Tracing the relationship between older probation order and the current therapeutic drug courts will give us a clear view of what Hutchinson is arguing about. A Probation Order is generally an agreement between the court and the offender where the latter is allowed restricted freedom provided he will have good behaviour, live a productive life, remain in designated place, and so on (Walker 2010, p.168). And, according to Garland this same probation order is systematically mixed with the unifying ethos of today’s correctionalism (Hutchinson 2006, p.446). In other words, the same principle that created probation now co-exists with the current therapeutic justice system but how it is possible.
According to Knafla (2003), probation was once seen as suitable for youth offenders or adult moral backsliders and the reason for that is the notion that these types of offenders are in need of moralistic and friendly guidance that was often administered by a trained caseworkers. However, many people who went under probation in the early 1950s were so disturbed that friendship and guidance was no longer viable but some long and intensive casework. In the 1960s, due to the advent scientific evidence on the humanist aspect of crime, probation then became as some kind of social service where further crime will be prevented by readjusting the offender.
Armed with scientific theories about personality and therapeutic method along with positivistic view of crime, the justice system in the following decades were marked by probation officers trained in the human personality, casework intervention, and criminological positivism (p.156). Clearly, the probation service is inherently rehabilitative in nature and the succeeding treatment model is just a special case of this rehabilitative ideals. Rehabilitation is always there and historically as mentioned earlier, it was only the view of offenders that changed.
For instance, the idea of punishment to deter criminality failed miserably because of the notion that offenders have to be punished if they done something morally wrong. Secondly, it follows the notion that punishment must match the level of offense. Note that the deterrence criminal justice system is not offender-centred but moral and offense oriented. In contrast, probation and other scientific model of punishment are centred on the offender’s human behaviour, biological, and social explanations of his or her actions (Masters & McGuire 1994, p.162). Similarly, some rehabilitation approaches were based on the notion that delinquent behaviour is a product of poor psychological development –psychiatry and therapeutic (McLaughlin & Muncie 2006, p.348) while other was based on social theories of crime that sees offenders as product of poverty, unemployment, and lower-class status (Masters & McGuire 1994, p.162). In general, these are reforms or rehabilitations dressed as a more humanitarian approach to criminality.
The rehabilitative principle of the 1950s was undoubtedly in some way therapeutic in nature as it considers the human and social side of the offender and his offense. Moreover, rehabilitation is seen as an offender’s right and it is the responsibility of the state to support this right (Robinson 2008, p.430). The neo-liberal way of thinking about crime and punishment of the 1980s however gave more emphasis on the managerial side of rehabilitation wherein strategies for improving efficiency, accountability, and value for money were given more importance resulting to containment rather than rehabilitation of offenders.
Moreover, analysis conducted by Seddon (2007) suggest that there were mixed practices in this neo-liberal administration or management of risk. For instance, study shows that treatment of mentally ill offenders increased in the mid and late 1980s (p.151) despite neo-liberals strong emphasis on containment. Note that neo-liberalism does not function on the basis of external moral considerations and not concern with what is right but efficiency.
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