United Nations peacekeeping - Essay Example

What determines success and failure in United Nations 'Peacekeeping' The United Nations recognized its first crisis force UNEF after the Suezwar in 1956; it was during this time that one heard the word UN peacekeeping for the first time. The "Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations." was formed in 1965 by the UN General Assembly (GA) to handle the matters regarding peacekeeping. In spite of this effort for a more systematic move, the presentation of peacekeeping operations has been impromptu. This system was designed to stand-in for the collective security system, which was hindered by the stalemate in the Security Council between the permanent members. Radhika (2002: Chapter15) Over the past thirty years international peacekeeping, has a diverse record of success. The opposition of third party states and other subnationals has been one of the main reasons for the failure of peacekeeping operations. These two play a key role either in refusing to stop any violence and also trying to attack the peacekeepers. The failure of some of the peacekeeping operations can be attributed to these. To make peacekeeping operations a success, all parties should stop violence, and should work hard and wish to maintain peace. The superpowers of the world like USA and Russia also play an important role in determining the success or failure of a peacekeeping operation. (Diehl 1988, p.503) A clear mandate of the proposed mission is very necessary to work efficiently on the mission. If a mandate were not clear, it would affect the efficiency of the work to be put in a mission. The way a peacekeeping operation is organized and the financial requirements of an operation also play a vital role in determining the efficiency of the operation, and the operation may be delayed due to the inefficiency. (Diehl 1988, p.503) The geography and the neutrality of the area in which the operation is to be undertaken have an impact on the success of the operation. If the areas of operation effectively divided the opponents, were not easily susceptible to attack and allowed easy inspection, peacekeeping operations can perform much better in such conditions. The absence of the above conditions could create problems even in the most minor cases. Maintaining neutrality is also very important for an operation, if the operation is biased in favor of a particular party, support from other parties that are interested could be withdrawn. (Diehl 1988, p.503) One of the key point which could be used to evaluate the success or failure of an operation, would be to assess whether the purpose of the mission according to the mandate has been achieved or not. Another way of evaluation could be to assess the undertakings of the mission, like how many people were rehabilitated, how many cease-fires were achieved. Comparison of the present state of an operation and the situation in the absence of the operation can also give a clear picture of how a state will be in the absence of the UN peacekeeping forces. (Diehl 1997, p.152) Four relative ways to assess whether an operation is a success or a failure are, comparison with mandate of the mission, comparison with other peacekeeping missions, the impact of the mission on the concerned state, and the impact on the United Nations. The last two methods are especially useful, because of their relevance to the concerned state to which the mission was organized. The success of any peacekeeping mission depends on the mindset of the people in that state, violence will only lead to their disaster, accepting a peaceful lifestyle helps them in the long run. (Ratner 1997, p.154) A relief mission organized by the United Nations, The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), in between 1993 to 1996, can be used as an example of a failed peacekeeping mission by the United Nations. The main objective of the operation was to reduce the pressure between the Hutu-dominated Rwanda's management and the Tutsi radicals. To protect the cease-fire between the government of Hutu and the Tutsi radicals, a United Nations peacekeeping force of 2,500 worldwide armed forces were sent to Rwanda. Hutu activists who were fiercely against the idea of sharing any sort of power with the Tutsis threatened to disturb the peace in Rwanda. These Hutu activists were looking for an opportunity, and were even prepared to kill the important leaders. (Genocide in Rwanda:1994) A number of peace meetings were held between the Tutsi rebels and the Rwandan President and Burundi President in 1994, amidst increasing violence in Rwanda. In April while the two Presidents were returning from a meeting in Tanzania, the jet in which the Presidents were traveling was shot down near the airport in Kigali. Their death sparked off a political bloodshed, as the Hutu activists targeted important people of the opponents who were on their death-lists, which included average Hutu political leaders and Tutsi leaders. (Genocide in Rwanda:1994) This led to the Hutu Military forces going on a rampage in the countryside killing many Tutsi nationals, which led to the Rwandan Genocide. The UNAMIR which had a very small force was peacekeeping force was alarmed as most of the Tutsi families and politicians came to them for security. Around 10 soldiers from the UN peacekeeping mission from Belgium were detained and murdered by the Hutus. Seeing all this, the UN members of the France, United States, Belgium, and Italy all started withdrawing their troops from Rwanda. (Genocide in Rwanda:1994) According to an estimation by the Red Cross in April, more than around hundreds of thousands of Tutsi's had been murdered. Reacting to the situation in Rwanda, which was worsening day by day, the U.N. Security Council decided to abandon Rwanda. The remaining UN peacekeeper troops were also withdrawn, which left behind only a small force of around 200 personnel. According to records around 5,00,000 Tutsi's had been murdered by the ending of May. At had become a common site to see bodies floating in the River Kigara into the Lake Victoria. (Genocide in Rwanda:1994) The UN Security Council were facing tough times, having to deal with the television news reports describing the genocide in Rwanda, the U.N. Security Council had no choice but to send nearly, 5,000 army personnel to Rwanda. But the Security Council with improper planning could not send the troops on time to stop the slaughter, by then the damage had already been done. The genocide came to an end in July 1994, when Tutsi's from the bordering countries managed to conquer the Hutus. Nearly 8,00,000 people were killed in Rwanda, around one-tenth of the total