A granular review of Contemporary Theorist - Term Paper Example

? A Granular Review of Contemporary Theorist Collage: This paper is geared towards presenting a sociological analysis of the reality of the day today life as presented by Berger and Luckmann. To be more precise on this issue, this paper presents in details the knowledge that plays the guiding role of the manner in which we do conduct ourselves on daily basis, and more so specifically targeting how this reality- as crafted by these contemporary theorists- do appear in different theoretical viewpoints to individuals, and for this case intellectuals. Also addressed is the manner in which common sense reality can be influenced by the theoretical constructions of both intellectuals and ideas from other merchants. The paper is therefore focused on handing out an understanding of a reality that makes up the core of the empirical science of sociology; what is commonly referred to as the world of everyday life (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Among the most promising perspectives of connect social psychology with sociology has over the time been the sociology of knowledge as is formulated by both Berger and Luckmann in their book The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. The logic of this is arguably very simple where these contemporary theorists argue out that the society ought to be perceived in its duality; as an objective and a subjective reality. Despite the fact that the objective social; reality is a function of social action, it actually appears to an individual as both separate and independent from the individual. On the other hand, the subjective social reality is made up of the consciousness that an actor has, molded in ubiquitous processes of socialization and thereafter sustained and modified in interactions of a daily basis. In this duality presented by these contemporary theorists, the seeming Durkheim and Weber’s dichotomy becomes reconciled and what remains is the basic sociological theory question of how possible it could be for the subjective meanings to become objective facilities (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). However and in an effort to make certain that intricate philosophical reflections are kept at bay, Becker and Luckmann avail definitions of the principal terms from the natural attitude point of view. For their purpose, they actually define reality as a quality that has a bearing to phenomena that we recognize to being independent of the volition individuals do have. In the view point of these contemporary theorists, knowledge refers to the certainty that phenomena is real and besides are in possession of specific characteristics (Lewis, 2010). The world-shattering idea in this case being declaring common sense knowledge as the dominant emphasis for the sociology of knowledge, since traditionally, the sociology of knowledge had been solely engrossed within the history of ideas. Nevertheless in this contemporary world, this field has to concern itself with each and everything that is passing knowledge in the society (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) In the viewpoint of Berger and Luckmann, reality is socially constructed and sociology is under obligation of studying the ways through which the above-mentioned is done. These theorists have actually resurrected the phenomenological analysis of the life world of former theorists like Alfred Schutz- who used to clarify the same the fundamental sociological concepts in terms of institution and role. As a matter of fact, Berger and Luckmann have availed us with a new-fashioned synthesis of Weber and Dukheim’s as well as Gehlen and Plessner’s mead and philosophical anthropology. In their (Berger and Luckmann) illumination of the media through which social order is objectified, signs, symbols, typification and habitualization among others have availed deep-seated intuitions into the fruitfulness of human interaction (Eberle, 1993). The manner in which they do present an analysis of the relationship existing between social institutions and the symbolic worlds of meaning, which legitimizes them presented the prove as to how conventional jargon as pertains to the logic of institutions concealed the actual processes via which institutions become social realities. What these theorists of the modern time are doing is presenting a sociological theory which is thought of social actors as being competent humans, having escaped sociological reifications and abnegated the expansive arrogance of social scientists, who at the time were lovers of talking of false consciousness and Freudian unconscious constrains- properly pinpointed solely by themselves. Nevertheless, what they made clear is how inexperienced an objectivist deportment towards social reality is- in simple terms- the ‘how’ of social phenomena has to be spelt out prior attending to the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). The phenomenological scrutiny of run-of-the-mill life, commonly referred to as the subjective experience of day today life, desists from any unpremeditated and/or genetic suppositions as well as from assertions concerning the ontological standing of the phenomena so being explored. It is imperative recalling the aforementioned since common sense entails inestimable pre-scientific and quasi-scientific interpretations with respect to the every daily reality, which it takes for granted. In the event that we are under obligation to present a description of the reality of common sense, then it would have been a mandatory for us to make reference of these interpretations, but within the phenomenological brackets (Esser, 1993). Having come up at a time when the prevalence of the Parsonian structural-functionalism was dying of ushering in the crisis of the Western