Since 9/11Terrorism is Best Understood as a Network Phenomenon - Essay Example

Introduction The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack is one of the most horrific terrorist attacks in human history. It was an attack which produced significant human casualties and considerable damage to various American structures and institutions. These attacks would have devastating consequences not just for America, but for the other Allied countries which have been battling terrorism. While these attacks were condemned by the US and its allies, these were lauded by terrorist organizations and anti-western groups. These attacks also brought to light the extent of the activities of the Al-Qaeda organization prompting the US and allies to intensify their anti-terrorist activities. This paper shall evaluate the September 11 terrorist attack, mostly in relation to the incident being a product of a terrorist network phenomenon. This paper’s analysis will be based on the terrorist network of the Al-Qaeda organization. First, a brief rundown of the events surrounding the attack will be presented. Second, a description and analysis of the Al-Qaeda organization will also be discussed. Third, an analysis of the attack in relation to the terrorist network organization shall be established. Finally, a summary and conclusion will close out this discussion. Body September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks At about 8:46 in the morning of September 11, 2001, hijackers crashed American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Centre, and after about 20 minutes, United Airlines Flight 175 would crash into the South Tower (Averill, 2005). American Airlines Flight 77 was crashed into the Pentagon about 25 minutes after the South Tower attack. Another flight, United Airlines Flight 93, which was controlled by four hijackers, crashed in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania at around 10 am that same day (Averill, 2005). It was later revealed that the Capitol was the intended target of the flight. In the UA Flight 93, passengers and crew found out about the earlier terrorist attacks and tried to regain control of the plane. Fearing that the passengers might regain control of the plane, the terrorists crashed the plane deliberately (Averill, 2005). Further investigations of the events surrounding that day indicate that the hijackers used mace, tear gas, pepper spray, knives, blades, and fake bombs to threaten the passengers; and in fact some passengers ended up being stabbed by the attackers (Holmes, 2006). The buildings which were attacked, including some of the other buildings in the World Trade Centre complex collapsed as a direct result of the suicide attacks. The Pentagon also suffered significant structural damage (Holmes, 2006). The FAA grounded all flights and those already in the air were told to land immediately. All international flights were also banned from landing on US soil for three days following the incident. About 3000 people were killed in these attacks, including the 19 hijackers and the numerous passengers of the hijacked flights (Atkins, 2011). The leader of the Al-Qaeda group Osama bin Laden was the immediate suspect for the attack but he immediately denied any involvement in the incidents; later however, he claimed responsibility for it (Atkins, 2011). The organization indicated various motives for their attack, primarily the US support of Israel, the US military presence in the Middle East, and the economic and political sanctions imposed on Iraq. Soon after the attacks, the US declared its War against Terror (Atkins, 2011). Al-Qaeda Organization The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization was first organized during the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan (Blanchard, 2004). When the USSR invaded Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden went to Afghanistan to help establish a mujahideen to fight the Soviet Union. With Ayman al-Zawahiri’s guidance, bin Laden became an even more active radical leader. In 1996, he issued a fatwa against American soldiers living in Saudi Arabia (Blanchard, 2004). In 1998, he declared a second fatwa, this time against American citizens (Blanchard, 2004). Bin Laden utilized Islamic verses and teachings in order to justify his attack on Americans and at one point, he firmly pointed out that the only solution left for the American issues in the Middle East was on the declaration of a jihad against America and its allies. Bin Laden planned the September 11, 2001 attacks even as he initially denied any involvement in the attacks. In 2004, for the first time, he publicly admitted involvement in the terrorist attack, indicating that the attacks were launched as a means of regaining Arab freedom from western influence (Pourmokhtari, 2010). The US never formally charged bin Laden for the attacks, however, he was on the FBI’s Most Wanted List soon after the September 11 attacks. A US led manhunt for bin Laden later led to his killing by Navy Seal infiltrators in Pakistan on the 2nd of May 2011 (Baker and Cooper, 2011). Al-Qaeda member Khalid Sheikh Mohammed admitted his involvement in the attacks in 2002, and in the 9/11 Commission Report, it was indicated that Mohammed’s hostility against the US was primarily based on the American policy on Israel (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). Mohammed was later arrested in 2003 in Pakistan after Pakistani officials tipped off the CIA about Mohammed’s presence in their country (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). Aside from Mohammed, other terrorists were identified as mainly responsible for the attack against the US. These terrorists included Ramzi bin al-shibh, Abut Turab al-Urduni and Mohammed Atef. These terrorists were assigned