In Your Interest to Believe that God Exists - Essay Example

In Your Interest to Believe that God Exists? For centuries, even millennia, people have opted to believe in a higher power. There is evidence in very ancient societies that religion existed, sometimes incorporating a number of different gods or goddesses who oversaw different aspects of life. As society developed, these gods were replaced by single gods finally culminating in a widespread acceptance of the idea of a single God for all people – the only difference being in the way the people were expected to worship Him. In many of these cases, the choice for the individual was not which religion to choose, but instead whether one will adopt a belief in God or will not – religion or atheism. Many individuals have given the matter a great deal of thought, offering up their reasons and rationals why it is in the best interests of the individual to believe in the existence of God. As society grew more advanced in technology and science and more of the true nature of the world came to light, these arguments began requiring a stronger basis in reason and fact to keep up with the times. Because of the lack of hard fact or empirical evidence, these discussions have necessarily taken place primarily within the realm of the philosophical and theological. It is no surprise that many of the individuals who have participated in these discussions were scientists within other arenas as well. One of these individuals was Blaise Pascal, a mathematician, physicist and inventor as well as a philosopher working in the mid-1600s. Coming to the subject from the perspective of a member of the Catholic church, Pascal nevertheless worked to base his argument for a belief in the existence of God on a skeptic’s logic. In the centuries since, numerous philosophers have engaged with Pascal’s text, exploring its logic and questioning its reasoning. Some of these writers have come to agree with Pascal’s reasoning, some frankly admit to being able to see both sides of his argument and still others seem to feel as if Pascal’s reasoning is either no longer valid in modern times or was never truly valid to begin with. By identifying Pascal’s argument and then engaging with some of these critical texts, one can begin to formulate personal opinion regarding whether it is truly in one’s best interest to believe in the existence of God. Pascal’s argument is presented in a single paragraph in his book Pensees. Geoffrey Brown offers up a straightforward outline of the argument structure. He starts out with two premises: 1) Either God exists or He doesn’t exist and 2) Reason cannot tell us whether He exists or not. Thus, Pascal effectively devalues the role of reason within the argument, but provides some focus for the discussion to move forward. This is through the presentation of two possibilities: 1) If He exists, then the people who believe in Him will be infinitely rewarded with infinite happiness for an infinity and 2) If He does not exist, then every man’s life will end with his natural death. Based on these two premises and two possibilities, Pascal then concludes that the prudent man will necessarily choose to believe in God – something along the lines of a contingency plan. Pascal builds the contingency plan into his argument by offering three supporting statements to his conclusion: 1) We have to bet either that God exists or that He does not and refusing to wager equates to betting that God does not exist, 2) The individual’s chances are 50-50 so the prudent man should bet on the side offering the highest reward and 3) Since we are balancing something finite against something infinite and thus vastly more valuable, we should not allow fear of risking the finite to interfere with betting on the infinite. There are many elements of Pascal’s Wager that have proven difficult to fully understand. Wetzel (1993) explores the two response possibilities to the concept of ‘infinitely desirable happiness’ as it can be understood by a finite human being. The first option falls under the category of hedging one’s bets. This is the typical interpretation of Pascal’s Wager in which the individual decides that it is in his best interest to believe in God as a means of ensuring that he has a chance at the infinite prize without risking too much in the finite life on Earth. Wagering on the existence of God provides the benefit of infinite happiness, even if it is considered an outside chance, as well as the benefit of having lived a life of goodness. “The life of virtue, as Pascal intimates, offers human beings a far greater source of finite satisfaction than the irreligious life of passion” (Wetzel, 1993: 142). However, the people who come to faith through such channels as the forced faith of a hedged wager are, Wetzel argues, people already despairing of their current state to a point where they are questioning whether they should try to believe in God for their own welfare. Finite happiness has already proven empty and they are now ready to commit psychological suicide in hopes of finding something better. Betting without hedging is the second possible response Wetzel offers to the question of how to define