sociology, the works of Berger and Luckmann was warmly received. According to many of the sociologists, Social Construction availed them with a new orientation. In the arguments of these sociologists, Berger and Luckmann presented them with a new-fashioned reading of a number of sociological classics, which are seemingly different from Parson’s interpretation as presented in his book, Structure of Social Action. The contemporary theorists do link their perspectives in way that is totally fresh. Scholars like Charkes Lemert (1992) are attesting to the fact that to the present moment, no other theorists have made an attempt to present so many divergent ideas in a clear way and with such exquisite parsimony as Berger and Luckmann. The undeniable reality is that the impact that both these theorists have to the American sociology through their book is marginal and in the event that they were to rewrite the same book, very little would be altered. As a result, both these authors became situated in a categorically outlying non-elite institution (Prendergast, 1992). Berger and Luckmann’s work was greatly and positively commended by numerous book reviewers since their approach is viewed at as not only new, but also as an un-ideological approach in America and elsewhere. For instance, according to readers in Germany, sociology of knowledge was understood or taken to be a pet theme- as is presented in Plessner’s introductory notes. An easy time for Social Construction was unheard of. Realizable benefits, following the confrontation of the growing criticism by quantitative sociology and structural functionalism of the 1960s, went to neo-Marxism. It was after this that Habermas and Niklas Luhmann- through a well-publicized debate- came in defense of the functionalist systems theory by blending phenomenological and Parsonian concepts. Both these became the most quoted and cited German sociologists of their era. Within the provisions of this intellectual context in the United States as well as in Europe, the works of Berger and Luckmann became more often than not inferred with a twist of its kind. A great percentage of the 1960’s left-liberal veterans turned the works of these contemporary theorists so as to make sense of both life and sociology, distinguishing the unpredictability of social construction (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). During this period, constructionism proved to be a radical perspective which availed assistance in the revelation of reality, in effort to strip it of ideological falsifications and at the same time makes the path clear for new-fashioned interpretations. A perfect example of this view is academic feminism. However, an interpretation of this level of inspiration remains to be considerably distant from the intentions of Berger and Luckmann. As per the assurance that Luckmann avails, each and every other moment an individual talks of constructivism or even social constructionism, there is a need to run for a cover. On the other hand, Berger’s viewpoint is that the greater percentage of the constructivist literature emanates from the earlier mentioned ideological cauldron with which he (Berger) has no affinity of whatever kind (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). In contention, it is notable that the sociology of knowledge- as put forth by the contemporary theorists- ought to concern itself with each and everything passing for knowledge within the society irrespective of the ultimate validity and/or unjustifiability of such knowledge- without regarding the criteria so used. As much as all human knowledge is developed, passed on and kept up in social situations, the sociology of knowledge is obliged to looking for a clearer understanding of the processes via which the same is so undertaken. In simplified form, the sociology of knowledge is all about the analysis of social construction of reality. This comprehension with regard to the proper arena of sociology of knowledge, so brought across by Berger and Luckmann, to a great extent differs from what in the past has been meant by this discipline right from its very beginning over four or so decades ago (Lewis, 2010). What is notable from both Berger and Luckmann is that both are advocates of an empirical sociology of knowledge which is in the business of investigating the elaborate ways and means through which reality is socially constructed. These authors and theorists of the present time did adhere to the Weberian maxim that the role of a scientist or even a theorist is describing and availing an explanation of social actions as well as their outcomes exactly as they are and totally keep off proclaiming any political position of how things ought to have been. Practically, the Weberian maxim has to been viewed within the tenets of its complexities. Any empirical preposition or description utilizing typifications has its value implications (Esser, 1993). As a result, viewing the already in existence social constructions from a different angle may be in the offing of sharpening an individual’s viewpoint of how the same are constructed. The principal problem may not be the search for social arbitraries among social constructions, but rather the manner in which a research of that footing is undertaken. It is only theoretical tokenism, as presented by Mary Rogers that is capable of unduly limiting the impact that the works of Berger and Luckmann has. Arguably, social constructionism more often than not better plays the role of theoretical shibboleth going along with by countable flat prepositions as pertains to the way people make a construct of their identities, worldviews as well as taken-for-granted avenues of taking care of their day today affairs (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Nonetheless, there are vast numbers of