particular roles in the bigger picture that is the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US. Terrorist Network for September 11 attacks Terrorism is an activity which needs the contribution of different people, having a common goal, – to cause terror – and carrying out various activities which are meant to cause bodily harm or mental injury to people (Cronin, 2002). The 9/11 terrorist attack is an incident which is founded on activities of terrorist networking. The Al-Qaeda organization planned this activity by utilizing their global resources and networks (Cronin, 2002). The attack however started with the seeds of war prompted by Osama bin Laden as he issued his fatwa against US troops and the American people. The US presence in the Middle East and the US position on Israel has always been a major motivation for terrorist attacks against the Americans and other allied countries (Clarke, 2004). Bin Laden also condemned the US sanctions against Iraq and protested against the US impact on the Middle East mostly as they accused the US of plundering the riches and resources of their region (Clarke, 2004). Based on the events leading up to the attack, the manifestation of the power of the Al-Qaeda network is very much in evidence. The idea for the terrorist attack was initiated by Mohammed who presented the possibility of attacking the US to bin Laden (Scott, 2007). This was in 1996, where a period of transition within the organization was in evidence as the organization was relocating from Sudan to Afghanistan (Scott, 2007). Bin Laden was very much in agreement with the plan and in 1998 the African Embassy bombings and his fatwa became strong signs of bin Laden’s interest in Mohammed’s plans (Scott, 2007). In the years that followed, the planning process was laid out and Mohammed was assigned with the task of plotting the attack. Various meetings occurred from 1998 to 1999 between Mohammed, bin Laden, and Atef (Rabasa, et.al., 2006). Atef was in charge of operations support and target selections. He was also tasked with arranging the travel plans for the hijackers (Rabasa, et.al., 2006). Bin Laden rejected some of Mohammed’s plans as he believed some of the projected attacks were too large-scale for them to realistically carry out. Bin Laden also secured financial support for their plans and also carefully chose the participants in the venture (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005). He initially chose al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar from Bosnia for the attacks; these were known jihadists. They first entered the US in January of 2000. A few months after, Hazmi and Mihdhar took flying lessons in the US (Wright, 2006). These two were meant to be the secondary hijackers as they did not do too well in the flying lessons (Wright, 2006). Before these two individuals entered the US, some of their conspirators started arriving in Afghanistan from Germany. These men (Atta, al-Shehhi, Jarrah, bin al-Shibh) were chosen because they were well-educated, were good English speakers, and have experienced Western living (Bernstein, 2002). Other recruits were chosen for their specific skills. Hanjour, one of these new recruits was already armed with a pilot’s license and he arrived in the US on December of 2000 (Wright, 2006). He joined Hazmi in the US and soon enough was starting a refresher learning course in flying. Al-Shehhi arrived in the US at the end of May, followed by Atta in June 3, 200 and Jarrah on the 27th of June, 2000 (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). Al-Shibh was denied entry into the US and so he stayed in Hamburg and coordinated activities between Atta and Mohammed. Three of the hijackers were therefore involved in pilot training in the US (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). The secondary hijackers started entering the US in 2001 and by July, 2001, Atta would meet with bin al-Shibh in Spain where they ironed out the final details of the plan and the selection of the final targets (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). Bin al-Shibh also expressed bin Laden’s desire to have the attacks carried out as soon as possible. The above events immediately leading up the attack indicates the presence of the network between and among the attackers, in terms of their goals, their activities, and their ultimate plans. In its earlier years, the organization has been described as a highly organized group, mostly supporting a hierarchical leadership (Rogers, 2003). The network approach has been commonly used in recent years with this shift in leadership style becoming the more ideal option for the organization in the fulfilment of its organization goals (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005). Bin Laden stressed the transnational nature of the organization and his desire to be more inclusive in securing goals and in supporting other causes. In understanding the terrorist networking process, the organization is seen as a web of specific but overlapping systems (Marin and Mayntz, 1991). Each community is part of one group under a larger organization, and none of its members can secure their goals without involving others (Marin and Mayntz, 1991). Under these conditions, the interests are no longer consistent, but they are heterogeneous and may sometimes compete with each other. Moreover, the organization actions are based on bargaining and negotiating (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The terrorist network has three ideal types – chains, hubs, and allchannel. In chain structures, the actors occupy a chain of nodes where information is passed from one actor or from one node to another (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005). Members may not know who is actually in command or what the final