Positivism as an Epistemological System - Essay Example

?Positivism as an Epistemological System By: of Introduction Throughout history, science has alwaysprovided an avenue towards reliable and objective knowledge. Scientific ideas “have tended to be the allies of a practical, scientific, down-to-earth outlook on life” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.22). It is in this regard that positivism definitely fits the formula. But what is positivism? “Positivism refers to a particular form of empiricism, and the positivists were always, throughout the long history of the positivist movements, primarily concerned with the issue of reliable knowledge” (Jordan, 2004, p.27). This paper examines positivism as an epistemological system, with particular reference to its historical development. In doing so, I will divide this paper into three main parts. The first part will consist of an historical analysis of 19th century positivism, logical positivism, up until the period of the Vienna Circle. The second part will cover the epistemological implications of positivism. Here, I shall discuss the main tenets of logical positivism and its adherence to epistemology. A main figure that I will discuss here is Karl Popper. Finally, I will conclude this paper by discussing the fall of positivism. Historical Analysis “The term positivism derives from the nineteenth-century scientific philosophy of Auguste Comte” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.22). The historical development of positivism can be traced in the light of three major waves, starting from Comte’s 19th century positivism. Here, “Comte argued that each branch of knowledge passes through three different theoretical states: the theological, the metaphysical and the scientific state” (Jordan, 2004, p.28). In the theological stage, phenomena are explained by reference to God’s will. In the metaphysical stage, phenomena are explained by reference to abstract philosophical categories. However, in the scientific or positive stage, any attempt to explain phenomena by reference to absolute and metaphysical entities are abandoned. Thus, it is in this final positive stage where Comte believes, progress will take place. For, “science focuses on how observational phenomena are related, and any generalizations are subjected to empirical verification” (Jordan, 2004, p.28). Thus, there can be no room for any mystical abstractions in explaining phenomena. In the second wave of positivist thought, a second form of positivism, i.e. logical positivism took place, and “took advantage of the further progress made in the hard sciences to insist on purging all metaphysics from the scientific method” (Jordan, 2004, p.28). “Logical positivist views about science and knowledge were based on a general theory of language. …This theory of language featured two main ideas, the analytic-synthetic distinction and the verifiability theory of meaning” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.25). I will discuss these ideas in detail in the next section. The third wave of positivism is generally attributed to a group called the Vienna Circle. “The Vienna Circle was established by Moritz Schlick and Otto Neurath. …But from the early days through the end, a central intellectual figure here was Rudolf Carnap” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.22). In this stage, positivism was carried in its logical form. However, some positivists prefer to regard this latter period as logical or scientific empiricism (Greetham, 2006, p.121), to distinguish it from the previous logical positivist movement. In this essay, I shall use the term logical positivism to refer to the whole of 20th century positivism, to distinguish it from Comte’s 19th century positivism. Positivism as Epistemology From a general perspective, positivism is considered to be an epistemological system through its advocacy of attaining empirical knowledge through sense perception, and its adherence to the scientific method i.e. induction. However when logical positivism stepped into the picture, it was made clear that “logical positivism had other roots besides that of empiricism, i.e. the analysis of language and its relation to symbolic logic” (Lindenfeld, 1980, p.6). Nevertheless, one common ground between all three waves of positivism is their scientific label, “for they assume things can be studies as hard facts and the relationship between these facts established as scientific laws. For positivists, such laws have the status of truth” (Smith, 1998, p.77). Indeed, positivist thought served as a foundation for the sciences. For instance, the influence of positivism grew ever more “in the social sciences, i.e. biology, psychology and linguistics. The development of behaviorism was also inspired by positivist ideology” (Jordan, 2004, p.28). And with the dawn of logical positivism in the 20th century, positivists paired the rigorous scientific method of empiricism with logic and mathematics. By the 20th century, positivists focused on language. “Since all knowledge is expressed in propositions, it was hoped that the analysis of language in which propositions are stated would yield a systematic insight into the logical structure and limits of knowledge” (Greetham, 2006, p.121). As mentioned in the previous section, “positivist views about knowledge were based on a theory of language, which featured two main ideas, i.e. analytic-synthetic distinction and the verifiability theory of meaning (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.25). These two central ideas contributed largely to positivism as an epistemological system. Why? The analytic synthetic distinction emphasized not only the formal structure of language in acquiring knowledge, but also the importance of logic. In a nutshell, “synthetic statements are true or false in virtue of both the meaning of the sentence and how the world actually is” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.25). Analytic statements on the other hand are “empty truths, with no factual content. Their truth has a kind of necessity, but only because they are empty” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.26). Positivists stressed this distinction for they claim that, “things that seem to be knowable are analytic, and hence empty of factual content” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.26). And for them, mathematics and logic are analytic truths – hence, they do not say anything about the world; “they merely record our conventional decision to use symbols in a particular way” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.26). Thus, by studying the structure of logical and mathematical propositions, we rid of any form of ambiguity in explanation. “The logical positivists insisted that once we break down such a proof into small steps, each step would be