How Did the New Diplomacy of 1919 Differ From the Old - Essay Example

How did the new diplomacy of 1919 differ from the 'old' The aim of the present work is not only to discuss the differences, which existed and existat present between the old diplomacy of the pre-war period and the new diplomacy, but to define and evaluate these differences, and conclude, whether it is truthful to define the two stages of the diplomatic history as the ages of old and new diplomacy, as many authors debate as for the existence of drastic differences between these two notions. The work will be designed in the following way: first of all it will be necessary to outline the main principles of the old diplomacy, and to closely consider, how it worked in different states; it is then important to discuss the Fourteen points of Woodrow Wilson - this discussion is relevant to understand, whether his Fourteen points were the first step towards the 'new' diplomacy or just the act against the spreading of communist ideology across Europe. Through the research of the literary sources, used for the present work, a serious debate about the existence of the notions of the 'old' and 'new' diplomacy has been found, thus it would be essential to discuss this debate and to evaluate it in the separate chapter of this paper; however, as the general topic is devoted to the differences between the 'old' and the 'new' diplomacy, it is essential to distinguish the exact differences between these two historical stages of the diplomacy and their brief characteristics. The age of the old diplomacy The division into the 'old' and the 'new' diplomacy has become evident for certain scientists and diplomats through the research of the period before and after the World War I, when at the edge of the 1919 the new concepts in relation to the international relations appeared. In order to understand the differences which exist between the two different stages of the diplomatic history, it is worth speaking about the situation, which existed in the diplomacy before WWI and 1919 in particular. The seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, which are often called the beginning of the diplomacy formation in Europe, have been characterized by the existing tradition of despotism - which meant that people of the state didn't have any influence at the foreign affair' decisions and foreign policy of the country. 'Despotism was an integral part of the old order which had to be overcome. To this way of thinking the decisive step in establishing the new order was a change in political leadership; the people themselves had to take over control of political life'. (Gilbert 1951: 26) This quotation was related to the French republic, which during the eighteenth century was one of the most prominent and powerful European states; simultaneously, it is impossible to omit the discussion of the diplomacy, which was characteristic to the country until the beginning of the WWI. It is interesting to look at France as one of the clear representatives of the diplomatic system, which existed before the WWI. The period, which we are here to discuss and consider, is the period of the 'Third French Republic', and the Constitution of 1875, which put the grounds to the diplomatic system of France, in conjunction with the traditions of the state. Schuman (1931) in his book about French diplomacy before the WWI wrote about the traditions, existing in the political system of France at the end of the 19th century, and which have created the irreversible effects on the course of diplomacy in Europe: 'In France, as in the other States of the Western State System, the control of foreign affairs was traditionally a prerogative of royalty during the formative period of modern international relations. From the earliest times to the Great revolution, the subject matter of diplomacy and international law dealt mainly with the dynastic relations and territorial ambitions of royal families and foreign policy was largely a personal affair of the king'. (p. 94) It is interesting to closer consider the idea, brought by this citation: on the one hand, the old diplomacy in Europe was not public, as has become characteristic closer to the edge of the 19th century, but on the other hand, it was a personal matter of the head of the State, and in fact represented the so-called personal diplomacy, which is now one of the most prominent features of the modern time. Thus, does this mean that there is no drastic difference between the 'old' and the 'new' diplomacy This debate will be discussed in the later chapters, but it is seen at present, that the 'old' diplomacy in France was characterized by concentration of the power in the hands of the king, which has already been related by us as despotism and tyranny. There was no judicial or public body, which would define the direction of the negotiations or foreign policy - it has all been defined by the monarch. Simultaneously, during the period of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the philosophers of that time were reflecting upon the diplomatic system - the