Do We Have an Obligation to Care about Future Generations in a Just Society - Coursework Example

Do we have an obligation to care about future generations in a just society? Introduction “What has posterity ever done for me?” (Old cynical censure) Future generations, as and when they are actually present, will undoubtedly have rights as much as we have today, in our society. The question that is important in this context is that, how much relevant are rights to a generation that is not ‘actual’ and simply lies within the uncertainty of posterity. So now it is imperative that we re-examine the first sentence and instead of saying that the future generation will have rights, frame it as, they do have rights, now, at this very instant. The entire perspective changes immediately, as there is a vast difference in the perception of will have rights and do have rights, now. If they have rights now, then they have a fair claim over the natural resources, already made scarce by our previous generations. So in that case, it becomes our moral obligation to safeguard those rights for the future generations that will eventually come. There are many arguments given to refute the logic behind the moral obligations for safeguarding the rights of the future generations. The main argument given is the ‘non-actuality’ or the absence of the future generations, which makes them ineligible for any rights. In this article I will examine this argument and many others that defy the theory that we have an obligation to care for the future generations within the realms of a just society. My article will also examine the counter arguments that support the view that we do have certain responsibilities to fulfil, towards our future generations; and in this process I will come to a logical conclusion and take a stand in respect of the arguments analysed. Discussion What are rights? For the mere reason that we are born as human beings we naturally become entitled to certain rights and freedom within our society. As the United Nations Universal Declaration of human rights tells us “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (UDHR, 1948, article 1). So the statement signifies that any individual, with a claim to rights, also deserves respect. “Having rights enables us to "stand up like men," to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of anyone... To respect a person then, or to think of him as possessed of human dignity, simply is to think of him as a potential maker of claims” (Feinberg, 1970, 252). Thus the term ‘rights’ refer to responses to certain moral principles that are considered to be an inherent part of all human beings. It entails that, it is the duty of every individual, to honour the freedom and opportunities of another individual and also see that the freedom is not curtailed by any means. Here one point is worth mentioning, “To have a right entails having a moral justification for limiting the freedom of another person and for determining how he should act” (Hart, 1955, 183). Thus limiting the freedom of another person simply means that as an individual living in a society one has certain duties towards the rights’ bearer. So having rights inarguably entails, that there are duties to be carried out too. So presumably one can conclude that duties are direct derivates of another individual’s rights. Here one must take instances from Kant’s concept of ‘imperfect duties’ and ‘perfect duties’. Perfect duties are those that are rightfully claimed by the holders. As for example, it is one’s duty to repay his debt or loan; it is one’s duty not to stop another individual from expressing his thoughts (right to speak); it is also one’s duty to allow another individual the freedom to practice religion as per his choice. The ‘imperfect duties’ also known as ‘beneficent duties’ entail that there are no claims from any holders over these rights. ‘Imperfect duties’ include acts of kindness, charity and beneficence, towards the society in general and thus is communitarian in nature. In short, our creditors have a right to a certain section of our money, while the charitable institutions or other social events that fall under ‘beneficent duties’, have no such rights. So, rights have a compulsion to be followed, while beneficent duties have no such obligations. However, on the basis of moral principles and the comprehension of respect that each right deserves, we can safely conclude that the future generations, that is, if they at all have any rights or claims on us, need not feel indebted to the previous generation for preserving the scarce natural resources for them. Moral principles that associated with rights always weigh more on those who are carrying out their duties. Now, the next relevant question is: does the next the future generation really have any rights/claims on us? Does the next the future generation really have any rights/claims on us? Here a look at Rawls theory is necessary to understand the justification behind the so called moral obligations/ moral principles, and the concept of moral duties that arise from rights. According to Rawls, “Natural duties and obligations arise only in virtue of ethical principles"(Rawls, 1999, 306). The principles, Rawls contends, must be chosen before and these principles “together with the relevant facts of the circumstances at hand...determine our obligations and duties, and single out what count as moral reasons” (ibid, 348). Before the duties and obligations, however there must be the presence of the concept of social justice, and thus also the existence of institutions that would frame, carry out, and enforce these duties and obligations. All this together, according to Rawl, would help to create a