The Throwaway Society - Dissertation Example

History Unit 7-Assignment The Throwaway Society During the 1950s consumption came into its own and America became what is described as a throwawaysociety (Harmin 1991). The throwaway society is characterized by products that are manufactured for a limited lifespan. The throwaway society is further fueled by advertisers who urge consumers to continuously purchase new products and to replace old ones. This in essence gives way to planned obsolescence which results in the consumer wanting to possess something “newer, a litter better, a little sooner than is necessary” (Stevens, 1960, 12). Post-World War Two America witnessed an economic policy that was focused on the consumer. By the time the 1950s came around, manufacturers were paying close attention to the consumer and their desires and used unique marketing concepts. It was the manner in which manufacturers marketed goods that had limited life spans through advertising gimmicks that influenced the throwaway society. These advertising and marketing tactics resulted in the development of malls which took consumers away from downtown shopping and into suburban malls (Dobson 2007, 327). Advances in technology during the 1950s would impact the ability of manufacturers to influence the throwaway society in two significant ways. First, the television made it possible for manufacturers to reach all walks of American life and to introduce newer and conceivably better products. Secondly, modern technology made it possible for manufacturers to mass produce and with mass production marketing concepts encouraged mass demands. These trends gave way to a growing pattern. As demands and supplies increased as did waste. With manufacturers putting Americans in a position to replace products on a whim, planned obsolescence became a way of life (Dobson 2007, 327). With American prosperity in “full swing” during the 1950s, manufactures through the use of the television and the print media were able to perpetuate the consumer culture (Tompkins, Baughman. Layman and Bondi 1994, 156). The 1950s youth were indoctrinated at an early age and primed for grand consumerism which in turn perpetuated the throwaway society (Tompkins, Baughman. Layman and Bondi 1994, 156). It therefore follows that purchasing habits of replacing products with newer products as soon as the latter became available would characterize America’s consumer-centric society and would facilitate manufacturers’ planned obsolescence. The luxuries created by the throwaway society however gave way to a heightened sense of awareness that it is the earth and its natural resources that are ultimately paying the price for planned obsolescence. Environmental consciousness was first aroused in the 1970s as the price of oil soared. With the increase in the costs of energy, recycling was introduced as a viable alternative to the throwaway mentality. As a result the practice of throwing out glass, paper and metal products slowed (Brown, Flavin and Postel 1992, 66). By the 1980s, environmental consciousness received a second boost when a number of urban landfills were filled with the result that municipal authorities were forced to dispatch waste “to faraway places for disposal” (Brown, Flavin and Postel 1992, 66). With the cost of waste disposal rising as a result, recycling became more and more attractive as it cut back on waste and the resulting increased cost of waste disposal. The nineties only served to buttress recycling efforts with growing concerns over toxic emissions, pollution, acid rain and other toxic waste concerns. Ultimately, modern technology which not only turns waste into usable products, but also helps to preserve the earth’s natural resources. The emphasis today is now on sustainable development and by taking this approach the throwaway society is becoming more and more unappealing (Brown, Flavin and Postel 1992, 66). Unit 7-Assignment 2: Evaluation the Civil Rights Movement The US Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s was characterized by non-violent action and protests which included sit-ins. This approach to resistance and civil disobedience was inspired by Christian values and the messages conveyed by Mahatma Ghandi in India’s move for independence. American Black churches and leaders likewise advocated for the use of non-violence. In fact Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. conceded that: Nonviolence is a powerful and just weapon. It is a sword that heals. It cuts without wounding and ennobles the man who wields it (O’Sargent 2004, 7). The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) played significant roles in the non-violent protests of the Civil Rights Movement. The SCLC served as mentor to the youth-based SNCC but began to move away from the SNCC as it began to move away from non-violent protests and integration concepts in the latter part of the 1960s. Both organizations were successful in that they empowered the oppressed masses by instilling in them the confidence that they could by virtue of non-violent confrontation eventually overcome oppression. In other words, both the SNCC and SCLC contributed to the rise in black consciousness (Carson 1980, 1). The SCLC was particularly successful. The Montgomery Bus Boycott is a testament to the SCLC’s success. It was sparked by Rosa Parks, a black seamstress who refused to vacate her seat for a white man as mandated by law. In response blacks, lead by Martin Luther King Jr. organized a boycott of the Montgomery, Alabama bus systems and