Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration - Risks, Opportunities, and Best Practices - Coursework Example

Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR): Risks, Opportunities, and Best Practices Introduction Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) comprises a series of activities that generally starts with disarmament and concludes with ex-soldiers discovering new, valuable roles as citizens. The significance of this process is becoming more and more crucial, especially in post-conflict societies. The statement of the UN secretary-general in 1998 on ‘The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa’ mentions the process of reintegrating ex-soldiers and others into mainstream society as a crucial task in the post-conflict peace building process (McMullin, 2013, p. 251). This essay describes the opportunities and risks associated with DDR in post-conflict environments and analyses ways in which the success of DDR, specifically with regard to its contribution to peace-building, can be best facilitated. DDR is crucial to bring back stability and peace after a peace agreement and must be considered early in the process of peace settlement. The unsuccessful DDR of ex-soldiers may result in an instant regress into conflict and cause intensifying violence (Torjesen, 2009). The unsuccessful reintegration of ex-soldiers into the society could provoke a relapse to a criminal and violent life for ex-soldiers who have militant, aggressive abilities that are only useful on the combat zone. In conflict-ridden societies where major social institutions, civil life, and infrastructure have been damaged by uncontrolled conflict, heightened criminal activities because of incompetent DDR, is an obstacle to achieving sustainable peace (McEvoy & Shirlow, 2009). Basically, if self-sustaining peace is to be achieved, DDR is a vital component of peace-building missions that should be supported by the involved individuals and groups and the international community. In recent years, UN peace-building missions have been carried out in post-conflict societies. Exposure to the implementation of peace-building programmes in specific conflicts reveals that timely and comprehensive evaluation of a DDR programme is in all likelihood will result in long-term peace. In societies lush with accessible weapons, long-term peace has been very hard to create because the abundant supply of weapons brought about insecurity even after a peace settlement has been made (Dzinesa, 2008). Hence, DDR should be focused on immediately after the peace negotiation starts. As soon as a peace settlement comprising a DDR programme has been negotiation, DDR could start. Soldiers involved in intrastate conflicts have become alienated and detached from civilian life and the civil society in terms of psychological and physical aspect because of their involvement in conflict. When a truce is made, ex-soldiers should go back to their civilian life. Because of the specific requirements of ex-soldiers, execution of the DDR element of the peace process should take place if a long-term, nonviolent aftermath is to be acquired (McEvoy & Shirlow, 2009). Successful DDR strategies should be performed to avoid the existence of conditions wherein ex-soldiers are easily pushed into conflict, further ruining the social foundation and normally any economic development that their societies had gained before the armed conflict. Opportunities and Risks Associated with DDR The process of transitioning from war to peace raises particular risks. In post-conflict societies, there is usually no definite winner on the combat zone and, therefore, DDR efforts have to be initiated through discussed agreement as component of peace treaties—including non-state armed organisations and current governments, as well as negotiators (Karame, 2009). As Ann Fitz-Gerald emphasises (Parsons, Porto, & Alden, 2013, p. 14): In these cases [societies transitioning from devastating conflict and others which border, or meet, collapsed state status] the holistic concept of ‘DDR’ takes on a much greater meaning. Countries patrolled by rebel groups and non-state actors face significant challenges in developing the necessary state security structures to sustain the country’s national development agenda. In such situations, DDR efforts are riskier, weaker, and more politically charged--- and remobilisation is a continuous likelihood. This basic difference is stressed by Knight and Ozerdem who believe that the result of a DDR effort relies mainly on the political setting wherein it is performed because “armed opposition to the government retains territorial control and possesses the ability to engage in war fighting, if the peace agreement breaks down owing to non-compliance” (Ozerdem, 2009, p. 13). Indeed, in numerous instances—as the situation in Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Burundi shows—armed factions refuse to take part in peace negotiations, declining to disarm (Bryden & Scherrer, 2012). The range of possibly conflicting problems during peace discussions associated with or with a significant implication on security and specifically DDR is substantial— from peace settlements to