings for a solution. It is widely believed that Jones v. WRFU has been a landmark decision that has set the tables right in the issues of players’ rights and privileges vis-a –vis powerful sporting unions to whom they are under contractual obligations. Perhaps the fact that there was a valid contract between Jones and the Union that allowed settlement of this case in favour of the player. The case of Jones v. WRFU also underlines the fact that although Courts are not averse to subjecting sporting bodies to the rigours of a scrutiny, not much in terms of regulatory measures could be effected. Given the kind of omnipotent powers that sporting bodies in this country represent, it is but natural that a certain degree of control and monitoring of their activities seem justifiable and, in certain cases, even warranted. Under the norms of natural justice and fairness, a wide range of situations would duly present itself that would seek court intervention and judicial verdicts. While Courts need to consider the situational aspects and the surroundings of each case on its own merits, it also needs to ensure that a reasonable degree of relative natural justice and fair play also needs to be enforced in such cases, even if this were to prejudice the interests of certain parties or interests in selective cases. This stems not only for the altruistic view of human bonding but also from the fact that man needs to justify and seek justification for actions. While certain actions of humans beings are beyond comprehension, it is necessary that Courts, should try, in as far as is possible to seek individual explanations for actions before passing judgements. Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club: Yet another sports related legal aspect is regarding restraint of trade. This aspect has been seen in the case of Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club (NFC) In this case, a professional British footballer was not allowed to leave even after his contract with NFC had expired. Counsel for his employer argued that since he was playing professional football for them, it was not a case of trade but employment. The Courts however ruled in favour of Eastham: “The Court considered the transfer system to be an unreasonable restraint of trade and held that if clubs did not rehire a player on a further contract, the player should be able to leave for free.” (Johnson 2009). Modahl v. British Athletic Federation Limited (BAL): The preponderance of the governing body of sports has been once again the focus of attention in the case of the British athlete, Diane Modahl case. This case known as the Modahl v. British Athletic Federation Limited (BAL) (1999) case occurred when during this year Diane was suspended from participation in international events following testing positive for doping during an event in Lisbon, Portugal. Although she was acquitted of the doping charge in subsequent testing, the fact that she had to forego one year of international participation created enough economic hardship for her to file an Appeal application for financial restitution against what she believed was testing done by un accredited laboratory. She challenged the laboratory tests on the ground that it was not done by an “accredited” laboratory. (Judgements – Modahl v. British athletic federation limited, 1999). Her justification for this was based on the fact that the concerned laboratory had changed its premises and according to her, this is enough justification to make it lose its accreditation status. The Courts of Appeal however, rejected her appeal on the ground that “In suspending an athlete and initiating disciplinary proceedings, the BAFs Drug Advisory Committee is not making a "finding". It is only deciding that, on the information it has been given, it considers that there is evidence that a doping offence may have taken place.” (Judgements – Modahl v. British athletic federation limited, 1999). Further, there are no allegations that the BAF knew or ought to have know about the accreditation or otherwise of the procedures of testing. Nagle v. Feilden: Gender discrimination in trade of racehorse jockeys has been the moot point in the case of Nagle v. Feilden (1966) 2 QB 633. In this case a club refused to grant licence to a woman on the grounds of her gender. Upon brining action, the lower courts rule that there being no contract between the women applicant and the club there was no cause for action. However, in the Court of Appeal, it was held argued that jockeying sports bodies were able to exercise tremendous amount of monopolistic business and this being so, it was their moral duty to conduct their business with fairness and responsibility. By showing gender discrimination, they had not upheld approved trade practices. “The Court of Appeal held that the board were under a duty to act fairly which required the board to give the applicants a sufficient indication of any relevant objections raised against them to enable the applicants to meet them.” (McInnes v. Onslow-Fane and another, n.d.). Conclusions: However, even given this fact, it is evidenced that more often than not, Courts are reluctant to interfere in the internal workings of sporting bodies, or subject it to the rigours of a legal procedure, unless absolutely necessary. The Courts have rationalised that sporting bodies need to be given a certain degree of suzerainty and autonomy to function well, and the preponderance of judicial decisions may, in certain cases vitiate the executor and regulatory mechanism. For one thing, sporting bodies do have their own Code