Language and Action: A Reassessment of Speech Act Theory - Report Example

Is John Austin correct to say that theatrical talk is ‘parasitic’ on real life? Table of Contents Introduction 2 2. Language and Theory 3 2 Performance of Language 3 2.2 Performative Utterance 4 2.3 Constatives 6 2.4 The Doctrine of Infelicities 6 3. Speech Act Theory 7 3.1 Speech Acts 7 4.0 The Theatre and Austin 8 4.1 Parasitic Nature of Language 8 4.2 Parasitic Language and the theatre 9 5. Conclusion 11 Bibliography 13 Is John Austin correct to say that theatrical talk is ‘parasitic’ on real life? 1. Introduction The performance of language is defined by the way in which it constructs reality. Language has the capacity to create a setting, a place in which the performance of language becomes the centre of its existence. Language does not only interpret, but it creates. Through the way in which language creates the space, it gives it meaning. The meaning that comes from the construction of language to create affect provides the context for the construction. Language has great power in society and therefore must be considered well as it is used. The use of language is a performance. Every time people speak they are creating a performance based on the theme which they are trying to express. In the theatre this should be the same but many times it is not. Sometimes the experience of creating becomes hampered by the need to tell. Telling is not nearly as effective as showing. A person can perform an entire monologue through a look, but can miss the entire meaning if it is spoken in several pages of spoken language. In creating real life, the nature of language is changed, the willingness to change the nature of communication in order to imitate life making it disingenuous. Therefore, because it is disingenuous, the language used in the theatre is parasitic and should be excluded. The theatre creates meaning that should reflect life, but in truth it feeds off of the reactions of the audience. The theatre can reconstruct society through making the audience believe in its utterances and that the emotions behind them are realistic. Even as the actor speaks his monologue he is being disingenuous about what he or she says, his or her ‘performance’ reflecting fiction and not reflecting his own experiences, meanings, or intentions. In truth, there is no truth in the theatre, thus Austin is right about the language of theatre. 2. Language and Theory 2.1 Performance of Language Unfortunately, language is not always considered well. John Austin (1975, p. 22) stated that theatrical talk is parasitic on real life. Theatre is the construction of an imitation of real life. Theatrical talk is a way that creates a gap between the ‘reality’ of a moment and the framing of a moment from the exterior space of it. Although it is too obvious of a way to show this phenomenon, the example can be seen through Hamlet. In many interpretations, in his soliloquy, Hamlet is discussing the idea of suicide. He talks what it would be like to do it, what it would mean, and how it would affect his existence. He talks around the topic, but the one thing he does not do is experience it. Of course, this evasion of action is central to the plot and character of Hamlet, but the point is made. The language talks about what should be experienced. The concept of performativity has become associated with a number of different ideas. The basic definition of the word is based upon the idea that language creates something that is ‘like a performance’ (Scheiner 2013, p. 4). However, the way in which John Austin discusses the idea of performativity is in relationship to the sincerity of the performance. Without this sincerity, the reality of the moment is lost in the parasite of theatrical language. Theatrical language often becomes a step away from reality, thus the ‘performance’ of the words detracts from the performance that is life. Eve Sedgwick (2003) discusses performativity in relationship to shame. Relating the action of looking down and away, the performance of shame is associated with the recognition of that performance by the receiver. Sedgewick (2003, p. 36) writes that “The shame/humiliation response, when it appears, represents the failure or absence of the smile of contact, a reaction to the loss of feedback from others, indicating social isolation and signalling relief from that condition”. The performance of shame requires no language, but it is clear from the moment it is sent what the message is about the context of the moment. 2.2 Performative Utterance Austin (1975, p. 14) discusses the idea of utterance in relationship to being a happy and an unhappy utterance. This does not convey the emotion of the utterance as much as the positive or negative connotation. In other words, if someone utters ‘I bet’ it may mean that they truly believe something to be true, which is a positive connotation, or that it is sarcasm in which there is the opposite intention to the utterance. Verschueren and Östman (2009, p. 230) discuss the nature of Austin’s description of the performative utterance as “characterized by a use of the first person indicative active” which means that it is used by an individual without regard to inclusion of others and in ways that indicate the emotion of the declaration. The performative utterance is one in which something is proclaimed. It can be said that every use of language is a performance of language. Language structures an idea so that those who listen to the words begin to form an idea about its intent. The example that Austin ( 1975, p. 21) uses in relationship to the action that can be done when language is used are the simple words ‘I do’. When someone says ‘I do’, or more often ‘I will’ in modern ceremonies, the action that these words create is that of becoming married to another person. In saying ‘I do’ the individual has created an action. They have performed an action through their use of words that have a particular association in the social context. Austin (1975, p. 22) lists six rules, considered felicity conditions, through which the doctrine of infelicities can be understood. The first is that there are certain accepted utterances that are understood and that have a conventional effect. The second is that the people that are in proximity to the utterance and involved must be appropriate to the utterance. The third is that all participants must execute the utterance completely and the fourth that it is done correctly. The fifth is that the individual who is making an utterance must have the intention of the utterance and the people who hear it must accept and expect to respond to that utterance and the sixth is that they will behave in accordance with that utterance. In other words, when the bride and groom each make the utterance of ‘I do’, it is understood in the social context in which it is said, those who hear it are friends, family, and officiates so they are appropriate, all who hear it will honour it and it has been done in a correct manner, The bride and the groom have the intention of fulfilling the obligation that comes with saying the words and those who are in attendance of the wedding will expect to from that point forward treat them as a husband and a wife in accordance with the new roles they have accepted through the procedure of the wedding utterance. In two very simple words the two people have defined their intentions and created an action that socially informed those around them of their change in status. 