most radical reformers saw no necessity for the diplomacy in the future, supposing it to be the archaic notion. (Butterfield 1966: 14) As an example Netherlands and Venice were taken - the fact that these States were the most successful at that time, keeping to their neutrality and not falling too deep into the foreign diplomacy, made people think that total absence of diplomatic relations, and foreign connections based on trade only were the means of making States flourish. It is interesting to note, that neutrality has proved itself to be successful and beneficial at present as well - the example of Switzerland makes us think as for the course the diplomatic system of each country has to choose. However, after the war with Holland, Spain and Italy, France returned to the old methods of conducting diplomacy. Though the talk here is mainly about the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, it is worth saying that the 19th century in France was the first attempt to break the existing system and to introduce the notions of the 'new diplomacy'. At the end of the 19th century the situation in the French diplomacy was not as concentrated as during the royal times - the President of the Republic could 'conduct himself in such fashion as to influence the course of diplomatic conversations'. (Schuman, 1931: 96) It is even more interesting to note, that by 1914, 'Poncaire, as President continued to exercise the functions of foreign minister and played an important secret role in strengthening the Franco-Russian Alliance and preparing the stage for 1914'. (Schuman, 1931: 99) This is another characteristics and feature of the 'old' diplomacy in Europe as a whole - the alliances made between the powers were mostly secret. The directions of the foreign policies and the choice of the alliances to create and to join were not delegated to the general public, as well as were based on the rationality, cost-benefits evaluation and the aims of the State. The beginning of the 20th century was a kind of the turning point in the general attitude towards diplomacy, as well as the changing relations between the countries, especially the so called Great Powers. The balance of powers by that time has become a central matter of any diplomatic relations. The close conjunction between nationalism and diplomacy has acquired by 1914 very clear forms - and probably this mixture of military race, secret powerful diplomacy and nationalism has become the reason of the WWI' outbreak. The turning point in the diplomatic course in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century was caused by the fall of Bismarck in Germany - as far as by 1890 Germany had to continue its treaty and alliance with Russia, it declined to do so, grounding this decline on certain statements of the Austro-German alliance. Bismarck never paid too much attention to the controversies, which were later found in the treaties made under his rule; he believed 'ambiguities would refrain a nation from going to war and attached more importance to a good understanding with other nations than to the exact terms of treaties'. (Hughes, 2000: 112) France and Russia have become the two greatest powers in Europe, which have created their alliance without German participation in it. The diplomatic implications for this alliance were in the following: France was looking for a powerful ally and was not scared by the differences in the regimes - as France was democratic, Russia at that time was autocratic; on the other hand, as both countries bordered on Germany, they were both insured from the escalation of violence on the German side. German diplomacy failed through both the termination of the alliance with Russia as well as in seeking the new partner. British diplomacy was directed at isolation and unwillingness to grant its leading military and trading role in Europe to any other country. British diplomats rejected the German offer to create the alliance, and thus by the 1900 the balance of powers has been formed in Europe - Russian-French Alliance was against Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy. (Goldstein 1991: 32) It should be pointed out, that one of the most prominent diplomats and writers of his time, Nicolson (1999) was the ardent supporter of the balance of powers in Europe. 'He regarded the 'balance of powers' to be the best method of preserving international peace.' (p. 49) He wrote, that 'in a world in which no single country tried to impose its will by force the system of the balance of power would of course become unnecessary. But until we reach such a utopia we must realize that the only means of resisting violence is to oppose it with a greater balance of force.' (Nicolson 1999: 54) It should also be added that by the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, an important change took place in the general course of European diplomacy - this change was coming closer to making the general diplomacy public. With the development of the industry and the proliferation of the press, each achievement or failure in the foreign policies of the European countries started to be closely perceived and evaluated by common populations. 