whites tried a number of tactics including court petitions and the division of the black community to bring the boycott to an end. The fact is, the boycott was covered by television and as a result it brought widespread attention to the civil rights struggles and succeeded in other Southern cities desegregating buses. It also led to intensified civil rights movements including the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 and the Voting Rights Act 1965 (Fradin 2008, 37). Prior to the 1960s there was a significant move toward desegregation. It came in the form of a US Supreme Court ruling in the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 1954. In this case the US Supreme Court ruled that state laws permitting segregation of black and white students and denying black students equal access to education was unconstitutional (Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 1954). This ruling was the most significant event of the Civil Rights Movement prior to the 1960s because it not only fueled the civil rights movement, it also set the stage for facilitating integration. The ruling validated the move for integration and equality and gave it legitimacy by essentially calling segregation and discrimination in schools unconstitutional. The civil rights strategies of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Jr. were entirely different. King Jr. advocated for non-violent direct protest in the form of civil disobedience while Malcolm X advocated violence in the form of radical and militant protests. Moreover, Malcolm X stood on a platform of hatred and advocated for separatism while King Jr. advocated for integration and patience (Kazin, Edwards and Rothman 2009, 10). Any interpretation of the facts would lead to the conclusion that Martin Luther King’s approach was far more successful than that of Malcolm X’s. At the end of the day, blacks now have the benefit of what Martin Luther King Jr. lobbied for and that is integration. Had Malcolm X been successful, the US would have been divided with blacks and whites living in separate communities. Unit 7 - Assignment 3 Civil Rights in the 1970s and 1980s Arguably, by the time of his assassination on April 4, 1968 Martin Luther King Jr. had become satisfied that he had done all that he could to lead the Civil Rights Movement toward accomplishing the end of discrimination and segregation in the US. Even so some doubt that King would have made any significant moves toward resurrecting the declining Civil Rights Movement of the 1970s and the 1980s. Fairclough (1995) speculates that King had “developed unrealistic expectation of his own leadership” and the onerous burdens he had taken on “were beginning to be too much for him” (126). Biographer, Fairclough (1995) also maintains that in months leading up to King’s death he had very little sleep and appeared to be preoccupied with the thought of his death. His preoccupation with his own death involved constantly question when and how it might occur. As a result of his fixation with death and having little sleep rendered King unable to relax and a bit agitated. Another King biographer, David Garrow reports that he was of the opinion that by the time King was assassinated he had “become exhausted, discouraged, and depressed” (Fairclough 1995, 126). Even so, it is quite possible that King would have gone on to achieve more victories for the Civil Rights Movement. As it were, King had never been one to be discouraged. Nor was he one to give in to “despair” (Fairclough 1995, 127). In an article published after his death, there was evidence that King had turned his focus on achieving economic equity. In fact prior to his death, in 1968, the SCLC had organized the Poor People’s Campaign for this purpose. King had traveled across the country to harvest what he referred to as an army for the poor (Fairclough 1995, 127). It is therefore quite possible that during the 1970s and the 1980s King would have continued to organize campaigns for economic justice. Prior to his death, King had also taken an interest in the Vietnam War and suggested that the US presence in Vietnam was entirely wrong and reeked of colonial underpinning (Fairclough 1995, 127). It therefore follows that King would have organized antiwar campaigns in the 1970s and the 1980s had he not been assassinated. As an impassioned advocate for justice and equality, it is entirely unlikely that King would have been satisfied that his work was done. Certainly, it is entirely unlikely that the Civil Rights Movements of the 1970s and the 1980s would have waned to the extent that it did if Martin Luther King, Jr. had been alive. One need only read his speech I Have a Dream to understand the extent of King’s commitment to total integration and equality for all Americans. While the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and the 1960s had made significant strides toward desegregation it had not accomplished all of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s vision for America. So with the victories of the 1960s were significant they did not automatically justify deceleration. There was more work to be done and if anything the victories of the 1960s should have served as an incentive and encouragement to press on. However, without King’s strong and passionate leadership, deceleration was inevitable. Unit 8 - Assignment 1 Cuban Missile Crisis Once President Kennedy learned of the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba he considered his options but it was clear that he did not want