The Sverdlovsk Antrax Epidemic - Research Paper Example

The Sverdlovsk Antrax Epidemic Introduction On April 2, 1979, the Soviet of Sverdlovsk, located approximately 850 miles east of Moscow, experienced an unusual outbreak of anthrax, which had an effect on 96 people and left not less than sixty-four dead. While the first victim passed away four days later, the last one passed away six weeks later (Pbs.org, 1995). Seventeen of these cases were said to coetaneous while seventy-nine were gastrointestinal. The epidemic has raised heated international speculation and debate with regard to whether it was accidental or natural and, if inadvertent, if it emanated from activities prohibited by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (Meselson, et al., 2000). The Soviet government alleged that intestinal anthrax from contaminated meat was the cause of these deaths, a story some prominent scientists from America found convincing. On the other hand, Carter administration officials alleged that an inadvertent anthrax spores’ release of from a suspected Soviet biological weapons facility situated in the city caused the outbreak (Pbs.org, 1995). Relying on information from CIA, the United States accused the Soviet Union of developing anthrax and using it as a weapon violating the 1972 Biological Weapons Treaty and disclosed their suspicions to the public. The CIA, which had satellite photographs of the military base of Sverdlovsk suggested that there was a laboratory facility in the military base. Soviet emigrants and dissidents had also heard about the death of people in the city’s southern part and ascribed these deaths to hazardous clouds emanating from the military base. The US therefore strongly believed that an explosion at Sverdlovsk’s main military base had spread lethal anthrax spores over the city, leading to the death of hundreds of people (Guillemin, 2002). The Soviets however rebutted any action regarding biological weapons and at various international conferences, they tried proving their tainted meat story. They also refused to refusal to permit researchers get into Sverdlovsk for investigations. As a restricted military area, Sverdlovsk was off-limits to foreigners (Pbs.org, 1995 and Wampler & Blanton, 2001). Western inspectors to this day have not been permitted to visit this military facility (Pbs.org, 1995). Approximately five thousand people got exposure to the aerosol. Roughly, three thousand workers were present in the ceramics factory on April 2, and eighteen of them passed away. This event’s attack rate has been estimated at two percent. Of the victims, two-thirds were men, with the median age being forty-five. Though they were definitely exposed, no children or young people were affected – the youngest victim being a 24-year-old kindergarten teacher who was suffering from tuberculosis (Guillemin, 2002). It was not until 1992, 13 years afterward, that President Boris Yeltsin confessed that military developments at the facility caused the outbreak. This was after the Soviet Union had stopped existing and Boris became the new president of the Russian government. Apparently, since he had been the chief of the Communist Party in the region during the time of the epidemic, Boris had a personal connection to the issue. He confessed that he believed that the military and KGB had deceived him regarding the true explanation. He made the confession to President George Bush at a summit meeting saying that the outbreak resulted from an accident at the biological warfare installation of the Soviet. He also pledged to clean up the hitch (Wampler & Blanton, 2001). However, he did not go into details. Consequently, the chairperson of the committee that Boris had created to oversee chemical and biological dis-armament and to determine the epidemic’s origin articulated doubts that the military facility infection was the origin of the epidemic stating that his team would carry out its own investigations, the results of which are yet to appear to date (Meselson, et al., 2000). During the 13 years, even as a strong debate raged in the international intelligence and scientific communities on whether the Russians were truthful, the Soviet Union went on with its offensive biological warfare program unimpeded (Pbs.org, 1995). Just about the time the President confessed that military activity at the facility caused the outbreak; Russia permitted a group of Western scientists to go to Sverdlovsk to carry out investigations concerning the outbreak. In June 1992 and August 1993, the group visited Sverdlovsk and incorporated Professor Matt Meselson (Pbs.org, 1995).The team managed to track where all the victims of the outbreak were during the time of the anthrax release. This is despite KGB, former Soviet secret police, having sequestered hospital and other records following the incident. According to the group’s epidemiological data, most victims lived or worked in a narrow region stretching from the facility of the military to the southern city limit on the fateful day. Farther south, along the extended axis of the zone, livestock also died of anthrax. The region paralleled the northerly wind, which prevailed shortly previous to the outbreak (Meselson, et al., 2000 & Meselson, et al., 1994). Following their investigation, the team concluded that a discharge of a pathogen of aerosol of anthrax at the military facility was the cause of the outbreak. Nevertheless, they could not establish the real cause of the release or the specific activities conducted by the Soviets at the facility (Pbs.org, 1995). In an interview with the former first deputy chief of the Soviet biological weapons program’s civilian part (Biopreparat), Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov, Frontline discovered that the military facility’s employees forgot to put back an exhaust system’s filter, leading to the anthrax airborne leak. Although they realized the mistake shortly after, some anthrax spores had already leaked out. According to Alibekov, the death rate could have been so great had the wind been in the opposite direction /toward Sverdlovsk city that day (Pbs.org, 1995). Conclusion The Sverdlovsk Antrax Epidemic was one of the most deadly outbreaks of the modern times. It was also the largest known human inhalation anthrax outbreak. It also took a very long time and so many people died some without being hospitalized and some in hospitals. Indubitably, an accidental escape of an anthrax pathogen aerosol at the soviet military microbiology facility situated in Sverdlovsk caused it. In support of this claim, most of the victims lived, worked, or were attendants of daytime military reserve classes near the facility. Additionally, in villages located along this facility’s extended axis, livestock died of anthrax. Thirdly, during most of the fateful day, a northerly wind parallel to the high-risk region was prevalent. Finally, the first cases of animal and human anthrax were recorded two to three days after that. As Meselson and his co-authors (2000) record, the absence of inhalation anthrax victims below 24 years is still a mystery. The soviet military microbiology facility was conducting a dangerous anthrax program, although its full dimensions remain unknown. Unfortunately, it was a secret undertaking of insignificant military significance, too dangerous to carry out near a populous region, and barely worth the illness, deaths, in addition to fear it brought about. Initially, the inadvertent nature of the release of the aerosol may have left the armed forces of the Soviet oblivious of the fact that it had brought about a catastrophe. The military was not careful in its undertakings and did not anticipate anything/any problem. Additionally, the alarm concerning human cases of anthrax in the city on April 7 and 8 was supposed to have made the military a part the response by public health. The cooperation of the military would also have been vital in the prevention of prevented death, fear and illness. People would have been informed that the cause of the epidemic was not infected meat, vaccinations would not have been necessary, and they would have helped in more general delivery of antibiotics to people exposed to the cloud. If the military revealed their secret, the city government may have banned the anthrax experiments immediately, rather than exposing the public to continued risk. Regrettably, the Soviet military instead allowed the community and officials of public health to go on as if the anthrax outbreak originated from tainted meat, just in order to selfishly protect its secrets (Guillemin, 2002). References Guillemin, J. (2002). The Political Determinants of Delayed Diagnosis: The 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak and the 1972 Yugoslavian Smallpox Epidemic. Retrieved from http://library.lanl.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc?event=CT2002&document=20 Meselson M, et al. (1994). The Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak of 1979. Science. 266 (5188), 1202-1208. Meselson, M., et al. (2000). The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979. Retrieved from http://www.vaccines.mil/documents/library/Sverdlovsk.pdf Pbs.org. (1995). The 1979 Anthrax Leak in Sverdlovsk. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sverdlovsk/ Wampler, R. A. and Blanton, T. S. (2001). U.S. Intelligence on the Deadliest Modern Outbreak. Retrieved from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB61/ Read More