'Europeans started to identify more with their nation states and considered its prestige a matter of highest interest'. (Kennedy 1989: 33) This was the rise of nationalism in the biggest European countries, the nationalism which later led to the crush of the diplomatic system of the old frame and the beginning of the WWI. This nationalism was acquiring the features of antagonism and aggressiveness, and thus could be skillfully used by the diplomats for the sake of the achievement the strategic goals of the country. 'The world appeared as a fighting ground of ruthless enemies; where only the fittest could survive; compassion, morality and forgiveness seemed inadequate forms of behavior between nations; instead readiness for war seemed the only appropriate attitude'. (Bridge 1983: 98) Thus, by 1914 in Europe it was evident that diplomacy failed as an institution in general. What is meant here, is that diplomacy as a notion, and as Nicolson put it, 'the aim of the sound diplomacy is the maintenance of amicable relations between sovereign states; once diplomacy is employed to provoke international animosity, it ceases to be diplomacy and becomes its opposite, namely war by another name'. (Otte 1998: 8) Thus, the WWI has become the landmark for the world diplomats, a strike for re-thinking the general notions of the European diplomacy and the necessity of making diplomacy open and amicable. The balance of powers has failed to rule the peaceful relations between European States; thus other means had to be found to support peace and amicable relations. This is why the 1949 has not only become the turning point, but has absolutely changed diplomatic relations across Europe. However, it is still a debate, whether one should make difference between the 'old' and the 'new' diplomacy, and whether the new diplomatic features really mattered. Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points By the end of the WWI it has become clear, that Russia, taking into account the revolutionary events which took place during 1917, has chosen absolutely different diplomatic course. Already by the end of the war, the two leading powers of the world, which later have become the two poles of the Cold War, have displayed their desires and strivings for the changed in the world diplomacy, based on the new principles of 'new' diplomatic order, the core idea of which was openness in conducting diplomatic activity. The ideas of Wilson are here paralleled with the diplomatic situation in Russia after Soviet revolution for the aims of identifying, whether Wilson's ideas were really intended at starting the age of the 'new' diplomacy in the world, or was it just a reaction at the Russian diplomatic actions in the fear of Russia getting into the alliance with Germany 'It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understanding of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by' (Martin 1966: 49) These were the words, with which Wilson started his declaration of the fourteenth principles of the 'new diplomacy'. There is a clear parallel of his strivings and the critique of the French philosophers of the diplomacy of the eighteenth century. Simultaneously, it can't but be taken into account, that probably surprisingly, but in fact, regularly, that his fourteen points have appeared following the soviet declarations in Brest-Litovsk. Russia was the first world power, visibly applying the rules of the new diplomacy, but in reality after a short period of time, it has quickly returned to the use of the principles of secrecy and isolation. 'Brest-Litovsk talks were portrayed as the antithesis of secret diplomacy, a manifestation of the capitalist superstructure; the Soviet leadership claimed that Bolshevik diplomacy was unique in its openness, fairness, humanitarianism and peaceful orientation'. (Sofer 1988: 200) This was the step of strengthening the weight of Soviet Russia at the international arena, and thus made its counterpart - The United States - act in absolutely opposite direction. What seems to be clear, having studied a number of literary sources, is that Wilson was hardly striving for changing the pillars of the international diplomacy; his wish was more of creating the power and weight which would be enough for opposing to Russia. As Sofer (1988) wrote, 'the Fourteenth Points were directed towards the United States' Western Allies as well as against the Soviet Union, constituting, inter alia, a counterweight to Bolshevik diplomacy and compelling Britain and France to reconsider their national interests as great powers'. (p. 198) Another author gave the idea, that 'new diplomacy [] served the function of gaining the support of the elements dissatisfied with the existing order an inherent problem in the American approach to foreign affairs was namely that of being ahead or behind, but not in real contact with the outside world.' (Lachs 1962: 34) Even despite the generally accepted opinion, that Wilson's ideas should not considered merely as the answer