outside monitoring; from negotiations regarding the integration of previous opponents in a consolidated army to transitional justice and political power distribution; from DDR scheduling to the transmission of information by fighting factions on their locations and combatants--- all these problems form risks and politicisation (Ozerdem, 2009). Furthermore, and possibly to a degree not experienced in the process of demilitarisation during peacetime, DDR efforts in post-conflict societies take place at individual, household, community, provincial, and national domains. Situated at the core of post-conflict societies, DDR efforts become a major tool for surpassing hostility and violence (Everill & Kaplan, 2013). Unfortunately, DDR rarely progresses in the straight and structured manner expected by those involved in it. Rather, several challenges often arise, ranging from opposing goals among DDR proponents; the mistreatment of objectives; inadequate evaluated financing for reintegration; and inconsistent selection standards. A recurrent problem in the development, planning and structuring of traditional DDR concerns the opposing goals of such efforts among contributors, development professionals, and military experts (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007). Negotiators or peacekeepers usually exercise a stubborn disarmament prejudice that visualises DDR as a temporary tactic to counteract ‘spoilers’, gather armaments, and accommodate ex-soldiers (Vries & Wiegink, 2011). Development professionals support a longer-term viewpoint, wherein DDR is considered as a way to widen the employment prospects of ex-soldiers and their families, reinforcing the absorptive capability of communities of ‘return’, strengthening reconciliation operations and rebuilding public services and infrastructures (Berdal, 1996). In addition, contributors consider DDR as a ‘developmental’ or ‘political’ answer to security problems. Although all of these are certainly valuable viewpoints, they are rarely successfully resolved in reality. Reintegration is possibly the most difficult part of DDR efforts. In post-conflict societies, where livelihood prospects and absorptive capabilities are insufficient, reintegration is extremely difficult and risky (Giustozzi, 2013). It also lacks funding. DDR programme planners and contributors often focus on more noticeable operations like the hardware collection, to the detriment of the more complicated task of restoring the capabilities of communities and recipients (Berdal, 1996). More recently, UN-supported DDR programmes have possibly been marked by a huge rift between an exterior of UN virtue and an element of protection of military systems underground (IDDRS, 2006). The interpretation of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) of the issue is usually downplayed (Giustozzi, 2013, p. 1985): …the weapons surrendered in the first waves of disarmament are either useless or of very poor quality. The quality and calibre of the weapons improves as the disarmament proceeds and mutual trust and confidence is gradually being built. The best weapons and forces are held in reserve for the last stages of the process, usually as a hedge against a return to conflict. In truth, in almost all instances the ‘best weapons’ are kept or not given up even as the peace operation ends. The El Salvador case is popular because a concealed collection of the FMLN—a rebel group that became an officially recognised political party—was exposed by accident after the end of disarmament in 1993 and the group afterward decided to give up its whole arsenal (Giustozzi, 2013). In truth, the stockpiling of armaments by the FMLN was merely the most recent in a chain of infringements of the peace treaty. Arsenals were continuously unearthed after 1993 (Berdal & Ucko, 2009). Looking back it seems clear that the FMLN did not plan to completely hand over its future to an incompetent UN operation in front of Salvadoran army which had been merciless in their subjugation of the rebellion, which could still expect support from the United States and which was holding a huge army. In fact, many had predicted that the FMLN will not completely disarm so as to keep a certain extent of bargaining power and self-defence (Giustozzi, 2013). Moreover, there is a conflict between the necessity of attaining a military and political stability in the peace agreement which ends a conflict, and the adverse effect that such stability usually has on the restoration of the domination of violence after the political settlement of a conflict (Knight & Ozerdem, 2004). Subnational cartels of violence could produce a certain level of stability temporarily, but unavoidably without a domestic control of the cartels of violence another crisis is guaranteed to emerge (Denov, 2009). Resolving such crisis is difficult and is possibly the major root of the dilemma for peacemakers. Fixing up the design of the evolving security domain in a manner that factional wellbeing is assured, and that a monopoly of violence remains intact, is likely but difficult. One more challenging feature of privy transaction in DDR relates to the validity of peace settlements. The inclination to depend