Sociology of War - Essay Example

Sociology of War The differences between the very ideologies of Pakistan and India have always been enough to give way to serious possible conflicts among the two countries. The basis lied upon the fact that the two countries had an intersecting belief of nation and nationalism (Soman & Dabhi, pp. 166-168). However, the primary bone of contention that has remained unresolved and that acts as a basis for other conflicts is the issue of Kashmir, which has so far taken more than 50 years after the partition of the Sub-continent in1947 (Sisson & Rose, pp.130-135). Both the countries claim possession and authority over Kashmir on the grounds of geography and religion. The matter of an enormous difference between the religions of the two countries has also taken lead in many of the existing conflict between the countries. Basically, India’s policy to strengthen its military as part of its decision to capture Kashmir through power and not by negotiation acted as a hurdle between the two countries in resolving their main differences (Soman & Dabhi, pp. 173). Militarist nationalism has taken over India which is the result of the internal policies and diplomacy having least control of external pressures. In this whole scenario, the concept of ethnicity, religion, gender, and all the social values also get militarized which played the maximum part in 1971’s division. The dominance of Hindus within the Sub-Continent was relatively more than the Muslims. In 1947, when India did not feel comfortable with the very idea of the partition of the Sub-Continent it showed its lack of interest in the concept of the Two Nation Theory. India assumed that it could retain its power worldwide if the partition does not take place so as to remain in the widened territory. However, the whole situation proved to be in favor of Pakistan and it finally succeeded in getting parted; however, it failed to part from the influence of India. The manifestation of the above fact occurred when the Muslim majority areas of Ferozpur and Gurdaaspur came under the possession of India after a huge conspiracy. According to the right wing, immediately after the partition, India felt that the two parts of Pakistan should divide themselves to break the power. Subsequently, many Bangladeshis who did not want to part from the country felt obliged to do so in the hands of India. To date, India keeps the blame over Pakistan of getting separated and bringing a halt to its aim of becoming a world power in future. As mentioned earlier, the religious conflicts do not remain the only conflicts between the two countries. The school of though of the two entities always coincided each other. The cultural barriers, the strategic doctrine and the philosophical sensibility among the two remained way apart for centuries. This had already led to the partition in 1947, and thus the whole unsettled scenario stretched to the matter of East and West Pakistan later in 1971. To narrate the events in chronological order, India lost its political stability, as such, after the demise of the Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru in 1964 (Sisson & Rose, pp.130). At that moment, India felt external pressures owing to political and foreign affairs. However, when Indira Gandhi won the March 1971 elections of the Congress Party, the whole scenario turned out to be in favor of India. She formulated and adapted new foreign policies in the domain of regional development (Sisson & Rose, pp.138). The making of foreign policies in the interest of India, thus, came under the authority of Indira Gandhi who made reforms to take control over the East Pakistan crisis. After independence in 1947, Pakistan faced an emptiness of almost all the resources ranging from physical to political. The political situation within Pakistan became quite apprehensive. The people who came to power remained unsettled as far as the policy making was concerned. The primary issue that arose was the unequal proportion of Muslims in East and West Pakistan. East Pakistan had fifty-two per cent of Muslims; however, West Pakistan had 48 per cent of Muslims. In this scenario, when the proportion was higher in East Pakistan, yet they did not receive any kind of authority in the initial phase. Then, there was an internal difference among the people. In the West Pakistan, people were less educated than the people of East Pakistan who were more of feudal lords than anything else. Being called with the same country name, they did not have anything in common. Their language, culture, life style, every thing differed from each other. Thus, Pakistan before coming out of the phase of getting their differences solved with its neighboring country India, it had a great many differences within its own territory. Seeing the picture in a wider spectrum, Pakistan and India had great linguistic and ethnic partialities. Their diverse sense of political approaches reflected an image of two entities living extremely close. Like wise, the ideology which remained the basis of the Indian National Congress inculcated such policies and initiatives that completely outcast those of the All India Muslim League. The constitutional unsettlement grouped with other social differences bloated the