Sociology of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami - Research Paper Example

Sociology of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami Introduction Homeland security covers preparedness for disasters and responding to these disasters appropriately. This is the reason why the Director of the Integrative Center for Homeland Security, Dave McIntyre, had made statements pertaining to disasters (see, for example, McIntyre, 2009). Sociological analyses of how society prepares for, responds, copes, and behaves after disasters provide a tool for homeland security professionals to perform their duties and responsibilities better. Sociology can be defined as the study of society’s structure and behavior (Shepard, 2010, p. 3). It follows that we can similarly define the sociology of disasters as the study of how society organizes itself and behaves in a situation of disasters. It is a standard view in sociology that social behavior is a function of society’s deeply held values, social cohesion or lack of social cohesion, and meanings people associate with each other and with their actions. However, in this work we cannot address these adequately as empirical studies will have to be done. Thus, we focus instead on aspects wherein literature or document studies may be useful. These are in the areas of social preparedness, response, and recovery, particularly on the institutional aspects related to these. Meanwhile, homeland security is not only about protecting the country from terrorism but also about keeping American society safe before, during, and immediately after a disaster is part of homeland security. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 Annex 1 (2009) defined that homeland security covers “security initiatives to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks or natural disasters” as well. In line with this, Department for Homeland Security Director Janet Napolitano has signed in 2009 Directive 252-11 that defined that some of the key tasks of homeland security personnel covers “preventing, preparing for, protecting against, and responding to natural disasters, acts of terrorism and other man-made disasters within the United States” (p. 2). Figure 1. Epicenter of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake Source: Horton et al., 2008, p. 308 In this work, we study the case of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami of how society prepares for, responds, copes, and behaves during a disaster and derives useful lessons both for sociology and for advancement of the science of homeland security. The over-riding objective is that through the case study, we hope that society and homeland security professionals can improve their work related to disaster preparedness and response. The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake refers to the earthquake that struck at 0:59 GMT on 26 December 2004 with a magnitude of 9.3 with the epicenter at 160 km west of Sumatra, Indonesia and 900 km southwest of Penang, Malaysia (Horton et al., 2008, p. 307). An encircled star in the southwestern area of Figure 1 indicates the epicenter of the earthquake. Since 1900, only the 1960 earthquake of Chile in 1960, estimated at magnitude 9.5, was larger (Horton et al., 2008, p. 307).1 The large magnitude of the earthquake caused tremendous damage to countries surrounding the Indian Ocean (Kato and Katayama, 2005, Preface). In particular, the magnitude 9.3 earthquake caused a tsunami that affected Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand, and India. In Myanmar, for instance, the tsunamis after the said earthquake were between 0.4 and 2.9 meters along the coasts (Satake et al., 2010, p. 15). In addition, the earthquake exposed coral beds and rock strata “due to the tectonic uplift caused by (the) 26 December 2004 event” (Satake et al., 2010, p. 23). In Sri Lanka, the 2004 tsunami resulting from the earthquake struck over two thirds of her coastline and left more than 31,229 dead, 4,100 persons missing, and displaced at least 516,150 persons (Rupasinghe and Dias, 2005, p. 39). About half of Sri Lanka’s land area was affected by the tsunami, including its 23,449 acres of cultivated land (Rupasinghe and Dias, 2005, p. 40). A year after the disaster, thousands of people have remained homeless in Sri Lanka (Rupasinghe and Dias, 2005, p. 41). In Indonesia, the situation was worst: more than 200,000 deaths, 500,000 people displaced, more than 200,000 units of houses damaged, around 600 school buildings damaged, and more than 5,000 kilometers or road partially or fully destroyed (Rauf, 2005, p. 43). More disasters are anticipated because of the ongoing global climate change (Amin, 2005, p. 60). Thus, it is extremely important to understand the sociology of disasters so we can be more able to prepare for, cope with, and respond to disasters. 2. Actors and Responsibilities The main actors in the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami disasters are the local communities, government, local nongovernment organizations, international nongovernment organizations, governments of other countries, and the multilateral institutions such as the United Nations or international relief organizations. Of course, at the country level, communities are responsible for keeping themselves safe from disasters. Governments have the primary responsibility but they can assume the responsibility initially alone if community organizations are weak or there are no local nongovernment groups attending to some of the communities. However, if this is the case, it may be in the government’s and community’s interest to mobilize nongovernment within the country: other nongovernment groups may come from another part of the country to attend to disaster preparedness concerns of a community. A nongovenment group may initially find its organization alone in assisting a particular community. If this is the