Analysis of Behaviour in Fires with Recommendations - Literature review Example

Analysis of Behaviour in Fires with Recommendations Literature Review 1. Introduction 2. Theoretical assumption of reactions and practices of people during a fire Chapter 10 of NFPA 921 is the most common resource for fire-related human behaviour in fires. This guideline is the result of studies of individual and group behaviour in fires for the past several decades where reaction to fire is categorised by individual, group, physical setting, and fire characteristics as shown in Table 1 . Individual Group Physical Setting Fire Physical limitations Cognitive comprehension limitations Familiarity with physical setting Group size Group structure Group permanence Roles and norms Location of exits Number of exits Height of structure Fire alarms systems Fire suppression systems Presence of flames Presence of smoke Effect of toxic gases Oxygen depletion Table 1- Human behaviour based on characteristics The above results of NFPA study suggest that physical disability and capacity to think, understand, reason, and others can affect the appropriateness of a person’s response to situations involving fire. Specifically, these are limitations generated by mental illness, drugs, alcohol or smoke and toxic gases coming for the fire itself. Familiarity with the physical setting on the other hand is the ability of a particular person to escape faster because he or she is familiar with the structure where the fire occurs. In contrast, those who are unfamiliar are likely to become lost or escape using the same route they came before even the fire and smoke originate from that direction . In group, the fire-related behaviour people depend on the size of the group. For instance, during a fire, consensus in smaller group is achieved faster and therefore has shorter response time. In contrast, consensus in large group takes time resulting to longer response time and delayed escape. The impact of formalised structure in fire-related human behaviour is the tendency of members to wait for their leader’s instruction. For instance, people working in a hospital or school will likely wait for management decision before they start to evacuate. In contrast, members of non-formalised group tend to decide on their own and escape as early as possible . Group with high level of permanence such as a family respond quicker because they know each other very well. However, group response also depends on roles and norms within the group such as gender, social class, education, and so on. For instance, a group tend to value the knowledge and decision of the most educated member thus their response depends on the timing and appropriateness of that decision. For instance, if the perceived leader see no immediate danger from fire then group response will be to delay escape until there is a clear and eminent danger . The clearly marked exit location is very helpful to those who are unfamiliar with the physical setting of the building. This is because it prevents unfamiliar occupants to move towards the direction of the threat. Similarly, sufficient number and obstacle-free exits avoid panic and therefore improve occupants’ behaviour during a fire. Moreover, the misconception that tall buildings offer less safety from fire can lead to unpredictable behaviour such as jumping out of windows instead of using the designated fire exits . In relation to perception of safety, availability of fire alarms and fire suppression systems such as smoke alarms, extinguishers, sprinklers, and so on can positively influence occupants’ response. For instance, occupants are more confident if they are notified early and aware that the building is capable of controlling the fire. However, a number of false alarms in the past will likely delay occupants’ response until the fire is confirmed. Moreover, this confidence over the installed fire suppression system can also lead to exaggeration or underestimation of the threat. For instance, occupants may excessively rely on the suppression system and delayed their reaction until such time that it’s already too dangerous to evacuate . Last, NFPA 921 assume that people is reacting to fire characteristics such as the presence of flames, smoke, smell of toxic gases, and oxygen depletion. For instance, most people tend to ignore small flames because its size appears to pose any hazard. Similarly, particularly those with light-coloured appearance, smoke is not dangerous to some people despite its toxic content and fatal effects . 3. Panic and rational Fire-related Behaviour Predicted fire-related human behaviour discussed in Section 2 is the result of just one of the many studies conducted in the subject and according to , these results vary from country to country. This is in particular are inconsistencies arising from the fact that none of the subject were places in real-life fire situations and erroneous testimonies from non-representative samples. According to , study of fire-related human behaviour is very useful because it allows the re-examination of different misconceptions about fire and subsequent human reactions. For instance, before NFPA Building Exits Code was developed, the reactions of fire victims were often attributed to ignorance rather than the absence of evacuation plan, safe escape route and fire exits. Moreover, assumptions of human behaviour in fires are often based on historical fires where fire-related human behaviour is simplified to panic or an irrational, non-adaptive and non-social behaviour. Result of