sociologists who call themselves phenomenological sociologists who have up to the present time not grasped the logic behind Berger and Luckmann’s paradigm in the correct perspective. A great percentage of these phenomenological sociologists have actually overlooked the prime fact that Berger and Luckmann did make an introduction of their dualistic conception of the society as being both an objective as well as a subjective reality via what the two refer to as the philosophical prolegomena and as a result, pre-sociological; what can be in simple terms be referred to as the phenomenological scrutiny of the foundation of knowledge in day today’s life (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). The line that these contemporary theorists draw between a phenomenological analysis of the life-world and a society’s sociological analysis is very strict. Though not in the same sense, both phenomenological analysis and sociological analysis are pragmatic. On the contrary, while the former is egological, sociological analysis (also referred to as the social scientific method) is cosmological. On this basis therefore, much of what had been branded to be phenomenological sociology has over the time had very little to do with phenomenology and hardly measurable contribution to sociology (Prendergast, 1992). However, it can be argued out that one of the shortfalls of Social Construction is that Berger and Luckmann did exclude methodological and epistemological considerations. Preemptively, this would have been one of the best moves since it would have laid emphasis on their intention of proclaiming an empirical sociology of knowledge, which would have played the role of differentiating it from the older tradition and instead opened the gateway to the uncountable social theorists to who philosophical binding was not their favorite. All the same, Berger and Luckmann did take risk of broad misconceptions of essential concepts and at the same time did miss out on a bursting analytic empowerment via life-world analyses by Schutz (Eberle, 1993). In the eyes of many, it remained quite unclear as to why sociology ought to factor in both consciousness and subjective meanings, and more especially in the event that their social facts and social actions have been adequately provided for. Another issue of concern was the reason as to why they had not to restrict their attention solely to peripheral observable behavior. Yet, it is Shutz’ epistemological contribution in richly analyzing the interpretation in the aspect in everyday life and also in the social sciences. The prescribed meaning structures of the life-world, which has been analyzed in phenomenological terms, puts forth a frame in which the hermeneutic role of any sociological analysis- be it quantitative or qualitative- without doubt has to be trailed. The manner in which socially derived subjective knowledge convoluted in material human actions can exclusively be spell out by the sociologists is a methodological issue. On the other hand, its implications are more often than not epistemological (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). As a result, it is considerably illuminating examining social construction within the provisions of the structures of the life-world as well as of the methodological writings of the respective authors. On this grounds therefore, it becomes clearer that instead of succinct term, construction does parallel constitution. While construction here denotes a social process and as thus has to be analyzed by sociology, constitution of meaning entails a subjective process taking place in consciousness and as thus analyzed in phenomenological terms. In addition to his, those readers who created issues with what to them appeared to be loose definitions of some of the core concepts in the works of Berger and Luckmann (such as reality, knowledge and objectification among others) did a fine-graining specification of each and every term within the Structures of the Life-world (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Even for those unconvinced of the likelihood of phenomenological analyses to escape the spontaneous circle, countable other books make plain knowledge, human experience and action, the divergent perfections and the sophisticated interrelatedness of subjective and inter-subjective knowledge in considerably richer detail (Esser, 1993). From the above literature, it is evident that the sociology of knowledge presented by the contemporary theorists is concerning itself with each and every thing passing for knowledge within the society. On this grounds therefore, it can be concluded that focusing on intellectual history is likely to be ill-chosen and more especially in the event that it happens to be the core vocal point of the sociology of knowledge. According to Berger and Luckmann, ideas as well as theoretical thoughts may not be of such a great importance to the society. Despite the undeniable fact that each and every society is in possession of these phenomena, they are hardly part and parcel of the totality of what passes for knowledge (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Only a very limited group of individuals in any society assumes active roles in theorizing when it comes to business ideas. Nevertheless, each individual within the society does participate in one way or the other in the society’s knowledge; but only countable are conscious of the theoretical interpretation of the world, though all are habitants of a world of some sort. Besides the focus on theoretical thought being taken to be out of all proportion constricting for the sociology of knowledge, it is equally unsatisfactory since even this portion of socially obtainable knowledge is hardly understood in its totality if at all it is not placed in the context of a