case, then the nongovernment group may tap government agencies for disaster preparedness. Disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts are principally a government’s and its citizen’s responsibility to their fellow citizens. However, it can happen that local efforts may not be adequate to respond to the needs related to disaster response, relief, and recover. In this case, international initiatives will have to emerge and act swiftly and decisively. Acting swiftly and decisively requires however, that local efforts have to blend in a good fit with international efforts. This naturally presupposes that both the national and international groups have developed protocols for a good fit between the national and international interfaces of efforts. This implies that disaster preparedness requires international and not only local efforts. Even if national initiatives are adequate to address local disasters, international efforts are important for experience exchange that can be useful for refining methods in disaster preparedness, response, relief, and recovery. International efforts in the Indian Ocean disasters are reflected in Figure 2. In addition, Figure 2 indicate that the gap between commitment and actual assistance disbursed may be reflecting bureaucratic constraints in donor countries. More than anything else, this highlights a need for in-house country capability to dealing with disasters. International or foreign organizations may want to help us immediately but they may have to face bureaucratic constraints in their governments, too, and it remains important each government and each locality have the capability to address their own disasters. Figure 2. OECD country assistance to the 2004 Indian Ocean disaster victims Source: Telford, 2007, p. 3 3. Sociological Overview Sociological studies on the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami disaster appears to be lacking. However, lacking in disaster awareness, it can be gathered from Kurita (2005, p. 59) that community people behaved this way during the disaster: while some people evacuated to higher ground at the occurrence of the tsunami, a significant number of people ran back to the sea to have a look as the sea level dropped. From several studies, we can also discover that people have limited knowledge of the dangers of tsunamis (Kurita, 2005, p. 59). Data indicate that almost half of schoolchildren have not even heard of disasters (Kurita, 2005, p. 59). Data also indicate that almost a third of students are ignorant of what causes tsunamis (Kurita, 2005, p. 59). Yet, surveys indicate schools continue to be most effective locations on which to promote disaster awareness (Kurita, 2005, p. 59). At the same time, it is expected that disaster education in schools can reach the adult population as well (Kurita, 2005, p. 59). This may be possible through the reach of schools with the parents of children. The most useful information for people immediately after tsunami seems to be verbal communications (Kurita, 2005, p. 59). People believe that that most effective way to raise awareness on disaster reduction are education in schools (Kurita, 2005, p. 59). There will be no difficulty in promoting an early warning system for natural disaster because residents in affected areas concur with the need for early warning systems for natural disasters. Meanwhile, with regard to communication systems, a society’s level of development can be indicative of what may be effective communication system during a disaster, as the disaster is ongoing. In India, for example, cellular phones may be useful as every village has 5-20 people in every village has a cellular phone (Takada et al., 2005, p. 51). Meanwhile, in the national and international scenes, multilevel networking and collaboration have become a standard practice among stakeholders, particularly among nongovernment organizations or NGOs (Amin, 2005, p. 60). NGOs play critical roles in relief and rehabilitation efforts during disasters (Amin, 2005, p. 60). 4. Readiness and Risk Reduction, Response, and Recovery The study of Iemura et al. (2005, p. 45) indicates that had people been prepared for a disaster, the number of deaths in Indonesia, for example, could have been significantly reduced. Figure 3 indicates that deaths from the 2004 Indian Ocean disaster could have been reduced by at least 25%. The percentages without parentheses in Figure 3 refer to actual survivors and the percentage figures in parentheses refer to what could have been survivor figures had people manage to ran away immediately after the earthquake in view of a tsunami. Figure 3. Survival rates had people ran away sooner after the earthquake in Indonesia Source: Iemura, 2005, p. 45 Figure 3 therefore indicates that given Indonesia’s death figure of 200,000 people from the disaster, at least 50,000 people could have been saved had there been adequate disaster preparedness in Indonesia. Most likely, the same situation was applicable to other countries affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean disaster. The 50,000 lives that could have been saved is highly conservative, of course. As could be seen in Figure 3, in one of the cases, there was only a survival rate of 8% given the potential survival rate of 80% had people managed to run immediately after the earthquake to escape from the tsunami. As a result of the 2004 disaster, Indonesians acquired awareness on the “need for establishing a real time sea level monitoring network to support the tsunami warning system in Indian Ocean” (Manurung, 2005, p. 36). Initiatives were undertaken to “build joint cooperation with international and inter-related government institutions and local governments in Indonesia” to have a permanent monitoring system on the sea level consisting of 60 stations (Manurung, 2005, p. 36). This seems to be the consensus that has emerged in Asia. Meanwhile, towards recovery, the UNDP has been helping several countries in recovering from the devastation of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami. In Sri Lanka, according to Rupasinghe and Dias (2005, p. 39), UNDP assistance has been through the Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN). 