to the Bolshevik diplomacy, one tends to think, that the fact of the United States being behind Soviet Russia, made Wilson create his Fourteen points, even taking into account that due to the non-European geographical position of the US the ideas of Wilson have never been checked or re-adjusted. (Plischke 1979: 69) Wilson's ideas were not aimed at creating the 'new diplomacy' in the world; the situation was absolutely different, and though the notions of the new diplomacy have appeared and were adjusted to the requirements of that time, this was not due to Wilson's doctrine, but to the general political situation, the end of the WWI and the understanding that the 'old diplomacy' has in fact become the reasons of peace failure. In order to prove, that Wilson's actions were not really directed at ending the age of the 'old' secret diplomacy, it will be interesting to look at the work of Mayer (1959), who wrote that in 1913 Wilson had not known anything about Communist regime, but had been the first to understand its core essence; he was the first to evaluate the Soviet ideological threat, and thus his Fourteen Points after the WWI were directed not at changing the diplomacy, but at restraining the spreading of the communist ideas over Europe. It is even more important, that some authors are sure, the Cold War was the initiative of Wilson (Craig, 1983; Lachs, 1962), and he was the one to start it, thus it is even impossible to assert that he was thinking about diplomacy at the time of him being the American President. While Russia before Revolution was actively developing international relations with other countries (by 1914 it had 37 its representatives in different countries of Europe), the Russians after the Bolshevik revolution 'made public the secret treaties of the Allied Powers and adopted several principles of liberalism [] seeking to direct diplomacy against the Allies.' (Sofer 1988: 198) With the new diplomacy coming, totalitarian regimes, among which the Russian one was the toughest, were mainly characterized by keeping to the diplomatic bureaucracy and the opinion that diplomacy and ideology were incompatible. (Sofer 1988: 200) Wilson has been warned by other American politicians and diplomats as for the real goals and tactics of the Soviet Union, but neither was he planning to create any terms of the 'new diplomacy' nor was he able to realize his plans. The refusal of the US to join the League of Nations and the decision of Wilson to choose the course which was absolutely different from the one preferred by Europe, was the first sign of the international situation, which would remain unchanged. As Nicholson put it, 'this was considered a manifestation of what would henceforth become a permanent phenomenon in international relations'. (Nicolson 1964: 98) Thus, the conclusion here is that Wilson diplomacy, having become total failure, was in fact the brave attempt to change the international diplomatic situation, but it was mainly the direction against the Soviet ideology in the wish to attract Allies to the American side. In the light of all abovementioned and taking into account that Wilson was in fact the first public figure to carry the ideas of the 'new' diplomacy, it is necessary to say some words about the League of Nations. The existence of this organization is rather contradictory from the following viewpoints: first of all, it was one of the first representations of the transition to the summit-type of the 'new' diplomacy, but it is still under debate whether this instrument is effective in the achievement of the strategic goals of diplomacy; on the other hand, the US refused to take part in this alliance - Nicolson (in Sofer 1988: 199) supposed the idea of this alliance utopian, tending to assert that the balance of powers was more efficient means of conducting diplomacy and keeping peace between the States. Thus, despite the fact that the League of Nations as an organization could be supposed the decisive step towards the total change of the diplomatic conduct in the world, its efficiency is yet argumentative. The debate about the 'new' and the 'old' diplomacy Certain authors (Mookerjee, 1973; Sofer, 1988; Hocking, 1995) argue about the existence of the notions of 'old' and 'new' diplomacy, and though the differences are evident, they still claim, that they are vague and inconsistent to state, that there exist two different stages in the diplomatic history. In this connection the work of Sofer comes into use - Sofer stated that the notions of the 'old' diplomacy and the 'new' diplomacy have no connection with the reality and had to be re-considered. In relation to this opinion, it is still necessary to note the changes, which took place after 1919 in the development of the European diplomacy. Sofer mainly relates to the assumption that 'the very term 'diplomacy' is problematic. Diplomacy is a modern phenomenon'. (p. 195) However, it can't be denied, that the constituents of the term diplomacy have existed during several previous to the 19th centuries, and it does not matter, that those notions were not