Social Constructivism - Essay Example

Running Head: Social Constructivism: The Theory and Its Application Social Constructivism: The Theory and Its Application Name Institution Name Social constructivism "brings the self-inflicted wounds of relativism, when the sociologist's own knowledge can be of no more relevance than that of anyone else" (Ahier 1977: 71). If relativism is accepted, then the logical requirements of sociology cannot be satisfied, and sociology itself is impossible. It is true that knowledge is socially constructed in the interests and according to the power of the constructor. But pushed too far, social constructivism becomes pure relativism, in which only constructors busy on the scaffolding are seen. What they construct, in particular its relationship with the world of nature is lost sight of. The stress on man being active in giving meaning to his world and on the reclamation of knowledge as a human production has led, in its more extreme interpretations, to a celebration of the activity of 'doing knowledge' and to the abandonment of a concern for the nature and status of the knowledge produced. (Whitty 1977: 36) Such is the partial view that social constructivists have constructed. "Constructivism can only be a distraction from any attempt to come to terms with the fundamentals of knowledge production" ( Woolgar 1983: 262-3). "Instead of defining [knowledge] as true belief-or perhaps justified true belief-knowledge for the sociologist, " said Bloor (1991), "is whatever people take to be knowledge" (p. 5). Social constructivism does not distinguish between truth and falsehood, judging both equally suspendable. It leaves no place for the distinction between true and false accounts of nature in its accounts of the development of science. By being uninterested in whether a science is true, by treating truth and falsity equally, that is, by treating unequal as if they were equal, constructivists suspend and fail to see the essential. Whereas it would be a major accomplishment for the sociology of science to explain true knowledge as well as false pretensions of knowledge, it is a major regression for such sociology to obscure the difference between the two. A central theme of social constructivism is that no social practice must be enshrined as a restricted way of getting at truth. No practice can put claim to universal, eternal, or context-free legitimacy. Social constructivists and other postmodernists seek to demystify or deconstruct science's epistemic authority. One route to demystification is to argue that science is just a highly elaborate set of social conventions--a "discursive formation" (Foucault) or "form of life" (Wittgenstein)--which arose in a particular historical setting and captured the loyalty of our culture, but which has no intrinsic claim to epistemic superiority. Translated into our terminology, this position implies that science is veritistically no better than other practices, despite the special reputation it enjoys. The constructivist perspective embodies a number of theoretical tensions stemming from its attempt to embrace a relativistic epistemology with respect to selected aspects of science while exhibiting a fairly inflexible commitment to epistemological realism in its own work. ( Woolgar 1983: 262) Constructivist sociologists adopt a variety of strategies in their attempt to defend themselves against the criticism that constructivism undermines itself. Some constructivists merely assert that constructivism does not undermine itself, in the hope that repetition will be as effective as argument or evidence. Other constructivists claim that their studies analyze how the original account was arrived at, but have no implications for the truth or falsity of that account. Constructivists thereby only criticize the view that scientists see the world "plainly," "straightforwardly," without skills ( Yearley 1991: 120, 143). Thus constructivist sociology of science has no implications concerning the validity of science, constructivist criminology has little bearing on the truth or falsity of crime statistics, constructivist sociology of education and the professions does not address the issue of professional claims of expertise, etc. This strategy limits the value of the theory of constructivism as social criticism, particularly since social constructivism has not developed a macroscopic basis of social criticism. Moreover, as Woolgar ( 1983: 253-4) argues, "such declarations were clearly disingenuous. . . . Notwithstanding the declared intentions of the sociologist, the preferred alternative account will be heard as a comment on the adequacy of the original account." This is because constructivism carries with it a tone of skeptical disbelief in the 'reality' of the problem it investigates. Still other social constructivists defend themselves and their ironical analysis of the work of others by virtue of their elite position. The ironicist sets himself above his subjects by claiming a higher level of insight and awareness. However, the constructivist sociologist "does not address these kinds of questions to his own accounts, even though he casts considerable doubt on those of his subjects" ( Woolgar 1983: 255). Constructivists apply their theory only to the knowledge of others, and resist its application to their own knowledge. What this amounts to is special pleading and begging the question. The constructivist approach is to be used to analyze the turf of others, but be suspended when approaching social constructivism: what is mine is mine and what is yours is