Feasibility of Implementing Voluntary Safety Reporting System in King Khalid Int Airport - Case Study Example

Literature Review: Feasibility of Implementing Voluntary Safety Reporting System in King Khalid International Airport Name Institution Name Introduction Safety in Aviation is a subject of international concern and thus its importance is recognized unanimously (Griffith, Scott and Marx 1998). The term aviation safety according to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Air Navigation Commission is the state of freedom from unacceptable risk of injury to persons or damage to aircraft and/or property. Various experts have concluded that aviation safety is both a technical and operational matter; however, it integrates into a matter of public law the moment the public is involved and private people participate under government control. Consequently, it is a matter of international obligations (Beaubien & Baker 2002). Voluntary Safety Reporting system is a voluntary non-punitive reporting system that is in line with Annex 13 standards of the Chicago Convention. This system provides an enhanced reporting channel for aviation incidents together with safety deficiencies while not revealing the reporter’s identity (Aviation Safety Reporting System 2014). This system does not obviate the mandatory reporting requirements with regard to aircraft accidents and incidents. Mandatory reporting with respect to aircraft incidents and accidents always result into investigations together with safety recommendations (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012). Contrastingly, a large percentage of incidents that have the capacity in helping the enhancement of aviation safety go unreported. Given this heinous consequence, many learning opportunities from the accidents and incidents together with their prevention are lost (Beaubien & Baker 2002). Voluntary safety reporting system in aviation is tasked with enhancing aviation safety through collection of feedback on incidents that would otherwise not be reported or which are often considered minor (NASA 2014). Nevertheless, if these minor issues are reported allow others to learn from the reporter’s experience and can eventually lead to procedural, practical, and design changes. A voluntary aviation safety reporting system focuses on systems, procedures, equipments, and human factors, rather than on individuals. The scope of a voluntary aviation safety reporting system covers but is not limited to the following key areas: Flight Operation: departure/en-rout/approach/landing, Aircraft cabin operations, air proximity events, weight and balance and performance. Ground Operations: Aircraft ground operations, operations in the movement area of the airport, fueling operations, airport conditions or services, and cargo handling Air Traffic Management: Air Traffic Control (ATC) operations, ATC equipment and navigation aids, and Pilot and ATC communication (Doody 2010). Maintenance: Aircraft maintenance and record keeping Miscellaneous: safety related passenger handling operations. The following literature review explores various dimensions of voluntary aviation safety reporting system. In this regard, the importance of aviation safety and its definitions, elements or pillars of aviation safety, International Civil Aviation Safety Organization (ICAO) annexes in regard to voluntary system and MMS aviation safety manual are expansively be discussed. Importance of Aviation Safety and Its Definitions Since the invention of the Aviation Industry, the safety with the industry has always been developed upon the reactive analysis of past aviation accidents together with the introduction of corrective actions that essential in preventing the recurrence of similar events. Currently, there are low aviation accident rates thus making it extremely difficult to continuously make further improvements to the level of safety using the aforementioned approach (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012). With this duly noted, it is important to have a proactive approach to managing aviation safety; this is vitally important as it concentrates on control processes rather than singularly relying on inspection and remedial actions (Beaubien & Baker 2002). A voluntary reporting system at an airport is the only proactive approach that ensures safety efforts are effectively embraced and made as an integrated part of the business operation. Safety Management System (SMS) is an excellent voluntary safety reporting system in most modern international airports across the globe (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). Across the aviation industry it has generally been accepted that a substantial percentage of aviation accident accrue from human error (Ganter, Dean and Cloer, 2000). Due to this establishment, it can be easily concluded that such errors occur due to carelessness and/or incompetence on the job; however, this is not the reason. The human aspect here is the last link in the chain leading to an aviation accident. Changing personnel in this scenario is not the ultimate solution; improved safety is only possible when the underlying causal factors are exhaustively addressed (Beaubien & Baker 2002). For overall safety to be enhanced in an efficient and effective manner, adoption of a systems approach to safety management