2.3 Constatives Constative are the category of statements that are either true or false, but create the concept of action in a statement. Illocutionary acts create action through what they are doing in saying something to another person. An example is someone saying goodbye, which is a way of signalling an exit from a space. The other type of constative is the perlocutionary which is the consequences of what someone says, such as when someone says goodbye and the receiver believes this is an ending to a relationship. They have a frightened or relieved reaction rather than just recognition of a statement that refers to an action (McCoy 2013, p. 73). The difference between a performative or a constative is subtle and not particularly distinct. The best way to describe the constative is that it makes a statement about a fact. This is why it can be defined by either being true or false. In contrast, the performative actually will accomplish something in its own right rather than just being descriptive. Telling someone the statement of fact ‘I will marry you’ implies an intention where the statement ‘I do’ creates an act (Hibbard 2005, p. 60). These two distinctions, while not absolute, are important in defining how to understand the theory of discussing how a statement can be an act or declarative. 2.4 The Doctrine of Infelicities Austin discusses the idea of the doctrine in which something will go wrong as the doctrine of infelicities. Infelicities can be described as those utterances that are or are not fulfilled. Every performative utterance has procedures or risks of failures through which the reactive moment to the utterance is defined. In other words, if the bride and groom say ‘I do’ but then declare that they have decided it does not mean they are married, then the original utterance was an infelicity. If the act of an utterance is not meant, then the existence of the utterance becomes a parasitic form of language (Mason 1998, p. 7). Mason (1998, p. 7) writes that in understanding infelicities one must understand that it is the possibility that something can go wrong that defines the doctrine of infelicities, not that it has gone wrong. It is the importance of norms and conventions that defines the way in which Austin has framed his belief on utterances. This means that the doctrine of infelicities assumes that things can go wrong in the occasion of an utterance, thus the intention of the statement has the potential for failing. 3. Speech Act Theory 3.1 Speech Acts It was through the discussion of performative utterance that Austin led to speech act theory. In this theory Austin showed that “linguistic form characteristic of performative utterances can be used for the explicit performance of assertive speech acts (‘I state that…’)” (Verschueren and Östman 2009, p. 231). This is just one type of speech act. Searle (1969, p. 24) describes three types of speech acts: uttering words which constitutes uttering acts, referring and predicting which is performing propositional acts, and stating, commanding, questioning, promising and so forth which are performing illocutionary acts. Speech act theory provides for the use of any number of combinations of these types of speech which come together to create the message that is based upon its constructing theme. At this point it is useful to bring up the nature of ‘false consciousnesses’. This is the state in which people are generally unaware of the origins in social spheres of their beliefs, values, and concepts. Through the lens of Marxist philosophy, it can be understood that even though beliefs, values, and concepts may be understood and embraced by someone, it is most likely that they do not have a specific understanding of why they have these values, beliefs, and concepts. People have frameworks of prejudices and values through which they develop their concepts of ideology, but these frameworks are made up of elements that they are unaware of consciously. Ideology is actually a misrepresentation of what they believe because the way in which they have formed their beliefs is unknown to them. This complication comes because of the complexity of prejudices that are often not a part of the awareness of an individual. How someone performs their language comes from this state of unconscious ideological formation in which they make utterances and react to the world through how they have formed their belief systems. This is one of the aspects of character development that makes recreating a character as an actor a painful and meticulous act. 4.0 The Theatre and Austin 4.1 Parasitic Nature of Language One of the ways in which Austin discussed deceptive language was as being parasitic. What must be understood is that parasitic language is also a part of ordinary language. The concept of the parasite is that it becomes an adjacent part of what it inhabits; feeding and thriving off its host. Parasitic language feeds off of and is a part of ordinary language because it has become part of its existence (Derrida 1995, p. 97). Derrida (1995, p. 96) discusses several reasons why Austin can be rejected for his description of parasitic language. One of the best arguments presented by Derrida (1995, p. 96) is through Sarl who suggests that parasitic language is rejected by Austin even after he has declared that it is a part of ordinary language. If a parasite is not alienated then it is a part of the host and this means it is a natural part of its host and as it is natural, cannot be rejected. Parasitic language maybe feeding off of real language, but it is part of it all the same. Derrida (1995, p. 96) discusses Sarl’s second objection to Austin’s parasitic rejection through the idea that it implies that there is a relationship between the parasite and the host that is dependent. This makes it neither moral nor immoral. Where Austin discusses the need to eliminate parasitic language, while still suggesting it is ordinary language, the one argument that is compelling is that parasitic language merely feeds off of its host without being positive or negative or creating a moralistic implication upon language. 