suspended. Books by physicists are assumed to describe what physicists think they are doing not what physicists actually books on physics written by philosophers inform us about nothing except the world of philosophers (H. Collins 1983). Only constructivist sociologists are immune to such human distortions and describe physics as it is. However, if constructivists can set themselves above the scientists they study by claiming a higher level of awareness, then by a similar logic those studying constructivism can set themselves above constructivists by claiming a still higher level of awareness. And this higher level of awareness could be rather easily attained, since most social constructivists have shown little awareness of the basis of their own constructivism (the effect of their interests, social circumstances, and taken-for-granted conceptions). Constructivist sociologists simply do not permit such awareness. Outsiders are to be the victims of ironical constructivist description, which is constructed for a closed community of social constructivist insiders. "To be an accredited member of the audience, one has to match the expectations of stable irony that one neither undermines the ironicist's own account nor looks beyond the specific instances and occasions for which the irony is claimed to apply" (Woolgar 1983: 259). Obedience of these cardinal rules of self-protection is what is meant by being a competent member of the constructivist sociological community. Outsiders who violate these community-imposed limitations are said to be lacking in understanding. Thus social constructivists employ a double standard: one for their own work, and a different one for the work of others. For example, the constructivist study of science either implicitly or explicitly makes problematic the warrant claimed by natural scientists for the relationship between scientific statements and the objects of scientific study . . . [yet the relevance of this] for the work of the social study of science is either denied or transformed. This kind of social study of science thus flirts with relativism by playing up its relevance for scientific work and yet repressing it in the course of its own constructivist explanation. (Woolgar 1983: 242) Social constructivism seeks to 'suspend' accepted meanings in order to arrive at an uncommon understanding of how science is socially constructed. Is this suspension of meanings by the constructivist to be interpreted as a denial of the structure of DNA, of the food chain, and of the ozone layer Or is the suspension to be seen as a temporary methodological tool of the constructivist to be used during the research project and desuspended thereafter, much like putting on a lab coat while doing research but not forgetting to remove it upon leaving the laboratory Is social constructivism to be interpreted as a methodological strategy "to look further and more carefully at factors which might be biasing the research process" (Woolgar 1983: 257) or is it to be interpreted as a substantive conclusion that scientific knowledge corresponds to the local contingencies in the lives of the scientists rather than to the characteristics and dynamics of nature Is social constructivism instrumental or substantive Reaction to the reflective approach has stimulated the development of two new approaches to the sociology of science: the true meditative approach and the constitutive approach (whether it be pseudo-meditative or not). The true meditative approach attempts to show that science is not just objective fact discovered by disinterested scientists but it does not claim to have undermined the validity of scientific knowledge. The constitutive approach has more subversive pretensions, implying that science is no more factual than non-science. The first approach seeks to humanize science (show science to be a human endeavor with its monopolistic power struggles like any other). The second attempts to deny the unique characteristics of scientific knowledge. Constructivist sociologists of science have failed to state clearly where they stand, choosing instead to imply the latter when they seek to give added importance to their project, and to fall back on the former when the latter is criticized. They tend to slide between the two according to the local contingencies of the debates and controversies in which they are involved at any particular moment. For example, H. Collins and Pinch ( 1979) claim that nothing unscientific is happening in the construction of the paranormal (extrasensory perception, telepathy, clairvoyance). When readers perceive the paper as adopting the perspective of parapsychologists, Collins and Pinch go against the grain of their own paper by claiming neutrality. Social constructivism is characterized by a great deal of ambiguity concerning its relationship (acceptance, indifference, rejection) to the truth claims of science and nonscience. On the other hand, the origins of the constructivist approach to technology lie significantly, although not exclusively, in developments in the 1970s and 1980s in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). These developments sought to move beyond previous empirical approaches to the study of science, which focused on institutional arrangements and the norms, careers and rewards of professional scientists, to focus on scientific knowledge itself (Pinch and Bijker 1987:18). A particular objective here was to show how such knowledge, rather than being a superior version of 'truth' and a better 'way of knowing', was in fact, in epistemological terms, no