of conduct, which need to be religiously indoctrinated in practice, and any interference would, in effect, invite public calumny for these hallowed institutions of jurisprudence. For another, Court decisions, as it were, may at best seek and effect changes in its administrative functioning, but may not be able to enforce changes in its regulatory norms. Given the kind of omnipotent powers that sporting bodies have come to represent in this country, it is but natural that cases like Jones v. WRFU have come to represent just the tip of the iceberg, with blocks of ice still found below freezing water. Moreover, since most cases relating to natural justice tend to challenge the procedural aspects of the administration of sports bodies, a more critical area, that of seeking ample dozes of changes in the regulatory regime of sporting bodies, remains, by and large, untouched. It could further be evidences that for conspicuous changes to occur in sporting bodies, the impact of sports laws need to seek out and enforce welcome changes in the regulatory regime of such bodies. Under such circumstances, the readiness of Courts to subject sporting bodies to scrutiny and pubic audit is at best subjective since it may serve only limited purposes and not much could really be achieved in terms of a complete overhauling of the functioning and regulations binding sporting bodies in this country. Application of concepts of natural justice in areas of disciplinary proceedings in sports: It would indeed be injudicious to apply the principles enunciated through natural justice on a predetermined or set manner. This is because its interpretation and relevance in the case setting is of crucial importance and could even determine the course of proceedings. As such, natural justice may not hold up in a court of law unless predicated by some act, or abstinences that could underpin it. Courts would be circumspect to make a ruling on the grounds of natural justice when all other aspects go against the defendant unless there are strong evidence that this aspect is crucial in the bearing and decision of the case. If a defendant cites natural justice as a redeeming feature, he needs to substantiate it with facts and figures to show that natural justices have been miscarriage by the other party. He needs to convince the Court, that had natural justice been present in this case setting, his position would have been better than what it presently is. By itself natural justice ceases to hold attention, or cause relevance to the robustness of a case, but when combined with other relevant factors it could be a turning point or determining factor for the winning or losing of a legal battle. However, the rights of Appeal to higher courts are always a prerogative for the parties and should be used whenever necessary to do so. Reference List Cases – law and justice, 2008. [Online] Sixth form law, Sixth form. Available at: http://sixthformlaw.info/02_cases/mod6/cases_justice.htm#Ridge%20v%20Baldwin%20(1964)%20HL [Accessed 11 January 2010]. Duhaime, L., n.d. Audi alteram partem. [Online] Duhaime.org. Available at: http://duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/A/Audialterampartem.aspx [Accessed 11 January 2010]. Duhaime, L., n.d. Nemo judex in parte sua. [Online] Duhaime.org. Available at: http://duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/N/Nemojudexinpartesua.aspx [Accessed 11 January 2010]. Fridman, S., n.d. Before the high court: Sport and the law: The south Sydney appeal. [Online] Google docs. Available at: http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:LLiuCCwoFToJ:www.law.usyd.edu.au/slr/docs_pdfs/editions/slr_v24_n4_bhc.pdf+Wayde+v.+New+South+Wales+Rugby+League+Ltd.&hl=en&gl=in&sig=AHIEtbQ2RMFuAg9BymDriqglfHzH_IVLZw [Accessed 11 January 2010]. Johnson, J., 2009. Restraint of trade law in sport. [online] Faculty of Law Sports Law eJournal. Available at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=slej [Accessed 11 January 2010]. Judgements – Modahl v. British athletic federation limited, 1999. [online] www.parliament.uk. Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd990722/modahl.htm [Accessed 11 January 2010]. Manohar, S.V. Just., 2009. The income tax appellate tribunal bar association, Mumbai. [Online] ITAT Online.org. Available at: http://www.itatonline.org/articles_new/index.php/principles-of-natural-justice/ [Accessed 11 January 2010]. Mark Jones v welsh rugby football union Jones v pugh, n.d. [Online]. Available at: http://74.125.153.132/search?q=cache:tg9y34MIC9wJ:oxcheps.new.ox.ac.uk/new/casebook/cases/Cases%2520Chapter%252012/Jones%2520v%2520Welsh%2520Rugby%2520Football%2520Union.doc+Jones+v.+Welsh+Rugby+Football+union&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=in [Accessed 11 January 2010]. McInnes v. Onslow-Fane and another, n.d. [Online]. Available at: http://law.hku.hk/hkadmlawsb/admlawcases/McInnes.htm [Accessed 11 January 2010]. Ridge V. Baldwin, n.d. [Online]. Available at: http://law.hku.hk/hkadmlawsb/admlawcases/ridgebaldwin.htm [Accessed 11 January 2010]. Summary, 2010. [Online] Vlex. Available at: http://vlex.in/vid/manak-lal-vs-prem-chand-29698119 [Accessed 11 January 2010]. Thakker, J.C.K., 2005. Departure of Lord Denning. [Online] Eastern Book Company. Available at: http://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/9904a1.htm [Accessed 11 January 2010]. The answer lies somewhere between conversation and chocolate, 2005. [Online] Business Line. Available at: http://www.blonnet.com/2005/11/19/stories/2005111900301100.htm [Accessed 11 January 2010]. Read More