The Acceptability of Torture and Some Viable Alternative Solutions - Term Paper Example

The Acceptability of Torture and Some Viable Alternative Solutions The United Nations General Assembly defined “torture” in 1984 as “any act by which severe pain or suffering…is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him…information or a confession” (Davis 163). The problem with this definition is that it failed to add a clause which explains the purpose of such information or confession. This rather unfair definition of “torture” is perhaps where the arguments first arose. Nevertheless, despite the fact that several people criticize acts of torture, I believe that if torture helps to obtain information to save people’s lives, then it is practically good, and that torture is justifiable as long as it fulfills this purpose. Despite the fact that several critics of torture would condemn it by calling it “abhorrent” and by justifying it in a rather simplistic way – that “making people suffer is a horrible thing [and that] pain hurts and bad pain hurts badly,” there is no denying that torture serves a rather good purpose (Luban 1429). Levin was right in saying that compared to torture, “mass murder is far more barbaric,” and that governments that do not resort to torture commit “moral cowardice” and eventually sacrifices innocent lives in favor of one whose life they do not want to be accused of taking (824). In Levin’s essay entitled “The Case for Torture,” he reiterates that in the case of a ticking time bomb incident, where it is only torture that would serve as the final resort for the authorities to obtain information from a captured terrorist about the location of a time bomb about to explode, the idea of using torture is indeed justified (824). This is indeed perfectly logical for there is no other way for anyone to be able to detect the bomb except by torturing the captive and making him admit where it is. Although the chances of the captured terrorist revealing the exact location may not be 100%, at least there was some hope of finding out where the bomb is. Moreover, even if such a procedure has failed, the government would not have to bear the burden of guilt from not having done anything to stop the explosion. People may criticize a government for failing to rescue hostages. However, there must be greater criticism intended for governments that did not do anything to come up with a rescue plan for hostages on the basis of their decision not to torture and violate the human rights of the captured terrorist bomber. The point here is not about the idea of criticism, and it is not that governments have the moral duty to avoid criticism. The point is that governments have the duty to protect its citizens and any negligence of this duty is tantamount to severe criticism and a violation of the human right of the citizens to live. Besides, a government that is bent more on protecting the rights of perpetrators more than the rights of victims must be one which is considered tyrannical, and when people lose their respect for the government – no matter how unjustifiable the basis for such loss of respect is – there is no reason not to expect anarchy. The ultimate end result therefore, although hypothetical, would be the destruction of human society. If people do not feel like the government is doing its best to protect their lives, interests and safety, then there must be no reason for them to continue believing in the integrity of this government. Such resentment and loss of faith would eventually foster dissent and rebellion. Krauthammer may criticize torture as an act which we take when we “descend to the level of our enemy” and one which is against “our nature as a moral and humane people,” but I believe that the words “moral” and “humane” are but ethical labels or at best mere generalizations (829). It is utterly fallacious to label the human race in general terms for what may be good in one place may not exactly be allowed in another, and this includes the fact that in Syria torture is allowed but in the United States it is against the law (Mayer). There is therefore no reason for Krauthammer to call the whole human race as “a moral and humane people” because in doing so, he is simply denying the millions of exceptions that do not fit such descriptions, which are themselves vague (829). In fact, nobody can actually say who is “moral” and who is “humane,” and whether the definition of such words must be done in the context of human thoughts or human acts. Krauthammer even believes the military should not conduct acts of torture and calls it violations of “military discipline and military honor” (833). In the same way that “moral” and “humane” are vague terms or even nonexistent in the context of someone about to be shot by his enemy, the conventional meanings of the words “discipline” and “honor” may simply not apply to combat situations, to those that involve armed conflict as well as to those who understand the concept of war, pain and death. This means that Krauthammer has no right to say that the military should not conduct torture in the name of democracy because soldiers are people who understand and accept the inevitability of pain and unfairness when it comes to war and to the protection of their country. In a similar way, the enemy may at least already have an inkling that they would be subjected to torture and inevitable pain once they are captured by their opponents. Regardless of how democracy defines “military discipline and military honor,” it may have an altogether different context among soldiers – and it may be something that non-servicemen may not be able to entirely understand. Admittedly, torture