called diplomacy. It is known, that Byzantine served as one of the brightest examples of the diplomatic structure for it being a clear legal entity, which was able to involve its partners into the diplomatic processes. We read about it in Chrysos (1992): 'The road was open for Byzantine diplomacy to draw them into a network of international and inter-state relations which was controlled by the empire.' (p. 26) Byzantine was the first state to have representatives (or embassies) which didn't change their members for years. This was the first sign of what we now call diplomacy - and no matter that the term itself is relatively new; it is possible not to agree to Sofer in this opinion, and to conclude, that diplomacy has existed in Europe for centuries, acquiring various features and changing according to the requirements of time. Another question is that the processes, which take place in the modern world, often appear to be the repetition or similarity of the older processes with slight modification in accordance with the modern requirements. This has already been stated in our work, when we were speaking about the 'old' diplomacy. There has appeared the question, whether the 'new' diplomacy is really 'new' or just a modified version of the old principles. This is particularly interesting in terms of the 'personal diplomacy, which has become one of the most prominent features of the modern time. it is no secret, that diplomacy at present is conducted not only by the ambassadors as official representatives of their states, but also directly by the heads of states, who meet and discuss international issues, making and signing treaties and often 'vocalize' the foreign policy of the state to the public. However, one cannot argue that while the 'old' diplomacy was concentrated in the hands of one person, namely the king or queen, the foreign policy and its determination has become the matter of the separate organ, and the most important issues of foreign affairs are even brought to the public for the solution through voting (as it has been with the decision to join the EU by certain states). Though Sofer is partially right in assertions, but in order to come to the reliable conclusion, it is worth reading other authors' reflection on the 'old' and 'new' diplomacy. For example, as one gets acquainted with Reus-Smith and his work about the moral purpose of the state (1999), one faces the opinion that 'the 'old' diplomacy of the absolutist Europe rested on a moral purpose that defined the entire period, namely that of heavenly salvation; earthly powers were ordered in a hierarchy of descending closeness to God, with France on top' (p. 119) However, with time these states 'reimagined' the world with distancing themselves from the church, and thus 'the moral purpose of the state was defined as the preservation of a divinely ordained, rigidly hierarchical social order'. (Reus-Smit 1999: 121) His thoughts are continued by Hamilton and Langhorne (1995), who state that the emergence of the 'old' diplomacy was mainly rooted in the isomorphism, between the international law and human nature (p. 77); multilateral interaction at that time was limited, and there were the four main characteristics of the 'old' diplomacy, named by Hamilton and Langhorne (1995): the old diplomacy was bilateral, incidental, secretive ad hierarchical. (p. 84) What is seen now is the absolute change of the general principles of the diplomacy; but the question arises, and it is in full agreement with Sofer and Nicolson, whether this openness is truthful or just a cover for the secret processes which take place in the modern diplomacy as it used to be for centuries Out of the four characteristics named by Hamilton and Langhorne, it would be assumed that: bilateralism has been now replaced by multilateralism, which has become the main means of conducting diplomacy, mainly displayed through the use of multilateral treaties as the instrument of regulating international relations, as well as the conference-type of diplomacy. In the debate about the 'old' and 'new' diplomacy, the multilateralism appears to be closely connected with the openness as the feature of the 'new' diplomacy in the following: is this multilateralism real, and plays decisive role in making diplomacy available for the public, or is it just a means of covering the secret character which is still characteristic of the present-day diplomacy What one reads in the quote by Malcolm Toon is: 'I have never regarded meetings at the summit as a satisfactory way of conducting diplomacy, and certainly those in which I have played a role did little to improve mutual understanding'. (Sofer 1988: 204) The similar idea is supported by Nicholson (Otte 1998: 27): 'the fact has not altered that the major decisions in this world are taken by those who possess power and are prepared to exercise it.' Thus, the debate as for the existence of the 'old' and 'new' diplomacy is relevant in the light of all abovementioned assumptions, however, taken into account that these assumptions made by the practicing diplomats, these assumptions