is the only way (Michaelides-Mateou & Mateou 2012). With regard to this establishment, each and every segment and/or level of the organization must be fully integrated to be part of a safety culture which extensively promotes as well as practices risk reduction. Management of safety is founded on the premise of presence of safety hazards and human errors. A voluntary safety reporting/management system establishes processes that enhances communication about these risks as well as take action to mitigate them (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012). By having such a proactive approach, subsequently improves the airport’s overall safety levels. There are multiple voluntary reporting programs for pilots, dispatch personnel, air traffic controllers, airline crews, airline maintenance staff, ground handlers and charter airlines. Such programs are tasked with receiving, analyzing, and reporting on hazards, incidents and accidents. Accordingly, these programs are developed on the premise of non-punitive safety reporting and confidentiality. The Air Charter Safety Foundation for instance, voluntary, cooperative, non-punitive reporting is fostered for safety of flight concerns (Ganter, Dean and Cloer, 2000). In this particular reporting system, all participants have access to essential or valuable information (NASA 2014). The information available is extensively analyzed, and corrective measures are developed to aid in resolving the identified safety issues. Most modern international airports have achieved high levels of safety by using voluntary reporting safety management system (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). A Safety Management System (SMS) as aforementioned is a voluntary safety reporting system that is formal, top-down business like system for managing safety risk and is built on basic principles of system safety (Hagen 2013). System safety and voluntary safety reporting system System safety in this regard is the application of management and engineering principles, criteria, and techniques to achieve safety levels that are acceptable across all phases of the system. The voluntary safety reporting system’s primary objective is achieving this definition of system safety (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). It has been established that a well structured system is empowered to provide a systematic, explicit and comprehensive way for managing safety risks. The process involved here include, goal setting, planning, documentation, and regular evaluation of the system to ensure that the system goals are being achieved. A voluntary safety reporting system has the following key system safety principles: i. Management Commitment to safety: management’s attitudes and actions have significant impact on the entire organization’s staff. With regard to this, it critically important that the management team commit to make sure that a voluntary safety reporting system is successfully implemented. ii. Proactive Identification of Hazards: early identification and reporting of hazards is an essential of saving that scarce time and resources. iii. Actions taken to manage risks: there must be a system in place to determine the logical approaches to counteracting known risks to safe operations. iv. Evaluation of safety actions: an unending evaluation of the impacts of risk (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012) management activities is essential to determine if further remedies are required. How a voluntary safety reporting system is different from traditional safety approaches SMS is not intended to be an entirely new safety management system; however, it builds on the existing safety process of an organization (Soekkha 1997). For instance, most of the above system safety principles are present in traditional safety approaches. This notwithstanding, there are various ways in which a voluntary safety reporting system differs from the traditional safety approaches (Beaubien & Baker 2002). For instance, this system has a proactive approach to safety reporting and hence it goes beyond checklist-based inspections and prescriptive audits to develop procedures as well as indicators that anticipate safety risks (Ganter, Dean and Cloer, 2000). Responsibilities for safe operations across all levels and segments of the organizations are spread equally in a voluntary safety reporting system (Raymond & Crane 2001). This has the capacity of increasing the people watching for safety issues thus making it impossible for hazards to go undetected (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). For this reason, each voluntary safety reporting system implementation has its own customized set of layers which directly coordinate thereby creating a safety culture (NASA 2014). A voluntary safety reporting system demands for excellent planning, performance monitoring, communication, as well as the participation of all organization’s employees (Raymond & Crane 2001). Consequently, this system fully recognizes that organizational and human errors cannot be exhaustively eliminated and thus the system reduces these errors but developing a safety-oriented culture (Federal Aviation Administration 2011). The safety-oriented culture provides an environment focused on hazardous conditions elimination before they occur (Beaubien & Baker 2002). It is