The intelligence community - Essay Example

Due There is indeed very little doubt that the creation of the Intelligence community was all but about the Soviet Union and how its rapid expanding global influence could be sabotaged and subsequently defeated altogether1. The Intelligence community, thus, had one and only mission of protecting the United States’ strategic and vital interests as a global super power from the Soviet Republic that had seemingly attained an almost equal strength to destabilize and/or pose the greatest test to the United States’ hegemony ever in history. Noteworthy, the collapse of the Soviet Union opened a new chapter in the history of intelligence community; an organization that had their guns all trained on defeating the Soviet Union had to redefine itself, for the enemy was no more2. Not until the 9/11 resurfaced with catastrophic bloodshed that left the nation in real shock for the first time in almost two decades over their security concerns, the intelligence community had virtually very little to show for their existence with regards to the dangers posed by the outside terror organizations3. More than ever since its formation, the 9/11 incident exposed the ineptitude of the Intelligence Service with reference to their exact role in securing the United States against terror organizations; an accusation deservedly sustained by the seemingly thriving terrorist networks, even in face of a burgeoning budget allocations for the very same purpose. This paper briefly analyses the Intelligence breakdown in the light of current security lapses, more so with regards to ineffective sharing of intelligence information between the intelligence agencies, the oversight committees, the effects of budget cuts, as well as the very relationship that feeds into policymaking. Right from the Revolution that ushered in the independent America to the constitutional making, America’s founding fathers had their best foot forward, instituting and subsequently implementing well thought out policies as a tool for conflict resolution; policies that have passed the test of time to ward-off the effects brought about by being a shaky nation. With the rise of the Soviet Union to the status of an equal super power, rivaling the United States soon after Second World War, the number of silver bullets toward the United States increased in leaps and bounds, threatening the very security of a nation that had enjoyed superiority since World War I, in effect, raising Americans’ fears to question the capability of the state to protect itself and its position among nations of the world; questions which only piled up with the shocking incident of Pearl Harbor in 19414. This very incident informed the need to increase security as a preventive mechanism to any foreign threats, which was but a reality, thus, the restructuring of the intelligence service from a simple political tool to a more developed and well-structured security organization that culminated into the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 19475. It is news in the open in the 21st century America, that the intelligence service might have failed the nation yet again. The question as to whether the United States has a supervisory role over nations is indisputable; for America has but a global footprint that no any other nation can and/or will ever match in the near future. As the Ukraine crisis continues unabated, with Russia’s sudden use of force to commit human rights crimes and a possible takeover in the offing, the Intelligence Service remains largely absent, more importantly with regards to finding a lasting solution to ensure world peace, which is but the United States function as the big brother6. More shocking is a video that has now gone viral, revealing the activities of the world dreaded terror organization, Al-Qaida, in Yemen7. Even though each of the two events differ from each other, both fall within the very basic missions of the Intelligence community. Indeed very little, if any, has ever been made public concerning the role of the intelligence community on the two incidents. The Director of Intelligence community has, however, indicated that they were aware of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but has fallen short of admitting failure to marshal the intelligence agencies to function as a team8. Though important in streamlining the nation’s engagements in the diplomatic circles, policymaking, which is a major facet in functioning of the Intelligence community itself, has had its fair share in the sidelines, and thus becoming one of the greatest obstacles in the breakdown of Intelligence effectiveness. The very relationship between policymaking and the effectiveness of intelligence service to the nation is but symbiotic relationship, where both should feeding into each other resources with reference to operational guidelines on the paths to follow in generating decisions that best serve the nation, more particularly with regards to complex issues9. Observably, this very important relations has not been beneficial in generating the most needed information at both ends, with policymakers occasionally rejecting intelligence reports presented to them on the basis of information inadequacy10. Strikingly notable is the very code of secrecy in the intelligence service that informs policymaking prioritization of their agenda, bypassing most critical issues of security concern. It is, thus, discernible to pinpoint the origins of biasness in the making of laws that safeguards the interests of the nation, both internally and externally, concerning how the intelligence service should handle and share information11. It is also important to that the two organs of the state, policymaking and the intelligence service, operate from different cultures and work spheres, with the former tasked mainly with the institutionalization of sustainable solutions that stands the test of time, while the latter focused principally on analytical aspects of circumstantial incidents for immediate, preventive actions12. In other words, it the constitutional duty of the policymakers to act on information presented to them based on briefings from the intelligence service13; analytical briefings occasionally built on none factual information [theories and/or hypotheses] to explain different situations14. Such was the Intelligence report on Iraq during the Bush administration, which, as