trivial and unsurprising” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.26). The verifiability theory of meaning on the other hand was formulated to apply to sentences that are not analytic. “Here is how the theory was often put: the meaning of a sentence consists in its method of verification. …If a sentence has no possible method of verification, it has no meaning” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.27). Indeed, the meaning of “verification” as used in this context is “testability by means of empirical observation”. In this theory lie the core epistemological roots of logical positivism. For, it claims that, “experience is the only source of meaning, as well as the only source of knowledge” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.27). Hence, our knowledge about the physical world is considered to be meaningful if and only if it is observable and testable. Now one might wonder how analytic and synthetic truths work together to form a coherent epistemology. Analytic truths, i.e. logic and mathematics, merely express these synthetic truths, making it possible for analytic statements to deal with knowledge within an empiricist framework. Along with these two main positivist ideas, for logical positivism, logic is a necessary tool for any scientific discussion to take place. It is generally said that there are two kinds of logic, i.e. deductive and inductive (Copi and Cohen, 2009, p.26). Logical positivists, like the 19th century positivism, believed in the latter kind of logic – inductive. The main difference between inductive and deductive logic is that the former always leaves room for the possibility of error, but positivists maintain that, “that does not stop some claims in science from being supported by evidence” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.29). In other words, positivists acknowledge the fact that error is an inevitable factor in attaining knowledge. A significant figure whose influence contributed to the development of positivism is Karl Popper. By the middle of the 20th century, many scholars had started to be critical towards positivism and its tendency to treat ideas as true depictions of the world; one of them being Karl Popper. One of the most significant contributions Popper gave was his critique of logical positivism. Unlike the logical positivists, Popper was not so much interested in language, meaning or knowledge. “His primary aim was to understand science” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.58). First in the list was his distinction between science and pseudo-science. This was known as the demarcation problem. “For Popper, a genuine example of science was the work of Einstein. Examples of pseudo-science were Freudian psychology and Marxist views about society and history” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.58). Furthermore, it is said that all of Popper’s philosophy starts from his proposed solution to the problem of demarcation, i.e. falsificationism (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.58). Falsificationism claims that, “a hypothesis is scientific if and only if it has the potential to be refuted by some possible observation” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.58). Scientific claims are assertions that are falsifiable, while pseudo-scientific claims are claims that are not. Moreover, Popper was skeptical about two central ideas in positivism, i.e. confirmation and induction. Popper identified two problems with the method of induction. The first is regarded as the psychological problem while the second is regarded as the logical problem. The former can be identified with David Hume’s empirical philosophy. According to Hume, we generally expect events to operate in the same manner that they do operate not because we have some solid proof for it, but because of custom or habit (Morris, 2009). If induction is the primary method used by the sciences to attain reliable knowledge, then what level of confirmation or validity does relying on custom or habits give us? On the other hand, the logical problem emphasizes the “jump” from statements we make based on experience versus that of a generalized statement. In other words, how sure are we that we’ve exhausted all possible situations? When we generalize a statement, we are assuming that this generalization holds true in all possible scenarios, even the ones we have not experienced. So it seems, it seems that scientists deal with the problem of not knowing what will happen in a given scenario. But what does this imply about our knowledge about science? Conclusion Progress and development in knowledge is an endless endeavor. Since the birth of positivism up until its downfall, positivism nevertheless shaped the manner by which we do science. But how did such a powerful tradition collapse? According to Peter Godfrey-Smith, there are five factors that led to the fall of the third and final wave of positivism: One is the breakdown of the view of language that formed the basis of many logical positivist and logical empiricist ideas. Another is pressure from holistic arguments. A third is the frustrating history of attempts to develop an inductive logic. A fourth is the development of a new role for fields like history and psychology in the philosophy of science. And eventually there was pressure from scientific realism (2003, p.37). Nevertheless, positivism succeeded in developing a systematic method of approaching reality. And scientific knowledge was the very basis for reconstructing reality, with scientific laws as central in research. If epistemology is the study of knowledge, then positivism is a valid epistemological system. For if there is one thing that positivism established, it is no other than a coherent reconstruction of human knowledge based on the methods and principles of science itself. It is in this regard that positivism, despite its fall, proved to be influential throughout history. References Copi, I. M. and Cohen, C., 2009. Introduction to logic. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. Godfrey-Smith, P., 2003. Theory and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Greetham, B., 2006. Philosophy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Jordan, G., 2004. Theory construction in second language acquisition. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Lindenfeld, D. F., 1980. The transformation of positivism: Alexius Meinong and European thought, 1880-1920. London: University of California Press. Morris, W. E., 2010. David Hume. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, [online]. Available at: [Accessed 4 March 2011]. Rosenberg, A., 2005. Philosophy of science: a contemporary introduction, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge. Smith, M. J., 1998. Social science in question. London: Sage. Read More