considerably more broad-spectrum analysis of knowledge (Lewis, 2010). Any form of exaggeration on the significance of theoretical thought within the society as well as in history is an ordinary failing of most of the theorizers. As thus, it is of a great importance to make corrections on this intellectualistic false impression. The theoretical constructions, be they philosophical, scientific or even mythological, hardly dissipate what is termed to be real among the members of the society. Since this is the case, the sociology of knowledge therefore, as asserted by Berger and Luckmann, has to first and foremost be concerned with what the members of the society know or refer to be reality in their day today no-theoretical as well as pre-theoretical lives (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). It is undeniably this kind of knowledge that makes up the fabric of meanings in whose absence not a single society would have been in existence. Having so said therefore, these theorists argue out that the sociology of knowledge ought to profoundly concern itself with the social construction of reality. Their argument behind this being that the analysis of the speculative expression of this reality is in the offing of persisting to be part and parcel of this concern, though not the most crucial part. It is likely that it is going to be crystal clear- even in the presence of exclusions of methodological and/or epistemological hiccups- that whatever Berger and Luckmann suggested was a far-reaching redefinition of the scope of the sociology of knowledge, which is considerably broader than has up to the present time been understood within the tenets of the discipline (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). The sole question arising from this is what the theoretical ingredients are to be added to this discipline (sociology of knowledge) so as to pave way for its subsequent redefinition on the basis of the aforementioned sense. Knowledge happens to be socially distributed and the manner in which this distribution is facilitated is in the offing of being made the subject matter of a sociological discipline. Even in the presence of the sociology of knowledge, there are very few exceptions- if any- and this has led to the misnaming which resultantly has approached the teething problem of the social distribution of knowledge form an ideological angle of truth in its dependence on both social and economic conditions (Prendergast, 1992). The most interesting thing about Berger and Luckmann as regarding to what they factored in in titling their work, The Social Construction of Reality is that this work of theirs was self-evident. However, the have hardly delivered an all-encompassing definition of what they intended to put across. Besides, social construction has assumed varied meanings, not essentially as a result of different translations. To begin with, construction, as a term, possesses both a dynamic and a static aspect (Esser, 1993). On the basis of the static aspect, construction denotes a reality as it appears. On the other hand, the dynamic aspect of construction denotes the process of reality-construction. In addition, it brings forth a measurable difference in the event that we view the society which over and again is produced by human actions, for example in a social setting. As thus, there is a need to comprehend the meanings actors personally employ and are implanted in. It is among the core propositions of the works of Berger and Luckmann that cultural constructs get to be socially calmed down by institutional structures. As thus, it is notable that constructions are not at their least subjective business of singular individuals; they are in point of fact socially derived and inter-subjectively shared and endorsed (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). As thus, Berger and Luckmann’s social constructionism stands in stout opposition to the subjective constructivism that other theorists, the likes of Paul Watzlawick among others strongly stand in defense of. The subjective construction of reality is all the time grounded on cultural knowledge that has been internalized. This therefore keeps at bay deep pathological peculiarities, harmonized with other human actors either in collaboration or interactions. On the contrary, there are those exceptional cases were only an insignificant embarrassment flashes across the scene in mild concern for those who made an attempt of incorrectly defining the situation (Eberle, 1993). Markedly, all that subjective constructivism does is leaving outside bracket what Berger and Luckmann (social construction) is all about; reality construction in both dealings and conversation via social objectivations and typifications that have been internalized and stabilized by institutionalization, routines and legitimations among others. On the lee side of this view is that subjective constructivism is a historical, social and blind to institutions. Notably, both phenomenologists and enthusiasts of the methodological individualism, in Weber’s perspective, have over and again come across punitive criticism of being highly subjectivist, and more so in American sociology. On the contrary, it is Berger and Luckmann, in the capacities of phenomenologists and methodological individualists, who have over and over outspokenly stood against subjectivism of such flatness (Lewis, 2010). Berger and Luckmann were aiming at moving the sociology of knowledge form the outside edge to the very core of sociological theory. Besides being partly successful, these theorists were able to make alterations of the consciousness of a number of sociologists as well as offering assistance in the institutionalization of the sociology of knowledge in the capacity of an accredited specialty in the sociological establishment (Lewis, 2010). Among the principal encouragements might have been the undeniable datum that members of diverse disciplines, the likes of anthropology, psychology, history, geography, theology and ethology equally exhibited their interest in Berger and Luckmann’s works of social construction. If we were to consider, for example that a discipline like cognitive anthropology did move from the linguistic analysis of terms to the exploration of dialects and is presently arriving at the notion of cultural knowledge and the complex link it has with action, we can undeniably recognize the extent to which Berger and Luckmann had been two and half decades or so in the past (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Furthermore, Berger and Luckmann’s works of social construction have without doubt played a very central role in seeing to it that Alfred Schutz’ phenomenology is greatly popularized among sociologists. At the present time, phenomenological concepts are found across varied sociological fields; with even the Germany ostentatious theorists, Luhmann and Habermas, also having made a step to incorporate these phenomenological concepts as elements of a central footing. In addition to this, rational theorists have also taken the initiative of trying as much as they can to integrate the work of Schutz on making a choice among projects of action so as to sharpen up their approach. In the United States, the alleged neo-institutionalists have come up with an analysis that has made assertions of making direct drawings on social construction. Nonetheless, there is also a more lively discussion on progress as regards to how adequately these theorists have handled the phenomenological framework as well as the social constructionist perspective and its conceptions (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Berger and Luckmann did position themselves closer to Schutz. Their separation was solely on geographical reasons. Notwithstanding this separation, these two remained compatible in principle, though following divergent roads towards theoretical development. Berger has over and over advocated coming back to what he considers the big questions, which are in his comprehension of a macro-sociological sort. His principal intellectual single-mindedness after social construction ended up being the teething troubles of both modernization and the third world development (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). In Berger’s viewpoint, social construction is closely related to various events within institutional structures to movements within the provisions of consciousness of individuals; and this remains to be the foremost guide in dealing with social issues. He explains that this is the very concept of economic culture which denotes the crossing point between economic institutions and the different elements of culture, such as religion, lifestyles, morality and ideas and as thus lending itself to elaborations in terms of the sociology of knowledge in a beautiful manner. Luckmann, on his side, has over and again carried on with his works of influencing a considerably stout group of sociologists, a majority being Germans (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). In availing a deep-seated analysis of what Berger and Luckmann refers to as conversational apparatus- in which a common sense of reality is constructed as a progressive accomplishment in head-on situations- these theorists of the contemporary time widely borrow from ethnography, ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, cognitive anthropology, symbolic interactionism and other related specialties. Through the investigation of the processes of reality construction both locally and in situ, Berger and Luckmann have complemented the general level of the analysis of social construction and at the same time materialized on what had gone outset resulting in the founding of an empirical sociological sociology of knowledge (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Notably, there happens to be a legacy of its kind for psychology. Berger and Luckmann’s social construction message in this respect appears to be considerably stronger as compared and contrasted to the allegedly scattered remarks in their work. Both these theorists are strong advocates of a sociological psychology; which refers to a psychology whose fundamental perspectives are derived from a sociological comprehension of the human condition (condition humana). Based on their principal arguments, in the event that their analysis of the interrelatedness of subjective and social stocks of knowledge is anything to go by, it is therefore undeniable that each and every other type of psychology is grounded on a cosmology (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). The exploration on subjective reality every other moment does imply some kind of social definition of reality. This is often the case in psychotherapy. Both the gauges through which pathological symptoms get to be identified as well as the therapeutic procedures through which the pathologies are to be cured remained to be so defined within social tenets. They are actually without doubt bound to a definite cultural world view of a particular society. On the grounds of sociological viewpoint, therapies usually have some shared features with other legitimation procedure and besides, many a times they serve precise ideology. Nevertheless, over and above pathology and therapy, psychological theories are considerably different from other types of theory. As a result of the close relationship between identification and internalization, psychological theories have tended to exert more as compared to others, shaping identities and socializing effects. In a dialectical sense, psychologies have given birth to a reality, which