essentially important to note that voluntary safety reporting system does not impose an additional oversight layer and/or regulations on the firm (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012). On the other hand, it is a seamless shift that is integrated into the day-to-day routine operations of the organization. Importance of a voluntary safety reporting system like SMS The main and clear objective of a voluntary reporting system is increased safety. By increasing system’s level safety automatically culminates into reduced loss of materials together with improved productivity (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012). In general, such a system affirms that safety is good for business operations to thrive within the organization. The following are specific benefits of a voluntary safety reporting system: a. Direct and indirect costs of accidents are reduced: for instance, repair costs, fines, damage claims and elevated insurance premiums are some of the potential economic consequences of a lapse in aviation safety. However, by implementing a voluntary safety reporting system, the dangers are significantly reduced (Ferguson & Nelson 2013). b. Employee productivity and morale are improved: non-punitive communication between the management and the rest of the organization ensures free communication thus preventing disenfranchisement while lifting employee morale at the same time. c. Marketable safety record is established: consistent safe operations record can be used to attract more customers as well as new investments (Muller, Wittmer & Drax, 2014). d. The system ensures prioritization of safety needs: a voluntary safety reporting system emphasizes actions that are aimed at risk mitigation thus providing massive positive impact on both safety and the bottom line (Raymond & Crane 2001). e. Voluntary safety reporting allows the company to be in compliance with legal responsibilities for safety: certification of airport requirements mandate several safety processes as well as standards which are essential to be included in a voluntary safety reporting system (Salas, Jentsch & Maurino 2010). f. Efficient maintenance scheduling and resource utilization: voluntary safety reporting system ensures effective hazard reporting which on the other hand allows proactive planning of maintenance tasks especially when the resources are available, thus increasing the likelihood that timely maintenance is efficiently performed. g. Reduces and/or avoids incident investigation costs together with operational disruptions: excellent and improved communication and risk mitigation strategies within the organization ensure prevention of incidents and accidents from ever occurring. h. Operational processes are continually improved: using a voluntary safety reporting system allows for lessons learned to be incorporated into the system thus culminating into superior system performance (Ganter, Dean and Cloer, 2000). A voluntary safety reporting system within any organizations necessitates cultural change within that particular organization thus safety of operations is the singular objective that drives every action and decision taken those overseeing procedures and those who actually carry them out (Beaubien & Baker 2002). According, a voluntary safety reporting system leads to standardized and unambiguous procedures for every crew-member during both emergency and routine operations (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012). Similarly, duties and responsibilities are assigned specifically to each staff member in terms of both standard and emergency operations (Ganter, Dean and Cloer, 2000). Elements or Pillars of Aviation Safety According to the ICAO there is a safety framework which represents the minimum requirements for implementing and maintaining a safety management system within an organization (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). This framework has four major components which have twelve safety elements of aviation safety as shown in the table below. In the aviation community these four major components of a safety management system are holistically accepted as a way of compliance that satisfies SMS requirements (NASA 2014). In accordance with this, it is imperative for every voluntary safety reporting system implementation to be based on the aforementioned four pillars or components. This section vastly describes how each component contributes to safety improvement. Components of Aviation Safety Elements of Aviation Safety Safety Policy and Objectives Management commitment and responsibility Safety accountability Appointment of key safety personnel Coordination of emergency response planning Safety management safety documentation Safety risk management (SRM) Hazard identification Risk assessment and mitigation Safety Assurance (SA) Safety performance, monitoring and measurement The management of change Continuous improvement of the SMS Safety promotion Training and education Safety Communication Safety Policy and Objectives A voluntary safety reporting system can only be effective with the availability of a safety policy and objectives that are well developed and communicated to the organization. It is vitally important for a policy statement to be issued that reflects the top leadership’s commitment to aviation safety (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012). In the same line of discussion, the safety policy should clearly indicate how safety management principles and objectives will be integrated to conform to the organizational structure as well as define the procedures necessary for the successful implementation of the system (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). The Safety Policy’s policy statement must be a written document from the senior management and must be communicated to all employees across the organization (Ganter, Dean and Cloer, 2000). Furthermore, entities affiliated with stakes in the organization’s safety should also be adequately informed (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012). Such entities in an airport environment may include flight operators, Aircraft ground operators, Air traffic management operators, and other operators. The safety policy in this essence must include (NASA 2014): i. Management commitment to the implementation of the SMS (Whittingham 2012) ii. Assurance that the executives are keenly monitoring organization’s safety performance iii. It should also encourage all employees to report potential safety lapses without fear of reprisal iv. The policy should also establish clear standards for acceptable behavior in relation to aviation safety v. The commitment of the organization to provide the necessary resources should also be well articulated in the policy statement. The safety policy must also define the organizational structure that will provide the basis for achieving and maintaining the stated safety objectives (Raymond & Crane 2001). In this regard, the organizational structure should be proportional and appropriate the complexity, size, and the operating environment of the firm. It is recommended that large organizations be served by a formal voluntary safety reporting system that utilizes a cross-functional safety committee (Gossling & Upham 2009). Notwithstanding the size and complexity of the organization, the safety manager must be designated as the core figure in implementing a voluntary safety reporting system. In the same line of discussion, safety procedures should be well articulated in the safety policy as they lay out the process through which the organization will be able to identify and remedy safety risks (Kingsbury 2009). These procedures are subject to revision due to circumstances or for improved and effective procedures to be developed (Beaubien & Baker 2002). In accordance with this, it is important that all procedural changes to be clearly communicated to the affected personnel as well as the new procedures to be easily accessible to the entire organization community for reference and continued learning purposes. Safety promotion This is vitally critical as it ensures that the whole organization has full knowledge and trusts the voluntary safety reporting system’s policies, objectives, procedures, and structure (Raymond & Crane 2001). Safety promotion is usually achieved through developing a culture of safety, employee training especially in safety principles, and allowing and facilitating open communication with regard to safety issues (Goglia, Halford & Stolzer 2012). Safety promotion’s main goal is to create a safety culture which enables the success of the system being implemented (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012). When an organization has a safety culture it virtually implies that all employees together with everybody within the organization are responsible for safety. Safety culture is usually driven by the organization’s top management; this is demonstrated through the manner in which the top leadership deals with the day-to-day safety activities (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). For instance, if employees fully trust that they will have management support for reporting safety issues, then the safety culture will be nurtured across the organization (Beaubien & Baker 2002). Having a non-punitive environment which encourages identification, reporting and correction of safety issues automatically amplifies the safety culture. For employees to fulfill their voluntary safety reporting responsibilities they must undergo training in order to be aware of the safety principles and the importance of voluntary safety reporting (NASA 2014). They must have full knowledge with regard to the organization’s safety philosophy, policies as well as practices. Accordingly, they must understand their responsibilities and roles within the safety management framework (GAIN Government Support Team 2004). The level and depth of the training should also conform to ones position and vary from familiarization of general safety to expert training especially for safety specialists. Continuous training is recommended as it essential for keeping employees up to date with any changes to the system. Employee safety training is usually supplemented by an ongoing open communication that is two way and ensures employees benefit from the learned safety lessons, see results of their actions, and continually improve their understanding of the firm’s voluntary safety reporting system (Dillingham 2009). Similarly, in the event that new procedures are introduced, it is important that the associated underlying safety analysis be communicated to the relevant employees. In addition to