on these secret negotiations has definitely been heightened by the inflexibility of UN standards. Before DDR was annexed by the UN with its strict standards and call for global decency, a level of flexibility in dealing with post-conflict negotiations was more satisfactory (IDDRS, 2006). For instance, in Yemen disarmament was not once truly taken into consideration based on the fact that owning weapons in Yemen is typical for all men, and thus cheating is unnecessary. In the cases of El Salvador and Nicaragua, the social disorder raised by the conflict and other occurrences contributed to the inability to completely disarm the fighting factions to set free a surge of violent crimes (Bryden & Scherrer, 2012). On the contrary, in Yemen, such did not occur in spite of its weapon-owning male population (Knight, 2008). Therefore, two assumptions deserve mention. First, complete disarmament of the two previously fighting groups and the populace is not a practical goal in post-conflict conditions and could never have been attained in the framework of negotiated agreements (McMullin, 2007). Second, widespread crimes are possibly not the outcome of the sheer accessibility of weapons, but of an intricate convergence of components wherein the limitation of the coercive authority of the state in dealing with minor violence is crucial (Kingma, 2000). Thus, concentrating on the state development and state-building facets of the post-conflict agreement is perhaps more useful than squandering resources, time, and effort in the quest for the illusion of complete disarmament. DDR is truly a delicate course of action carried out in a setting where the roots of conflict usually stay unsettled in spite of peace negotiations and actual occurrences and experiences have provided warnings that could help prevent unintentionally provoking conflict. The continuous dissemination of information about the course of action to the armed forces, communities, and society can prevent gossips and impractical expectations or hope, as can the application of clear standards for the selection and phasing of the populations to undergo demobilisation (Miklaucic & Civic, 2011). Effective, competent reintegration support involves directed strategies derived from socioeconomic information about former combatants (Ozerdem, 2009). These socioeconomic data strongly support the development of practical, accurate reintegration assistance, which usually involves employment prospects, education, and training. DDR efforts are a component of a natural scale in the peace process and necessitate a coordinated, unified, and wide-ranging or inclusive framework in their development, preparation, and implementation. Once disarmament ends, demobilisation starts and once demobilisation concludes, reintegration begins. Reintegration efforts can coincide with on-going peace-building efforts and several operations can begin at any phase in the peace-building course (Junne & Verkoren, 2005). Within the short-term, the inability to disarm and demobilise ex-soldiers successfully could lead to an instant backslide into conflict; within the long-and medium-term, unsuccessful or unfinished reintegration of former soldiers into civilian life could result in armed delinquency by these ex-combatants who do not have other employment or livelihood prospects (Berdal & Ucko, 2009). In societies where internal systems for maintaining stability, peace, and order have already been damaged by civil strife, this rise in armed misconduct would be an additional setback to peace building. Due to their valuable role in the process of creating both long- and short-term sustainable peace, methods for DDR of ex-soldiers will keep on requiring attention from national and international peace agencies. Peace-building programmes, and the international agreements or systems that emerge after their conclusion, tend to keep on being instructed to carry out DDR associated operations or help national leaders in conducting them (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007). In post-conflict societies where there is a clear winner, the winning group or party must ratify a law to enforce DDR operations, upon taking over the country. As pointed out by Colletta and colleagues (1996), “strong political will and leadership, expressed in terms of commitment, realism, and pragmatism, are crucial factors” (as cited in Parsons et al., 2013, p. 15). Furthermore, “the success of this first step following the signing of a peace accord [DDR] signals the end to organised conflict and provides the security necessary for people affected by war to reinvest in their lives and their country” (Parsons et al., 2013, p. 15). Demobilisation activities have created opportunities for looking at ex-soldiers’ post-conflict needs and goals, and for guidance and counselling. Likewise, disarmament is crucial to all DDR programmes, as by trying to regulate the kind and quantity of available armaments in post-conflict societies, it has a definite function to serve in reinforcing security temporarily, as well as boosting trust and certainty among stakeholders and finally prevent the recurrence of conflict (Mitton, 2008). In reality, unfinished and unsuccessful