is morally evil, perhaps no matter which religion one consults with, but the inclusion of torture in the military and in the police system requires acknowledgement of the practical aspect of the practice, and not necessarily its moral aspect. If one fails to see the difference between these two aspects, he is like someone who prohibits his family members to use knives when slicing steak at dinner for many innocent people have died from being stabbed with knives. This analogy may seem sarcastic but there is no denying that as long as one fails to see the practical value of torture, then the condemnation of the practice will never stop. Moreover, one should understand that anyone who acknowledges the practical value of torture – like the police and the military – may actually also be fully knowledgeable of the moral aspect of the act. It is like whenever I use a knife for cutting my steak, I also know that I can use this knife to stab the person sitting beside me, but I know that the latter is morally wrong. Thus, those who use torture as a means to obtain information acknowledge the practical aspect of the practice but do not necessarily deny the moral issues behind it. Krauthammer cannot therefore just simply label people who practice torture as not “moral” and not “humane.” Moreover, what is most inconsistent with Krauthammer is that although he is against torture, he allows it two exceptions: in “the ticking time bomb and the slower-fuse high-level terrorist,” and thus he becomes very inconsistent (833). If he allows torture in order to elicit information about a bomb which is to explode or about a future invasion, then he simply objects to his previous stance that torture is against our “moral” and “humane” nature as a people. His exceptions, regardless of his justifications for it, somehow translate as: Indeed, “it is in our nature as a moral and humane people” but some circumstances require us to be “immoral” and “inhumane” despite our nature. Although this is simply a realistic statement to many people, it clearly blurs where Krauthammer stands in his opinion on torture. Indeed, there may be some people who are secretly actually in favor of the idea of torture but whose conscience simply cannot bear the guilt that comes with such affirmation. These people then hide under a cloak of inconsistency and paradox, under the label of a hypocritical “true moralist who favors torture.” As previously said, the practice of torture may have both a practical and a moral aspect, and those who fail to concentrate on only one aspect end up being both confusing and confused. Torture may be morally evil but it is indeed practically good if it serves its purpose. Other authors, Gronke et al., claim that “people who supported torture were wrong for the most human of reasons – they believed that their view represented the public majority,” and that “they overestimated how many people agreed with them” – but using the opinion of the public majority as the basis of rightness and wrongness, or the practicality or impracticality of an act, is totally absurd (441). When people like me say that torture is justifiable, then this opinion of mine does not necessarily represent the entire human race, the whole country or even my family. Opinions on the rightness and wrongness of an act are purely individual and even if a whole group has the same opinion of it, the decision to accept such opinion must have been made at the level of the individual. The point is that regardless of the belief of the public majority, I believe that torture is justifiable in “the ticking time bomb and the slower-fuse high-level terrorist,” to quote Krauthammer (833). Whether everyone agrees with me or no one does, my opinion does not change, because an opinion does not become valid by virtue of its appeal to the people. On the other hand, when it comes to the institutionalization and imposition of torture, perhaps Gronke et al. are right in implying that the practice will inevitably meet with opposition, simply because many are against it (441). Nevertheless, the practical rightness or wrongness of torture does not depend on its chances of being institutionalized or accepted by society. Many impractical and immoral acts have been institutionalized and many good ones have been discarded by governments, and so the social acceptability of an act like torture does not necessarily reflect its practical or even moral nature. Still, other authors like Crandall et al. oppose the idea of culture by claiming that the rationalization of the practice of torture may have come from the assumption “that a long-standing practice was relatively intractable, and this obstinacy led to rationalization on its behalf” (7). Moreover, Crandall et al. believe that “describing torture as the status quo increased support for and justifications of the practice” (7). Several critics of torture believe that after the 911 terror in the United States, political parties have somehow used the people’s negative sentiments towards terrorists as grounds for justifying acts of torture. Thus, the people have since come to believe that the practice of torture is already an integral part of every military and police operation and cannot therefore be removed from the system anymore. The point of Crandall et al. is that torture is actually still morally wrong and they may be implying that those who believe in its rightness may have only been brainwashed by politicians and the media. Indeed, this is something that I cannot disprove for I myself do not exactly know how I have come to accept torture as justifiable, but whether or not, my opinion on torture or other people’s opinion too are