are easily turned into statements on the basis of which it is possible to make reasonable conclusions. It has been proved, that the general international diplomacy has changed, but the changes are merely surface, and at the deeper level the principles of hierarchy and secrecy has remained stable. This probably will continue this debate, as there is yet much to be said on it, but one should specify here, what changes have really occurred in the modern diplomacy, omitting argumentative and dubious assumptions. The main differences between the 'old' and the 'new diplomacy' Through the research of the literary sources, it has become evident, that the main differences between the notions of 'old' and 'new diplomacy' could briefly be identified as follows: 1. The transition from the 'secret' to 'open' international diplomacy; 2. The appearance and the development of the so-called 'personal diplomacy' 3. The summit (conference) type of diplomacy has become one of the characteristic features of the new diplomatic stage 4. The concept of the 'balance of powers' has been replaced by the 'democratic consent'. The transition from the 'secret' to 'open' international diplomacy could be viewed from the various viewpoints. On the one hand, and as Curzon (1937) puts it, 'foreign policy-makers, on whose instructions the diplomatist managed the relations with another country, were obliged to inform the sovereign electorate of their policy aims in an effort to obtain their approval'. (p. 22) Thus, this already meant that the result of the negotiations and the general course of foreign affairs and diplomacy of certain country could not be secret. On the other hand, it is yet under doubt, whether the knowledge made public in relation to the course and outcomes of diplomacy is truthful, or just the means of keeping the public assured of the course the country takes in regulating foreign affairs. As it has been written that 'The first duty of the ambassador is exactly the same as that of any other servant of a government, that is, to do, say, advise and think whatever may best serve the preservation and aggrandizement of his own state'. (Craig 1983: 388) As the ambassador in the new diplomacy was the representative of the public opinion on foreign policy, the outcomes of any negotiations and decisions could not but made public. This was an important transition from the one to the next stage of diplomacy in Europe, if not for one 'but': the knowledge of foreign policy laws was hardly available for the common population, and thus giving them the authority in directing the state's international diplomatic policy would be too straightforward and risky. The US through the Wilson's Fourteen points seemed to be the first nation to have talked about the openness in diplomacy; the Soviet Union, despite the fact of making the treaties with Allies known to the public, also seemed to apply the notions of openness; ultimately, both countries failed to perform their tasks due to the strategic goals they had - though the countries as Britain and France at present successfully exercise these principles in their foreign policies. Meetings of the heads of States (the US and the Soviet Union, for example) have become traditional after the WWII; however, in relation to the US and the USSR this personal diplomacy in no way implied the openness of the conduct - the personal meetings have not contributed much into the elimination of the 'cold war' between the two powers. The development of the so-called personal diplomacy is one of the basic characteristics of the 'new' diplomacy. We ourselves witness this change, seeing the heads of the states meeting and signing treaties, as well as discussing important international issues. Though Nicolson was sure, that the appearance of this kind of diplomacy was absolutely wrong for the idea, that negotiations were always the art of exchanging the written documents, and not the art of oral conversation (Nicolson 1988: 22), yet it can't be denied, that heads of states have become the personification of the general state foreign policy. Yes, this kind of diplomacy carries serious drawbacks, but we should state, that this difference has become one of the brightest to distinguish the 'new' diplomacy from the 'old' one. The period after the WWI was characterized by the innovation, which can briefly be called as the conference (or summit)-type of negotiations. The summits of the heads of states have become tradition at present. The doubts of the effectiveness of these summits are discussed by Nicholson: he supposed personal contacts of policy-makers through the process of conference to be not useless, but difficult and unnecessary. (Mookerjee 1973: 154) It still appears, that the main vote is kept by the Great powers, among which the United States is the strongest at present. Thus, the conference type of diplomacy has really become the landmark of the new diplomatic conduct after 1914, but the fact that it has not changed much in the previous balance of the voting rights and decision-making is not doubtful. This summit-type of diplomacy