disarmament operations have in a number of instances bolstered the propagation of small weapons, disrupting not just the country at issue but also nearby countries (Alden, 2002). Therefore, as the discussion shows, DDR programmes should be complete and successful in order to achieve the targeted objectives. But what are the measures to enhance DDR programmes, especially with regard to their contribution to peace building or creation of sustainable peace? Enhancing the Success of DDR Programmes Recently, scholars and policymakers involved or interested in dealing with intrastate wars or restoring post-conflict societies have recommended methods that comprise the DDR of ex-soldiers. These methods have been regarded crucial not just for helping restore post-conflict societies, but also for substantially cutting down military costs and permitting inadequate resources to be channelled to civil programmes. In short, it has been believed that DDR are integral to peace-building, state formation, economic modernisation, and the alleviation of racial, ethic, or religious conflicts. For peace consolidation and the cultivation of stability, peace-building process in post-conflict societies should be viewed as supplementary to DDR (Maley et al., 2003). In order to create long-term stability and peace and to thwart further spate of violence, the central roots of the conflict must be identified and mitigated. All involved parties in the conflict must take part in the quest for sustainable peace. Peace agreements usually cause an indispensable termination of intrastate conflicts. Nevertheless, within the context of the peace agreement there should be an agenda to complete DDR (Vries & Wiegink, 2011). If not there is a possibility that insurgents may ignore the treaty and continue violence. In view of that, the experience of previous UN peace-building missions shows that the initial step to putting into action an effective demilitarisation operation is to create a wide-ranging DDR strategy within the peace treaty (Torjesen, 2009). DDR can become effective, but only if it becomes part of an all-inclusive, comprehensive operation. Interventions should support calls for DDR with considerable incentives and a practical risk of intimidation or force. DDR efforts should be long-term and wide-ranging and should be incorporated into the bigger plan for post-conflict rebuilding. Former soldiers should be given sufficient training and re-education courses to make them ready for civilian life. In addition, they require sufficient ‘reinsertion’ support to guarantee that they have basic necessities, such as food, shelter, and clothing for the duration needed to move to sustainable livelihood in local communities (Knight, 2008). Furthermore, DDR should be complemented by attempts to revive the wider economy in order for demobilised soldiers to gain economic prospects to replace their means of subsistence when they surrender their armaments (Dzinesa, 2008). DDR efforts must also consist of attempts to help ex-soldiers to assimilate into communities that could view and treat them with hatred, misgiving, fear, and that could feel bitter about the special privileges granted to individuals who ‘deserved’ them merely by taking part in wars and slaughtering civilians (McMullin, 2013). Specific focus should be given to gender themes in DDR. Vulnerable and marginalized populations in society, especially children and women, often endure the greatest during domestic conflicts of the type that cause outside military involvement. For instance, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, women were habitually viewed and treated as a property, to be abducted to play the role of a wife or hesitant secondary soldiers (Denov, 2009). Sexual violence in Bosnia was purposely exploited as an ethnic cleansing method. Unluckily, women also endure unreasonably when organised violence ceases. Only a small number of women and groups that focus on women’s issues are usually engaged in dialogues on how to develop and enforce DDR programmes (Mitton, 2008). Taking into consideration a gender-based viewpoint in future DDR programmes will contribute to the development of a fairer and, in the end, more effective DDR programmes. In spite of the setbacks, challenges, and risks, an inclusive DDR programme, appropriately executed, can greatly contribute to the creation of post-conflict peace and rebuilding attempts. Some successes are the Kosovo and Sierra Leone case, although they are still under reconstruction (Bryden & Scherrer, 2012). Military force, in the case of Sierra Leone, forced the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to go through disarmament and demobilisation in 2001 (Everill & Kaplan, 2013, p. 84). The programme was performed in phases. Successful disarmament took place in instances where foreign forces, armed groups, opposition factions, and government forces were disarmed as soon as their arrival at chosen meeting sites so as to prevent a regress in conflict. Even in domestic wars, developing local or regional programmes to deal with post-conflict supervision concerns all over the state cultivates a resilient and nonviolent setting for addressing post-conflict disarmament