a matter of fact, included inaccurate information about the use of weapon of mass destruction, leading to the failure of military operations to unearth any tangible evidence to as alluded to in the reports. Given the nature of their work and work culture, the success of the theories and/or hypotheses generated by the Intelligence service depends on a lot of factors, which includes but not limited to assumptions, mirror-imaging, cultural and historical knowledge, source of information, experience as well as the operational environment, which by and large constitutes political pressures for inclined opinions15. Such political pressures go to the extent of influencing analytical reports prepared by intelligence organizations to suit certain opinions16; opinions which may as well put the country, albeit unknowingly, in the line of danger. One of the issues that the 9/11 commission report tackled regarding the intelligence failure to predict the incident was the lack of informational sharing between the Intelligence community themselves and the policy makers. As indicated in the report, that the intelligence community does not function as a community; the agencies were not isolated from each in terms of their services to the nation, but were never cooperating with each other17. Additionally, the Intelligence community had a rather slow process of sharing information, sometimes hiding them from each other or sharing them late when they no longer of no value. A clear example would be the failure to catch the 9/11 airplane hijackers even though some of them went through airport screening system. With the lack of information sharing, the identification of the criminal became rather difficult. Shockingly, the hijackers traveled severally in and out the United States, yet no one bothered to share information on the dealings of such individuals18. It is this very resistance to share information that hugely contributed the security lapse that resulted into the 9/11. According to the Counterterrorism and GITMO 9/11 commission report, the Intelligence Community only begun to cooperate with each other long after the incident had occurred. But even so, Snowden spillover has yet again dropped a bombshell that may well rollback the strides made and/or create similar dilemmas in sharing critical information with other agencies19. In ways than one, the congress is responsible of funding the Intelligence community through an oversight committee that follows its processes and progress20. As a support organization, therefore, congress plays a fundamental in the function of the intelligence community, and that huge pressures remain in their shoulders when their [IC] reports are ignored21. Even so, the congress is itself a threat when it comes to shared information. According to the speaker on congress oversight, congress members do not like to be the members of the oversight committees because Intelligence information are but always confidential22. Congress members in their nature are known to be public figures, attracting public and the media attention, more so during campaigns. The intelligence community, thus, view them as a sources of informational leak, and so not trustable23. They are also responsible for the Intelligence community funding, and may sometimes go into competition with the president, through such channels24. The current Intelligence community budget is already a challenge in the present and will continue to be into the future; for foreign threats and the disorder in many of countries such as Syria, Ukraine, Iraq, Libya and others have risen threefold all over the world, making it even harder to accomplish the mission of protecting the United States and it is interests abroad. According to the speaker on Intelligence and ethics, the limited budget prevents the intelligence community from hiring more professorial analysts25. Accordingly, the Intelligence community can not only be able to do long term work, but the budget runs deep to affect even the quality of work done, which includes their ability to counter terrorism26. Even with the advanced technology and the diverse Intelligence sources for collecting information, the Intelligence community is facing difficulties connecting with success. The failure of Intelligence community can be linked to several reasons, some of which are related to the actors already mentioned such as the policymakers, analysts within the intelligence community and oversight committees by congress. Other reasons include the strategic structure of the organizations such as the lack of information sharing within the Intelligence community itself, the budget limitations as well as the effect of technological knowhow. With the rise of foreign threats and terrorist networks, Intelligence reform is, therefore, required, right from the functioning of the Intelligence community itself to the other stakeholders in matters of security, including the public. More importantly, the relations between the policymakers and the Intelligence community should strengthened to enable them work as a team. On their part, policymakers should consider Intelligence reports seriously, and prioritize without bias. Given the nature of political interference, laws should be enacted to ward-off political pressures into changing well-meaning policies to suit certain opinions wide off public security interests. Also analysis should not work on one issue all the time27. To increase creativity and experience in their areas of expertise, it is recommended that the Intelligence community connect multiple subjects to encourage more credible results28. When it comes to the budget, the money spent on intelligence should be increased by the congress in order for the Intelligence community to attract and retain top notch expertise that can deliver quality work within the recommended timelines. According to the speaker on Intelligence reform, the Intelligence community does not reform by itself, but it does so when new legislations are created29. It, therefore, follows that attempts to chain the Intelligence operations to the current budget estimates only signals failure in accomplishing security missions of the entire United States at home and abroad. The only way to implement best security policies is to provide the intelligence community with the necessary capacity to collect the vital information needed to keep threats at bay. Read More