whole scenario that resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan (Soman & Dabhi, pp. 167). The widely generated argument is that the division of East and West Pakistan in 1971 mainly stands upon the belief that India, to be in opposition of Pakistan, maintained its support for the national liberation movement that occurred in Bangladesh during that period (Soman & Dabhi, pp. 167). As a matter of fact, before the division in 1971 and during that time, the West Pakistan had an authoritative nature which acted as a destructive role and a stimulator for external powers to get the two parts of Pakistan divided. Even, East Pakistan came under the spell and it wanted its West part to see them as their equal partners in political, social and religious issues. However, West Pakistan failed to do so and maintained its manipulative forces over the other part. Thus, India, who already had been in the opposition of Pakistan, played on its weaker most point. It started to support the people in East Pakistan, who were later termed as Bengalis, in their movement for liberation. They supported them in a way as to oppose the overall culture prevailing in the West Pakistan. They made them realize that their liberation moment would eventually mean their freedom to act according to their own interest in their own territory. All these arguments had their basis on the 1947 partition opposed by India. Since, India could not retain the power that it wanted; it started making efforts for dismemberment of Pakistan. Moreover, this initiative was also backed with the language movement in which Bengalis were not given the right to have their language called as national language and they were forced to adopt Urdu alternatively. The above mentioned differences created a wide vacuum between the two countries and since, negotiation never became their tool of reconciliation; India took one more step to assist the isolation of the two parts. They created a naval blockage which crippled the West Pakistan to withdraw its forces in its East wing. This way, India had a domination of the air as well. The differences in the military resources between India and Pakistan, here, further widened the gulf. India was in a position to attack Pakistani areas; it had all the equipments necessary to do so without the fear of losing anything. On the contrary, Pakistan, as already mentioned, had lost its stability in all aspects, the Pakistan navy could not risk of losing what limited resources it has. Their strategies proved to be very strong than any of the strategies incorporated by the Pakistani side. To add to this appalling scenario, the Pakistani navy did not keep the rural territory of East Pakistan protected. Thus, all these movements kept on building up and the bloodbath continued. So, one of the diplomatic efforts that India adopted was to make an effort to lessen the massacre of 1971 in the East Pakistan. For that purpose, India assumed a position to invade the place so as to help in putting a halt to the flight of the refugees. This act, which was actually in the interest of India, disturbed the interests of the power bloc of the United Sates (Chomsky, pp. 46). Chomsky has also declared the paradigm of Pakistan as a failed paradigm which is under the impression of oppression and excessive violence because of the military power that has taken over the country. On the other hand the right wing supporters, literally, provide a more socialist analysis of the whole Sub-Continent than anything else. According to this paradigm the war hysteria has always been in the environment of these two South Asian countries. The internal pressures within the two countries forced them to build up their military power with excessive troop deployment and taking care of the popular line of control. It also suggests that the Indian forces are constantly vigilant of the Islamic fundamentalists along and close to the border. They have an inclination of fighting them whenever they come across Indian fighters. It further comments that the policies entailed by the left wing parties in Pakistan are one of the major setbacks to the division of 1971. This makes the government of that time responsible to fail in making decisions which pose to be so-called democratic but never thought of the interest of its Western part (Gough & Sharma, pp. 32-40). Eventually, the two dominant views accentuate upon the fact that two distinct philosophies lived for years under the same rule but when parted, they could not consent to a single platform which further deepened their differences. One aiming for the power destabilized the other as to maintain dominance in different aspects. They also suggest that two countries having so distinct cultures, histories, ideologies and religion are bound to end up in disagreements and war and each, then, would make effort to keep its interests in the forefront so as to be stable. Works Cited Chomsky, N. Rogue States. Pluto Press, 2000. Gough, K. & Sharma, H. Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia. Monthly Review Press, 1973. Sisson, R. & Rose, L. E. War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh. University of California Press, 1990. Soman, Z. & Dabhi, J. Peace and Justice. Pearson Education, 2010. Read More