A Summary of the Buncefield Disaster - Assignment Example

1. A summary of the Buncefield disaster (time line of events). The Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal on the suburban area of Hemel Hempstead represents a part of terminal distribution facility located in the north of London. The terminal is the fifth largest in the United Kingdom and fills about 400 road tankers per day on a constant 24 hour basis. The Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal provides supply to Heathrow and Luton airports through solid pipe lines (Charlton, 2005). In his report Charlton (2005) observes that the system in the terminal is controlled by “supervisory control and data collection”. The system is planned in such a way so as to monitor and detect any problems that may occur. Moreover, the system is manned 24 hours. The size of the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal is about 22 acres out of 100 acre site (Charlton, 2005). The permanent personnel is required to pass fire safety training and there is a health care duty center which ensures the safety of all employees. Charlton (2005) continues in his report that the fide suppressant systems consist of foam system and pressurised water delivered by the firewater lagoon situated in the north corner of the terminal. The lagoon can supply 1.4 million litres of water which is sufficient to drench all 19 tanks in case of an accident for straight 40 minutes. The accident took place at about 6 a.m on 11 December 2005. Colin Campbell a journalist who was reporting live on BBC News near Foreign Office in Central London heard a bursting sound in the background. Despite the large exploding sound, this event was taking place 30 miles away (Workplace Law Magazine, 2009). This was announced to be the biggest explosion since the end of the World War II. One remarkable coincidence caused no fatal incidents. The explosion occurred at 6 in the morning on Sunday. If this had happened another day or in different time, the situation would have been with devastating number of casualties. Charlton (2005) reports the following events taking place. At about 6 a.m. a driver employed by “Total” arrived to load his tanker from the distribution filler. This happened minutes before the explosion. After being interrogated the driver remembers seeing a smoke and vapours coming out of the storage tank where he was supposed to load from. He informed some “Tesco” drivers who went to report the circumstances to the main office. A few minutes later the tank suddenly exploded (Charlton, 2005). At least one of the early explosions was produced by a massive, major fire. Afterwards the fire engulfed high proportions of the site of the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal. Luckily, over 40 people were injured, with no reported cases of fatalities (The Buncefield disaster, 2007). Although, there was a site alarm system, the fire and the explosion which followed started on without any alarms being signalized. The drivers who were the witnesses of the events reported that prior to the blasting, all lights and switches turned off (Charlton, 2005). The drivers explained that they find it difficult to escape from the site, since they could not see the routes leading to the exit, because there were no emergency exits. After the investigation it was reported that a vehicle which was turned off early on might have caused an ignition and created the disastrous consequences. On 20 March 2009, the High Court determined that “Total” oil and gas company, is liable for causing the damages led to the explosion at the Buncefield oil depot in Hertfordshire. Initially the oil company denied the responsibility of the accident. Only later did the board of directors admit that the accident might have happened because of a fault of the supervisor on duty this day. Consequently, the accident was foreseeable (Workplace Law Magazine, 2009). In an ideal world, a storage depot keeping 100 million litres of petrol with direct pipelines to Heathrow and Luton airports must not be situated half a mile from residential areas and in the vicinity of business park where more than 16 thousand people work (Miller, 2006). Miller (2006) elaborates that when the storage depot was built in 1968 the place was open countryside. One of the rhetorical questions to ask is how authorities allowed residential buildings to be constructed in such proximity to the terminal and why many operational companies did not take into account the danger and risk involved and did not make proper insurance for their businesses. 2. Details of the effects on the surrounding area both during and after the event. In particular the report should address contaminated land and effects on the environment. The effects on the surrounding areas are damaging by no means. They caused severe destructions both on commercial and residential properties in the nearby villages and towns and the whole site was evacuated on emergency service advice (The Buncefield disaster, 2007). The fire burned for several days, eliminating most of the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal and uncontrollably emitting clouds of smoke and contaminated materials into the atmosphere. The fire suppressant systems and facilities were supposed to use the 15 million litres of water and 250 000 litres of foaming agent. The nearby lake, then was useless for two reasons. Most of all, the lake was primarily used to supple fresh water to be combined with the foaming agent. However, if the used water was pumped back into the lake this would create an environmental disaster. The reason is that the foam has to be treated with anti-foam agents which would contaminate the lake. The other reason is that the water used from other sources, would have flooded the reservoir and damaged the natural lake (Charlton, 2005). The priority at the time of explosion was to extinguish the fire, so any other consequences were regarded as minor and anything done would be felt acceptable. The damage evaluation conducted shows that the damage on property can vary from structural to contamination. Many of the