4.2 Parasitic Language and the theatre Austin (1975, p. 22)states that “performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy.” Jeffers (2011, p. 47) writes that the language of the theatre is considered etiolated, a weaker paler version that cannot begin to fill the void between the speaker and the acceptance of his speech. In other words, the actor does not mean what he says, therefore it is weaker than if it was said during ordinary speech. Jeffers (2011, p. 47) suggests that this is an abuse because the actor will never truly feel what they are saying. Under the doctrine of etiolations of language, the speech of an actor is weakened by the lack of truth in his intention. There is no doubt that theatre performance is parasitic under the terms that Austin has set forth. The aim of an actor is to create a performance in which they mean what they say because they have embraced their character. However, there is no realism in what is expressed in the theatre. Auslander (2003, p. 90) discusses the ideas of Sedgwick and Parker in relationship to identifying how the theatre relates to the act of speech. They look at the theatre as a reproductive act with the theatre being parasitic on the dramatic text, while Austin saw it as theatrical language being parasitic on language. The question that must be answered is whether or not the disingenuous statements constitute etiological language or if the actor has the capacity to create reality within their use of speech and its intention by believing at the moment of utterance that they are the character they have embodied. The fact that they know outside of the framework of acting that they are not the character they have put on does not necessarily mean that they do not believe that during the performance they are who they are creating. The identity of most people on a daily basis is a performance that they give. They state things they may or may not believe and the way in which they say things may change for the meaning and intention that lies behind those statements. Many of the things that are said during the roles that are put on may be seen as parasitic language because they are repeated by rote in order to maintain the status of relationships, even when they are actually in flux. The example of the most used statement ‘I love you’ which is said with all kinds of intention, sometimes without any intention at all. It is sometimes a wish for an emotion rather than a true expression of emotions which makes it parasitic. Langbauer (1999, p. 101) discusses how the difference between ordinary language as normal and poetic language as special is not actually accurate. Poetic language has the capacity to transform ordinary language, expressing what ordinary language does not express, and creating a basis upon which to interpret what ordinary language means to say, but rarely does. In other words, what is intended is transformed into deeper meaning through fictionalized versions which is then interpreted by the actor. 5. Conclusion John Austin (1975) wrote an exploration of language that ended in creating speech act theory. Speech act theory creates a framework through which the ideas of the meaning and intention of language can be understood. Language can be truthful or false, it can be intentional or infelicitous, or it can even be happy or unhappy. The meaning behind language has the capacity to be genuine or disingenuous. The disingenuous result of a performative utterances as they are performed on the stage or in any fictionalized expression is considered parasitic by John Austin. Although in the sense that the actor is creating and interpreting emotions and intentions, they do not mean what they say nor do they intend the actions of their statements. Austin, however, believes that this should mean that these types of speech should be excluded. While the speech can be seen as parasitic, it does not have to be excluded because it performs an important part of communications in that it can be transformative. The expressions within the theatre can interpret and transform what cannot be said easily or at all in normal everyday speech. While it can be agreed that terming theatrical language as parasitic is not inaccurate, there is no reason that it does not mean that it should be excluded. Theatrical language and fiction has become a part of the sub-textual experience of modern life. It is a parasite that now belongs and gives back to its host. Bibliography Auslander, Philip. (2003). Performance: Visual art and performance art. Abingdon: Routledge. Austin, J. L. (1978). How to do things with words. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Derrida, J. (1995). Limited Inc. Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Pr. Duffy, Mervyn. (2005). How language, ritual and sacraments work: According to John Austin, Jürgen Habermas and Louis-Marie Chauvet. Roma: Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana. Hibberd, F. J. (2005). Unfolding social constructionism. New York: Springer. Jeffers, A. (2011). Refugees, theatre and crisis: Performing global identities. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Top of Form Langbauer, L. (1999). Novels of everyday life: The series in English fiction, 1850-1930. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell Univ. Press.Bottom of Form Mason, P. (1998). Infelicities: Representations of the exotic. Baltimore [u.a.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press. McCoy, R. C. (2013). Faith in Shakespeare. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scheiner, Richard. (2013). Performance studies: An introduction. London: Routledge. Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language. London: Cambridge University Press. Sedgwick, E. K. (2003). Touching feeling: Affect, pedagogy, performativity. Durham: Duke University Press. Souza, Daniel (1984). Language and action: A reassessment of speech act theory. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Verschueren, Jef., and Östman, Jan-Ola. (2009). Key notions for pragmatics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Pub. Co. Read More