just society. As we have already seen there are differences between obligations, and benefactions (‘natural duties’, as Rawls refers it). “Obligations are moral requirements that derive from the principle of fairness, while other moral requirements are called natural duties” (ibid, 343). Here we will examine whether the future generation does really come under the purview of our obligations/ natural duties; or do we really need not care for the rights of those that are not actually existent, at the present. The theory of non actuality and time-span gap of the future generation: “A lack of interactive reciprocity between non-adjacent generations appears to be the major conceptual barrier in addressing the ethical issue of intergenerational equity/justice” (Li, 1994). The chief argument given by the proponents of the theory that do not support rights of the future generation, is that what is not present or does not exist now, cannot have any claims or rights. There is no logical reasoning behind providing rights to those that belong to posterity, as it simply does not make sense to provide for something that in future may not even exist. We have a difference in perception, as to accepting rights and claims of our direct descendants (whom we can perceive and are in touch with); and the rights and claims of the generation that lie in the distant posterity (that we tend to overlook). Here a look at Kant’s opinion on human outlook tells us that “human nature is such that it cannot be indifferent even to the most remote epoch which may eventually affect our species, so long as this epoch can be expected with certainty” (Kant, 1970, 5). In terms of preserving the natural resources however we find that this outlook is missing. This arises mainly from the fact that we accept our moral responsibilities towards our direct descendants whom we can see, but justify our sense of indifference towards the generation that is not ‘actual’. It is the ‘social contract theory’ that throws some light on the reciprocal nature of the ethics followed by man, where we find that there is a sort of contract amongst all members of a society, which defines all the social, political and the moral relationships. Each rational individual must follow the ‘fair play’ rules, and must work as one while participating in the various social activities, for the betterment of all (self and the society). Before this there must be created the various social institutions of justice that would help the society members in framing and enforcing the ’fair play’. As Rawls says, under the ‘natural duty of justice’ one’s “most important natural duty is,,, to support and further just institutions” (Rawls, 1999, 334), and that would help to achieve a just society. Thus involuntarily, the individual as a social member must become a player in the negotiation and shaping of the social contract that forms the basis of all kinds of social relationships. Herein lies the main point of contention, where certain theorists feel that such obligations under the ethical norms should be made optional, and should be dependent on an individual’s choice. Since one cannot form a contract with the generation in posterity, one may not feel the compulsion to have any obligation towards the latter. Such individual rationality that tends to overlook the claims of the future generations is mainly based on notions of self interest. These individuals argue that “the class describable as "future generations" does not have any identifiable members -- no existing person or persons on whose behalf the specific right can be claimed to exist” (Macklin, 1981, 152). In view of this, Rawls tells us that individual rationality should be based on certain political claims, and not on any metaphysical claims (Rawls, 1985, 223-51). This means there should be mutual consent amongst the rationalities of all social individuals that would form the framework of a ‘fair and egalitarian society’, and this mutual consent should not be treated as “an end-goal but as a process for the cooperative generation of truth or validity” (Benhabib, 1992, 37). Thus the basic concept behind this ‘consent’ is that one should treat his social members in a manner in which he would himself like to be treated; and it is as Rawls declares “[only]Those who can give justice are owed justice” (Rawls, 1999, 510) In this context we will explore some of the irrational behaviours of our ancestral generations, which are causing great concerns, in today’s context. Here we will examine the ‘time lag effects’ as described by the ecologists. These are the various environment related activities committed by the various generations before us, whose side effects have accumulated over the years to produce disastrous effects on our present generation. The production of nuclear weapons in order to create more energy from the fission process for the last few decades (involving more than 2 generations), has produced toxic radioactive by-products, and scientists say that it may take thousands of years to isolate from the atmosphere these harmful products (the actinides) for the human population be safe once more (Millert and Fritsch, 1974, 41-17). So we find that the present generation is suffering and so will the next few generations; for activities that had started almost two generations back. Similarly, uncontrolled releases of chloro-fluorocarbons (CFCs) in the atmosphere for the last few decades have caused serious depletion in the atmospheric ozone layer that protects the earth from the harmful UV radiation. Though it has now been brought under control, the damage has, however, already been caused. Now it is quite evident that owing to this ‘time lag’, the generation that had