How Did General Slim Turn the Burma Campaign from Defeat into Victory - Essay Example

How did General Slim Turn the Burma Campaign (1944) from Defeat into Victory The WWII was one of the major military conflicts of the last century. It was the most extensive and costly armed conflict in the history of the world, involving many of the world's countries, being fought simultaneously in several major theaters around the globe. It lasted for 6 years (1939-1945) and costing approximately 50 ml lives. Burma campaign was a part of WWII which took place in India. This campaign was led by Field-Marshal Viscount William Slim who turned a ragged separated army into a unit of proud fighting soldiers. In 1944, William Slim was a commander of the 14th Army in Burma against Japan. In fact, this war episode is one of the lesser-known but more "nightmarish retreats" (Rooney, 2000) of the WWII. Some historians call it the forgotten campaign, because "it was a confusing battle with disparate elements fighting inside a confused political situation", and because of resources allocated for the eventual triumph of British Arms in Burma. It should be mentioned that in 1944 the army needed a strong leader to be ruled. Without the direct participation and support of a leadership, this power could not be pushed to its full potential. A commander required many of the characteristics common to all leaders, but also requires special abilities to manage ragged and low moral soldiers and inspired them into new feats. And Field-Marshal Viscount William Slim became a person and a leader who was able to change the moral of the army and won. According to the views of strategists it would have been better if the chain of command had gone as planned though the 11th Army Group, but this was a compromise which worked because Slim was able to handle Stilwell. "The reason why it was essential that there was one operational commander for the three fronts, North, Central and Southern, was so that the intended attacks in late 1944 could be co-coordinated to prevent the Japanese concentrating large numbers of reserves for a counter attack on any one front" (Rooney, 2000). The original conception of the plan to retake Burma had seen XV Corps making an amphibious assault on Rangoon well before Fourteenth Army forces reached the capital in order to ease supply problems. However, lack of resources meant that this operation did not take place in its original form. The assault did go in, but by the time it happened, British forces were only a few miles north of the city boundary, rendering it somewhat useless (Allen, 1985). The ability to motivate and inspire soldiers was a core for the general. In order to achieve optimal goals three basics were taken into account by slim: motivation, reward and commitment. Motivating other people was about getting them to move in the direction he wanted them to go in order to achieve a result. Motivation in the Army can be described as goal-directed behaviour and ability to contribute to a solution. Soldiers were motivated when they expect that a course of action was likely to lead to the attainment of a goal - one that satisfies their needs, the victory and the end of the war. It is reasonable to believe that strong commitment was likely to result in conscientious and self-directed application to perform their task. Slim's methodology means that political leaders gave course of action for the campaign, and generals had to provide the training and backup so that the soldiers can get on with their business. The main his advantage was that Slim tries to be open-hearted with his praise, and his criticisms were measured in tone. He is also humble, rightly praising his men as the true architects of the victory. In general, Slim's approach was simple: he accepted that the defeat was due to faulty planning of the general staff. He then set out to provide training and equipment to the front-line troops. Since he commanded a multi-ethnic international army, he saw that every unit was supplied according to its own special needs. He put his own staff on half-rations if any field unit lacked provisions - which usually quickly solved the problem. It is evident that with the intervention approach the change retained the co-ordination of and authority for such processes, but delegates aspects of the change process. For example, defeats were not minimized, and incompetence and ill-preparedness not glossed over (Slim, 1986). The General who had been fighting the Japanese for more than three years told this young division what the enemy soldier was like, and how to beat him. He told much about the the Japanese Army, its strategy, tactics, and supply. He explained its strength and pointed out the weakness. Slim analysed the British soldier, trying to describe an "ideal" type for Army and victory. "Of course, at root he is no better than any other soldier. Almost all soldiers are fundamentally the same. Germans, Russians, Frenchmen, perhaps even Italians. But the British Tommy generally manages to go on five minutes longer than his opposite number. You have to get that minutes overtime out of your men. And, the only way to get it is by giving them the whole of your own time and thought and care. If you do this. they will never let you down" (Slim, 1986). In fact, slim was a perfect educator who agitated soldiers souls providing a lot of examples of good and bad, right and wrong behaviour and situations. For instance, he described the "bad" Army as follows: "I took one look at them and thought "My God, they're worse than I supposed." then I saw why. I walked round the corner of that clearing and I saw officers making themselves a bivouac. They were just as exhausted as their men, but that isn't my point. Officers are there to lead. I tell you, therefore, as officers, that you will neither eat, nor drink, nor sleep, nor smoke, nor even sit down until you have personally seen that your men have done those things. If you will do this for them, they will follow you to the end of the world. And, if you do not, I will break you" (Slim, 1986). Historians suppose that the general did not like to talk much, but cared much about his soldiers. One story runs that one morning at Army Headquarters the roof lifted when he received a demand that mules should be installed in concrete floor stables in a training camp, well in the rear. "My men are sleeping on earth, and often on something worse. What's good enough for