actions of the organization are. They have orders from one player and pass these orders on to others without knowing the overall picture (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005). In the hub structure, the orders originate from a leader in the centre of the organization and are passed on to the different nodes in the organization (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005). The leader has a clear picture or clear idea of what the overall goal is and the players are subjugated to that one player; these players may have a sense of the entire picture, but not in its entirety (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005). In the allchannel structure, the information flows freely from one node to another in a manner which is well-collaborated. There is no single player in the entire structure. The important players are however identified and the transmission of information does not involve outside players (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001). From 1998 to September 11, 2001, the organization mostly utilized the network organizational structure (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005). Bin Laden established the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders (IIF) which was considered a network of Islam leaders (Fighel and Shahar, 2002). This organization supported bin Laden’s fatwa against the American troops in the Middle East and it also counselled their members on killing Americans and their allies in order to liberate their Islam ideals from what they believed were the clutches and the control of the western world (Fighel and Shahar, 2002). This IIF expanded to include the Pakistan Jihadi organizations as well as the Bangladesh jihad movements. Until the September 11 attacks, the network approach was a useful tool in understanding the Al-Qaeda and their actions. Geographically, bin Laden made Sudan and later Afghanistan as its base country and after moving to Afghanistan, he soon mobilized support for the organization’s goals and activities (Goodman, 2004). Sudan and Afghanistan were providing territorial bases for the Al-Qaeda and they were also very much willing to secure an institutional presence for the organization in their countries. Bin Laden was able to deploy his skilled devotees with instructions to attack specific targets; he also utilized modern technology in order to communicate with his members in various parts of the globe (Hoffman, 2003). These activities persisted even when the US was actively searching for bin Laden, especially in the aftermath of the 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). The Al-Qaeda’s success during the September 11 bombings is an exemplary example of the network structure of terrorism (Khan, 2007). The terrorists recruited from different parts of the world including Arab communities in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East first underwent training in various camps in Afghanistan. They also gained logistical training through their sleeper units in Europe and Southeast Asia in order to gradually slip into the US without setting off any alarms from the intelligence agencies (Blanchard, 2004). Most of their activities were carried out based on the hub-network principle. However, for their smaller units, including their lieutenants and soldiers, they only received partial data on specific parts of the operations (Blanchard, 2004). By applying new techniques of operations after the 2001 US-assault on Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda was able to use the strategic difficulties and military barriers established by the US to their advantage (Johnson, 2004). Their activities disturbed the basic prerequisites of the traditional organizational elements seen in the hierarchical and the network structures. Based on these structures, the activities of the organizations focused on an impending affiliation with a specific rationale and a permanent institutional presence (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005). For the Al-Qaeda, its primary leadership relied on these two structures; however, overall, it has also highlighted the importance of de-territorialization, not affiliation and disappearance, and not institutional presence (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2005). These two elements have become primary structures which have supported their activities, and have shaped their activities before and since the September 11 attacks. One of the main elements of the Al-Qaeda network is its financial network. The organization relied on fund-raising in the months and years leading up to the 9/11 attacks and to a more significant extent than was considered at that time. Bin Laden did not have a huge source of funds as was thought of at that time (Roth, Greenburg, and Wille, 2008). Instead, the organization practically had a hand-to-mouth existence. Several groups of financial facilitators secured and generated the funds and may have gotten funds from various donors, charities, and even mosques with only some of these sources actually knowing the end recipient for these donations (Roth, et.al., 2008). The CIA believed that in order to run its annual operations before 9/11, the Al-Qaeda raised about $30 million per year and this amount mostly came from donations (Roth, et.al., 2008). For a long while, the US believed that bin Laden financially supported the organization’s activities via his inheritance and the proceeds of his businesses in Sudan. This was an inaccurate assumption. Based on intelligence reports, bin Laden inherited a million per year from 1970 to 1994, the inheritance amounted to significantly less than the speculated 300 million inheritance (Roth, et.al., 2008). Moreover, in 1994, Saudi Arabia forced the bin Laden family to