is easily seen through the example of the League of Nations, followed by the UN, though it is evident that the 'balance of powers' still works for these organizations - the US has more actual weight in influencing the decisions on the international issues, than any other member of the organization. One reads about the replacement of the 'balance of powers' by the diplomatic consent in Reychler (1996: 85). It is interesting to note, that this diplomatic consent has replaced this 'balance of powers' only on the surface, displaying it through the already mentioned summits and open diplomatic conduct; though it still makes the 'old' diplomacy differ from the 'new' one, this difference is easily denied by many diplomats or made vague and unclear. Despite the generally accepted notion of the diplomatic consent, the balance of powers is more efficient instrument in the 'new' diplomacy, actively applied by the most powerful nations - Britain, and the U.S. Conclusion The differences between the 'old' and the 'new' diplomacy are dubious and can be easily put under debate. International organizations and summits have become the bright examples of the aspects, which make the 'old' diplomacy different from the 'new' one. It would be appropriate to quote the opinion, expressed by Langhorne in relation to the differences between the two diplomacies: 'the old machinery of diplomacy knew that it existed to represent states to other states and just occasionally to combinations of states in various forms. It is not just that it is difficult to adjust to the necessity to represent the continuing state to non-state actors. It can be rendered impossible where new centers of power have emerged, but have not yet generated their own structures and thus cannot represent themselves and in any case difficult if that process is still unfolding.' (Langhorne 2000: 44) This quotation may be taken as the conclusion to the general change of the diplomacy through the period from 1914 to the present times. Wilson's attempt to change the general course of conducting diplomacy have appeared to be merely an act of opposition against the Soviet regime and directed at neutralizing the influence of the communist regime on the European countries. Simultaneously, despite the active declaration of the openness and the necessity for making foreign diplomacy public, it is still doubtful, whether these principles are followed by the states. The balance of powers, so actively argued by the diplomats after the end of the WWI, is often seen to be kept at present, with these Powers having more authority in influencing the adoption of the international diplomatic decisions. Thus, the differences between the 'old' and the 'new' diplomacy appear rather vague and unclear, than one has used to take them. Though the pre-war diplomacy at the beginning of the 20th century put many dangers in itself, and the necessity of changing it and implementing somewhat new features was obvious, it is yet to be solved, whether the introduced changes brought much into the general course of international diplomacy. It is yet unclear, whether the openness and publicity of the foreign policies works for the better of the states, who use this principles, and is it the head of the state or the professional diplomat who has to be in charge of the diplomatic and foreign affairs. It is concluded, that the 'new' diplomacy does exist, and there is no doubt that the beginning and the end of the WWI has become the turning point for the international conduct of the diplomacy. As the consequence, the pre-war diplomacy due to its secrecy and inability to correctly rule the balance of powers has failed to prevent the beginning of the WWI. Thus, through the end of the WWI the necessity to re-consider the general principles of the international diplomacy has come into surface. Though some of the principles ad features of the pre-war diplomacy, as hierarchy, are still traced through the diplomatic affairs of the present times, it is no doubt that the whole picture of the post-war diplomacy has absolutely changed. The diplomats have the right to debate the existence of the two stages in the development of the diplomatic history, as well as the effectiveness of the measures, implemented after the WWI to make peaceful processes work; but it is evident, that with the development of communication, industrialization and technologies, the process of conducting diplomacy has changed its appearance, having become faster, more personal and closer to public. We now live in the age of the 'new' diplomacy, being its witnesses and at times even participants, which should not be underestimated. Works cited Anderson, Matthew S. The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919. Longman, 1993 Barston, Ron Modern Diplomacy, second edition, 1997 Beisner, Robert L. From the old diplomacy to the new 1865-1900, 1975 Berridge, G. R., and Keens - Soper, Maurice. Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger. Palgrave, 2001 Bridge, F. The coming of the First World War. 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