Waziristan as the Geography of Modern Terrorism - Research Paper Example

Of Waziristan as the Geography of Modern Terrorism Introduction The province of Waziristan is considered as the geography of modern terrorism; thisthesis has historical and probably contemporary truth. Historically speaking, Waziristan had been the most difficult place for the imperial British government to totally subjugate. In the present-day context, another Western invader is attempting to subjugate such region; like the British, this modern-day invader is finding it hard to colonize, physically and mentally, the Waziristan tribes. This paper explores and examines several factors associated to the thesis that Waziristan is the geography of modern terrorism: (1) a brief historical background of Waziristan province; (2) the relationship of the terms “geography” and “terrorism;” (3) the connection or network of the “terrorist” organizations (i.e., Taliban and Al Qaeda) to Waziristan; (4) the affinity or relation of bin Laden to Waziristan peoples; (5) the concepts of modern terrorism; (6) Waziristan as the geography of modern terrorism; and (7) the dilemma of such thesis. Background of Waziristan Lyon (2008, 174) depicts the inhabitants of Waziristan region in a gloomy fashion: raiders. Historically, it has certain grain of truth. Since the 19th century, the tribes from Waziristan had been raiding other tribes or peoples -- especially the British troops and officials -- living from or at the neighboring lands. It must be noted, however, that Lyon refers to this local people as that tribe that greatly belongs to the Mahsud. Of the two major tribes from said region, the Mahsud tribe is the fiercest. The depiction of Mahsud peoples as robbers entails the economic aspect of raiding. Beattie (2002, 216) states that the 19th-century British colonizers had thought that the main reason of raiding practices by the local people from the Waziristan region was that of poverty. In fact, they, the colonial masters, blamed poverty for the prominence of raiding or robbery in the said region. Nevertheless, the notorious activities (i.e., of robbery) committed by the locals were a phenomenon associated not largely to economic rationale but to the “ethos and martial values” marked in Waziristan peoples (Beattie 2002). Perhaps Lyon’s thesis -- that feud is an institution for the peoples in Waziristan -- points to the enduring feudal war mainly between the Mahsud’s and the Wazir’s tribes. Ahmed (1983, 33) argues that these two principal tribes had “long been at feud” against each other that the British colonizers were able to subjugate, at certain extent, the Waziristan region. Thence, it shows that the pre-19th century Waziristan -- and even to these days -- was a geographical place in which multifaceted tribal systems were commonplace. In contrast to the ancient time, nonetheless, the number of tribes in the present-day Waziristan is reduced into two major groups. Geography and Terrorism Marburger (2003, xvii) says that geography as a body of human knowledge provides an essential tool in fully visualizing, organizing, and assessing the “real world data.” True, to gather and obtain spatial data from places that are of interests to certain group of peoples are highly significant. For one, such information or “real world data” have the potentiality to be utilized for specific purpose or purposes. Geographical data greatly facilitate the visualization, among other things, of the place or region in which the interested party has plans or schemes in the immediate future. On the other hand, Gallaher (2009, 251) notes that geography as a discipline has not been used or explored in studying “political violence, generally, or terrorism more specifically.” Despite the importance of geography as described by Marburger, such field of human knowledge has “not usually been a source discipline.” Presently, there are two frames in which the concepts and praxis of geography and terrorism are tackled and examined. Of the two theoretical frameworks, the frame of geopolitics focuses more on the process of analyzing violence or terrorism by the state as the interpreter. The central weakness marked in geopolitical frame -- including the framework characterized in political economy -- is mainly its failure to utilize the discipline of geography in determining or understanding the nature of violence or terrorism. De Blij (2007, 7) defines geography as a discipline in which it views the world in the spatial dimension. In applying this definition, it is arguable that violence or terrorism is spatial in nature. That is to say, any event or happening has certain geographical origin or source. And perhaps to fully comprehend today’s terrorism, one needs to grasp or obtain the spatial dimension -- what Marburger calls “real world data” -- wherein the “terrorist” resides into. Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Waziristan Filkins (2009, 254-275) seems to suggest that the Taliban and the Al Qaeda are spatially located at the Waziristan region; that the geography of these movements or organizations is currently, and probably previously, within the spatial dimension of South Waziristan. Thence, Maliks -- group elders or leaders probably from the Wazir tribe -- who oppose or fail to follow the fundamental ideology marked in Taliban or Al Qaeda are intentionally and systematically murdered. This implies that with the increasing number of their members, it becomes empirical for the Taliban and Al Qaeda to silence or kill those peoples or tribes who stand against them. In order to expand, if not maintain, their membership, Taliban and Al Qaeda have to resort to violence or “terroristic” acts within their spatial dominance. What is interesting in the thesis of Filkins is that it