written communication, it is vital that employees witness evidence of top management’s commitment to safety. Safety Risk Management Aviation is one of the activities exposed to numerous risks daily. Given this understanding, it is entirely impossible to eliminate risks; nonetheless, these risks can be substantially reduced to acceptable levels through Safety Risk Management (SRM) techniques. SRM mainly consists of hazard identification, risk assessment/analysis, and risk mitigation. In safety risk management the first step is identifying the hazard or risk that the firm is facing in its operational environment (NASA 2014). After identifying the risk it is recommended that a description of operations that are to be changed or implemented should be developed; this step is essential as it allows for easy identification of what could be wrong (Patankar et al., 2012). Hazards are any existing or potential situations that can culminate into an accident or incident. In a voluntary safety reporting system, all hazards are recorded analyzed and the action required to mitigate or reduce the safety risk is determined. Under risk assessment, all identified hazards are assessed in order to determine their potential consequences (NASA 2014). In this regard, the assessment process takes into consideration both the consequence severity and the likelihood of such events occurring. In accordance with risk assessment, some hazards may be found to have acceptable risk levels while other must be mitigated for continued safety to be realized (Beaubien & Baker 2002). The mitigation actions taken must be carefully analyzed for the risk together with its root causes to be fully eliminated or be reduced to acceptable risk levels (Raymond & Crane 2001). It is usually recommended to explore various risk mitigation strategies prior to embarking on the preferred choice and this should be based on factors such like cost, timeliness, organizational capabilities, and the overall effectiveness (Michaelis 2007). The management has an obligation of providing the necessary resources to address the risk. A voluntary safety reporting must have in place logical approaches that are essential in counteracting operational safety risks (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). This can only be determined when the implemented system eliminates or reduces the hazard’s recurrence likelihood. In the same way, if the severity of the risk effects are reduced (Rademakers & Coleman 2012). Safety Assurance This pillar provides reassurance and confidence that the organization is able to meet and exceed its safety objectives (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012). The main activities involved here include internal audits, external audits and corrective actions which provide feedback on the organization’s performance together with the effectiveness of the implemented safety management strategies (Dhillon 2011). The internal audits are usually performed by each and every department of organization to make sure that they have adhered to the safety procedures and that they are continuously meeting their safety objectives (Raymond & Crane 2001). Internal audits are regularly performed and they may be coupled with employee surveys together with formal and/or informal inspections that are performed within a given department. The short-and long-term safety actions’ effectiveness should also be evaluated (Rodrigues & Cusick 2011). The external audits are mainly undertaken as an independent part of the organization’s safety oversight. They can be unscheduled or scheduled and they are vital in providing ways for ensuring that the organization is in compliance with the voluntary safety reporting system’s standards, policies, and processes. The corrective actions are only developed after the auditing procedure discovers that the prescribed procedures are not being fully followed (Beaubien & Baker 2002). The corrective actions are taken by the under-performing department within the safety assurance framework. Additionally, corrective actions can also be taken to make sure the safety risks identified are resolved. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO): Voluntary Reporting System Annex 13 of the International Civil Aviation Organization defines how Aircraft accidents and incidents should be investigated. In this regard, state responsibilities are clearly brought to light. For instance, the international standards together with recommended practices for Aircraft Accident and Incident investigation are well discussed (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). The applicability of this Annex is to all activities following an aircraft accidents and incidents wherever they occur. Similarly, the sole objective of the investigation is to prevent Aircraft accidents and incidents. this annex also defines how the state should conduct the investigation as well as how other sates can participate (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012). Accordingly how the final report is to be written or the format of the final report is also described under this annex. The responsibilities of any state with regard to ICAO are also given. From this observation, Annex 13 of ICAO only describes the reactive activities that should be undertaken by any state in the event that there is Aircraft Accident