freeze Osama’s share of the bin Laden inheritance. This divested bin Laden of the fortune which he could have continuously received. Bin Laden’s Sudan businesses also did not support the Al-Qaeda organization and some were actually not owned by him; in fact, some of these businesses were very small and not economically profitable (Roth, et.al., 2008). However, his assumed investments were meant to influence the Sudan government, swaying the government to allow its presence in the country. Pressure from the US and their allies prompted Sudan to withdraw its support of the Al-Qaeda, and soon enough, bin Laden and the group would leave Sudan for Afghanistan (Roth, et.al., 2008). When bin Laden left Sudan, the government seized his businesses and left him with next to nothing. His move to Afghanistan marked a period of financial difficulties (Roth, et.al., 2008). The support of the Taliban helped him get through such period. He was eventually able to establish networks with various wealthy Saudi nationals and gradually raise funds for the organization and for himself. The organization was dependent on the fund-raising activities of bin Laden and his network of supporters. It was highly dependent on the financial facilitators who raised funds from numerous donors and fund-raisers (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). These donors were mainly based in the Gulf region, specifically Saudi Arabia. As was mentioned previously, some of the donors knew the eventual recipient and purpose of their donations, however, others did not. These donors were approached by the finance facilitators and employees of corrupted charities, more often than not during the holy month of the Ramadan (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). These facilitators also secured financial support from imams at mosques who re-allocated zakat donations and prompted more donations from their members in support of radical Islamic goals (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). The Al-Qaeda charities’ strategy before September 11 was based on various goals. The organization covered specific foreign subsidiaries of major internationally-supported charities (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). In some instances, significant negligence and ineffective financial management of charities especially in remote regions of the globe made it relatively easy for the organization to siphon funds from charitable organizations. These charities donated to the ultimate recipients which were usually smaller charities who often shaved off money for the Al-Qaeda from various donations (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). In these instances, the operatives had significant control over the entire organization, and had access to their bank accounts. Saudi charities have also been known to support terrorist organizations. It is important to understand the nature of these Saudi or some Muslim charities. Charitable giving or zakat is part of the ideals of the Muslim faith and it has a deeper context than what is understood of charity in the western countries (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). Zakat is also considered as income tax, academic assistance for students, foreign aid, as well as political leverage (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). Where the west separates social and religious duties, there is no such separation for the Muslim faith. The Koran apparently teaches that the Sunna or traditions of Muslim would serve as their government policies and the Islam-designated officials are also the primary leaders of their cultural and social life (Colas and Saull, 2006). Allocating donations for charitable activities is therefore an essential part of the Saudi Arabia tradition and the zakat has been known to provide humanitarian support within the Muslim community. Moreover, a significant goal of their charity has been to teach their beliefs and culture in different parts of the world (Colas and Saull, 2006). In effect, Saudi has funded the establishment of mosques and schools around the world, including Central Asia, Europe, the US, and Pakistan, among others. Through these charities, the network of financial support for Al-Qaeda has been gradually built and the different activities of the organization have been financed (Colas and Saull, 2006). In the days leading up to the 9/11 attacks, the organization moved its money through the hawala system. This system works by transferring money through a network of brokers where the money is transferred but not actually moved (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). This system became significant after the 1998 Africa bombings where the financing system of terrorists was scrutinized. Bin Laden used the hawala system which has been successful in Pakistan in order to secure the finances of the organization. Aside from the hawala system, the organization also used financial institutions to transfer and secure its funds (Jost, 2000). The use of this system however became problematic at one point, especially after the 1998 Africa bombings. Nevertheless, this was the most common means used in moving the funds of these terrorists. For which reason, the 9/11 attacks have been considered successful because of the almost total lack of regulation of the financial systems in the UAE and Pakistan on these terrorist accounts (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). The hijackers used the formal financial institutions including credit cards, ATM card transactions, as well as wire transfers in order to manage their activities prior to the 9/11 attacks. These operatives were relatively anonymous in their activities as compared to their known core leaders in their use of the formal financial systems. Couriers were also used