paradoxically tells the maintenance or continuance of the tribal system prominent in Waziristan since time immemorial. Blumenthal affirms the idea or claim of Filkins that the Taliban and the Al Qaeda are residing, if not hiding, within the geography of Waziristan. In the post-9/11 event, pro-American forces waged a military campaign against these “terrorist” groups “in the remote tribal province of Waziristan” (Blumenthal 2008, 198). It appears that these groups have retreated from the plains of Afghanistan into the mountains of Waziristan. Perhaps due to the intense campaign pursued mainly by the American government, the Taliban and the Al Qaeda have probably found safety from the intricate terrain of mountainous Waziristan. History has proven the complicated nature of the type of hill warfare. In fact, Reid (1997, 113) remarks that the mountainous nature of the territorial terrain prominent in the outskirts of India -- which includes Waziristan -- makes the military campaign in the 1920s by the British government the “most insistent military problem.” Bin Laden and Waziristan “... the other is somewhere in the border mountains of South Waziristan with his father, fighting alongside bin Laden and al-Qaeda against United States, its allies, and the Karzai regime.” (Schultheis 2008, 57). The time-period in which the narration of Schultheis occurred is in the early 1990s. Thence, local peoples from the Waziristan province had been actively participating in the struggle mainly led by bin Laden and his organization. The narration of Schultheis is revealing: first, it suggests that bin Laden has connection, if not relation, to the tribe or tribes of Waziristan region; second, prior to 9/11, bin Laden has cohorts associated to, or living in, Waziristan; and third, bin Laden’s enlisted men from Waziristan are mostly young boys from the tribes in said region. By and large, Waziristan has been valuable for bin Laden -- both as a place for recruit and perhaps for refuge -- since the early decade of the 1990s. In 2004, the American government and its Pakistani ally had systematically pursued a man-hunt operation in search of bin Laden. Greene (2005, 39) states that America’s ally “launched a military operation aimed at flushing out suspected terrorists in the northwestern province of South Waziristan.” Such launching of military campaign was executed after US President George W. Bush expressed his conviction of searching for bin Laden. This implies that bin Laden could be hiding in, if not expanding his organization within, the spatial dimension characterized in South Waziristan. Bergen (2006, 399) suggests that bin Laden could be under the protection of Jalaluddin Haqqani; both bin Laden and Haqqani had known each other long since the 1980s. A Taliban commander, Haqqani’s forces are spread or scattered from Khost in Afghanistan towards Waziristan in Pakistan. Probably Berger is correct when he says that bin Laden is protected by a Taliban commander. However, the role of the tribes in Waziristan, especially the Mahsud tribe, seems to be manifestly absent. Modern Terrorism Maitra’s (2009, 30) notion of modern terrorism centers on the use of force or violence “carried with fanatic zeal and commitment.” In general, Maitra categorizes the term “modern terrorism” in relation to its approach, source of belief or ideology, and purpose. What is fascinating in his definition of modern terrorism is its utilization of the signifier “fanatic” to describe the type of commitment in which the armed group or “modern terrorist” has. Perhaps this is the key feature of Maitra’s definition of modern terrorism: fanaticism. Unlike Maitra’s, Price’s modern terrorism is less forceful or violent. Price (2008, 130) defines the phrase modern terrorism as a response from an “oppressed people who innately believe themselves to be the victims of great injustice by an invincibly more powerful force.” Obviously, Price’s concept of modern terrorism stresses on the praxis of response. Thence, modern terrorism in this fashion is a sort of re-action by certain people against the action of others. With respect to Price’s modern terrorism, it transpires in two general ways: (1) a belief that certain people are oppressed or exploited; and (2) an action as a response from such perceived oppression or injustice. On the other hand, Albritton (2008, n.pag.) views the concept of modern terrorism as a “direct by-product of the technological civilization.” That is to say, the technological innovation in the modern-day world provides the means for which the “modern terrorist” can utilize for specific purposes or objectives. Albritton seems to suggest that modern terrorism is a sort of terroristic acts that heavily use present-day technologies and weaponry. In the context of bin Laden’s “terroristic” acts, Maitra’s definition of modern terrorism is very close. Indeed, bin Laden’s “terrorism” involves a commitment of destroying the infidels and the ungodly, especially the superpower countries. And yes, Albritton’s technological connotation of modern terrorism is applicable to bin Laden’s with regard to the latter’s use of present-day technologies as a means of attaining his ends. Geography of Modern Terrorism Waziristan is considered as a geography of modern terrorism for three general reasons: (1) it is believed to be the geographical location of the Taliban and Al Qaeda organizations -- thence, they could expand and widen their membership; (2) bin Laden, the symbol of modern terrorist, is presumed to be hiding or residing within the Waziristan mountains; and (3) the region of Waziristan is viewed as a difficult and complicated spatial dimension to be conquered by outsiders (e.g., American soldiers) -- thus, it is a strong fortress for the modern terrorist. First, the “terrorist” organizations are operating within the province of Waziristan. They use the spatial dimension marked in Waziristan both as a haven and a barrack. Due to the mountainous nature of place, the opponents -- or “freedom fighters” in the American perspective -- of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda cannot easily enter into the rug terrain of Waziristan. Since the imperial British period, peoples from the Waziristan region were not subjugated by colonial masters. And now, the American forces and allies find it intricate or challenging to conquer the territory of Waziristan. Considering the impregnability of the said region, the Taliban and the Al Qaeda can presumably prepare, organize, and expand themselves in an attempt to destroy the ungodly nations of the West. Second, bin Laden is, by far, viewed as the terrorist of our time -- at least to the Western media’s projection. Thence, any feature (e.g., spatial location) associated to bin Laden is very crucial in determining modern terrorism. The geography of the “number-one terrorist” is the most important feature for it facilitates the powers-that-be in defeating the subversive or terrorist. Moreover, the specific location of the modern-day terrorist speaks more of the causal nature of terroristic acts. And third, the choice of Waziristan as a haven and barrack for bin Laden and his organization/s is very appropriate. In the historical life of the Waziristan tribes, never did it happen that they were directly colonized or subjugated by alien forces such as the Anglo-Saxon race. Besides the mountainous characteristic of the said province, the local peoples from Waziristan fully know -- through tradition or social logos perhaps -- the use of, or tactics in using the, rug terrain in combating the military campaigns of the outsiders. And why Waziristan is a geography of modern terrorism is because of the strength or power of its fortress -- namely, mountains, terrains, among other natural geographical elements. Dilemma There are two major dilemmas in the thesis that Waziristan is the geography of modern terrorism: (1) it reduces terrorism into a single and singular place; and (2) terrorism is directly associated to geography and, in the process, disregards other factors (e.g., economic, spirituality, etc.) that categorize or define modern terrorism. First, terrorism as a theory and practice is complicated and complex. That is to say, terrorism works in a multifarious fashion -- which includes a complex network of places or spaces. To argue that Waziristan is a geography of modern terrorism is to say that such spatial location is the central dimension of battle characterized in modern-day terroristic warfare. Yes, it is arguably true that Waziristan is the major base for the Taliban and Al Qaeda organizations. And basing from Maitra’s concept of terrorism, perhaps there is a grain of truth that Waziristan is the geography of modern terrorism. As long as modern terrorism is viewed as bin Laden and his “terrorist” groups, Waziristan will continue to symbolize as a spatial dimension of violence “carried with fanatic zeal and commitment.” Nonetheless, terrorism is not confined to a single place such as Waziristan. It goes beyond the border of said region. When bin Laden and his men planned and succeeded in causing shock and awe to the American people in 9/11, activities associated to modern terrorism were borderless and spacious. The element of place or space was not exclusive in carrying the plans or schemes of destroying America as a global military power. And second, there are other relevant and equally important factors that define or categorize modern terrorism besides geography. In fact, there are numerous networks connected to Al Qaeda and other “terrorist” organizations -- networks that go beyond the mountains of Waziristan. John and Parashar (2005, 139) state that there are networks of “Islamic militant groups” -- the phrase “Islamic militant groups” is Maitra’s modern terrorist -- working and operating in Southeast Asia. This suggests that terrorism does not only speak of geography but also speak of religion, ideology, among other factors. Conclusion Perhaps it is true that terrorism has a particular place or spatial dimension. Like people, terrorist groups move from one place to another in order to pursue their “fanatic zeal and commitment.” Moreover, they have particular place in which these peoples can stand onto: as a refuge and base. As long as bin Laden is considered as the genuine modern terrorist -- and considering that he is hiding or residing in the Waziristan province -- Waziristan is the geography of modern terrorism. This province, to the writer’s mind, is a strategic geography for bin Laden and his men. Due to the nature of the terrain, the tribes in Waziristan had fought well, and won at certain rate, against the foreign invaders. And bin Laden, the ultimate symbol of modern-day terrorist, is benefiting from such mountainous state of Waziristan region. Perhaps Waziristan is the geography of modern terrorism if it means that such region is the military and ideological base of the modern-day terrorist. Bibliography Ahmed, Akbar S. 1983. Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and Conflict in Pakistan. New York: Cambridge University Press. Albritton, James S. 2008. “The Technique of Terrorism.” Forum on Public Policy: A Journal of the Oxford Round Table. Beattie, Hugh. 2002. Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan. London: Curzon Press. Bergen, Peter L. 2006. The Osama bin Laden I Know. New York: Free Press. Blumenthal, Sidney. 2008. The Strange Death of Republican America: Chronicles of a Collapsing Party. New York: Sterling Publishing. De Blij, Harm. 2007. 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