5. Conclusion In this review of the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, several insights can be derived: a. The actors in a disaster are not limited to domestic actors but include international actors as well. Most likely, the extent of international participation would be a function of the severity of the disaster. The more severe the disaster, the greater the likelihood of the participation of international actors. b. Declarations of assistance are not usually equal to actual assistance and this distinction must be borne in mind as we conduct relief efforts. Some of the assistance may take years before the assistance can actually be realized. c. Based on the sociological overview we have outlined, it appears logical to adopt the recommendations of Kurita (2005, p. 59): promote disaster education in schools as well as in communities. d. Homeland security professionals must be keen in the sociological aspects of disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. e. In particular, homeland security professionals must be good in tapping not only government but also nongovernment efforts and international and not merely national efforts. f. Homeland security professional must be focus on the preparedness of citizens for disasters and the promotion of consciousness among citizens of the possibility of disasters and how they may be able to cope or deal with them. This aspect alone can save the lives of at least 25% of the casualties if not 100% of them. References Amin, A. (2005). Strengthening communities through partnership---The ADRRN model. In T. Kato and T. Katayama (eds.), Documentation on the 2005 Memorial Conference of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://www.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/sumatra/Abstract051202b.pdf Iemura, H., Takahashi, Y., Sukamdo, P., Pradono, M., and Kurniawan, R. (2005). Tsunami questionnaires and bridge damage surveys in Banda Aceh for city restoration planning and urban design. In T. Kato and T. Katayama (eds.), Documentation on the 2005 Memorial Conference of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://www.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/sumatra/Abstract051202b.pdf Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 Annex 1. (2009). Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1199894121015.shtm#1 Horton, B., Bird, M., Birkland, T., Cowie, S., Eong, O., Hawkes, A., Khoon, G., Law, L., Macgregor, C., Shawu-Hwai, A., Sa, T., and Yasin, Z. (2008). Environmental and socioeconomic dynamics of the Indian Ocean tsunami in Penang, Malaysia. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 29, 307-324. Kato, T. and Katayama, T. (2005). Documentation on the 2005 Memorial Conference of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://www.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/sumatra/Abstract051202b.pdf Kurita, T. (2005). Tsunami risk awareness in the affected communities. . In T. Kato and T. Katayama (eds.), Documentation on the 2005 Memorial Conference of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://www.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/sumatra/Abstract051202b.pdf Manurung, P. (2005). Development of Indonesia permanent sea level monitoring network for supporting Indian Ocean tsunami warning system. In T. Kato and T. Katayama (eds.), Documentation on the 2005 Memorial Conference of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://www.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/sumatra/Abstract051202b.pdf McIntyre, D. (2009, 26 March). Disaster declarations. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://homelandsecurity.tamu.edu/media/weekly_radio/disaster-declarations-march-26-2009-187.html/ Napolitano, J. (2009). Directive 252-11 (Revision Number 00). US Department of Homeland Security: Office for State and Local Law Enforcement. Rauf, J. (2005). Damage of infrastructures caused by December 2004 great earthquake and tsunami in Aceh Region Indonesia. In T. Kato and T. Katayama (eds.), Documentation on the 2005 Memorial Conference of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://www.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/sumatra/Abstract051202b.pdf Rupasinghe, N. and Dias, A. (2005). Post tsunami construction, rehabilitation, and restoration program in Sri Lanka. In T. Kato and T. Katayama (eds.), Documentation on the 2005 Memorial Conference of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://www.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/sumatra/Abstract051202b.pdf Satake, K., Aung, T., Sawai, Y., Okamura, Y., Wing, K., Swe, W., Swe, C., Swe, T., Tun, S., Soe, M., Oo, T., and Zaw, S. (2005). In T. Kato and T. Katayama (eds.), Documentation on the 2005 Memorial Conference of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://www.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/sumatra/Abstract051202b.pdf Shepard, J. (2010). Sociology. 10th ed. Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. Takada, S., Kuwata, Y., and Pieta, A. (2005). Damage and restoration of lifeline in Thailand due to the 2004 giant earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean. . In T. Kato and T. Katayama (eds.), Documentation on the 2005 Memorial Conference of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake Tsunami. Retrieved August 28, 2010, from http://www.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/sumatra/Abstract051202b.pdf Telford, J. (2007). The international humanitarian system and the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis. 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