issues (Junne & Verkoren, 2005). The distribution of precise and prompt information among target populations and citizens on the goals of DDR programmes is critical for successful outcome. Successful demobilisation efforts should be complemented by well-developed, efficient information mechanisms that convey information about enclosure areas, reinsertion packages, and other socioeconomic prospects for the citizens (McEvoy & Shirlow, 2009). Even though soldiers may frequently have the ability to disturb weak peace agreements by relapsing to open violence or falling back on crime against civilians, these hostilities is discouraged through campaigns that aim at ex-soldiers, and taking advantage of their disarmament and demobilisation through providing educational and financial incentives that are intended to enable the nonviolent reintegration of ex-soldiers into civilian life (Parsons et al., 2013). Effective UN reintegration missions took into consideration the importance of integrating a dual strategy that merged short-term goals of immediate support and assistance with long-term goals of progress. The demilitarisation effort initiated by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) used this strategy which attempted to connect short-term goals with long-term ones (Junne & Verkoren, 2005). The short-term goals of ONUMOZ were to supervise the truce, confirm the pulling out of foreign soldiers, monitor the soldiers’ demobilisation, and confirm the formation of a new national armed force. The long-term goal of ONUMOZ was to formulate vocational training programmes for previous soldiers (Junne & Verkoren, 2005, p. 22). Ultimately, the social crises that stem from armed conflicts and impact minority groups and particular needs are very crucial and require specific consideration and concentration. Conclusion In addressing DDR, a number of issues have to be dealt with practically at the same time. For instance, is DDR tackling notions like interests and identities, or merely physical aspects like combatants and armaments, or both? Armaments and combatants are physical aspects, and DDR programmes can view them like that if DDR efforts use a problem-solving approach, but such is incapable of producing adequate information, in several instances, to allow DDR programmes to carry out significant measures in relation to stable peace and order. Within a critical point of view, DDR efforts must consider armaments and combatants as component of the institutions and mechanisms wherein they are rooted. If they are detached from the institutions, interests, mechanisms, and systems that establish them, DDR programmes alienate them and in the long run are misled. Another issue that DDR programmes may take into consideration is their objective. Do they desire to attain progress, democratic transition, or security? In numerous developing countries, these three are always together. Hence, any attempt to develop DDR programmes has to consider the reality that this course of action is a component of a larger long-term effort to build the needed psychological, social, economic, and political context for civilian life. DDR efforts involve not just individual interests and identities, but also social, economic, and political domains. DDR programmes have to acknowledge that for soldiers, disarmament involves the desertion of both their means of subsistence and vocation. For some, an armament is not only a way to achieve security. Armaments have social, political, and economic attributes. Thus, in creating DDR programmes for ex-soldiers, it must constantly be remembered that these situations require consideration of identity and culture, besides physical aspects. There are numerous ways to make DDR programmes successful, such a integrating long-term and short-term DDR objectives. But the most important strategy is taking into consideration the risks and opportunities inherent in DDR programmes. These risks range from armed groups refusing to disarm, opposing goals of stakeholders, rebel group refusing to give up the ‘best weapons’, to the possibility of restoring monopoly of violence once DDR programmes become insufficient or incomplete. However, there are also opportunities, such as prevention of conflict recurrence, rehabilitation of ex-combatants, and precise knowledge of the needs and interests of ex-combatants. All of these should be taken into consideration in the development, planning, and implementation of DDR programmes. References Alden, C. (2002) ‘Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique’, Security Dialogue, 33(3), 341-356. Berdal, M. (1996) Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. 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Parsons, M., Porto, J., & Alden, C. (2013) From Soldiers to Citizens: Demilitarisation of Conflict and Society. England: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Torjesen, S. (2009) ‘New Avenues for Research in the Study of DDR’, Conflict, Security and Development, 9(4), 411-423. Vries, H. & Wiegink, N. (2011) ‘Breaking up and Going Home? Contesting Two Assumptions in the Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants’, International Peacekeeping, 18(1), 38-51. Read More