recent studies suggest that panic is rare because many people that were involved in fire incidents actually try to resolve their situation in the most rational manner, helpful, and calm in the face of danger . Panic according to , is one of the earliest view of human behaviour in fires where people is assumed to loss their humanity in the face of overwhelming fear which is contrary to recent findings that most people often remain reasonably calm and helping each other. In fact, there is no strong evidence to prove the injudicious and competitive flight behaviour of people during an emergency. For instance, people caught in a night club fire during the late 1980s and the recent 9/11 disaster did not engage in irrational behaviour but rather rational and pro-social responses. A study conducted in 2008 about the cause of fire fatalities in the United States suggest that the major reasons for deaths and injuries are lack of preparedness and people’s misconceptions on the dynamics of fire emergencies. For instance, although most people avoid breathing smoke coming from a fire, most of them underestimate the effects of smoke inhalation and delay their responses for at least 10 minutes before they start evacuating. This delayed reaction put them in a more dangerous situation such as slowly moving through smoke with potentially lethal effects . This lack of preparedness can be best described by the February 20, 2003 Station Nightclub fire in West Warwick, Rhode Island where 100 people died. The video footage of the incident shows how people ignore the danger of wall covering ignited by pyrotechnic sparks and the congestion created by people all heading to the main door instead of the three fire exits provided for the structure . In terms of human behaviour in fires, the term “preparedness” according to , is not only about installation of fire doors, suppression and warning systems but awareness of the need be familiar with the escape routes and other avoidance measures. Occupants’ actions play a significant role in reducing the number of fatalities from fire . Sequentially for instance, most occupants will discover the fire and attempt to initiate manual suppression during the early stages of fire growth. Next is calling the fire department, alert everyone of the existence of fire, and find the nearest exit. However, these do not occur in all situations since occupants sometimes see the need to investigate, hide, and attempt to rescue others before finally leaving the building. This variation occurs because people make decisions and act according to their personal experience with fire, perception of threat, education, and influenced by others actions . In the study conducted by Lawson et al. (2009) as cited in , where fire-related human behaviour is measured by their act and frequency of such acts, the tendency to seek information and investigate appears to be the primary concern during a fire as shown below. Figure 1- Human behaviour in fires measured by intended acts and frequency As shown above, the need for information, observance of fire development, the need to advice, instruct and reassure others, attempt to prevent fire spread, and fighting the fire dominate human behaviour in fires which in essence are rational behaviours. In contrast, disregarding a fire, experiencing uncertainty, and searching for people during a fire is nearly ignored mainly because participants consider them as less important actions. Note that some of these findings are contrary to the predicted behaviour in NFPA 921 particularly in the area of experiencing uncertainty and irrational responses. 4. The role of media and fire safety training in shaping people behaviour in fires. As mentioned in the previous section, preparedness is central to survival and reduction of fire fatalities. For this reason, fire safety campaigns through media are often intended to spread awareness of fire safety practices. For instance, the UK Home Office in the late 1970s sponsored a television campaign to raise public level of awareness on the danger of misusing mobile radiant electric space heaters in the home. Specifically, the objective of this campaign is to awareness of the potential hazards of portable radiant electric fires and to affect behaviour of people to place such heater at safe distance . Similarly, the nationwide campaign “Fire Kills” is intended to reduce the occurrence of fires and associated consequences in the home and in the workplace. This campaign provides fire safety education and advice to householders and businesses in order increase their awareness of safe practices . According to , one of the most important objective of this media campaign is to reduce the risk of fire by educating the community of the danger of fire and safe practices to avoid and safely escape from fire. For instance, Fire Kills recommend several steps to keep home and workplace safe such as fitting a fire alarm, creating a fire action plan, keep potential escape route clear, never smoke in bed, don’t overload electrical socket, and others. In terms of reach and recall, the impact of a campaign being delivered through various social media is significant. According to, fire safety public awareness campaigns delivered through media can reach a large number of people including those that are more vulnerable to fire. For instance, aside from television, newspapers, and magazine, fire safety awareness nowadays can be delivered through social media websites such Facebook, Twitter, and others that can reach not only the UK population but millions