to provoke a military response from the Soviets. He immediately commenced negotiations with the Soviet Union. It was only after those negotiations appeared to going nowhere, that Kennedy weighed his options very carefully. He could have ordered a military strike or he could have launched a naval blockade around Cuba. Ultimately Kennedy selected the latter option but with some constraints while continuing to negotiate with the Soviet Union. The naval blockade would abandon the practice of boarding approaching Soviet ships. In order to diffuse the situation , Kennedy referred to the naval blockade as a “quarantine” (Ethridge 2007, 506). The Soviet Union, obviously vary of going to war with the US reneged somewhat and gave an undertaking to remove their missiles. It is popularly believed that the Soviets withdrew their missiles from Cuba because they were fully aware that the US had in its possession a larger arsenal of nuclear weapons at the time and the Soviets were therefore not prepared to engage in a “nuclear exchange” with the US. Moreover, Cuba was far closer to the US than it was to the Soviet Union and the latter was not going to risk conventional warfare with the US when it could mobilize its troops a lot faster and with greater intensity than the Soviet Union could (Ethridge 2007, 506). It is also believed that the Cuban missile crisis was a move by the Soviets to ensure the balance of powers during the height of the Cold War. The US had already place nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey, areas within striking distance of the Soviet Union. The positioning of US nuclear missiles so close to the Soviet Union tipped the balance of power in the US’s favor. It is therefore argued by many that the placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba by the Soviet Union was a move to ensure a more equitable balance of powers (Hislman 1997, 130). Even so, Kennedy did not appear to think that the placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba was that much of an issue. He is quoted as having said: What difference does it make? They’ve got enough to blow us up now anyway (English 1987, 52). This statement suggests that those who hold fast to the concept of US nuclear superiority is not entirely true. At least from Kennedy’s perspective the Soviet Union was endowed enough to command respect and fear. There was a underlying belief on the part of both sides that any nuclear advantage was fragile at best (English 1987, 52). The fact is, the Cuban Missile Crisis was more about a balance of interests rather than a balance of fear. Neither side wanted to use their weapons against the other. The deployment of US nuclear weapons to Italy and Turkey was as much about asserting power as was the deployment of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union to Cuba. Neither the US or the Soviet Union were concerned with the actual direct use of those weapons. In both cases the nuclear weapons were symbolic of political power and world dominance and they were never in serious danger of being used. The Cuban Missile Crisis was just a part of the entire Cold War strategies for asserting world dominance and nothing more. In this regard, the Cuban Missile Crisis was never about nuclear weapons. Nor were the about Cuba as the Soviets claimed. The Cuban Missile Crisis was not a crisis. It was an exercise in the assertion of world dominance and the balancing of fear and power amongst the world’s super powers. Unit 8 -Assignment 2 The Tonkin Resolution The Tonkin Gulf Resolution also known as the Southeast Asia Resolution, Public Law 88-408 was passed by virtue of a joint resolution by the US Congress on August 7, 1964. The Resolution followed a battle between the North Vietnamese Navy’s Torpedo Squadron 135 and USS Maddox five days earlier. Allegedly, there was another naval battle involving Vietnamese torpedoes and USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy three days prior to the US Congress joint resolution (Moise 1996, 78). President Johnson upon signing the resolution would represent from the US perspective the justification for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in the sense that it engaged a more aggressive involvement of the US in Vietnam. President Johnson, addressing Americans states that: My fellow Americans: One week ago, half a world away our Nation was faced by the challenge of deliberate and unprovoked acts of aggression in Southeast Asia. The cause of peace clearly required that we respond with prompt and unmistakable reply (Eccleston, Dawson and McNamara 1998, 354). The controversy surrounding the Tonkin Gulf Resolution would taint any justification that it might have purported to have for the escalation of America’s involvement in Vietnam. There were doubts about whether or not the North Vietnamese had launched the alleged second attack as claimed by the Johnson administration. Moreover, there were questions about whether or not the attacks if they had occurred had been unprovoked. Specifically it was debated among politicians and observers, that even if North Vietnam had launched an attack on the US ships, there was substantial evidence that the US had violated international law because the US “had provoked he North Vietnamese by conducting offensive military operations” in Vietnamese “territorial waters” (Woods 2003, 290). On a constitutional level, a number of Senators were doubtful as to whether or not the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 1964 conferred upon the US President “the sort of open-ended authority to escalate the war” to the extent that it did in the ensuing years of 1966 and 1967 (Woods 2003, 290). Those who had voted for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 1964 also maintained in 1967 and 1968 that the only reason that they had voted for the 1964 Resolution was to authorize retaliation in the Tonkin Gulf only. They had not intended to authorize a full scale war (Woods 2003, 290- 291). Be that as it may, President Johnson had convinced Congress to provide him with broad powers that were open to interpretation (Moise 1996, 226). The important parts of the Resolution provides that the US will take such steps as the “President determines” “including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the South Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom” (Moise 1996, 226). In the final analysis, Congress was single minded of purpose in that it was focused on the Tonkin Gulf incident and nothing more. President Johnson on the other hand, was looking ahead and was realizing a long held goal to engage US with Vietnam in the drive to eradicate the spread of communism to that area. Congress in this regard should have been more specific if they had not intended for the Resolution to authorize escalation of the US involvement in Vietnam. In this regard, Congress acted irresponsibly and were therefore not justified in the passing of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution which ultimately became a justification for the escalation of US involvement in Vietnam. Unit 8 - Assignment 3 Vietnam War:  Won or Lost? Dye and Zeigler (2008) describe the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam as a military victory, but a political defeat (65). Politically, the US authorities did not have an unambiguous military goal. The political defeat was obvious from the onset. When the US made the decision to dispatch troops to Vietnam it was a decision made without first checking the public’s opinion. Nor was there any effort to assess the government or the economy’s ability to facilitate the war (Dye and Zeigler 2008, 65). The president set about restraining the military’s work by placing constraints on the number of troops on the ground in Vietnam. It placed constraints on attack targets and did not fully appreciate or predict the strength of North Vietnam’s military abilities. Complicating matters for US troops, they were not permitted to cross over into North Vietnam (Dye and Zeigler 2008, 65). Having to conduct a war under constraints such as these against a fearless and brutal enemy would undermine the military’s war efforts. It therefore follows that withdrawal would no doubt be characterized as a military victory. The prospect of abandoning a war effort that was so poorly organized and regulated was welcome. A direct military victory came in January 1968 in the form of the Tet offensive. On January 30, 1968 Vietcong forces forcibly entered the US embassy in Saigon. It was part of the Tet offensive in which Vietcong had planned to attack all of South Vietnam’s major cities. The US’s response was brutal and resulted in significant casualties for Vietcong. As Dyd and Ziegler (2008) explain: By any military measure, the Tet offensive was a “defeat” for the enemy and a “victory for US force (65). Despite the US success in the Tet offensive, it was a political victory for North Vietnam. Media reports and pictures of the blood and gore in Saigon ad Hue demonstrated that US officials were not being honest about an early end to the war. The media responded by campaigning against the war effort in Vietnam. The result was a steady decline for support of the war at home in America (Dye and Zeigler 2008, 66). With declining support for the war effort in Vietnam, then President Johnson commenced peace talks with North Vietnam which formally began in Paris. When Nixon took office he was aware that the Vietnamese War must end. However, it must end with some honor so that America would not lose face and credibility relative to its promises and commitments globally. A peace settlement in which South Vietnam could be satisfied with was Nixon’s priority. The Paris Peace Agreement 1973 called for a cease fire but with North Vietnam troops remaining in South Vietnam in areas where they had gained control. However, the political status of South Vietnam, the primary point of the war remained unresolved. Therefore the war was meaningless and as a result withdrawal of the troops was entirely necessary. In this regard, the withdrawal of US troops was a military victory, but it was at the same time, a political defeat. Bibliography Brown, L.; Flavin, C. and Postel, S. Saving the Planet: How To Shape an Environmentally Sustainable Global Economy. Earthscan Publications, 1992. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 US 483 (1954). Carson, C. In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s. Harvard University Press, 1980. Dobson, J. Bulls, Bears, Boom, and Bust: A Historical Encyclopedia of American Business Concepts. ABC-CLIO, 2007. 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The University of North Carolina Press, 1996. O’Sargent, F. The Civil Rights Revolution: Events and Leaders, 1955-1968. McFarland, 2004. Stevens, Brooks. “Planned Obsolescence”. The Rotarian, Feb. 1960, 12. Tompkins, V.; Baughman, J.; Layman, R. and Bondi, V. American Decades: 1950-1959. Gale Research 1994. Woods, R. Vietnam and the American Political Tradition: The Politics of Dissent. Cambridge University Press, 2003. Read More