and Incident. No proactive procedures are defined in this Annex; voluntary safety reporting is not clearly discussed (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). Annex 19 of the International Civil Aviation Organization was developed in response to the recommendations by the Directors General of Civil Aviation Conference on a Global Strategy for Aviation Safety that was held in Montreal, Canada in 2006 (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). Similarly, the High-level Safety Conference held in Montreal, Canada 2010 extensively provides the need for the establishment of an Annex dedicated towards safety management. After the Air Navigation Commission (ANC) vastly examined and reviewed these issues and established sufficient scope and need, they agreed to constitute the Safety Management Panel (SMP) to come up with recommendations for the development of this Annex. The Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of this Annex are inclined towards assisting states in managing safety risks in aviation (NASA 2014). This Annex observes that the global air transport system is complex and thus there is need for aviation activities that assure the safe operation of the aircraft. In this regard, this Annex supports the use of proactive strategies in order to improve safety performance. The proactive safety strategy is founded on the implementation of a State Safety Programme (SSP) which systematically addresses safety issues. In order for SSP implementation to be effective it must be gradual process which takes time to fully mature. The complexity of the air transportation system together with the maturity of the aviation safety oversight capabilities of the state are the main factors that determine the time required to implement an SSP (NASA 2014). This annex advocates for the Safety Management System (SMS) together with the elements associated with proactive collection of safety data and State safety oversight activities (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012). According to ICAO’s Annex, each state is mandated to establish a mandatory incident reporting system to facilitate data and information collection with regard to actual and/or potential deficiencies in safety (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). Accordingly, it is recommended for each state to develop a voluntary incident reporting system that is vital in facilitating information collection on actual and/or potential safety deficiencies that may not be acquired through the mandatory incident reporting system (ICAO 2013). In general, the voluntary safety reporting system (SMS) of any organization should be established in accordance with the framework elements of the system which include (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014): Safety policy and objectives Safety risk management Safety assurance Safety promotion In addition to the above, the system should be commensurate with the size of the service provider together with the complexity of aviation products and/or services. The SMS of an International general aviation operator responsible for conducting operations of large airplanes in accordance with Annex 6 has the obligation of commensurating the size and operation complexity. Annex 19 recommends that the SMS at minimum include: a. The process of identifying actual and potential safety hazards as well as assess the risk associated with the identified hazard (Dillingham 2010) b. The procedure for developing and implementing remedial actions necessary for maintaining an acceptable safety levels c. There should be provisions for continuous monitoring together with frequent assessment of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the safety management activities. The Safety Management Manual (SMM) This manual is designed to provide States with guidance for establishing a regulatory framework as well as the supporting guidance materials for implementing a voluntary safety reporting system like the safety management system (SMS) by the organization or service providers. Accordingly, this manual aids in the development of State safety programme (SSP) that is in accordance with the International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) as contained in Annex 1 - personal licensing, Annex 6 - Aircraft Operation, Annex 8 - Aircraft’s Airworthiness, Annex 11 - Air Traffic services, Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation and Annex 14 – Aerodromes (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). The objective of the System Management Manual is to provide States with: i. Knowledge of safety management concepts, the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices with regard to safety management as contained in the aforementioned Annexes and related guidance material (NASA 2014) ii. Guidance with regard to accepting and overseeing the implementation of the essential SMS components and in compliance with the ICAO SARPs iii. Providing states with guidance on the development and implementation of an SSP in compliance with the necessary ICAO SARPs. The manual significantly discusses the basic safety concepts as it provides in-depth review of the strengths as well as weaknesses of organization’s long-established approaches to safety together with the new concepts and perspectives that underlie contemporary