initiated the maximum damage have escaped the harmful effects of their actions. The scenario is similar for the ‘greenhouse effect’, and the resultant global warming and natural disasters that we are facing is in the form of devastating cyclones, tsunamis, droughts, and various other adverse natural effects. The above discourse very clearly shows that the activities of one generation may produce beneficial effects for that particular generation and for its direct next generation; however they take place at the cost of the future generations, which are in posterity at the present. The theory of ‘no claims’, and ‘indeterminacy’: “The ascription of rights is properly to be made to actual persons -- not possible persons. Since future generations can only be viewed as consisting of possible persons... rights cannot properly be ascribed to [the] future generations”(Macklin, 1981, 152). The future generation, being merely a potential, (claim the adherents of the ‘no claims’ theory), and is thus in no position to claim their rights. Without claims there can be no rights, so legally speaking, there cannot be any legal protection or legal remedy for the future generations, based on claims of moral rights. A similar situation was faced by the runaway slave Dred Scott in 1857 who filed a case asking for freedom based on moral rights, however the US Supreme Court could not provide any legal remedy based on the concept of moral rights (before the Emancipation Program Act of 1863). Here it is to be remembered that legal means are, however, not the only way to ‘claim’ one’s rights. As Feinberg tell us “a claim, the recognition of which is called for...not [necessarily] by legal rules...but by moral principles...principles of an enlightened conscience” (Feinberg, 1973, 67). Taking a hint from the Rawls “principle of difference”, it would be indeed be suitable for us to include our future generations, under the ‘duty if justice’, if we indeed wish to call our society a fair and just one, with an ’enlightened conscience’. In our society there are enough instances where there are duties in relation to person/persons unidentified, as for example, we have laws against trespassing, that has been created against ‘unidentifiable people’. In this regards, it is as Feinberg states, “the duty of care that every citizen is said to owe to any and every person in a position to be injured by his negligence. I have this duty to some degree even to the uninvited trespasser on my land”(Feinberg, 1966, 139-40). So if there can be legal claims against ‘persons unknown’, in a similar note there can also be legal claims by the ‘future generation unknown’. There have also been instances where morality has indeed been legalised by society, like drug and substance abuse, gambling, or prostitution. Various social institutions like government agencies or NGOs have represented animals and infants in cases of cruelty and abuse (animals or infants cannot ‘claim’ their rights, as they cannot speak). In a similar manner there should be moral principles and institutions that should act to safeguard the rights and claims of the future generations that are not present to claim their rights. It is indeed our moral responsibility to see that we provide for our future generations, and ensure, that they receive a fair share of the natural resources, that has in no way been created for one generation only. Conclusion: In a just society, as has been defined by Rawls, we find that there are certain moral and ethical principles under which we are obliged to safeguard the rights and claims of our future generations, and not repeat the same mistakes of our forefathers, for which we suffer today. Time cannot be used as a point of argument against the claims and rights of the future generation; instead in a just society, as we claim to belong to, the "moral requirements apply not to the distribution of resources themselves [amongst the present and the future generations] but to the distribution of whatever it is that makes resources valuable” (MacLean, 1983, 5). “Time, is a stream I go a-fishing in” said Henry David Thoreau (cited in Tauber, 37), and it is indeed our own brief existence besides this river called ‘time’ would be justified, if we are able to look upstream and feel gratitude at what our ancestors have left behind for us; and while looking downstream feel proud of what we leave behind as a legacy for our future generations, that lay hidden in the shadows of posterity. Bibliography Benhabib, S. 1992. Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. New York: Routledge, 37. Feinberg, J. 1973. Social Philosophy. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 67. Feinberg, J. 1966. Duties, Rights and Claims. American Philosophical Quarterly 3:2, 139-40. Hart, H. 1995. Are There Any Natural Rights? Philosophical Review, Vol. 64, 183. Kant, I. 1970. “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” Proposition 8, in Kant’s Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5. Li, H. 1994. Environmental Education: Rethinking Intergenerational Relationship. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Accessed at, http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/eps/PES-Yearbook/94_docs/LI.HTM Macklin, R. 1981. "Can Future Generations Correctly Be Said to Have Rights?," in Ernest Partridge, Ed. Responsibilities to Future Generations, Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 151-2. MacLean, D. 1983. "Introduction" to Energy and the Future, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 5. Millert, W & Fritsch, A. 1974. Nuclear Energy: The Morality of Our National Policy. CSPI Energy Series IV. 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