different to other knowledge systems (Hughes, T. 1987). In other words it could be understood and explained as a social construct, 'that is, explanations for the genesis, acceptance, and rejection of knowledge claims are sought in the domain of the social world rather than the natural world' (Pinch and Bijker 1987:18). This approach was referred to by its proponents as the 'strong programme' in that it took as its starting point the view that the investigator or analyst should adopt an impartial position with regard to the truth or falsity of the beliefs embodied in any knowledge system. In other words such beliefs should be 'explained symmetrically' (Pinch and Bijker 1987). Studies that adopted this approach typically involved detailed 'anthropological' and ethnographic research of scientific activity. This revealed how the process of scientific development could be seen as comprising key points at which ambiguities are present in the development of a scientific knowledge base-for example, when a controversy exists between competing theories seeking to explain an empirically observed phenomenon (Collins and Pinch 1993). The resolution of these ambiguities has a significant impact on the future development of the area of scientific knowledge concerned and much broader implications in terms of the understanding of science by decision-makers and the public at large (Collins and Pinch 1993). Explaining why one interpretation wins out over others through the establishing of its plausibility by its proponents within the scientific community, and ultimately beyond it, is a key objective of SSK. Since the early 1980s attention has been turned by some of the SSK community to the social construction of technological knowledge embodied in individual artifacts and systems. The defining characteristics of this 'turn to technology' have been described by three of its principal early exponents as a: Move from considering the individual inventor as the key explanatory concept in technological innovation Rejection of 'technological determinism' (in particular linear/rationalistic models of the process of technological development), and Regarding the social and the technical as a 'seamless web' where no clear distinctions between the technical, social, economic and political elements of technological development are made (Bijker et al. 1987:3). For the social constructivist, the idea that it is the essential capacity 'within' a technology which, in the end, accounts for the way we organize ourselves, our work and other life experiences is the defining characteristic of technological determinist thought (Grint and Woolgar 1997:2). In contrast, from the constructivist or 'anti-essentialist' position the capacities embodied in technological artifacts are seen as the product of social antecedents involved in their production. As such, technology can be regarded as 'congealed social relations' or 'society made durable' (Latour: 1991). It follows that, seen as a social and cultural product, technology and technical systems are open to social analysis, 'not just in their usage but especially with respect to their design and "technical" content' (Bijker et al. 1987:4). The key questions from a social constructivist position therefore are not to do with the social effects (for example on work or organization) of the 'machine-like' characteristics and capabilities of a particular technology, technological paradigm or trajectory of technological development. Rather the burden of explanation shifts to questions such as: 'how do technologies "firm up", "congeal" and become "durable entities"'; 'why is it that they take the form they do, rather than some other configuration'; 'how do these processes develop and become resolved' (Bijker et al. 1987:8). What marks constructivist approaches out from those considered so far, therefore, is their recasting of the relationship between technology and the social 'as a network rather than as parallel but separate systems' (Grint and Woolgar 1997:10) or as Bijker and Law put it, 'technologies are not purely technologicalthey are heterogeneous' and as such, 'embody tradeoffs and compromises' in the form of 'social, political, psychological, economic, and professional commitments, skills, prejudices, possibilities, and constraints' (Bijker et al. 1987:10). Where and when the line between the technical and the social is drawn, therefore, is contingent. Thus, Science and technology are not just fictitiously useful social constructions; rather they are important resources in monopolistic struggle precisely because of their utility in manipulating nature. To conceive of science and its applications as 'accounts' like magic or parapsychology is to misunderstand their power as monopolizable resources and underestimate their importance. To conceive of them as ideology is, paradoxically, to ignore the basis that enables them to function ideologically. Science entails a factual possibility of understanding and manipulating nature not characteristic of other social constructions, even though they share the quality of being oriented by interests, power, and values. The true meditative approach, unlike its constitutive rival, does not blur the difference between science and other social constructions. By documenting the embarrassment of scientists at their lack of knowledge of nature's processes and "factlessness" (inability to construct facts about nature) concerning environmental problems, in contrast to traditional and charismatic responses that can be constructed at will, Yearley ( 1991: 518) provides an indirect