approach to safety (Federal Aviation Administration 2009). In this regard, safety concepts, the evolution of safety thinking, causes of aviation accidents, organizational accidents, people, operational contexts and safety, errors and violation, and safety investigation (Dixon 2009). In accordance with the above, SMM also discusses the importance of having safety management together with its strategies and key features. Similarly, the differences between management of safety as an organizational process and the prevention of accidents as remedial activities are significantly addressed (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). In this regard, the manual vastly discuss safety stereotypes, the dilemmas that the management is faced with, the need for safety management, safety management strategies, the imperative of change, the eight building blocks of safety management, and the four responsibilities for managing safety. The fundamentals of hazard identification and analysis are discussed in SMM under topics such as: hazards and consequences, understanding hazards, hazard identification, hazard analysis, and documentation of hazards. After hazard identification and analysis, the manual provides safety information analysis (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). For instance after collecting and recording the safety information using various hazard identification strategies, meaningful decisions can only be made through analysis of the acquired information (NASA 2014). When an organization has a safety databases as well as reporting systems always makes information analysis together with determining the safety action that should be undertaken to mitigate or reduce the safety risk. Chapter five of the SMM discusses the safety risks thus it presents the fundamentals of safety risk management. Safety risk management is discussed under safety risk definitions, safety risk management, safety risk probability, safety risk severity, safety risk tolerability, and safety risk control. References Australian Transport Safety Bureau. The ATSB Voluntary and Confidential Reporting Programme. First Meeting of the APRAST – Accident Investigation Ad hoc Working Group (APRAST-AIG AWG/1). International Civil Aviation Organization 2012. Aviation Safety Reporting System 2014, Home, Retrieved from http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/ Beaubien JM & Baker DP 2002, A Review of Selected Aviation Human Factors Taxonomies, Accident/Incident Reporting Systems, and Data Reporting Tools. International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 11-36. Dhillon, B 2011, Transportation Systems Reliability and Safety, New York: CRC Press Dillingham, G 2009, National Airspace System: FAA Reauthorization Issues are Critical to System Transformation and Operations: Congressional Testimony, New York, DIANE Publishing Dillingham, G 2010, Aviation Safety: Preliminary Information on Aircraft Icing and Winter Operations: Congressional Testimony, New York, DIANE Publishing Dixon, L 2009, FAA Is Not Realizing the Full Benefits of the Aviation Safety Action Program: Federal Aviation Administration, London, DIANE Publishing Doody, D 2010, Deep Space Craft: An Overview of Interplanetary Flight, London, Springer Science & Business Media Federal Aviation Administration, 2009, Plane Sense, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office Federal Aviation Administration 2011, Plane Sense: A Beginner's Guide to Owning and Operating Private Aircraft, New York, Skyhorse Publishing Inc. Ferguson, M & Nelson, S 2013, Aviation Safety: A Balanced Industry Approach, London, Cengage Learning GAIN Government Support Team (GST). Major current or planned government Aviation Safety Information Collection Programs. Global Aviation Network, 2004. Ganter, J.H., Dean, C.D., and Cloer, B.K 2000, Fast Pragmatic Safety Decisions: Analysis of an Event review team of the aviation safety action partnership. USDOE, SAND2000-1134. Goglia, J, Halford, C & Stolzer, A 2012, Implementing Safety Management Systems in Aviation, Sydney, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd Gossling, S & Upham, P 2009, Climate Change and Aviation: Issues, Challenges and Solutions, London, Earthscan Griffith, K. Scott, and Marx, K 1998, Viewpoint: To improve air safety, focus on incidents, not accidents. Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 13, 1998. Hagen, J 2013, Confronting Mistakes: Lessons from the Aviation Industry when Dealing with Error, London, Palgrave Macmillan International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2014, Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, Retrieved from http://www.emsa.europa.eu/retro/Docs/marine_casualties/annex_13.pdf Kingsbury, N 2009, Aviation Safety: NASAs National Aviation Operations Monitoring Service Project was Designed Appropriately But Sampling and Other Issues Complicate Data Analysis, New York: DIANE Publishing Michaelides-Mateou, S & Mateou, A 2012, Flying in the Face of Criminalization: The Safety Implications of Prosecuting Aviation Professionals for Accidents, London, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Michaelis, S 2007, Aviation Contaminated Air Reference Manual, New York, S. Michaelis Muller, R, Wittmer, A, & Drax, C 2014, Aviation Risk and Safety Management: Methods and Applications in