merely results of brainwashing, no one can exactly prove it. Furthermore, no one can also exactly deny that those who are not in favor of torture have not been brainwashed. Everyone watches the media and is exposed to the statements of politicians, and anyone could have been brainwashed. Nevertheless, whether or not there was brainwashing, the benefits of torturing a terrorist captive can give potential victims of a future terrorist attack a second chance to live and a chance to survive. I do not think that someone who simply wishes for the survival and safety of others has been brainwashed. Nevertheless, if it is true that I have been brainwashed, then I would rather be brainwashed to empathize for the lives of the innocent, than one who empathizes for a terrorist. Nevertheless, admittedly, despite the benefits of torture, these benefits do not make it the best way to fulfill the same purpose. Alternatively, according to Allhoff, one may rather opt for the institution of torture warrants, where “some judiciary authorizes torture before it happens” (221). The result is the elimination of the illegal torture cases such as those carried out for retribution, thus leaving out only legal torture in order to fulfill the purpose of obtaining useful information for the benefit of innocent people. Thus, through torture warrants, there would be fewer cases of torture and only justified ones remain. This must also create an idea in everyone that the government is now being just in its dealings with detained suspects, and at the same time suspects who are actually innocent will be freed from the fear of being unjustly tortured. Another good suggestion by Allhoff is the use of “self-defense” or something like a due process (226). If one defends himself before a jury or a judge first before a judiciary decides on whether or not a torture warrant is to be issued, there will be fewer cases of torture leaving only those that are justified. If there is due process, one is indeed able to justify himself through the assistance of a lawyer, and thus this will give the suspect a chance to redeem himself and thus avoid unfair torture. Moreover, in order for authorities to make clear decisions when deciding whether or not to torture a captured terrorist or criminal, Harel and Sharon suggested adopting the philosophy of threshold deontology, where they have to weigh whether the consequences of performing torture would outweigh the consequences of not carrying it out (250). Although this view somehow reflects the utilitarian principle, it is better than taking the absolute deontologist position, where torture is wrong in all instances, or the absolute consequentialist position, where torture is right when the results are good. Nevertheless, threshold deontologists will still have a problem determining on which should the hypothetical consequences be based – is it on the amount of pain of the terrorist or the number of deaths of potential victims? Truly, it is difficult for the threshold deontologist to be in such an intermediate position. The idea and practice of torture has been preyed upon by several critics who claim that it is morally wrong, that it is against our “moral” and “humane” nature as a people, that most people do not agree with it, and that it has been deeply inculcated into society through brainwashing. Nevertheless, torture remains justifiable if the task it has to fulfill is to obtain information regarding a future attack that will hopefully save the lives of innocent people. The claims of the critics are mostly fallacious. Those who claim that it is morally wrong are evading the issue of the practicality of torture. Those who claim that it is against our “moral” and “humane” nature are simply generalizing. Those that claim that most people agree with it fail to recognize the fact that the wrongness or rightness of something does not depend on its appeal to the people. Lastly, those who say that the support for torture is merely a result of brainwashing may also be implying that brainwashing was also done to those who adopt the opposite view. I therefore believe that torture remains to be a justifiable act if it fulfills its purpose. Nevertheless, several alternatives may be used in order to ensure that unjustified forms of torture are minimized, and these include the use of torture warrants, self-defense, and the adoption of the position of a threshold deontologist. Works Cited Allhoff, Fritz. “Torture Warrants, Self-Defense, and Necessity.” 2011. Public Affairs Quarterly, 25:3 (217-240). Crandhall, Christian S., Scott Eidelman, Linda J. Skitka, & G. Scott Morgan. Scott. “Status quo framing increases support for torture.” 2009. Social Influence, 4:1 (1-10). Davis, Michael. “The Moral Justifiability of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment.” 2005. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 19:2 (161-178). Gronke, Paul, Darius Rejali, Dustin Drenguis, James Hicks, Peter Miller & Bryain Nakayama. “U.S. Public Opinion on Torture, 2001-2009.” July 2010. PS (437-444). Harel, Alon & Sharon, Assaf. “What is Really Wrong with Torture?” 2008. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 6 (241-259). Krauthammer, Charles. “The Truth about Torture.” Reassessing the Presidency. New York: Prentice Hall, 2008. Print. Levin, Michael. “The Case for Torture.” Reassessing the Presidency. New York: Prentice Hall, 2008. Print. Luban, David. “Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb.” 2005. Virginia Law Review, 91 (1425-1462). Mayer, Jane. “Outsourcing Torture: The secret history of America’s ‘extraordinary rendition’ program.” 2005. 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