infinite happiness from a finite perspective. This approach embraces the desire for a life beyond the finite without expecting any improvement and perhaps stark degradation of earthly existence. In either case, the individual is not capable of comprehending ideas of infinity or the stakes involved and is thus unable to fully measure the relative merits of belief. However, there are several individuals who argue that Pascal’s Wager is sound reasoning for belief in the existence of God. Geoffrey Brown is one such individual as expressed in his article “A Defence of Pascal’s Wager.” Brown starts his discussion by questioning Pascal’s assumption that nothing will be lost if one chooses to believe God exists. In many cases, there is sacrifice of pleasures now in hopes of greater pleasures in the afterlife, but the outcome is not known until the afterlife is reached. If the bet is lost, the individual has lost all opportunity to go back and enjoy the earthly life left behind. However, Pascal addresses this concern by indicating that the person who chooses to believe in God will receive rewards even in this life for having made the correct choice. “You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, full of good works, a sincere, true friend … I tell you that you will gain even in this life, and … in the end, you will realize that you have wagered on something certain and infinite for which you have paid nothing” (468). Another argument against Pascal’s theory that Brown brings forward is the concept that beliefs are not something we can manipulate by a simple ‘act of will’. “I may be fully aware of the beneficial consequences of believing that I am drinking Claret, but, given the completeness and immediacy of the evidence which I possess, I cannot rid myself of the irritating knowledge that it is Coca-Cola” (470). This assertion goes against Pascal’s advice that one should simply ‘fake it until you make it’ in the belief department. Yet again, Brown demonstrates that Pascal’s reasoning is based on the idea that one cannot be contemplating a choice to this degree without also contemplating one’s personal morals. “The more fundamental principle which I think is established here is that we are not being asked to wager on any old god in isolation from the moral issues involved: having a certain conception of God, believing in His existence and worshipping Him as supremely good, are all inextricably linked up with each other” (479). In other words, Brown argues that Pascal’s argument is sound because he is essentially giving us a choice between a moral being and an immoral existence. He leaves it up to us to determine what we feel the nature of that superior being might be and the most appropriate form of worshipping. In the article “Pascal on Self-Caused Belief,” Stephen Davis presents an in-depth examination of what was characterized above as a ‘fake it until you make it’ attitude within Pascal’s presentation. From Pascal’s argument, Davis extrapolates a hypothetical in which he can successfully force himself to believe in a proposition as long as he satisfies five criteria. These are 1) the truth or falsity of the proposition is not discoverable by reason, 2) he strongly desires to believe in the proposition, 3) he understands that believing in the proposition is a prudent choice, 4) he acts as if he believes in the proposition and 5) he is making his choice within a forced choice situation. Davis labels this extrapolated hypothetical Pascal’s doctrine. In acknowledging that the existence of God cannot be proven by reason, Pascal ensures that his argument fulfills the first criteria in the doctrine Davis presents. The second and third criterions are met by the individual’s desire and recognition that belief is warranted and in the best interests of the individual. “Another point emerges here: since it is rationally warranted for me to believe in God, then clearly what prevents me from believing, and what must be overcome, are non-rational factors. Pascal calls them passions, by which he seems to mean emotions or dispositions that attract people to worldly things. Unbelief, then, is a matter of habit” (30). Davis also takes a wider view of what Pascal meant when he instructed non-believers to act as if they believe as a means of finding belief. According to Davis, this means not only mimicking the behavior of believers, but also interacting with them, critically examining those things that cause doubts and avoiding questioning the central beliefs. Rather than a purely mental process in which one simply makes oneself believe, Davis argues that Pascal envisioned a process by which a person would come to believe in the proposition after changing one’s habits and associations. Although arguments have also been made that forcing belief is immoral or irresponsible, Davis argues that in a forced choice option such as Pascal has presented, such forced belief is justified if adopted in a spirit of earnest desire for growth. There are other arguments presented that support Pascal’s ideas of forced belief from different perspectives. Groothuis (1994) examines this same concept of forced belief in terms of religious brainwashing and