Aviation Organizations, California, Springer Science & Business Media NASA. Confidential Safety Incident Reporting: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System. NASA Ames Research Center, 2014. Patankar, M, Sabin, E, Bigda-Peyton, T & Brown, J 2012, Safety Culture: Building and Sustaining a Cultural Change in Aviation and Healthcare, California, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Rademakers, L & Coleman, D 2012, Spinoff, 2011: NASA Technologies Benefit Society, Washington, Government Printing Office Raymond, B & Crane, R. Design Considerations for a Patient Safety Improvement Reporting System. Institute for Health Policy 2001; 1-27 Rodrigues, C & Cusick, S 2011, Commercial Aviation Safety 5/E, New York, McGraw Hill Professional Salas, E, Jentsch, F, & Maurino, D 2010, Human Factors in Aviation, London, Academic Press Soekkha, H 1997, Aviation Safety: Human Factors, System Engineering, Flight Operations, Economics, Strategies, Management, Manchester, VSP Whittingham, R 2012, Preventing Corporate Accidents, London, Routledge Publishers Read More

Across the aviation industry it has generally been accepted that a substantial percentage of aviation accident accrue from human error (Ganter, Dean and Cloer, 2000). Due to this establishment, it can be easily concluded that such errors occur due to carelessness and/or incompetence on the job; however, this is not the reason. The human aspect here is the last link in the chain leading to an aviation accident. Changing personnel in this scenario is not the ultimate solution; improved safety is only possible when the underlying causal factors are exhaustively addressed (Beaubien & Baker 2002).

For overall safety to be enhanced in an efficient and effective manner, adoption of a systems approach to safety management is the only way (Michaelides-Mateou & Mateou 2012). With regard to this establishment, each and every segment and/or level of the organization must be fully integrated to be part of a safety culture which extensively promotes as well as practices risk reduction. Management of safety is founded on the premise of presence of safety hazards and human errors. A voluntary safety reporting/management system establishes processes that enhances communication about these risks as well as take action to mitigate them (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012).

By having such a proactive approach, subsequently improves the airport’s overall safety levels. There are multiple voluntary reporting programs for pilots, dispatch personnel, air traffic controllers, airline crews, airline maintenance staff, ground handlers and charter airlines. Such programs are tasked with receiving, analyzing, and reporting on hazards, incidents and accidents. Accordingly, these programs are developed on the premise of non-punitive safety reporting and confidentiality. The Air Charter Safety Foundation for instance, voluntary, cooperative, non-punitive reporting is fostered for safety of flight concerns (Ganter, Dean and Cloer, 2000).

In this particular reporting system, all participants have access to essential or valuable information (NASA 2014). The information available is extensively analyzed, and corrective measures are developed to aid in resolving the identified safety issues. Most modern international airports have achieved high levels of safety by using voluntary reporting safety management system (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). A Safety Management System (SMS) as aforementioned is a voluntary safety reporting system that is formal, top-down business like system for managing safety risk and is built on basic principles of system safety (Hagen 2013).

System safety and voluntary safety reporting system System safety in this regard is the application of management and engineering principles, criteria, and techniques to achieve safety levels that are acceptable across all phases of the system. The voluntary safety reporting system’s primary objective is achieving this definition of system safety (International Civil Aviation Organization 2014). It has been established that a well structured system is empowered to provide a systematic, explicit and comprehensive way for managing safety risks.

The process involved here include, goal setting, planning, documentation, and regular evaluation of the system to ensure that the system goals are being achieved. A voluntary safety reporting system has the following key system safety principles: i. Management Commitment to safety: management’s attitudes and actions have significant impact on the entire organization’s staff. With regard to this, it critically important that the management team commit to make sure that a voluntary safety reporting system is successfully implemented. ii. Proactive Identification of Hazards: early identification and reporting of hazards is an essential of saving that scarce time and resources. iii. Actions taken to manage risks: there must be a system in place to determine the logical approaches to counteracting known risks to safe operations. iv. Evaluation of safety actions: an unending evaluation of the impacts of risk (Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2012) management activities is essential to determine if further remedies are required.

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