thereafter acts as the basis for their verification. Based on the above highlighted arguments therefore, it can be concluded that psychology ought to be critical in the senses that it is under obligation to everlastingly reflect its social implications (Eberle, 1993). Despite the fact that there happens to be a certain parallel to Habermas’s hypothesis to hermeneutically reflect the socially-defined assumptions of the social theory, there happens to be an essential point of divergence to Frankfurt school’s Critical Theory. Psychological premises can hardly seat in the place of quasi-objective instance in the criticism of a particular society; nonetheless, the same has to be deeply scrutinized for the purposes of cosmological implications (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Another of the arguments for a sociological psychology, as put across by Berger and Luckmann, is as a direct result of the principal opinion that reality is a social construction. It is imperative in linking reality constructions to their likely structures to the interactive processes- which are more often than not within institutionalized settings- in which they are not only produced, but also maintained. Psychology, as a result, all the time has to be social psychology; with subjective worlds being hardly detachable from the social processes, in which they are constructed, passed across and sustained. Both properties and features of individuals cannot be observed and thereafter conceived of in the absence of carrying out investigations on the labeling processes through which the same are attached to. Additionally, personal identities may not be separated from the social structure of a particular society in which they are made up of (Lewis, 201). However, the most important of all these respects is the concept of knowledge since it makes a reflection of the dialectic existing between identity and its biological substratum and as a result connects social psychology with philosophical anthropology. In addition, it perfectly complements Mead’s interaction between both personal and social identity with that existing between knowledge’s subjective and social stocks. It resultantly plays the linking role between sociology and social psychology as well as highlights its social distribution to the various divergent cultural environments within their very precise typifications and systems of relevancies (Prendegast, 1992). Through the above mentioned, a concrete bridge to macro-sociological level is put in place. Both the links and the bridges are not ordinarily superficial magniloquence; they put effort in helping realize a fundamental integration. Even in the event that Berger and Luckmann keep on talking of micro- and macro-sociology, social construction’s logic has availed a prove of the existent artificial distinction. The big questions, according to Berger, are in line with the society’s structure- in its totality- as well as concerning the daily experience of the members of the society. Phenomena including such as urbanization, modernization, pluralism and globalization among others are the ones which people are experiencing in their day today lives (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Research in social psychology is therefore inexorably handling the phenomena of modernity if not postmodernity even in the event that is limits itself to what some theorists may refer to as a micro-level. The methodological inferences are manifold, for instance, as pertains to the status of its concepts, though discussing them further remains to be the sole challenge. In designing a sociology which perfectly links social psychology with philosophical anthropology on one side and sociology on the other is undeniably Berger and Luckmann’s eminent contribution. Their aim was way far from engaging in philosophy; but all in all, in the event that the reality of each day’s life is to be rightly perceived, its intrinsic character has to be factored in prior carrying on with sociological analysis in a proper manner. Everyday life offers itself as a reality take to mean by men and subjectively meaningful to them as a comprehensible world. In the capacity of sociologists and theorists, reality ought to be taken as the object of analyses (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Until the period Berger and Luckmann were making eminent contributions as earlier mentioned, neither the so called American social psychology nor the sociology of knowledge- the likes of Robert Merton- had come to the recognition the relevance they held for one another. Even at the present moment, Berger and Luckmann’s work of social construction puts across a theoretical framework which is considerably broader than a great percentage of other social psychological theories to have been in existence. In an effort to reorder its programmatic framework of a social psychology into an aspiring theory and an empirical research, a lot of work has to be undertaken in future (Esser, 1993). References Berger, P.L. & Luckmann, T. (1967). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. The Penguin Press. England Eberle, T.S. (1993). Social Psychology and the Sociology of Knowledge. Aprendizaje, Revista de Psicologia Social, 8(1): 5-13. Hochschule St. Gallen, Switzerland Esser, H. (1993). The Rationality of Everyday Behavior: A Rational Choice’s Reconstruction of the Theory of Action of Alfred Schutz. Rationality and Society, 5(1): 7-31. DOI:10.1177/1043463193005001003 Lewis, P. (2010). Peter Berger and His Critics: The Significance of Emergence. Springer, 47(3): 207-213. Science and Business Media, LLC Prendergast, C. (1992). Rationality, Optimality and Choice: Esser’s Reconstruction of Alfred Schutz’s Theory of Action. Rationality and Society, 5(1): 47-57. DOI:10.1177/1043463193005001005 Read More