population. (Genocide in Rwanda:1994) UNAMIR continued to work so as to ensure the safekeeping and strength, supporting charitable assistance, clearing landmines and by helping the refugees to settle down. But the authorities of Rwanda wanted to end the mission of UNAMIR; on the pretext that UNAMIR did not take action to its needs, which were of utmost priority. Taking note of the Rwandan's reaction the Security Council asked UNAMIR to leave Rwanda in March 1996. (UNAMIR:1999) The Cambodian peacekeeping operation can be called a successful operation. The Cambodian peacekeeping mission was the major and mainly ambitious UN peacekeeping operation till date when it was initiated in 1992. The UN mission consisted of around 20,000 UN workers, of which 16,000 of them were uniformed armed peacekeepers, and the cost of the mission was more than $2 billion. Cambodia has Vietnam and Thailand two violent nations as its neighbors. The peacekeeping mission in Cambodia was known as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). (Farris: 1994) The main agendas of this mission included military, political, and humanitarian agendas, which were approved by the Security Council in 1992, according to the UN Secretary General's plan for UNTAC. The main aim of the UNTAC was to dismantle more than 70 percent of the opposite armed forces and achieve total control over the left over 30 percent forces; to systematize, control, and conduct free and just elections; and to bring back and re-establish the 350,000 Cambodians living in different refugee camps in and around Thailand. The Security Council was given authorization to organize the mission for a period of 18 months only. (Farris: 1994) A senior national UN career staff officer was selected, as the Special Representative of the Secretary General, to whom the overall command was handed over. The main aim of the UN mission was to create favorable conditions that would promote the growth of an independent nation and civilization in Cambodia. The UNTAC mission was unique and diverse, because peacekeeping in Cambodia meant a big challenge and a greatly prolonged mission for the United Nations. UNTAC's mission consisted of seven different operative elements, six national factors and one military factor. The Human Rights Component, the Civil Administration Component, the Civil Police Component, the Repatriation Component, the Rehabilitation Component, the Electoral Component, the Military Component. (Farris: 1994) The most important functions of the UNTAC were to create the conditions for a general election by appealing and cantoning the military services of the four Cambodian groups, and to carry out the elections during the period approved in the Paris Peace Treaty. All the other activities by the UNTAC, whatever guaranteed benefits they created were planned in such a manner to guarantee the success of these two functions. (Farris: 1994) UNTAC was being criticized by everyone for its diffidence and uncertainty by the beginning of 1993. Even as the national elections neared, the chances for the success of UNTAC and the potential of Cambodia seemed very bleak. Everybody wrote off Cambodia, as it was very difficult to conduct proper elections in an environment as distraught as that of Cambodia. In spite of the tense atmosphere, elections were held in between 23 and 28 May 1993 and were extremely successful. The strong need of the Cambodian people to express their free will, made the elections an instant success. An astonishing 89.6 percent of people came to express their vote during the polling, which was conducted for six days. (Farris: 1994) The UNTAC mission completed within the time mentioned in the mandate, and it was within the budget allocated. By sticking to the norms and showing effective results, the United Nations peacekeeping effort in Cambodia accomplished its most key objective. In comparison to the difficulties faced by other peacekeeping operations, the UNTAC mission was a success in spite of its failure to disarm the groups. (Farris: 1994) Conclusion The success or failure of any peacekeeping operation depends on the people and the authorities of the place were the peacekeeping mission is being operated. The UN, who operates these missions, should have experienced and efficient staff to handle these operations. They should compare and study previous peacekeeping operations to have an in-depth idea of how these missions should be handled. The background, the nature of people, the financial conditions, the lifestyle and the attitude of the neighboring states of the place at which the operation is going to be held, should be deeply studied. The attitude of the people should also change, instead of developing feelings of revenge and jealousy; they should try to be sympathetic and compassionate towards other people. People should develop a feeling to maintain peace in their state. If peacekeeping can stop revenge and murders, then it is the responsibility of each and every person to try and make these peacekeeping operations a success. The failure of any one peacekeeping operation need not effect the following operations, but one can learn a lot from the previous operations and try not to repeat the same mistakes, and try to make it work for their advantage. A lot of dedication and hard work goes into making a peacekeeping operation a success References Karl Farris, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, A Success [online]. Available from : http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1994/farris.htm [cited 23 March, 2007] Radhika Withana-Arachchi, Human Rights Law Resources, International Peacekeeping [online] Available from : http://bar.austlii.edu.au/au/other/HRLRes/2002/6/index.html#Heading46 [cited 23 March, 2007] UNAMIR, International Tribunal for Rwanda [online]. Available from : http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirS.htm [cited 23 March, 2007] United Human Rights Council, Genocide in Rwanda [online]. Available from : http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/Genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm [cited 26 March, 2007] Paul Diehl, Steven Ratner, 1997, Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions [online]. 41(1), pp.151-165. Available from : http://links.jstor.org/sicisici=1079-1760%28199705%2941%3A1%3C151%3AEPM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I [cited 27 March,2007] Paul F. Diehl, 1988, Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace [online]. 103(3), pp. 485-507. Available from : http://links.jstor.org/sicisici=0032-3195%28198823%29103%3A3%3C485%3APOATQF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2 [cited 27 March, 2007] Read More