of people around the world .The role of media in reducing fire and associated fatalities is enormous considering the change in attitude and widespread adoption of safe practices from public awareness campaign delivered through television and social media. For instance, television advertising campaign showing spectacular images of fires being developed and means to avoid and control them can greatly influence people’s safety behaviour. Moreover, frequent presentation of recommended fire safety practices can greatly improve community knowledge of fire development and things to do in case of fire . Fire safety training on the other hand is often designed and delivered in the workplace and specifically to staff and personnel with delegated responsibility so that they know what to do in case of fire. Knowledge and skills that can be gained from fire safety training include awareness of the law, good housekeeping practices, fire science, and fire fighting. Other more specific matters include the precautions defined in the building’s fire safety management plan as shown below . In summary, the role of media and fire safety training is to positively influence fire-related human behaviour and reduce deaths and injuries that are often caused by fire-induced irrationality and unprepared building occupants. Figure 2- Example of Fire Safety Management Plan where Fire Safety Training is part of precautionary or preventive measures . 5. The conflict between theory and actual behaviour of people in fires. 5.1 Introduction The conflict between theoretical assumption and actual human behaviour in fires can be demonstrated by previous fire incidents. Analysis of case studies of several known fire incidents can help identify and compare behavioural similarities and differences such as the presence or absence of panic in one or more fire incidents. As detailed in Chapter 4 (Results and Findings) of this study, the following facts taken from several fire incidents or Case Studies of fire-related human behaviour in actual fires can greatly improve our understanding of the conflict between predicted (theoretical) and behaviours exhibited in real-life fire emergencies. A brief background and summary of behavioural analysis of people involved in these fire incidents are presented in the following subsections. Important notes: These case studies (below) can be change with other fire incidents if requested. 5.2 Case Study 1- Coconut Grove Night Club Fire, Boston, USA, 1942 The 1942 Coconut Grove Fire in Boston, USA claimed a significant number of lives. The fire started with a lighted match that accidently ignited the artificial palm trees and drapery. Many people were trapped when the fire quickly (15 minutes as reported) engulfed the building. Result of subsequent investigation aimed to determine the cause of death of 300 people suggest that most of them could have be saved if the exit doors had swung outward . More importantly, the occurrence of panic or irrational flight behaviour in this fire incident is minimal as only a handful or one-third of hundreds of victims actually panicked . 5.3 Case Study 2 – MGM Hilton Fire, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, 1980 This 1980 fire incident claimed the lives of 85 people who died from smoke inhalation. Result of investigation reveals that there were about five thousand people in the hotel and casino when the fire that originate from the “The Deli” restaurant and caused by electrical ground fault inside a wall soffit started. In terms of human behaviour, most of the victims were trapped in their rooms, corridors, stairwells, and some of them died from fire-related injuries within a year . Again, NFPA investigation of fire-related human behaviour in this fire incident suggest that occupants did not panic and actually exhibit rational life saving behaviour such notifying other hotel guest, using wet towels to protect them from smoke and heat, blocking spaces in doors to prevent smoke entry and others . 5.4 Case Study 3 – Star Dust Disco Fire, Dublin, Ireland, 1981 The 1981 Star Dust Disco fire left 48 people dead and 128 injured. The fire started from the seating areas and spread rapidly to the ballroom of the club. Subsequent investigation reveals that the fire caused the lightings to fail and customers running from the deadly blaze were desperate to find an exit in the dark . According to , a staff attempted to extinguish the fire but the false ceiling collapse, two of the exits were locked, and the disc jockey announced the fire and advised people not to panic and use the designated exits. However, post-fire inquiry found that most patrons left the ballroom in panic; others were watching the fire while some were dancing. There was stampede, disorientation, and completely irrational behaviour in the face of danger. 5.5 Case Study 4 – Bradford Stadium Fire, England, 1985 The fire in this incident claimed 56 lives and injured 300 more. The fire started beneath the wooden bleachers of the main grandstand that was filled with trash. Spectators who saw the fire immediately moved away toward the aisle and then to the rear concourse while others who either unaware or unconcerned continue to watch the match. Investigation of the fire incident found that no announcement about the fire was made . Footage of this fire incident suggest that the crowd generally did not panic while most spectators contrary to prediction did not take the same route they entered to escape as evidence by significant number of people who escaped to the pitch . 6. References Read More