British soldiers is good enough for mules of any nationality." Slim set his Army hard tasks, but none have been beyond their power. After the great battles of Imphal and Kohima, where five Japanese divisions were destroyed, Slim called on his exhausted soldiers to carry on relentless, final pursuit (Chan, 1986). "So great were the dividends that could accrue," Slim said, "that I asked for the impossible - and got it" (Slim, 1986). As the commander of the Army slim found one of the most appropriate ways to solve this problem - to change a style to more progressive one. On the one hand, he had to provide strict control, but in a time the authoritarian style would stop working also, and for this reason slim persuaded his soldiers to overcome current difficulties maintaining high moral status (Chan, 1986). His victorious host had marched back a thousand miles, planted its battle flags on Manadalay and above the capitol city of Rangoon, killing 100,00 Japanese on the way. Their achievement had to be attributed in large degree to the character of their Commander. Many researchers suppose that Slim did not like popularity, and hated publicity (Chan, 1986). Slim was a person who had a great impact on his troops and was respected. This attitude was supported by the fact that he cared much for his troops, and soldiers were well aware that their well-being was his permanent priority. The 14th Army had never been out of Slims' mind since that day when Mountbatten appointed him to the command. And for this reason the Mountbatten-Slim partnership history records that it was one of the rock foundations of our Jungle Victory. Slim understood that "new policy" should be introduced carefully, step be step into the Army. To persuade his troops to the necessity of changes, he needed well-grounded and sound reasons. For instance, Slim used discussions and vivid stories to demonstrate high moral of other soldiers. "What has a soldier got asks Slim, and answers it himself. "He has got his country, but that is far away. In battle, the soldier has only his sense of duty, and his sense of shame. These are the things which make men go on fighting even though terror grips their heart. Every soldier, therefore, must be instilled with pride in his unit and in himself, and to do this he must be treated with justice and respect" (slim, 1986). Because of his "Lessons" his troops gradually became the operating system. Everyone focused on the vision and mission. Structure and operating changes were implemented with minimal disruption. Change in soldiers' minds brought with it concerns, challenges, and a degree of discomfort. Slim addressed the troops saying: "You don't have to cringe in the Army, though it's true some incorrigible cringers do. In the Army you don't have to go out to dinner with a man if you can't stand the sight of him" (Slim, 1986). In addition to all his successful strategies, Slim's personal charisma played a crucial role. The main feature of his character were his "own determined honesty and a loathing of humbug in any shape" (Rooney, 2000). In the battles of Imphal and Kohima (1944) Slim deliberately chose to let the Japanese cross the frontier and invade Imphal plain. Thus, the enemy would be fighting at the end of a long and tenuous line of communication across mountain jungle and with a flooded river at his back; nor did he possess an air supply such as ours. "He had stocked it up with food and ammunition, flown out 30,000 non-combatants and flown in 30,000 combat troops, a decisive item which the Mountbatten-Slim firm insisted on in face of every difficulty. Slim ordered his outpost divisions also to concentrate there for the coming battle" (Rooney, 2000). There was a direct relationship between superior and subordinate, with each subordinate responsible to only one person. He demands of his officers absolute loyalty to the Army and duty. Placed himself in difficult or painful circumstances, he had faithfully asked not what was smart, but what is right And, then, he has it done without flinching, and without regret. He used only one test to those who serve the 14th Army asking: "does this man do his job If so, he is OK with the general, whether he likes him or not. If the man does not do his job, he goes!" (Slim, 1986). Slim supposed that a success or failure of a strategy depended not only on decisions made in the past but also on how those decisions were being implemented now by soldiers and commanders. It was therefore important to questions about who, how and why people was doing what they was doing and what they should do. In short human resources, manage the Army they could make spectacular errors that could be very costly to the country. But, to avoid this Slim liked to repeat that: "There are no bad soldiers, only bad officers," was what Napoleon said, and though that great man uttered some foolish phrases, this is not one" (Slim, 1986). Slim showed that development reviews provided Army with the opportunity to reflect on past performance as a basis for making development and improvement plans. Obtaining historical perspective through analysis was a necessary part of the review but reaching agreement about what should be done in the future was what it was all about. The discussion of right and wrong morals took the form of a dialogue. It is possible to summarize the methods helped Slim to change the attitude and moral of the troops, and turned a ragged soldiers into a proud humans. The first was identification of a task and the quality of its fulfillment. Slim explained that the Army existed to achieve a common task, and the defeat or victory in one area affected the others; thus successful campaign or battle was essential if the troops were to be held together and its members motivated to give their best effort to win. For Slim it meant taking steps to assess and satisfy his soldiers needs and to enhance and develop the inherent capacities of people. Providing all those strategies mentioned above helped Slim to turn Burma campaign from defeat into victory. References 1. Allen, Louis. 1985, Burma, the Longest War, 1941-45. New York: St. Martin's Press. 2. Chan, Won-loy. 1986, Burma, the Untold Story. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 3. Rooney, D. C. 2000, Military Classics: Burma Victory: Imphal and Kohima March 1944 to May 1945, Sterling Publishing; New Ed edition. 4. Slim, William, Viscount. 1986, Defeat into Victory. London- PaperMac. Read More