buildings may contain asbestos. The type of smoke released during the explosion carry oxides of nitrogen and sulphur and when in contact with moisture may result into sulphuric and nitric acids (Charlton, 2005). Bond (2005) concludes that after the disaster toxic rains might be expected, particularly due to the smoke which will contaminate the soil. The toxic fallout will be dispersed over a wide area and because of its huge scale will cause major environmental problems. Another consequence of the smoke will be the potential to intensify respiratory problems such as asthma and health care centres were overloaded with such cases, since the citizens in the vicinity did not take precautionary measures. Bold (2005) states that “[t]he fire-waters, combined with oil and petrol, could have a severe impact on surface and ground water quality, and, in turn, aquatic life (par. 8).” In addition, the burning fuel at site emitted greenhouse gas carbon dioxide and even though the amount released is not officiated announced it is registered on a global and European scale. Another real prospect for environmental disaster comes from the pollutants both from the fire and the foam released to extinguish it. They reach the aquifer and contaminate both the water supply and the natural habitat. What is more, they cause damaging effects to the land quality (Bond, 2005). Bond (2005) cites the Environmental Agency in the UK which issued a statement saying that a contamination of such degree would occur only if any of the petrochemicals was freed from the site, though several days after the explosion there were no evidence supporting this hypothesis. One of the consequences of the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal explosion is the catastrophic effects that it has over the aquatic life. The fire-water combined with the foam and oil and petrol from the storages had alarming impact on the surface namely the soil and the ground and underground water quality. The spokesman of the Environmental Agency in the UK announced that they were collaborating with the fire brigades and service to guarantee the strict observation of the measures taken to avoid ecological disaster in the region affected (Bond, 2005). The run-offs of water and foam were gathered in bunds near the site prior to being pumped to safe depots. As a precaution drinking water boreholes were closed in consent with the Three Valleys Water Company (Bond, 2005). Notably, this eliminated the possibility of transmitting diseases through the water. Bond (2005) cites Colin Chiverton from the Environmental Agency elaborating that the immediate concern for all is to hold control over the incident. “At the moment we are closely monitoring the situation for any potential environmental impact and will continue to do so.” (Chiverton cited in Bond, 2005). Officials and specialist were constantly observing the impact of the smoke plume emitted, however, not much can be done, since all was dependent on the weather conditions at that time. The long-term environmental risk is hard to be determined – this was the experts’ conclusions. However, the agencies were performing analysis stating that the water basins, upper soil structure and air quality are irreversibly damaged for decades (Health and Safety Commission, 2006). The Environmental Agency cooperated both with the Local Authorities and Health and Safety Commission to address any specific local issues on air quality and dust deposit from the fire. The residents in the local communities were advised about the soot released from the explosions and fire and assured that they are relatively harmless (Bond, 2005). Though the streets were covered with soot which was mainly carbon dust, the citizens are asked to stay indoors, because the air may contain irritant chemicals which can lead to respiratory dysfunctions. The carbon dust is safe to be cleaned from windows and vehicles, but any dust in contact with food grown in the garden should be carefully washed and peeled before consumed (Bond, 2005). The Green Party in the UK took advantage of the accident to highlight the dangers of such plants for the environment. The Green Party argued that large-scale fatalities destroy irreversibly the environment and that such calamities can happen in the most strictly-regulated industries (Bond, 2005). Green Party Principal Speaker expressed his growing concern about the environmental consequences on the natural habitat, summarizing that had this been a nuclear power plant, situation might have ended fatally for everybody (Bond, 2005). The radioactive wave in Chernobyl in the 1980s has left more than 4 million people in several countries receiving medical treatments two decades after the accident. Bond (2005) outlines that the airborne pollution is clearly visible and felt, as floating across the country and may have catastrophic impact on crops. The agricultural production will be harmed because of the carbon and kerosene residue on the harvest. Therefore, this will affect the local diary manufacturer and other related food processing industries. Hertfordshire paid about £1.8 million in expenses for dealing with the caused environmental damage. This includes primarily removing the contaminated topsoil, replacing the destructed street lighting and vegetations (mostly trees) and initiating repairs on the local infrastructure (Miller, 2006). 