illustration of the distinctive element involved in scientific constructions: its peculiar relationship with nature. The increasing capacity to manipulate nature, resulting from the development of science and its applications, has been a cornerstone of the development of capitalism and modern bureaucracy. Nature has, however, reacted to such manipulation through high-technology accidents, the creation of pesticide-resistant and drug-resistant species, atmospheric change, etc. The unique learning curve of science gives it its utility, but also its danger. "It is only since science has learned to replicate complex physical, chemical, and biological processes in the laboratory that its actions have been so consequential for the eco-system" (Latour, B. 1991: 296). Environmental problems are a reminder of imperfectly perceived forces of nature working behind the backs of human constructors, forces that are influencing social action or will eventually influence it. The constructivist portrayal of science has failed to capture its specificity as formidable yet dangerous resources of empowerment. The perverse consequences of the interaction between social constructions and nature's dynamics have provoked the emergence of new social constructions, particularly the environmental movement, which take into account the requirements of a natural environment capable of sustaining human society and other forms of life. Environmental problems have shown that nature is a dynamic force influencing social action and a crucial source of knowledge, both practical and scientific. Government measures of the proportion of population below the poverty level compared with news stories about poverty. Admittedly official statistics also provide a social construction of reality, and these can also be affected by the news media, for example if the publicity surrounding cases of violent rape deters or encourages other victims to come forward to report cases to the police. Yet official statistics provide an alternative way to calculate the statistical risk of terrorism, especially if their construction is relatively independent of the media. Whereas, Social constructivism in the sociology of science and in sociology generally has been pre-ecological sociology. Through environmental problems and the environmental movement, the sociology of science is now confronted with the question of its capacity to go beyond the radically anthropocentric, restricted, and false premise of the social construction of reality in order to integrate into its interpretations the embeddedness of social action in nature and dependence on nature. Thus, Social constructivism interprets science as a product of some particular, and therefore "local," social interaction or discourse. Science is located in time, space, and societies. It is conditioned by cultural interests, biases, vocabulary, beliefs, and values. It is located spatially, as in European culture rather than Chinese. It is located in the lives of a particular group of people who constitute, for example, the astronomers of sixteenth-century Catholic Italy or the chemists of Protestant areas in late eighteenth-century Europe and America. The conclusion drawn by social constructivists from this is that science does not have any universal validity; nor is any validity it achieves at a certain time guaranteed to last. The science of today may not be valid tomorrow. Science is a particular language game among other and quite different types of language games. Social constructivism is therefore at odds with classical universalism. It tends to reject even the criterion of "universal fit" as used by probabilist science. Reference: Ahier, John. 1977. "Philosophers, Sociologists and Knowledge in Education". In Society, State, and Schooling, eds. Michael Young and Geoff Whitty. Pp. 59-72. Ringmer: Falmer. Whitty, G. 1977. "Sociology and the Problem of Radical Educational Change." In Society, State, and Schooling, eds. M. F. D. Young and G. Whitty. Ringmer: Falmer Press. Bloor, D. (1991). Knowledge and Social Imagery. 2nd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Woolgar, S. 1983. "Irony in the Social Study of Science." In Science Observed, eds. K. Knorr-Cetina and M. Mulkay. Pp. 239-66. London: Sage. Yearley, Steven. 1991. The Green Case. London: Harper Collins Academic. Collins, H. (1983). "An Empirical Relativist Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge". In Karin Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay (eds.). Science Observed. Beverly Hills: Sage. Collins, H. and Pinch, T. 1979. "The Construction of the Paranormal: Nothing Unscientific is Happening". In On the Margins of Science, ed. R. Wallis. Pp. 237-70. University of Keele: Sociological Review Monograph no. 27. Pinch, T.J. and Bijker, W.B. 1987. 'The social construction of facts and artifacts: or how the sociology of science and the sociology of technology might benefit each other', in Bijker, W.E., Hughes, T.P. and Pinch, T.J. (eds) The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology of History and Technology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 17-50. Grint, K. and Woolgar, S. 1997. The Machine at Work, Oxford: Polity Press Hughes, T. (1987). "The Evolution of Large Technological System". In Wiebe Bijekr, Thomas Hughes and Trevor pinch (eds.), The Social Construction of Technological Systems. Cambridge: MIT Press. Latour, B. 1991. 'Technology is society made durable', in Law, J. (ed.) A Sociology of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination, London: Routledge, 103-31. Read More