by the organization in moving their funds and these couriers were members of the organization and were known for their ability to keep a low profile due to their language skills, ethnicity, and background (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). Some of them were not aware of the exact purpose of the funds and at a time, several couriers were asked to handle or transfer funds. They usually moved money from the hawaladars or donors and to their recipients. The 9/11 transaction is a primary example of their efficient use of their system when Mohammed transferred a significant amount of money to Abdul Aziz Ali in Dubai and then Ali wired the funds to the hijackers in the US (The 9/11 Commission, 2004). Ali was the courier in this case and would not have aroused as much suspicion in his activities as Mohammed. When taken together, these financial activities for the organization were based on a rich and dynamic network of activities which ultimately made it possible for the organization to fly under the radar and not gain the significant attention or notice of the US and other international agencies. The Al-Qaeda also gained organization and operational maturity and established a base of operations in Afghanistan which provided bin Laden with a venue to plan and prepare for his activities (Lewis, 2002). Through the attacks carried out by his people, bin Laden exemplified that his organization was a pioneering organization to be reckoned with, and he was showing other terrorists that they could follow suit. The organization’s entry into suicide terrorism had a significant impact on how this terrorist act would be carried out in other parts of the world (Schweitzer and Ferber, 2005). The organization sought to further perpetuate and internationalize such suicide attacks. In fact, their suicide attack gained much global attention. Before the Al-Qaeda, suicide attacks were used only in local theatres and in other local venues (Schweitzer and Ferber, 2005). The suicide attack of September 11 showed the world that the attack can be carried out beyond their local borders. After bin Laden was thrown out of Sudan, he sought to unify the Islamic cause against the western ‘infidels.’ As was mentioned previously, his establishment of the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders sought to band the terrorist groups. Aside from establishing such network, he also sought to secure greater cooperation between the Al-Qaeda and the Egyptian terrorist organizations, mostly the Egyptian Islamic Jihad as headed by Dr. Zawahiri (Schweitzer and Ferber, 2005). This group became part of the network of the organization and also provided support for the activities of Al-Qaeda against the US and its allies. Regardless of the strong reputation which the organization has secured over the years, it has actually carried out only seven terrorist acts, and all of these attacks have been suicide attacks (Muthuswamy and Emerson, 2009). Before the 9/11 incident, three Al-Qaeda suicide attacks were carried out, including the American embassies of Kenya and Tanzania and the USS Cole (Muthuswamy and Emerson, 2009). The organization has been under the specific control of bin Laden during the attack; however, there have also been affiliates under his command who have not played uniform roles. These affiliates have been loosely labelled as Al-Qaeda members with different levels of association and affinity for the organization (Muthuswamy and Emerson, 2009). Nevertheless, these affiliates have been considered part of the network of the organization, forming a younger generation of members supporting the activities of the organization. These organizations have also been considered members due to their operation knowledge and training in terrorist camps in Afghanistan, as well as their indoctrination into the ideals of the organization. The Al-Qaeda core leaders have not been actually involved in the operational planning and execution of the attacks by their affiliates (Scott, 2007). These attacks have mostly been carried out by the commanders from the local terror networks. The links of these affiliates to the Al-Qaeda organization have been founded on shared ideals and common military experiences in Afghanistan (Scott, 2007). The Afghanistan veterans were in the prime position as commanders within local organizations. Their networks extended to other Asian countries including the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, Harakat-al-Ansar in India, al-Islami in Somalia, and many others. Although these groups were autonomous, they often cooperated and supported the activities of the Al-Qaeda as far as terrorist activities were concerned (Rumford, 2008). Logistical support was also given to the Al-Qaeda when needed and protection was offered when sought (Farely, 2003). When considered in combination with each other, the network of the Al-Qaeda is extensive and has gone beyond Afghan borders. And, it is such network which made it possible for them to infiltrate the most powerful country in the world and attack from within, effectively rattling America’s and the world’s sense of security. Conclusion The September 11 attacks have been carried out by the Al-Qaeda organization through its terrorist network. This network is founded on an organizational, leadership, and financial structure which is linked, coordinated, and integrated as a unified whole. This network is also supported by a strong and charismatic leadership, one which was able to sway members towards suicide attacks on the US. The Al-Qaeda organization has been built on what is claimed as Islam teachings, teachings which oppose the interference or the presence of the US in the Middle East as well as their support for their enemy – Israel. 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