3. Assuming the depot is closed completely, detailed steps (associated with contaminated land issues) a developer would have to go through to re develop the depot site to build residential or commercial property (ie desk study/ site survey that the developer would go through to conduct potential steps to mitigate against contaminated land). If a developed is about to reconstruct the closed depot after Buncefield disaster, he might follow the below steps: An initial request for re-opening the area should be placed before Health and Safety Executives and the Environmental Agency; After obtaining the agreement and advice from them a planning and architectural authorization needs to be sought; Examining the area by experts would determine whether the area would be used for constructing commercial property or residential buildings (these includes land and soil evaluation and trials made); After obtaining the necessary documentations and instructions so as to whether the site can be operational and re-build a plan and design for the buildings have to be presented; An official report should be issued to address the necessity for the area to be revitalized; If there are any concerns from the local communities they have to be taken into consideration and if any requests are made by the citizens they have to be properly communicated with the developers of the projects at site; Before commencing the construction, an investigation should be conducted to assess the physical damages in the area – contaminated land, aquatic life, air, vegetation; Presumably, there will be corroding structures at the site, so they have to be carefully demounted and transported to the designated areas; After the accident at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal recommendations were issued to minimize other similar situations. Thus, they have to be implemented if any other sites are to emerge on its premises; If residential buildings are constructed, the future dwellers are to be correctly counseled about the consequences of the accident in 2005, and no facts be left behind; If commercial centres are built, research should be made to the ground’s stability and subterranean water and underground channels which emerged after the explosion; In both cases, regardless of the construction type, drinkable water facilities should be utilized and remedial actions taken to secure the sustainability of the future edifice; The focal point is to establish reliable alarm systems which will prevent any possible accidents and to secure the protection of the natural habitat around. 4. A summary of the key findings following the official investigation into the event. The Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal should have had a verified and adequate alarm system which would signalize and provide a warning of possible dangers such as smoke, increased heat or temperature or ignition (Charlton, 2005). The investigation found out that the site did not have a workable alarm system, which caused further inspection since the site was audited 3 months prior the accident and SCADA (supervisory control and data collection) system was employed to supervise the site. In addition SCADA system should have had a “fail safe alarm system” which will indicate a problem if the alarm system has failed (Charlton, 2005). The drivers’ inability to find the escape routes demonstrates a failure to provide the necessary training. None of the present personnel has the skills, capabilities or knowledge to control the situation prior the escalation (Charlton, 2005). After the explosion, police officers arrived immediately at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal and secured a cordon. However, the police authorities were not equipped properly according to the emergency regulation, wore paper masks which did not provide respiratory protection. Moreover, none of them had helmets and explosion of such scale often results in mental and building destruction which falling elements. All these factors show a gross disregard to the safety of both the employees at site and the police officers and serious breaches of the Health and Safety legislation in the UK (Charlton, 2005). Few hours after the explosion 16 police officers were hospitalized with respiratory dysfunctions. The employers faced a prosecution under the Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1974 (Charlton, 2005). According to Charlton’s report (2005) eyewitnesses reported that the fuel supply pipes were getting hot, because they transported fuel from the refinery at great speed to meet targets. It is possible that the tanks have become warm, but not hot enough to start the alarms. The requirement is that vents balance the air in and out and while the tanks are filling or emptying fuel. Thus, the vented warm vapour in contact with the cold outside air had condensed and fell to the ground level. The vapours were volatile and therefore capable of producing the supposed ignition (Charlton, 2005). The point that a vehicle that was turned off early that fatal morning led to the ignition of vapour is questionable. First no vapours should be at ground level in such quantities that would lead for a storage tank to explode. If a vehicle was parked nearby indeed, this have to be taken as a result, but not a cause for the accident. Second, all transportation tools in flammable work areas must be intrinsically safe. Therefore, no sparks or heat sources may cause ignition at any time (Charlton, 2005). The investigation board set up by the Health and Safety Commission issued a report in May 2006. The discovered cause of the explosion was a faulty gauge located on tank 912. This enabled the tank to be overfilled with petrol and approximately 300 tons of fuel flooded the ground floors which led to the explosion vapour. (Health and Safety Commission, 2006). Bond, Sam. 2005. Buncefield blast: environmental impact likely to be limited. ACR-News. [online] Available at: http://www.edie.net/news/news_story.asp?id=10894 accessed at 14 December 2010. Charlton, Jeff. 2005. Buncefield Oil Storage Disaster, Disaster Advice Ltd. The Buncefield disaster. 2007. BAPCO Journal, [online] Available at http://www.bapcojournal.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/265/The_Buncefield_disaster.html [accessed 13 January 2010]. Health and Safety Commission. 2006. HSC announces independent chair of Buncefield investigation board. [online] Available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/press/2006/c06001.htm accessed on 14 January 2010. Miller, Kate. 2006. LGC Finance – Buncefield explosion: Facing the aftermath. Emap.Ltd. [online] Available at: http://www.lgcplus.com/news/lgc-finance-buncefield-explosion-facing-the-aftermath/505265.article accessed on 14 January 2010. Workplace Law Magazine. 2009. Buncefield disaster: the aftermath and what you can learn from it, issue 47. Read More