attempts to clarify whether the requirement of theistic belief to achieve salvation is a defensible position based on a theological perspective. The religious brainwashing charge refers to the concept that the non-believer should engage in the practices of a religion as a means of convincing himself, brainwashing himself, into believing. However, Groothuis argues that there is an argument to be had that “human pride has the tendency to filter out that which would humble one; and this would especially be true with respect to recognizing the existence of a morally impeccable deity before whom one is exhaustively accountable and without excuse” (481). Only by changing one’s habits and testing out the religious life can one distance oneself from these actions enough to be able to gain perspective and glimpse the advantages or complexities of the issues at stake. Groothuis brings forward a more disturbing argument in questioning whether a God who provides so little evidence of His existence has any moral code in demanding that followers express belief in Him in order to achieve salvation. This suggests an infantile egotism undeserving of such homage. Yet Groothuis points out that it is this faith in God that causes people to struggle in adopting a lifestyle in keeping with the lifestyle prescribed by the church, one that makes people “faithful, honest, humble, grateful, full of good works, a sincere, true friend” (Pascal cited in Groothuis, 484). These states are only possible through the discipline of belief in a master teacher. “Pascal views these desirable states as impossible apart from belief in God” (Groothuis 484). Viewed from this perspective, brainwashing oneself to belief in God is thus seen as an exercise in responsibility to try to change one’s perspective and thus gain a clearer view of what is truly important leading to a natural and fully emotional religious conviction. This conviction is then necessary to sustain these changes to reap the benefits of this labor. Many objections to Pascal’s Wager have been brought forward, examined and refuted with satisfactory results, but there remain issues with the concept. Mougin and Sober (1994) point out, “If God sends people to heaven and hell for reasons having nothing to do with whether they are theists, then Pascal’s analysis will be mistaken” (384). They argue that Pascal supporters claim there is no reason to doubt Pascal’s claim that is theology is well-supported and thus his prudential conclusions are valid, but similar arguments can be made that show atheism to be the more prudential option. Because an equal case can be made for each side in which each is shown to be more prudential than the other, the authors claim Pascal’s argument does not suffice for theism to be preferred over atheism. Because there are a number of viable combinations to belief available to the wagerer, the authors argue that Pascal’s argument is fundamentally flawed. Studying the various perspectives offered in the literature regarding Pascal’s Wager makes it clear that the simple-sounding outline provided by Brown is anything but simple. Every premise offered has been called into question and either supported or refuted based on relatively rational grounds. Each writer has strong points to make and backs up these points with logical steps. In the end, though, it’s up to each individual to determine just how they wish to examine the question of whether it is in their best interest to believe in God. My personal knowledge of this subject was not strong coming into this study making the literature very compelling. Most of the literature seems pre-disposed to accepting Pascal’s Wager as valid suggesting that a belief in God is the only prudential choice available. However, I find myself questioning some of the assumptions made simply on my personal emotional and experiential beliefs. For example, it is suggested that one can only lead a moral and appropriate life if one is a believer in God, but I have known many atheists who uphold the concepts commonly considered to be ‘Christian’ without the need for a compulsion either to discover belief or to avoid the fear of hell. Another objection I had is that I don’t believe it correct to claim that only the God of a particular church or belief system is the ‘right’ God to achieve salvation for everyone. This objection was met by Brown, though, when he interprets Pascal’s God as being the representative of the most moral choice. Finally, my upbringing and personal feeling has me predisposed to believe in a higher power. Thus for me, Pascal’s argument that it is most prudential to believe in the existence of God is valid. References Brown, Geoffrey. “A Defence of Pascal’s Wager.” Religious Studies. Vol. 20, pp. 465-479. Davis, Stephen T. “Pascal on Self-Caused Belief.” Religious Studies. Vol. 27, pp. 27-37. Groothuis, D. (1994). “Wagering Belief: Examining Two Objections to Pascal’s Wager.” Religious Studies. Vol. 30, pp. 479-486. Mougin, Gregory & Elliott Sober. (September 1994). “Betting Against Pascal’s Wager.” Nous. Vol. 28, pp. 382-395. Wetzel, James. (June 1993). “Two Ways of Wagering with Pascal.” Religious Studies. Vol. 29, pp. 139-149. Read More